Petitioner was convicted in an Oklahoma trial court of
first-degree murder for killing a police officer and was sentenced
to death. At the time of the offense, petitioner was 16 years old,
but he was tried as an adult. The Oklahoma death penalty statute
provides that, in a sentencing proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to "any mitigating circumstances" or as to any of
certain enumerated aggravating circumstances. At the sentencing
hearing, the State alleged certain of the enumerated aggravating
circumstances, and petitioner, in mitigation, presented substantial
evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh
father, and of serious emotional disturbance. In imposing the death
sentence, the trial judge found that the State had proved each of
the alleged aggravating circumstances. But he refused, as a matter
of law, to consider in mitigation the circumstances of petitioner's
unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance, and found that the
only mitigating circumstance was petitioner's youth, which
circumstance was held to be insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed.
Held: The death sentence must be vacated, as it was
imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of
mitigating factors . . . required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments in capital cases,"
Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586,
438 U. S. 606.
Pp.
455 U. S.
110-116.
(a) "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death."
Lockett v. Ohio,
supra at
438 U. S. 604.
This rule follows from the requirement that capital punishment be
imposed fairly and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, and
recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual
differences is a false consistency. Pp.
455 U. S.
110-112.
(b) The limitation placed by the courts below upon the
mitigating evidence they would consider violated the above rule.
Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from
considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse
to consider,
as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence. The sentencer and the reviewing
Page 455 U. S. 105
court may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating
evidence, but may not give it no weight by excluding it from their
consideration. Here, the evidence of a difficult family history and
of emotional disturbance petitioner offered at the sentencing
hearing should have been duly considered in sentencing. Pp.
455 U. S.
112-116.
616
P.2d 1159, reversed in part and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,
post, p.
455 U. S. 117,
and O'CONNOR, J.,
post, p.
455 U. S. 117,
filed concurring opinions. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined,
post, p.
455 U. S.
120.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of first degree
murder, and sentenced to death. Because this sentence was imposed
without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating
factors . . . required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in
capital cases,"
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.
S. 586,
438 U. S. 606
(1978) (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), we reverse.
I
On April 4, 1977, Eddings, a 16-year-old youth, and several
younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. They
traveled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove
Page 455 U. S. 106
without destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction,
eventually reaching the Oklahoma Turnpike. Eddings had in the car a
shotgun and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he
momentarily lost control of the car, he was signalled to pull over
by Officer Crabtree of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. Eddings did so,
and when the officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded
shotgun out of the window and fired, killing the officer.
Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State moved to have him
certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there was
prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was not
amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the trial
court granted the motion. The ruling was affirmed on appeal.
In
re M. E., 584 P.2d
1340 (Okla.Crim.App.),
cert. denied sub nom. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 436 U.S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then charged with
murder in the first degree, and the District Court of Creek County
found him guilty upon his plea of
nolo contendere.
The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides in pertinent
part:
"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in the
first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing
proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced
to death or life imprisonment. . . . In the sentencing proceeding,
evidence may be presented as to
any mitigating
circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in this act."
Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980) (emphasis added). Section
701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the statute
nowhere defines what is meant by "any mitigating
circumstances."
At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute: that the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the crime
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
Page 455 U. S. 107
a lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society. §§ 701.12(4), (5), and
(7).
In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial evidence at the
hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his supervising
Juvenile Officer indicated that Eddings had been raised without
proper guidance. His parents were divorced when he was 5 years old,
and until he was 14, Eddings lived with his mother without rules or
supervision. App. 109. There is the suggestion that Eddings' mother
was an alcoholic, and possibly a prostitute.
Id. at
110-111. By the time Eddings was 14, he no longer could be
controlled, and his mother sent him to live with his father. But
neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and
talk gave way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer
testified that Eddings was frightened and bitter, that his father
overreacted and used excessive physical punishment:
"Mr. Eddings found the only thing that he thought was effectful
with the boy was actual punishment, or physical violence -- hitting
with a strap or something like this. [
Footnote 1]"
Id. at 121.
Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings was
emotionally disturbed in general and at the time of the crime, and
that his mental and emotional development were at a level several
years below his age.
Id. at 134, 149, and 173. A state
psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial
personality and that approximately 30% of youths suffering from
such a disorder grew out of it as they aged.
Id. at 137
and 139. A sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified
that Eddings was treatable.
Id. at 149. A psychiatrist
testified that Eddings could be rehabilitated by intensive therapy
over a 15- to 20-year period.
Page 455 U. S. 108
Id. at 181. He testified further that Eddings "did pull
the trigger, he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew
that he was doing it." [
Footnote
2] The psychiatrist suggested that, if treated, Eddings would
no longer pose a serious threat to society.
Id. at
180-181.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge weighed
the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He found
that the State had proved each of the three alleged aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [
Footnote 3] Turning to the evidence of mitigating
circumstances, the judge found that Eddings' youth was a mitigating
factor of great weight:
"I have given very serious consideration to the youth of the
Defendant when this particular
Page 455 U. S. 109
crime was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I would
not be carrying out my duty."
Id. a 188-189. But he would not consider in mitigation
the circumstances of Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional
disturbance:
"[T]he Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact that
the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime was
committed.
Nor can the Court, in following the law, in my
opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background."
Id. at 189 (emphasis added). Finding that the only
mitigating circumstance was Eddings' youth, and finding further
that this circumstance could not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances present, the judge sentenced Eddings to death.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of death.
616 P.2d
1159 (1980). It found that each of the aggravating
circumstances alleged by the State had been present. [
Footnote 4] It recited the mitigating
evidence presented by Eddings in some detail, but, in the end, it
agreed with the trial court that only the fact of Eddings' youth
was properly considered as a mitigating circumstance:
"[Eddings] also argues his mental state at the time of the
murder. He stresses his family history in saying he was suffering
from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and that the
killing was, in actuality, an inevitable product of the way he was
raised. There is no doubt that the petitioner has a personality
disorder. But all the evidence tends to show that he knew the
difference between right and wrong at the time he pulled the
trigger, and that is the test of criminal responsibility
Page 455 U. S. 110
in this State. For the same reason, the petitioner's family
history is useful in explaining why he behaved the way he did, but
it does not excuse his behavior."
Id. at 1170 (citation omitted).
II
In
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586
(1978), CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the
rule that we apply today: [
Footnote
5]
"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering,
as
a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."
Id. at
438 U. S. 604
(emphasis in original). Recognizing "that the imposition of death
by public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other
penalties," the plurality held that the sentencer must be free to
give "independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's
character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered
in mitigation. . . ."
Id. at
438 U. S. 605.
Because the Ohio death penalty statute only permitted consideration
of three mitigating circumstances, the Court found the statute to
be invalid.
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in
Lockett is
the product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort
to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and
principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the
individual. Since the early days of the common law, the legal
system has struggled to accommodate these twin objectives. Thus,
the common law began by treating all criminal homicides as capital
offenses, with a
Page 455 U. S. 111
mandatory sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, first
through an exclusion for those entitled to claim benefit of clergy
and then by limiting capital punishment to murders upon "malice
prepensed." In this country, we attempted to soften the rigor of
the system of mandatory death sentences we inherited from England,
first by grading murder into different degrees of which only murder
of the first degree was a capital offense and then by committing
use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of the jury. By
the time of our decision in
Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238
(1972), the country had moved so far from a mandatory system that
the imposition of capital punishment frequently had become
arbitrary and capricious.
Beginning with
Furman, the Court has attempted to
provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness
to the accused. Thus, in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153 (1976), the principal opinion held that the
danger of an arbitrary and capricious death penalty could be met
"by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance."
Id.
at
428 U. S. 195.
By its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating
circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its
direction to the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances,"
the Georgia statute properly confined and directed the jury's
attention to the circumstances of the particular crime and to "the
characteristics of the person who committed the crime. . . ."
Id. at
428 U. S. 197.
[
Footnote 6]
Similarly, in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.
S. 280 (1976), the plurality held that mandatory death
sentencing was not a permissible response to the problem of
arbitrary
Page 455 U. S. 112
jury discretion. As the history of capital punishment had shown,
such an approach to the problem of discretion could not succeed
while the Eighth Amendment required that the individual be given
his due:
"the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death."
Id. at
428 U. S. 304.
[
Footnote 7]
See Roberts
(Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633
(1977);
Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.
S. 325 (1976).
Thus, the rule in
Lockett followed from the earlier
decisions of the Court and from the Court's insistence that capital
punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or
not at all. By requiring that the sentencer be permitted to focus
"on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime,"
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at
428 U. S. 197,
the rule in
Lockett recognizes that
"justice . . . requires . . . that there be taken into account
the circumstances of the offense, together with the character and
propensities of the offender."
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51,
302 U. S. 55
(1937). By holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in
Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring
individual differences is a false consistency.
III
We now apply the rule in
Lockett to the circumstances
of this case. The trial judge stated that, "in following the
law,"
Page 455 U. S. 113
he could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189. There is no dispute that, by "violent
background," the trial judge was referring to the mitigating
evidence of Eddings' family history. [
Footnote 8] From this statement, it is clear that the
trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it
wanting as a matter of fact; rather, he found that,
as a matter
of law, he was unable even to consider the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. It found
that the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not
tend to provide a legal excuse from criminal responsibility. Thus,
the court conceded that Eddings had a "personality disorder," but
cast this evidence aside on the basis that "he knew the difference
between right and wrong . . . , and that is the test of criminal
responsibility." 616 P.2d at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of
Eddings' family history was "useful in explaining" his behavior,
but it did not "excuse" the behavior. From these statements, it
appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only
that evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a legal
excuse from criminal liability.
We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon the
mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in
Lockett. [
Footnote 9]
Just as the State may not, by statute, preclude
Page 455 U. S. 114
the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer refuse to consider,
as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as if
the trial judge had instructed a jury to disregard the mitigating
evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The sentencer, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may
Page 455 U. S. 115
determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence.
But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from
their consideration. [
Footnote
10]
Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was relevant
mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 years at the time of
the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional
disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.
S. 183,
402 U. S.
187-188,
402 U. S. 193
(1971). In some cases, such evidence properly may be given little
weight. But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the
offense, there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent family
history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional
disturbance is particularly relevant.
The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a
relevant mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological
fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. [
Footnote 11] Our history is replete
with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their
earlier years, generally
Page 455 U. S. 116
are less mature and responsible than adults. [
Footnote 12] Particularly "during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622,
443 U. S. 635
(1979).
Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an
adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16-year-old; he had
been deprived of the care, concern, and paternal attention that
children deserve. On the contrary, it is not disputed that he was a
juvenile with serious emotional problems, and had been raised in a
neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition,
there was testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development
were at a level several years below his chronological age. All of
this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of
murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is to say
that, just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and
mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly
considered in sentencing.
We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage
increasingly in violent crime. [
Footnote 13] Nor do we suggest an absence of legal
responsibility where crime is committed by a minor. We are
concerned here only with the manner of the imposition of the
ultimate penalty: the death sentence imposed for the crime of
murder upon an emotionally disturbed youth with a disturbed child's
immaturity.
Page 455 U. S. 117
On remand, the state courts must consider all relevant
mitigating evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the
aggravating circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to the extent that it
sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
There was evidence that, immediately after the shooting, Eddings
said: "I would rather have shot an Officer than go back to where I
live." App. 93.
[
Footnote 2]
The psychiatrist suggested that, at the time of the murder,
Eddings was, in his own mind ,shooting his stepfather -- a
policeman who had been married to his mother for a brief period
when Eddings was seven. The psychiatrist stated:
"I think that, given the circumstances and the facts of his
life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a
seven year old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act -- he did
pull the trigger, he did kill someone, but I don't even think he
knew that he was doing it."
Id. at 172.
[
Footnote 3]
The trial judge found first that the crime was "heinous,
atrocious, and cruel" because "designed to inflict a high degree of
pain . . . in utter indifference to the lights of Patrolman
Crabtree."
Id.. at 187. Second, the judge found that the
crime was "committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or prosecution."
Id. at 187-188. The
evidence was sufficient to indicate that, at the time of the
offense, Eddings did not wish to be returned to Missouri, and that,
in stopping the car, the officer's intent was to make a lawful
arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that Eddings posed a
continuing threat of violence to society. There was evidence that,
at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been taken
to the county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose . .
. he would shoot" them all.
Id. at 77. There was also
evidence that, at another time, when an officer refused to turn off
the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings became angry and threatened the
officer: "Now I have shot one of you people, and I'll get you too
if you don't turn this light out."
Id. at 10. Based on
these two "spontaneous utterances,"
id. at 188, the trial
judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a
criminal act of violence if released.
[
Footnote 4]
We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold that the
murder of a police officer in the performance of his duties is
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" under the Oklahoma statute.
See
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633,
431 U. S. 636
(1977). However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and
application of this aggravating circumstance conformed to that
degree of certainty required by our decision in
Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U. S. 420
(1980).
See n 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 5]
Because we decide this case on the basis of
Locket v.
Ohio, we do not reach the question of whether -- in light of
contemporary standards -- the Eighth Amendment forbids the
execution of a defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense.
Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 637
(1978).
[
Footnote 6]
"[T]he jury's attention is focused on the characteristics of the
person who committed the crime: . . . are there any special facts
about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital
punishment (
e.g., his youth, the extent of his cooperation
with the police, his emotional state at the time of the
crime)."
28 U.S. at
28 U. S.
197.
[
Footnote 7]
"A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of
the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration
in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a
designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings. . .
."
428 U.S. at
428 U. S.
304.
[
Footnote 8]
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is
that the court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and
family life to be a mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 36
("the trial court did not consider the fact of his family
background as a mitigating circumstance. . . . [T]he violent
background, which I assume he meant was . . . [that Eddings] was
subject to some slapping around and some beating by his father")
(argument of respondent).
[
Footnote 9]
Eddings argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that imposition
of the death penalty in the particular circumstances of his case,
and in light of the mitigating factors present, was excessive
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. But he did not specifically
argue that the trial judge erred in refusing to consider relevant
mitigating circumstances in the process of sentencing. In rejecting
his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that Eddings'
family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating
circumstances that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's
holding that these factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into
excessiveness was also a holding that they need not have been
considered by the sentencer in imposing capital punishment.
Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition for certiorari that
imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the facts of this
case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in refusing to
consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at the
sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the
Court of Criminal Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari
spoke to our decision in
Lockett by name, the question of
whether the decisions below were consistent with our decision in
Lockett is properly before us. Our jurisdiction does not
depend on citation to book and verse.
See, e.g., New York ex
rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63,
278 U. S. 67
(1928).
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari did not expressly
present the
Lockett issue, his brief in this Court argued
it, and the State responded to the argument. Brief for Petitioner
64-67; Brief for Respondent 55-57. The dissenting opinion of THE
CHIEF JUSTICE,
post at
455 U. S. 120,
n. 1, states that the courts below were not afforded the
opportunity to consider this issue. The fact is, however, that, in
his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals for a rehearing,
Eddings specifically presented the issue, and at some considerable
length.
See Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief
in No. C-78-325, p. 10 ("This Court, by its interpretation of
mitigating circumstances, has effectively limited the scope of
mitigation, and that limitation renders the Oklahoma death penalty
statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied
the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and
had been "fully advised in the premises."
See Rule 1.18,
Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals (1980) (court will entertain
new arguments upon a petition for rehearing).
Cf. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469,
450 U. S. 476
(1975).
See also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.
S. 261,
450 U. S. 265,
n. 5 (1981);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.
S. 625,
447 U. S. 631,
n. 6 (1980);
Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.
S. 478,
414 U. S. 479,
n. 3 (1974).
[
Footnote 10]
We note that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the
defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating circumstances."
Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980).
Lockett requires the
sentencer to listen.
[
Footnote 11]
"Adolescents everywhere, from every walk of life, are often
dangerous to themselves and to others." The President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967).
"[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years,
are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than
adults. Crimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to
victims as those committed by older persons, but they deserve less
punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control
their conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults.
Moreover, youth crime, as such, is not exclusively the offender's
fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of family,
school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the
development of America's youth."
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward
Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978).
[
Footnote 12]
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[c]hildren have a very special
place in life which law should reflect."
May v. Anderson,
345 U. S. 528,
345 U. S. 536
(1953) (concurring opinion). And indeed the law does reflect this
special place. Every State in the country makes some separate
provision for juvenile offenders.
See In re Gault,
387 U. S. 1,
387 U. S. 14
(1967).
[
Footnote 13]
See, e.g., National Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force Report on Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention 3 (1976).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion without, however, departing from my
view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153,
428 U. S. 227
(1976) (dissenting opinion).
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
I write separately to address more fully the reasons why this
case must be remanded in light of
Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U. S. 586
(1978), which requires the trial court to consider and weigh all of
the mitigating evidence concerning the petitioner's family
background and personal history.
*
Because sentences of death are "qualitatively different" from
prison sentences,
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.
S. 280,
428 U. S. 305
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and
Page 455 U. S. 118
STEVENS, JJ.), this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to
ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded
process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that
the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or
mistake. Surely, no less can be required when the defendant is a
minor. One example of the measures taken is in
Lockett v. Ohio,
supra, where a plurality of this Court wrote:
"There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases
governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from
giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's
character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered
in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be
imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."
Id. at
428 U. S. 605
(opinion of BURGER, C.J.). In order to ensure that the death
penalty was not erroneously imposed, the
Lockett plurality
concluded that
"the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering,
as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death."
Id. at
428 U. S. 604
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
In the present case, of course, the relevant Oklahoma statute
permits the defendant to present evidence of any mitigating
circumstance.
See Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980).
Nonetheless, in sentencing the petitioner (which occurred about one
month before
Lockett was decided), the judge remarked that
he could not "in following the law, . . . consider
Page 455 U. S. 119
the fact of this young man's violent background." App. 189.
Although one can reasonably argue that these extemporaneous remarks
are of no legal significance, I believe that the reasoning of the
plurality opinion in
Lockett compels a remand, so that we
do not "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severe penalty." 438 U.S. at
438 U. S.
605.
I disagree with the suggestion in the dissent that remanding
this case may serve no useful purpose. Even though the petitioner
had an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of the crime,
it appears that the trial judge believed that he could not consider
some of the mitigating evidence in imposing sentence. In any event,
we may not speculate as to whether the trial judge and the Court of
Criminal Appeals actually considered all of the mitigating factors
and found them insufficient to offset the aggravating
circumstances, or whether the difference between this Court's
opinion and the trial court's treatment of the petitioner's
evidence is "purely a matter of semantics," as suggested by the
dissent.
Woodson and
Lockett require us to remove
any legitimate basis for finding ambiguity concerning the factors
actually considered by the trial court.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE may be correct in concluding that the Court's
opinion reflects a decision by some Justices that they would not
have imposed the death penalty in this case had they sat as the
trial judge.
See post at
455 U. S. 127.
I, however, do not read the Court's opinion either as altering this
Court's opinions establishing the constitutionality of the death
penalty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution
permits imposition of the death penalty on an individual who
committed a murder at age 16. Rather, by listing in detail some of
the circumstances surrounding the petitioner's life, the Court has
sought to emphasize the variety of mitigating information that may
not have been considered by the trial court in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty or some lesser sentence.
Page 455 U. S. 120
* Despite THE CHIEF JUSTICE's argument that we may not consider
the
Lockett issue because it was never fairly presented to
the court below, there is precedent for this Court to consider the
merits of the issue. In
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.
S. 261,
450 U. S. 265,
n. 5 (1981), this Court wrote:
"Even if one considers that the conflict of interest question
was not technically raised below, there is ample support for a
remand required in the interests of justice.
See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 (authorizing this Court to 'require such further proceedings
to be had as may be just under the circumstances')."
Because the trial court's failure to consider all of the
mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death
sentence, in plain violation of
Lockett, it is our duty to
remand this case for resentencing.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
It is important at the outset to remember -- as the Court does
not -- the narrow question on which we granted certiorari. We took
care to limit our consideration to whether the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a death sentence
on an offender because he was 16 years old in 1977 at the time he
committed the offense; review of all other questions raised in the
petition for certiorari was denied. 450 U.S. 1040 (1981). Yet the
Court today goes beyond the issue on which review was sought -- and
granted -- to decide the case on a point raised for the first time
in petitioner's brief to this Court. This claim was neither
presented to the Oklahoma courts nor presented to this Court in the
petition for certiorari. [
Footnote
2/1] Relying on this "11th-hour" claim, the Court strains to
construct a plausible legal theory to support its mandate for the
relief granted.
I
In
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586
(1978), we considered whether Ohio violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by sentencing Lockett to death under a
statute that
"narrowly limit[ed] the sentencer's discretion to consider
the
Page 455 U. S. 121
circumstances of the crime and the record and character of the
offender as mitigating factors."
Id. at
438 U. S. 589.
The statute at issue, Ohio Rev.Code 2929.03-2929.04(B) (1975),
required the trial court to impose the death penalty upon Lockett's
conviction for "aggravated murder with specifications," [
Footnote 2/2] unless it found
"that (1) the victim had included or facilitated the offense,
(2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have committed the offense
but for the fact that she 'was under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation,' or (3) the offense was 'primarily the product of
[Lockett's] psychosis or mental deficiency.'"
438 U.S. at
438 U. S.
593-594. It was plain that, although guilty of felony
homicide under Ohio law, Lockett had played a relatively minor role
in a robbery which resulted in a homicide actually perpetrated by
the hand of another. Lockett had previously committed no major
offenses; in addition, a psychological report described her
"prognosis for rehabilitation" as "favorable."
Id. at
438 U. S. 594.
However, since she was not found to have acted under duress, did
not suffer from "psychosis," and was not "mentally deficient," the
sentencing judge concluded that he had "
no alternative, whether
[he] like[d] the law or not,' but to impose the death penalty. "
Ibid.
We held in
Lockett that the
"Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . .
. not be precluded from considering,
as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death."
Id. at
438 U. S. 604
(emphasis in original). We therefore found the Ohio statute flawed,
because
Page 455 U. S. 122
it did not permit individualized consideration of mitigating
circumstances -- such as the defendant's comparatively minor role
in the offense, lack of intent to kill the victim, or age.
Id. at
438 U. S.
606-608. We did not, however, undertake to dictate the
weight that a sentencing court must ascribe to the various
factors that might be categorized as "mitigating," nor did we in
any way suggest that this Court may substitute its sentencing
judgment for that of state courts in capital cases.
In contrast to the Ohio statute at issue in
Lockett,
the Oklahoma death penalty statute provides:
"In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to
any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act."
Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980) (emphasis added). The
statute further provides that,
"[u]nless at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances enumerated in this act is [found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt] or if it is found that any such aggravating
circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating
circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed."
§ 701.11. This provision, of course, instructs the sentencer to
weigh the mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant against the
aggravating circumstances proved by the State. [
Footnote 2/3]
The Oklahoma statute thus contains provisions virtually
identical to those cited with approval in
Lockett, as
examples of proper legislation which highlighted the Ohio statute's
"constitutional infirmities." 438 U.S. at
438 U. S.
606-607. Indeed, the Court does not contend that the
Oklahoma sentencing
Page 455 U. S. 123
provisions are inconsistent with
Lockett. Moreover, the
Court recognizes that, as mandated by the Oklahoma statute, Eddings
was permitted to present "substantial evidence at the [sentencing]
hearing of his troubled youth."
Ante at
455 U. S. 107.
[
Footnote 2/4]
In its attempt to make out a violation of
Lockett, the
Court relies entirely on a single sentence of the trial court's
opinion delivered from the bench at the close of the sentencing
hearing. After discussing the aggravated nature of petitioner's
offense, and noting that he had "given very serious consideration
to the youth of the Defendant when this particular crime was
committed," the trial judge said that he could not
Page 455 U. S. 124
"be persuaded entirely by the . . . fact that the youth was
sixteen years old when this heinous crime was committed. Nor can
the Court, in following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact
of this young man's violent background."
App. 189. From this statement, the Court concludes
"it is clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the evidence
in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact; rather he
found that,
as a matter of law, he was unable even to
consider the evidence."
Ante at
455 U. S. 113.
This is simply not a correct characterization of the sentencing
judge's action.
In its parsing of the trial court's oral statement, the Court
ignores the fact that the judge was delivering his opinion
extemporaneously from the bench, and could not be expected to frame
each utterance with the specificity and precision that might be
expected of a written opinion or statute. Extemporaneous courtroom
statements are not often models of clarity. Nor does the Court give
any weight to the fact that the trial court had spent considerable
time listening to the testimony of a probation officer and various
mental health professionals who described Eddings' personality and
family history -- an obviously meaningless exercise if, as the
Court asserts, the judge believed he was barred "as a matter of
law" from "considering" their testimony. Yet, even examined in
isolation, the trial court's statement is, at best, ambiguous;
[
Footnote 2/5] it can just as
easily be read to say that, while the court
Page 455 U. S. 125
had taken account of Eddings' unfortunate childhood, it did not
consider that either his youth or his family background was
sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances that the
evidence revealed. Certainly nothing in
Lockett would
preclude the court from making such a determination.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals independently examined
the evidence of "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors presented at
Eddings' sentencing hearing.
616 P.2d
1159 (1980). After reviewing the testimony concerning Eddings'
personality and family background, and after referring to the trial
court's discussion of mitigating circumstances, it stated that,
while Eddings' "family history is useful in explaining why he
behaved the way he did, . . .
it does not excuse his
behavior."
Id. at 1170 (emphasis added). From this,
the Court concludes that
"the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only that
evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a legal
excuse from criminal liability."
Ante at
455 U. S. 113.
[
Footnote 2/6] However, there is no
reason to read that court's statements as reflecting anything more
than a conclusion that Eddings' background was not a sufficiently
mitigating factor to tip the scales, given the aggravating
circumstances, including Eddings' statements immediately before the
killing. [
Footnote 2/7] The Court
of Criminal Appeals most assuredly did
not, as the Court's
opinion suggests, hold that this "evidence in mitigation was not
relevant,"
see ibid.; indeed, had the Court of Criminal
Appeals thought the evidence irrelevant,
Page 455 U. S. 126
it is unlikely that it would have spent several paragraphs
summarizing it. The Court's opinion offers no reasonable
explanation for its assumption that the Court of Criminal Appeals
considered itself bound by some unstated legal principle not to
"consider" Eddings' background.
To be sure, neither the Court of Criminal Appeals nor the trial
court labeled Eddings' family background and personality
disturbance as "mitigating factors." It is plain to me, however,
that this was purely a matter of semantics associated with the
rational belief that "evidence in mitigation" must rise to a
certain level of persuasiveness before it can be said to constitute
a "mitigating circumstance." In contrast, the Court seems to
require that any potentially mitigating evidence be described as a
"mitigating factor" -- regardless of its weight; the
insubstantiality of the evidence is simply to be a factor in the
process of weighing the evidence against aggravating circumstances.
Yet if this is all the Court's opinion stands for, it provides
scant support for the result reached. For it is clearly the choice
of the Oklahoma courts -- a choice not inconsistent with
Lockett or any other decision of this Court -- to accord
relatively little weight to Eddings' family background and
emotional problems as balanced against the circumstances of his
crime and his potential for future dangerousness. [
Footnote 2/8]
Page 455 U. S. 127
II
It can never be less than the most painful of our duties to pass
on capital cases, and the more so in a case such as this one.
However, there comes a time in every case when a court must "bite
the bullet."
Whether the Court's remand will serve any useful purpose remains
to be seen, for petitioner has already been given an opportunity to
introduce whatever evidence he considered relevant to the
sentencing determination. Two Oklahoma courts have weighed that
evidence and found it insufficient to offset the aggravating
circumstances shown by the State. The Court's opinion makes clear
that some Justices who join it would not have imposed the death
penalty had they sat as the sentencing authority,
see, e.g.,
ante at
455 U. S.
115-116. Indeed,
Page 455 U. S. 128
I am not sure I would have done so. But the Constitution does
not authorize us to determine whether sentences imposed by state
courts are sentences we consider "appropriate"; our only authority
is to decide whether they are constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. The Court stops far short of suggesting that there is
any constitutional proscription against imposition of the death
penalty on a person who was under age 18 when the murder was
committed. In the last analysis, the Court is forced to conclude
that it is
"the state courts [which] must consider [petitioner's mitigating
evidence] and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating
circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them."
Ante at
455 U. S.
117.
Because the sentencing proceedings in this case were in no sense
inconsistent with
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.
S. 586 (1978), I would decide the sole issue on which we
granted certiorari, and affirm the judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court struggles to demonstrate that "the question of whether
the decisions below were consistent with our decision in
Lockett is properly before us."
Ante at
455 U. S.
113-114, n. 9. It argues that petitioner's
"
Lockett claim" as somehow inherent in his general
assertion that the death penalty as "excessive." However, it is
obvious that petitioner not only failed to present to this Court
the question which the Court now addresses, but also never "fairly
presented" the
Lockett argument to the state courts so as
to have afford them the first "opportunity to apply controlling
legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional
claim."
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.
S. 270,
404 U. S.
275-277 (1971). Indeed, petitioner concedes as much,
admitting that the "
Lockett error was not enumerated or
argued on appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. . . ."
Brief for Petitioner 64.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In that case the evidence showed that while, Lockett waited in a
"getaway" car, her three companions robbed a store; during the
robbery, the proprietor was fatally wounded. Lockett was charged
with aggravated murder with two "specifications" of "aggravating
circumstances": (1) that the murder was "committed for the purpose
of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment" for
aggravated robbery; and (2) that the murder was "committed while .
. . committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after
committing or attempting to commit . . . aggravated robbery."
See Ohio Rev.Code 2929.04(A) (1975).
[
Footnote 2/3]
It is ironic that, in his petition for certiorari filed with the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner asserted that the
Oklahoma sentencing scheme was constitutionally deficient because
"[t]he mitigating circumstances which may be considered are not
statutorily defined
or limited" (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Although I think it is immaterial to a correct decision of this
case, it is worth noting that the Court overstates and
oversimplifies the evidence presented by Eddings at the sentencing
hearing. For example, it twice characterizes the testimony as
indicating that, at the time of the crime, Eddings' "mental and
emotional development were at a level several years below his age."
Ante at
455 U. S. 107,
455 U. S. 116.
Dr. Dietsche, a psychologist, testified that, if forced to
extrapolate from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, he would
place petitioner's "mental age" at about 14 years, 6 months;
however, he then said that this mental age would have "no meaning,"
since "the mental age concepts break down . . . between fourteen to
sixteen years of age." He went on to state: "
My opinion is that
[Eddings] has the intelligence of an adult." App. 134-136
(emphasis added). Describing a single interview with petitioner
while he was awaiting trial on murder charges, Dr. Rettig, a
sociologist, said that petitioner's "responses appeared to me to be
several years below his chronological age"; he "qualif[ied]" this
answer, however, by noting that petitioner was "under a great deal
of constraint in the atmosphere in which I saw him."
Id.
at 149. Finally, Dr. Gagliano, a psychiatrist, opined on the basis
of a one-hour interview -- during which petitioner's attorney was
present and refused to allow questioning about petitioner's "mental
status" on the day of the shooting,
id. at 177 -- that, at
the time petitioner pulled the trigger, "he acted as a seven year
old seeking revenge and rebellion" against his stepfather, a
policeman.
Id. at 172-173. Dr. Gagliano was also willing
to state categorically, on the basis of this single interview and
without reference to the results of the psychological testing of
Eddings,
id. at 174, that Eddings was "preordained" to
commit the murder from the time his parents were divorced, when he
was five.
Id. at 179-180. This sort of "determinist"
approach is rejected by an overwhelming majority of
psychiatrists.
[
Footnote 2/5]
It is not even clear what the trial court meant by Eddings'
"violent background." For example, Eddings' probation officer
testified that Eddings had "problems with fighting" while in
school, and had once been charged with "Assault with intent to do
great bodily harm."
Id. at 106-107. The State seems to
concede, however, that the court was probably referring, at least
in part, to Eddings' family history.
See Brief for
Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the court
did not consider petitioner's
juvenile record and family
life to be a mitigating circumstance") (emphasis added).
But
cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35 ("the remark is ambiguous. It could be
interpreted to mean that [the trial court] was not going to
consider the juvenile's previous juvenile record in Missouri, which
was extensive . . .").
[
Footnote 2/6]
On the other hand, the Court's opinion concedes that
petitioner's
youth was given serious consideration as a
"mitigating circumstance," although his age at the time of the
offense would not "tend to support a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility."
[
Footnote 2/7]
When Eddings' companions informed him that the officer's patrol
car was approaching, Eddings responded that, if the "mother___ pig
tried to stop him, he was going to blow him away." App. 66.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Nor is this choice necessarily an unreasonable one. As the Court
notes, "[e]vidence of a difficult family history and of emotional
disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation."
Ante at
455 U. S. 115.
One might even be surprised if a person capable of a brutal and
unprovoked killing of a police officer did not suffer from some
sort sf "personality disorder."
Indeed, Dr. Dietsche, who testified that Eddings had a
"sociopathic or antisocial personality,"
see ante at
455 U. S. 107,
estimated that 91% "of your criminal element" would test as
sociopathic or antisocial. App. 136. Dr. Dietsche defined
"antisocial personalities" as individuals without "the usual type
of companions" or "loyalties," who are "[f]requently . . . selfish,
. . . very impulsive," showing "little in the line of
responsibility" or concern "for the needs or wants of others," and
"hav[ing] little in the line of guilt or remorse."
Id. at
137-138. Although the Court describes Dietsche's testimony as
indicating that "approximately 30% of youths suffering from such a
disorder grew out of it as they aged,"
ante at
455 U. S. 107,
Dietsche was in fact describing a study which he thought had
subsequently been discredited. App. 139-141. Even that study,
however, concluded that most of those who "grew out of" the
disorder by the age of 35 or 40 were "more of a con-artist type,"
and "not . . . the assaultive type."
Ibid. A more recent
study estimated that only 20% of sociopathic persons were
"treatable,"
id. at 141; in this study, only 9 of 255
initial participants were successfully treated, after "literally .
. . thousands of hours of therapy."
Id. at 142. Thus,
characterization of Eddings as a "sociopath" may connote little
more than that he is egocentric, concerned only with his own
desires and unremorseful, has a propensity for criminal conduct,
and is unlikely to respond well to conventional psychiatric
treatment -- hardly significant "mitigating" factors.
See
Blocker v. United States, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 41, 48-49, and nn.
11, 12, 288 F.2d 853, 860-861, and nn. 11, 12 (1961) (Burger, J.,
concurring in result). While the Court speaks of Eddings' "severe
emotional disturbance,"
ante at
455 U. S. 115;
see also ante at
455 U. S. 116,
it appears to be referring primarily to the testimony that Eddings
was a sociopath, and to Dr. Gagliano's rather fantastic speculation
concerning Eddings' dissociation at the time of the crime,
see 455
U.S. 104fn2/4|>n. 4,
supra. The Court's opinion
exemplifies the proposition that the very occurrence of the crime
functions as a powerful impetus to search for a theory to explain
it.
See Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law,
58 Colum.L.Rev. 183, 190-191 (1958).