Held: There is no rigid rule requiring that the content
of the warnings to an accused prior to police interrogation
required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436, be a virtual incantation of the precise language
contained in the
Miranda opinion. Thus, the California
Court of Appeal erred in holding that
Miranda warnings
were inadequate simply because of the order in which they were
given to respondent (a minor), where, after he was told that he had
"the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him
present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the
questioning," he was informed that he had the right to have his
parents present, and then was informed that he had "the right to
have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself."
These warnings adequately conveyed to respondent his right to have
a lawyer appointed if he could not afford one prior to and during
interrogation, and the Court of Appeal erred in concluding
otherwise.
Certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
This case presents the question whether the warnings given to
respondent prior to a recorded conversation with a police officer
satisfied the requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U. S. 436
(1966). Although ordinarily this Court would not be inclined to
review a case involving application of that precedent to a
particular set of facts,
see Fare v. Michael C.,
439 U. S. 1310,
439 U. S.
1314 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers, opinion of
Court at
442 U. S. 442 U.S.
707 (1979)), the opinion of the California Court of Appeal
essentially laid down a flat rule requiring that the content of
Miranda warnings be a virtual incantation of the precise
language contained in the
Miranda opinion. Because such a
rigid rule was not mandated by
Miranda or any other
decision of this Court, and is not required to serve the purposes
of
Miranda, we grant the motion
Page 453 U. S. 356
of respondent for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis
and the petition for certiorari, and reverse.
On January 30, 1978, Mrs. Donna Iris Erickson was brutally
murdered. Later that evening, respondent and a codefendant were
apprehended for commission of the offense. Respondent was brought
to a substation of the Tulare County Sheriff's Department and
advised of his
Miranda rights. He declined to talk, and,
since he was a minor, his parents were notified. Respondent's
parents arrived and, after meeting with them, respondent decided to
answer police questions. An officer questioned respondent, on tape,
with respondent's parents present. The tape reflects that the
following warnings were given prior to any questioning:
"Sgt. Byrd: . . . Mr. Randall James Prysock, earlier today I
advised you of your legal rights, and at that time you advised me
you did not wish to talk to me, is that correct?"
"Randall P.: Yeh."
"Sgt. Byrd: And, uh, during, at the first interview, your folks
were not present, they are now present. I want to go through your
legal rights again with you and after each legal right I would like
for you to answer whether you understand it or not. . . . Your
legal rights, Mr. Prysock, is [
sic] follows: Number one,
you have the right to remain silent. This means you don't have to
talk to me at all unless you so desire. Do you understand
this?"
"Randall P.: Yeh."
"Sgt. Byrd: If you give up your right to remain silent, anything
you say can and will be used as evidence against you in a court of
law. Do you understand this?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
"Sgt. Byrd: You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you
are questioned, have him present with you while you are being
questioned, and all during the questioning. Do you understand this?
"
Page 453 U. S. 357
"Randall P.: Yes."
"Sgt. Byrd: You also, being a juvenile, you have the right to
have your parents present, which they are. Do you understand
this?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
"Sgt. Byrd: Even if they weren't here, you'd have this right. Do
you understand this?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
"Sgt. Byrd: You all, uh, -- if, -- you have the right to have a
lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself. Do you
understand this?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
"Sgt. Byrd: Now, having all these legal rights in mind, do you
wish to talk to me at this time?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
App. A to Pet. for Cert. i-iii. At this point, at the request of
Mrs. Prysock, a conversation took place with the tape recorder
turned off. According to Sgt. Byrd, Mrs. Prysock asked if
respondent could still have an attorney at a later time if he gave
a statement now without one. Sgt. Byrd assured Mrs. Prysock that
respondent would have an attorney when he went to court, and that
"he could have one at this time if he wished one."
Id. at
11. [
Footnote 1]
Page 453 U. S. 358
At trial in the Superior Court of Tulare County, the court
denied respondent's motion to suppress the taped statement.
Respondent was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder with two
special circumstances -- torture and robbery. Cal.Penal Code Ann.
§§ 187, 190.2, 12022(b) (West Supp.1981). He was also convicted of
robbery with the use of a dangerous weapon, §§ 211, 12022(b),
burglary with the use of a deadly weapon, §§ 459, 12022(b),
automobile theft, Cal.Veh.Code Ann. § 10851 (West Supp.1981),
escape from a youth facility, Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code Ann. § 871
(West 1972), and destruction of evidence, Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 135
(West 1970). The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District
reversed respondent's convictions and ordered a new trial because
of what it thought to be error under
Miranda. App. A to
Pet. for Cert. 4. The Court of Appeal ruled that respondent's
recorded incriminating statements, given with his parents present,
had to be excluded from consideration by the jury because
respondent was not properly advised of his right to the services of
a free attorney before and during interrogation. Although
respondent was indisputably informed that he had
"the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have
him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during
the questioning,"
and further informed that he had "the right to have a lawyer
appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself," the Court of
Appeal ruled that these warnings were inadequate because
respondent
Page 453 U. S. 359
was not explicitly informed of his right to have an attorney
appointed before further questioning. The Court of Appeal stated
that "[o]ne of [
Miranda's] virtues is its precise
requirements which are so easily met," and quoted from
Harryman
v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 87874 (CA5),
cert. denied,
449 U.S. 860 (1980), that
"'the rigidity of the
Miranda rules and the way in
which they are to be applied was conceived of and continues to be
recognized as the decision's greatest strength.'"
App. A to Pet. for Cert. 12. Relying on two previous decisions
of the California Court of Appeal,
People v.
Bolinski, 260 Cal. App.
2d 705, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1968), and
People v.
Stewart, 267 Cal. App.
2d 366, 73 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1968), the court ruled that the
requirements of
Miranda were not met in this case.
[
Footnote 2] The California
Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing, with two justices
dissenting. App. D to Pet. for Cert.
This Court has never indicated that the "rigidity" of
Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings
given a criminal defendant.
See, e.g., United States v.
Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 375-376 (CA2),
cert. denied, 400
U.S. 907 (1970). This Court and others
have stressed as
one virtue of
Miranda the fact that the giving of the
warnings obviates the need for a case-by-case inquiry into the
actual voluntariness of the admissions of the accused.
See Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 718;
Harryman v. Estelle, supra. Nothing in these observations
suggests any desirable rigidity in the form of the required
warnings.
Quite the contrary,
Miranda itself indicated that no
talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures. The
Court in that case stated that
"[t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance
with our opinion today
Page 453 U. S. 360
are,
in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a
defendant."
384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 476
(emphasis supplied).
See also id. at
384 U. S. 479.
Just last Term, in considering when
Miranda applied, we
noted that that decision announced procedural safeguards including
"the now-familiar
Miranda warnings . . . or their
equivalent."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.
S. 291,
446 U. S. 297
(1980) (emphasis supplied).
Other courts considering the precise question presented by this
case -- whether a criminal defendant was adequately informed of his
right to the presence of appointed counsel prior to and during
interrogation -- have not required a verbatim recital of the words
of the
Miranda opinion, but rather have examined the
warnings given to determine if the reference to the right to
appointed counsel was linked with some future point in time after
the police interrogation. In
United States v. Garcia, 431
F.2d 134 (CA9 1970) (per curiam), for example, the court found
inadequate advice to the defendant that she could "have an attorney
appointed to represent you when you first appear before the U.S.
Commissioner or the Court."
People v. Bolinski, supra,
relied upon by the court below, is a case of this type. Two
separate sets of warnings were ruled inadequate. In the first, the
defendant was advised that "
if he was charged, . . . he
would be appointed counsel." 260 Cal. App. 2d at 718, 67 Cal. Rptr.
at 355 (emphasis supplied). In the second, the defendant, then in
Illinois and about to be moved to California, was advised that
"
the court would appoint [an attorney] in Riverside County
[, California.]'" Id. at 723, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 359
(emphasis supplied). In both instances, the reference to appointed
counsel was linked to a future point in time after police
interrogation, and therefore did not fully advise the suspect of
his right to appointed counsel before such interrogation.
Here, in contrast, nothing in the warnings given respondent
suggested any limitation on the right to the presence of
Page 453 U. S. 361
appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to
a lawyer in general, including the right "to a lawyer before you
are questioned, . . . while you are being questioned, and all
during the questioning." App. A to Pet. for Cert. 10; ii. Like
United States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144 (CA9 1971), where the
warnings given were substantially similar to those given here and
defendant's argument was the same as that adopted by the Court of
Appeal,
"[t]his is not a case in which the defendant was not informed of
his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning . . .
or in which the offer of an appointed attorney was associated with
a future time in court. . . ."
Id. at 146.
It is clear that the police in this case fully conveyed to
respondent his rights as required by
Miranda. He was told
of his right to have a lawyer present prior to and during
interrogation, and his right to have a lawyer appointed at no cost
if he could not afford one. These warnings conveyed to respondent
his right to have a lawyer appointed if he could not afford one
prior to and during interrogation. The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the warnings were inadequate simply because of the
order in which they were given. [
Footnote 3]
Page 453 U. S. 362
Because respondent was given the warnings required by
Miranda, the decision of the California Court of Appeal to
the contrary is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The tape reflects the following concerning the off-the-record
discussion:
"Sgt. Byrd: . . . Okay, Mrs. Prysock, you asked to get off the
tape. . . . During that time, you asked, decided you wanted some
time to think about getting, whether to hire a lawyer or not."
"Mrs. P.: 'Cause I didn't understand it."
"Sgt. Byrd: And you have decided now that you want to go ahead
and you do not wish a lawyer present at this time?"
"Mrs. P.: That's right."
"Sgt. Byrd: And I have not persuaded you in any way, is that
correct?"
"Mrs. P.: No, you have not."
"Sgt. Byrd: And, Mr. Prysock is that correct that I have done
nothing to persuade you not to, to hire a lawyer or to go on with
this?"
"Mr. P.: That's right."
"Sgt. Byrd: Okay, everything we're doing here is strictly in
accordance with Randall and yourselves, is that correct?"
"Mr. P.: That is correct."
"Sgt. Byrd: Okay. Uh, all right, Randy, I can't remember where I
left off, I think I asked you, uh, with your legal rights in mind,
do you wish to talk to me at this time? This is with everything I
told you, all your legal rights, your right to an attorney, your
right, and your right to remain silent, and all these, I mean do
you wish to talk to me at this time about the case?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
App. A to Pet. for Cert. iii-iv.
[
Footnote 2]
Contrary to respondent's suggestion, it is clear that the
decision below was based on federal law. The Court of Appeal stated
that it was reversing and ordering a new trial "because of
Miranda error."
Id. at 4.
[
Footnote 3]
The dissent, arguing that the Court of Appeal opinion is
unfairly criticized as requiring mimicking of
Miranda,
post at
453 U. S.
365-366, ignores substantial portions of the opinion
below and substitutes arguments of its own for those articulated by
the Court of Appeal. For example, the dissent makes no mention of
the lower court's stress on the "precise requirements" of
Miranda or its "rigidity" in this area, and ignores the
portion of the opinion in which the court quotes from
Miranda and then criticizes the officer for not repeating
the exact language in advising respondent of his rights.
See App. A to Pet. for Cert. 12-14. The Court of Appeal
did conclude that respondent was not advised of his right to
appointed counsel prior to and during interrogation, but this was
because the officer did not parrot the language of
Miranda. The more substantive reasons suggested by the
dissent are implausible. The reference to "appointed" counsel has
never been considered as suggesting that the availability of
counsel was postponed, and Mrs. Prysock's off-the-record
conversation was occasioned by her fear that waiving the right to
counsel at interrogation would occasion a waiver of the right to
counsel later in court, App. A to Pet. for Cert. 11, clearly
indicating that the officer conveyed the right to counsel at
interrogation.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.
A juvenile informed by police that he has a right to counsel may
understand that right to include one or more of three options: (1)
that he has a right to have a lawyer represent him if he or his
parents are able and willing to hire one; (2) that, if he cannot
afford to hire an attorney, he has a right to have a lawyer
represent him without charge at trial, even if his parents are
unwilling to spend money on his behalf; or (3) that, if he is
unable to afford an attorney, he has a right to consult a lawyer
without charge before he decides whether to talk to the police,
even if his parents decline to pay for such legal representation.
[
Footnote 2/1] All three of these
options are encompassed within the right to counsel possessed by a
juvenile charged with a crime. In this case, the first two options
were explained to respondent, but the third was not.
In
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436, this Court held that, in order to protect an
accused's privilege against self-incrimination, certain procedural
safeguards must be employed.
Page 453 U. S. 363
In particular, an individual taken into police custody and
subjected to questioning must be given the
Miranda
warnings:
"He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
Id. at
384 U. S. 479.
See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.
S. 291,
446 U. S. 297.
This formulation makes it clear beyond any doubt that an indigent
accused has the right to the presence of an attorney and the right
to have that attorney appointed to represent him prior to any
questioning. While it is certainly true, as the Court emphasizes
today, that the Federal Constitution does not require a "talismanic
incantation" of the language of the
Miranda opinion,
ante at
453 U. S. 359,
it is also indisputable that it requires that an accused be
adequately informed of his right to have counsel appointed prior to
any police questioning.
The California Court of Appeal in this case analyzed the warning
given respondent, quoted
ante at
453 U. S.
356-357, and concluded that he had not been adequately
informed of this crucial right. The police sergeant informed
respondent that he had the right to have counsel present during
questioning and, after a brief interlude, informed him that he had
the right to appointed counsel.
See ibid. The Court of
Appeal concluded that this warning was constitutionally inadequate,
not because it deviated from the precise language of
Miranda, but because
"[u]nfortunately, the minor was not given the crucial
information that the services of the free attorney were available
prior to the impending questioning."
App. A to Pet. for Cert. 15 (emphasis in original). [
Footnote 2/2]
Page 453 U. S. 364
There can be no question that
Miranda requires, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, that an accused effectively
be provided with this "crucial information" in some form. The
Court's demonstration that the Constitution does not require that
the precise language of
Miranda be recited to an accused
simply fails to come to terms with the express finding of the
California Court of Appeal that respondent was not given this
information. The warning recited by the police sergeant is
sufficiently ambiguous on its face to provide adequate support for
the California court's finding. That court's conclusion is at least
reasonable, and is clearly not so patently erroneous as to warrant
summary reversal.
The ambiguity in the warning given respondent is further
demonstrated by the colloquy between the police sergeant and
respondent's parents that occurred after respondent was told that
he had the "right to have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no
cost to yourself." Because lawyers are normally "appointed" by
judges, and not by law enforcement officers, the reference to
appointed counsel could reasonably have been understood to refer to
trial counsel. [
Footnote 2/3] That
is what
Page 453 U. S. 365
respondent's parents must have assumed, because their ensuing
colloquy with the sergeant related to their option "to
hire a lawyer." [
Footnote
2/4]
The judges on the California Court of Appeal and on the
California Supreme Court, all of whom are presumably more familiar
with the procedures followed by California police officers than we
are, concluded that respondent was not adequately informed of his
right to have a lawyer present without charge during the
questioning. This Court is not at all fair to those judges when it
construes their conscientious appraisal of a somewhat ambiguous
record as requiring "a virtual incantation of the precise language
contained in the
Page 453 U. S. 366
Miranda opinion."
Ante at
453 U. S. 355. It
seems clear to me that it is this Court, rather than the state
courts, that is guilty of attaching greater importance to the form
of the
Miranda ritual than to the substance of the message
it is intended to convey.
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In his dissenting opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U. S. 436,
384 U. S. 504,
Justice Harlan accurately summarized the four essential elements of
the warning that must be given a person in custody before he is
questioned,
"namely, that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he
says may be used against him, that he has a right to have present
an attorney during the questioning, and that, if indigent he has a
right to a lawyer without charge."
[
Footnote 2/2]
According to the Court of Appeal, the principal defect in the
warning was that the police sergeant, in a "needless excursion,"
inserted a discussion of respondent's right to have his parents
present between the description of the right to have counsel
present during questioning and the description of the right of an
indigent to have counsel appointed to represent him.
See
App. A to Pet. for Cert. 115. The subsequent untaped conversation
"obfuscated, rather than clarified" the matter.
Id. at 15.
The warnings given respondent were defective, not because "the
officer did not parrot the language of
Miranda,"
ante at
453 U. S. 361,
n. 3, but because, in the form in which the warnings were given,
they failed to convey the essential information required by
Miranda.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The fact that the reference also might have been understood to
refer to the appointment of counsel prior to questioning does not
undercut the Court of Appeal's conclusion.
Miranda
requires "meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in
language which he can comprehend and on which he can knowingly
act."
Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305, 308 (CA10
1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992. Such meaningful advice
is not provided by a warning which requires that an accused choose
among several reasonable interpretations of the language employed
by a police officer in a custodial situation.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Court simply ignores the significance of the references to
hiring a lawyer in the colloquy which it quotes
ante at
453 U. S.
357-358, n. 1. The colloquy bears repeating:
"Sgt. Byrd: . . . Okay, Mrs. Prysock, you asked to get off the
tape. . . . During that time, you asked, decided you wanted some
time to think about getting,
whether to hire a lawyer or
not."
"Mrs. P.: 'Cause I didn't understand it."
"Sgt. Byrd: And you have decided now that you want to go ahead
and you do not wish a lawyer present at this time?"
"Mrs. P.: That's right."
"Sgt. Byrd: And I have not persuaded you in any way, is that
correct?"
"Mrs. P.: No, you have not."
"Sgt. Byrd: And Mr. Prysock, is that correct that I have done
nothing to persuade you
not to, to hire a lawyer or to go
on with this?"
"Mr. P.: That's right."
"Sgt. Byrd: Okay, everything we're doing here is strictly in
accordance with Randall and yourselves, is that correct?"
"Mr. P.: That is correct."
"Sgt. Byrd: Okay. Uh, all right, Randy, I can't remember where I
left off, I think I asked you, uh, with your legal rights in mind,
do you wish to talk to me at this time? This is with everything I
told you, all your legal rights, your right to an attorney, your
right, and your right to remain silent, and all these, I mean do
you wish to talk to me at this time about the case?"
"Randall P.: Yes."
App. A to Pet. for Cert. iii-iv (emphasis added).