Federal agents, aware that respondent had been indicted on
federal drug charges and had retained counsel, met with her without
her counsel's knowledge or permission, seeking her cooperation in a
related investigation. The agents disparaged respondent's counsel
and indicated that she would gain various benefits if she
cooperated and would face a stiff jail term if she did not, but she
declined to cooperate, and notified her attorney. The agents
visited respondent again in the absence of counsel, but she did not
agree to cooperate with them, nor did she incriminate herself or
supply any information pertinent to her case. Subsequently,
respondent moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice on the
ground that the agents' conduct violated her Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. The agents' egregious behavior was described as having
"interfered" in some unspecified way with respondent's right to
counsel, but it was not alleged that the claimed violation had
prejudiced the quality or effectiveness of her legal representation
or that the agents' conduct had any adverse impact on her legal
position. The District Court denied the motion and respondent,
pursuant to a prior agreement with the Government, entered a
conditional plea of guilty to one count of the indictment. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondent's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had been violated and that whether or
not any tangible effect upon her representation had been
demonstrated or alleged, the appropriate remedy was dismissal of
the indictment with prejudice.
Held: Assuming, arguendo, that the Sixth Amendment was
violated in the circumstances of this case, nevertheless the
dismissal of the indictment was not appropriate, absent a showing
of any adverse consequence to the representation respondent
received or to the fairness of the proceedings leading to her
conviction. Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are
subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the
injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not
unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. Absent demonstrable
prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, from the violation of the
Sixth Amendment, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in the
criminal proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition
of
Page 449 U. S. 362
the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial, and
dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though
the violation may have been deliberate. Pp.
449 U. S.
364-367.
602 F.2d 529, reversed and remanded. WHITE, J., delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Hazel Morrison, respondent here, was indicted on two counts of
distributing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. $ 841(a)(1). She
retained private counsel to represent her in the impending criminal
proceedings. Thereafter, two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
aware that she had been indicted and had retained counsel, sought
to obtain her cooperation in a related investigation. They met and
conversed with her without the knowledge or permission of her
counsel. Furthermore, in the course of the conversation, the agents
disparaged respondent's counsel, stating that respondent should
think about the type of representation she could expect for the $
200 retainer she had paid him and suggesting that she could be
better represented by the public defender. In addition, the agents
indicated that respondent would gain various benefits if she
cooperated, but would face a stiff jail term if she did not.
Respondent declined to cooperate and immediately notified her
attorney. The agents visited respondent again in the absence of
counsel, but at no time did respondent agree to cooperate with
them, incriminate herself, or supply any information
Page 449 U. S. 363
pertinent to her case. Contrary to the agents' advice,
respondent continued to rely upon the services of the attorney whom
she had retained.
Respondent subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment with
prejudice on the ground that the conduct of the agents had violated
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The motion contained no
allegation that the claimed violation had prejudiced the quality or
effectiveness of respondent's legal representation; nor did it
assert that the behavior of the agents had induced her to plead
guilty, had resulted in the prosecution having a stronger case
against her, or had any other adverse impact on her legal position.
The motion was based solely upon the egregious behavior of the
agents, which was described as having "interfered" in some
unspecified way with respondent's right to counsel. This
interference, unaccompanied by any allegation of adverse effect,
was urged as a sufficient basis for the requested disposition.
The District Court denied the motion and respondent, pursuant to
a prior agreement with the Government, entered a conditional plea
of guilty to one count of the indictment. [
Footnote 1] On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, the judgment of the District Court was reversed. The
appellate court concluded that respondent's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel had been violated and that, whether or not any tangible
effect upon respondent's representation had been demonstrated or
alleged, the appropriate remedy was dismissal of the indictment
with prejudice. 602 F.2d 529 (1979). We granted the United States'
petition for certiorari to consider whether this extraordinary
relief was appropriate in the absence of some adverse consequence
to the representation respondent
Page 449 U. S. 364
received or to the fairness of the proceedings leading to her
conviction. 448 U.S. 906. We reverse.
The United States initially urges that, absent some showing of
prejudice, there could be no Sixth Amendment violation to be
remedied. Because we agree with the United States, however, that
the dismissal of the indictment was error in any event, we shall
assume, without deciding, that the Sixth Amendment was violated in
the circumstances of this case.
The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused shall enjoy the
right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." This
right, fundamental to our system of justice, is meant to assure
fairness in the adversary criminal process.
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335,
372 U. S. 344
(1963);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60,
315 U. S. 69-70,
315 U. S. 75-76
(1942); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458,
304 U. S.
462-463 (1938). Our cases have accordingly been
responsive to proved claims that governmental conduct has rendered
counsel's assistance to the defendant ineffective.
Moore v.
Illinois, 434 U. S. 220
(1977);
Geders v. United States, 425 U. S.
80 (1976);
Herring v. New York, 422 U.
S. 853 (1975);
Gilbert v. California,
388 U. S. 263
(1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.
S. 218 (1967);
Massiah v. United States,
377 U. S. 201
(1964).
At the same time and without detracting from the fundamental
importance of the right to counsel in criminal cases, we have
implicitly recognized the necessity for preserving society's
interest in the administration of criminal justice. Cases involving
Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that
remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation, and should not unnecessarily infringe on
competing interests. Our relevant cases reflect this approach. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, the defendant was totally
denied the assistance of counsel at his criminal trial. In
Geders v. United States, supra, Herring v. New York,
supra, and
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45 (1932), judicial action before or during trial
prevented counsel from being fully effective. In
Black v.
United States, 385
Page 449 U. S. 365
U.S. 26 (1966), and
O'Brien v. United States,
386 U. S. 345
(1967), law enforcement officers improperly overheard pretrial
conversations between a defendant and his lawyer. None of these
deprivations, however, resulted in the dismissal of the indictment.
Rather, the conviction in each case was reversed and the Government
was free to proceed with a new trial. Similarly, when before trial
but after the institution of adversary proceedings, the prosecution
has improperly obtained incriminating information from the
defendant in the absence of his counsel, the remedy
characteristically imposed is not to dismiss the indictment but to
suppress the evidence or to order a new trial if the evidence has
been wrongfully admitted and the defendant convicted.
Gilbert
v. California, supra; United States v. Wade, supra; Massiah v.
United States, supra. In addition, certain violations of the
right to counsel may be disregarded as harmless error.
Compare
Moore v. Illinois, supra at
434 U. S. 232,
with Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18,
386 U. S. 23,
and n. 8 (1967).
Our approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize the
taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to
assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair
trial. The premise of our prior cases is that the constitutional
infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect
upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or has produced
some other prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the
criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a
remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full
recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair
trial.
More particularly, absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial
threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly
inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.
[
Footnote 2] This has been the
result reached where a Fifth
Page 449 U. S. 366
Amendment.violation has occurred, [
Footnote 3] and we have not suggested that searches and
seizures contrary to the Fourth Amendment warrant dismissal of the
indictment. The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to
denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.
Here, respondent has demonstrated no prejudice of any kind,
either transitory or permanent, to the ability of her counsel to
provide adequate representation in these criminal proceedings.
There is no effect of a constitutional dimension which needs to be
purged to make certain that respondent has been effectively
represented and not unfairly convicted. The Sixth Amendment
violation, if any, accordingly provides no justification for
interfering with the criminal proceedings against
Page 449 U. S. 367
respondent Morrison, much less the drastic relief granted by the
Court of Appeals. [
Footnote
4]
In arriving at this conclusion, we do not condone the egregious
behavior of the Government agents. Nor do we suggest that, in cases
such as this, a Sixth Amendment violation may not be remedied in
other proceedings. We simply conclude that the solution provided by
the Court of Appeals is inappropriate where the violation, which we
assume has occurred, has had no adverse impact upon the criminal
proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed,
and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
A second count was dismissed as required by the plea agreement.
The plea was conditioned on respondent's right to appeal the
District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit
has approved this procedure.
United States v. Moskow, 588
F.2d 882 (1978);
United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848
(1975). We express no view on the propriety of such conditional
pleas.
[
Footnote 2]
There is no claim here that there was continuing prejudice
which, because it could not be remedied by a new trial or
suppression of evidence, called for more drastic treatment.
Cf.
United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307,
404 U. S.
325-326 (1971). Indeed, there being no claim of any
discernible taint, even the traditional remedies were beside the
point. The Court of Appeals seemed to reason that, because there
was no injury claimed, and because other remedies would not be
fruitful, dismissal of the indictment was appropriate. But as the
dissent below indicated, it is odd to reserve the most drastic
remedy for those situations where there has been no discernible
injury or other impact.
The Court of Appeals also thought dismissal was appropriate to
deter deliberate infringements of the right to counsel. But this
proves too much, for it would warrant dismissal not just in this
case, but in any case where there has been a knowing violation.
Furthermore, we note that the record before us does not reveal a
pattern of recurring violations by investigative officers that
might warrant the imposition of a more extreme remedy in order to
deter further lawlessness.
[
Footnote 3]
This is clear from
United States v. Blue, 384 U.
S. 251,
384 U. S. 255
(1966):
"Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating
evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Blue would, at most,
be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits if they were
sought to be used against him at trial. . . . Our numerous
precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally obtained
evidence assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to
barring the prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might advance
marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it
would also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the
public interest in having the guilty brought to book."
(Footnote omitted.)
[
Footnote 4]
The position we have adopted finds substantial support in the
Courts of Appeals.
United States v. Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39,
41-42 (CA7 1980);
United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192,
196-197 (CA2 1980);
United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857,
861-864 (CA9 1979);
United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d
1182, 1196-1197 (CA8 1976);
United States v. Acosta, 526
F.2d 670, 674 (CA5 1976);
but see United States v. McCord,
166 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 15-18, 509 F.2d 334, 348-351 (1974) (en banc)
(dicta). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has adopted a
contrary view.
See Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438,
367
N.E.2d 635 (1977).