Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides that in "any action or proceeding under this title" the
court may allow attorney's fees to "the prevailing party," other
than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the
United States. Alleging that petitioners had denied her employment
because of her race, respondent filed an employment discrimination
charge with the EEOC, which, as required by Title VII, forwarded
the complaint to the appropriate New York administrative agency.
Respondent was represented by counsel throughout administrative and
judicial proceedings in the state system, which proceedings
ultimately resulted in affirmance of the state agency's order
directing petitioners to offer respondent employment and pay back
wages, but not awarding attorney's fees. Meanwhile, the EEOC
reassumed jurisdiction and, under § 706(f) of Title VII, issued a
right-to-sue letter to respondent, who filed suit in Federal
District Court, alleging a claim under Title VII,
inter
alia, and seeking appropriate relief, including attorney's
fees. Petitioners having agreed to comply with the state agency's
order, the District Court dismissed the federal action, except for
respondent's request for attorney's fees, including fees for her
attorney's services in the state proceedings. The court later
denied the fee request, ruling that, although the EEOC's issuance
of a right-to-sue letter had forced respondent to preserve her
rights by filing a complaint in federal court, the mere filing of a
federal suit did not entitle an aggrieved party to attorney's fees,
and that respondent had the option of pursuing her state
administrative remedies without incurring any expenses for legal
services, since state law provides that the case in support of the
complaint is to be presented to the administrative hearing examiner
by one of the state agency's attorneys. The Court of Appeals
reversed.
Held: Sections 706(f) and 706(k) of Title VII authorize
a federal court action to recover an award of attorney's fees for
work done by the prevailing complainant in state administrative and
judicial proceedings to which the complainant was referred pursuant
to the provisions of Title VII, and no special circumstances exist
in this case that would justify denial of a fee award. Pp.
447 U. S.
60-71.
Page 447 U. S. 55
(a) Congress' use of the broadly inclusive disjunctive phrase
"any action or proceeding" in § 706(k) indicates an intent to
subject the losing party to an award of attorney's fees and costs
that includes expenses incurred for administrative proceedings.
Other provisions of the statute that interact with § 706(k), the
purpose of § 706(k) to facilitate the bringing of discrimination
complaints, the humanitarian remedial policies of Title VII, and
the statute's structure of cooperation between federal and state
enforcement authorities -- calling for deferral to state
proceedings, with proceedings before the EEOC and in federal courts
being supplements to available state remedies -- all point to the
conclusion that fee awards are authorized for work done in state
administrative or judicial proceedings as, well as in federal
proceedings. Since Congress intended to authorize fee awards for
work done in administrative proceedings, § 706(f)(1)'s
authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit
solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in
state or local proceedings. Pp.
447 U. S.
666.
(b) Awarding fees for work done in state proceedings for which
the State does not authorize fees does not infringe on the State's
powers under the Tenth Amendment, since Congress' power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad, and overrides any interest
the State might have in not authorizing awards for fees. Nor is
there any merit in the argument that Congress' intent to preempt
the state law has not been clearly expressed. Section 706(k) does
not "preempt" state law, since § 706(f)(1) merely provides a
supplemental right to sue in federal court if satisfactory relief
is not obtained in state forums, and one aspect of complete relief
is an award of attorney's fees, which Congress considered necessary
for the fulfillment of federal goals. And even if it can be said
that § 706(k) preempts the state rule, Congress' intent to achieve
this result is manifest. Furthermore, the availability under New
York law of an agency attorney to present the case in support of
the complaint at the public hearing is not a "special circumstance"
depriving a prevailing complainant of a fee award, since a private
attorney is needed to assist the complainant during administrative
procedures before and after the public hearing stage, and even if
an agency attorney appears at the public hearing, he does not
represent the complainant's interests, but rather those of the
State. Pp.
447 U. S.
66-70.
598 F.2d 1253, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined, and in all but
n. 6 of which BURGER, C.J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment,
post, p.
447 U. S. 71.
WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., filed a dissenting statement,
post, p.
447 U. S.
71.
Page 447 U. S. 56
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether, under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal court may allow the prevailing
party attorney's fees for legal services performed in prosecuting
an employment discrimination claim in
state administrative
and judicial proceedings that Title VII requires federal claimants
to invoke.
I
Respondent Cidni Carey, in August 1974, applied for work as a
cocktail waitress with petitioner New York Gaslight Club, Inc.
After an interview, she was advised that no position was
available.
The following January, respondent filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that petitioners,
the Club and its manager, had denied her a position because of her
race. App. to Brief for Respondent a1-a3. As required by § 706(c)
of Title VII of the Civil
Page 447 U. S. 57
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, as redesignated, 86 Stat. 104,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), respondent's complaint was forwarded to the
New York State Division of Human Rights (Division).
In May, 1975, after an investigation during which respondent was
represented by counsel, [
Footnote
1] the Division found probable cause to believe that
petitioners had engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice.
Efforts at conciliation failed, and the Division, pursuant to
N.Y.Exec.Law § 297(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979), recommended that a
public hearing be held.
Counsel for respondent wrote to the EEOC on May 20, advising the
Commission that respondent was proceeding in the Division. He asked
that the Commission "reassume" jurisdiction over the claim so that,
if necessary, respondent could obtain a right-to-sue letter at an
appropriate time. On May 22, the EEOC responded, stating that an
investigator would be assigned to respondent's matter as soon as
possible.
The state administrative hearing was held on two separate days
in late 1975 and early 1976. Both respondent and petitioners were
represented by counsel. App. 68. No attorney for the State
appeared. On August 13, 1976, the hearing examiner found that
petitioners had discriminated against respondent because she is
black.
Id. at 70. Petitioners were ordered to offer
respondent employment as a cocktail waitress and to pay her back
wages from August, 1974.
Id. at 772. No attorney's fee was
awarded.
Petitioners appealed to the New York State Human Rights Appeal
Board, an agency established to hear appeals from orders of the
Division. N.Y.Exec.Law § 297-a (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1979). The
Board held a hearing in December, 1976, at which counsel for
petitioners, respondent, and the Division appeared.
Page 447 U. S. 58
Meanwhile, EEOC proceedings had begun. Giving due weight to the
state finding of probable cause,
see § 70(b), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b), the EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to
believe petitioners had violated Title VII. The EEOC's attempts at
conciliation also failed. The Commission's General Counsel chose
not to sue, and, as required by § 706(f)(1) , § 2000e-5(f)(1), the
EEOC issued respondent a right-to-sue letter. This was issued on
July 13, 1977; respondent, under § 706(f)(1), then had 90 days to
file a Title VII action in federal district court.
On August 26, the Appeal Board confirmed the Division's order.
Petitioners immediately appealed the Board's decision to the New
York Supreme Court. The Division cross-petitioned for enforcement
of its order.
On September 30, respondent filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting
claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title
VII, and the Thirteenth Amendment. App. 29. Respondent alleged that
petitioners did not hire her because she is black, and that
petitioner Club had employed only four blacks as waitresses during
its 2-year existence. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment
that petitioners' practices were unlawful under federal law, an
order requiring petitioners to hire respondent, backpay with
interest, retroactive employment-related benefits, attorney's fees,
and other appropriate relief. Petitioners' answer denied virtually
all the allegations in the complaint and cited the pendency of the
state proceedings as an affirmative defense.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, on
November 3, unanimously affirmed the Appeal Board's determination.
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Board, 59 App.Div.2d 852, 399 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1977).
Petitioners unsuccessfully moved for reargument, and then filed a
motion with the New York Court of Appeals for leave to appeal.
Page 447 U. S. 59
On February 3, 1978, while that motion was pending, the Federal
District Court held a pretrial conference, after which petitioners
agreed that, if the state court denied their motion for leave to
appeal, they would comply with the Division's order. App. 73. One
week later, the New York Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
motion. 43 N.Y.2d 951 (1978).
The parties thereafter apparently agreed that the federal action
could be dismissed, except for respondent's request for attorney's
fees.
See App. 75-79. Respondent sought an award for 82
hours of attorney's time. Of that total, 9 hours were spent in
preparing and filing the EEOC charge and the federal suit, 22 hours
were spent in preparing and presenting the case before the hearing
examiner, 29 hours were spent in defending the Division's order
before the Appeal Board and the state courts, and 22 hours were
spent seeking the fee award. App. to Pet. for Cert. A39-A40.
In July, 1978, the District Court dismissed respondent's
complaint, App. 35, but left pending the application for attorney's
fees. After further briefing, the court denied the fee request.
458 F. Supp.
79 (SDNY 1978).
The District Court found the propriety of the EEOC's issuance of
a right-to-sue letter while state proceedings were pending "very
doubtful."
Id. at 80. Although the EEOC's action had given
respondent no choice but to preserve her rights by filing a
complaint in federal court, the District Court ruled that the mere
filing of a federal suit does not entitle an aggrieved party to
attorney's fees. The court reasoned that the fortuity of a need to
file a protective federal suit should not make the defendants
responsible for the costs of representing the plaintiff in the
state forums.
Id. at 81.
The District Court also relied on its conclusion that respondent
"had the option of pursuing her state administrative remedies
without incurring any expenses at all for legal services," since
state law, N.Y.Exec.Law § 297 (4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978),
provides that the case in support of the complaint is to be
presented to the hearing examiner by one
Page 447 U. S. 60
of the attorneys for the Division.
458 F. Supp.
at 81. The decision in
Parker v. Califano, 182
U.S.App.D.C. 322, 561 F.2d 320 (1977), upholding an award of
attorney's fees for prosecution of a federal employee's Title VII
claim in mandatory preliminary proceedings within the employee's
agency, was distinguished on the ground that the agency did not
provide an independent attorney to prosecute the complaint.
458 F. Supp.
at 81.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed. 598 F.2d 1253 (1979). The court ruled:
"A complaining party who is successful in state administrative
proceedings after having her complaint under Title VII referred to
a state agency in accordance with the statutory scheme of that
Title is entitled to recover attorney's fees in the same manner as
a party who prevails in federal court."
Id. at 1260. The court relied on several factors in
reaching its decision. Among them were the significant role of
state human rights agencies in the Title VII enforcement scheme;
the statute's strong preference for administrative resolution of a
discrimination complaint; the importance of providing an incentive
for complete development of the administrative record; the language
of the statute's fee provision; and the desirability of encouraging
a complainant to retain private counsel notwithstanding
participation of a Division attorney at certain points during the
state proceedings.
We granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 897 (1979), to consider this
question that is significant to the enforcement of the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII.
II
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), provides:
"In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs. "
Page 447 U. S. 61
The question presented is whether, in the words of the statute,
respondent was the "prevailing party" in an "action or proceeding
under this title." An examination of the language and history of
the statute, the nature of the proceedings in which respondent
participated, and the relationship of those proceedings to Title
VII's enforcement mechanisms, together persuade us that Congress
clearly intended to authorize awards of attorney's fees to persons
in respondent's situation.
The words of § 706(k) leave little doubt that fee awards are
authorized for legal work done in "proceedings" other than court
actions. Congress' use of the broadly inclusive disjunctive phrase
"action or proceeding" indicates an intent to subject the losing
party to an award of attorney's fees and costs that includes
expenses incurred for administrative proceedings. This conclusion
is supported by a comparison of § 706(k) with another fee provision
in the same Act, namely, § 204(b) of Title II, 78 Stat. 244, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b). The pertinent language of § 204(b) is
identical to that of § 706(k) except that § 204(b) permits an award
only with respect to "any action commenced pursuant to this title."
The two provisions were enacted contemporaneously as parts of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The omission of the words "or proceeding"
from § 204(b) is understandable, since enforcement of Title II
depends solely on court actions.
See Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400,
390 U. S. 401
(1968). It is apparent, therefore, that the two fee provisions were
carefully tailored to the enforcement scheme of each Title. It
cannot be assumed that the words "or proceeding" in § 706(k) are
mere surplusage.
It might be argued that the words "or proceeding" authorize fee
awards only for work done in federal administrative proceedings,
[
Footnote 2] such as those
before the EEOC, but not for
Page 447 U. S. 62
state administrative or state judicial proceedings. This reading
at least would not render the words "or proceeding" a complete
nullity. We find nothing in the statute, however, to suggest that
Congress intended to draw this particular line. Rather, other
provisions of the statute that interact with § 706(k); the purpose
of § 706(k); the humanitarian remedial policies of Title VII; and
the statute's structure of cooperation between federal and state
enforcement authorities, all point to the opposite conclusion.
Section 706(k) authorizes a fee award to the prevailing party in
"
any . . . proceeding under this title." (Emphasis added.)
The same Title creates the system of deferral to state and local
remedies. The statute uses the word "proceeding" to describe the
state and local remedies to which complainants are required to
resort. For example, § 706(c), 86 Stat. 104, provides:
"[N]o charge may be filed . . . before the expiration of sixty
days after
proceedings have been commenced under the State
or local law, unless such
proceedings have been earlier
terminated. . . . If any requirement for the commencement of such
proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other
than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement
of the facts upon which the
proceeding is based, the
proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the
purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent. . .
."
(Emphasis added) . Indeed, throughout Title VII, the word
"proceeding," or its plural form, is used to refer to all the
different types of proceedings in which the statute is enforced,
state and federal,
Page 447 U. S. 63
administrative and judicial. [
Footnote 3] The conclusion that fees are authorized for
work done at the state and local levels is inescapable.
This Court recently examined the legislative history and purpose
of § 706(k). In
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U. S. 412
(1978), it was noted that, although the legislative history of §
706(k) is "sparse," 434 U.S. at
434 U. S. 42, it
is clear that one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the
section was to "make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to
bring a meritorious suit."
Ibid., quoting 110 Cong.Rec.
12724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Because Congress has cast
the Title VII plaintiff in the role of "a private attorney
general," vindicating a policy "of the highest priority," a
prevailing plaintiff "ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees
in all but special circumstances." 434 U.S. at
434 U. S. 416,
434 U. S. 417.
See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 402.
It is clear that Congress intended to facilitate the bringing of
discrimination complaints. Permitting an attorney's fee award to
one in respondent's situation furthers this goal, while a contrary
rule would force the complainant to bear the costs of mandatory
state and local proceedings, and thereby would inhibit the
enforcement of a meritorious discrimination claim.
Title VII establishes a comprehensive enforcement scheme in
which state agencies are given
"a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment
discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal
relief by victims of the discrimination."
Oscar Mayer Co. v. Evans, 441 U.
S. 750,
441 U. S. 755
(1979). Congress envisioned that Title VII's procedures and
remedies would "mes[h] nicely, logically, and coherently with the
State and city legislation," and that remedying employment
Page 447 U. S. 64
discrimination would be an area in which "[t]he Federal
Government and the State governments could cooperate effectively."
110 Cong. Rec 7205 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
Pursuant to this policy of cooperation, Title VII provides that
where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred
in a State or locality which has a law prohibiting the practice and
in which an agency has been established to enforce that law, "no
charge may be filed [with the EEOC] by the person aggrieved before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been
earlier terminated." § 706(c). In practice, § 706(c) has resulted
in EEOC's development of a referral and deferral system, which the
Court approved in
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.
S. 522 (1972). When a charge is filed with the EEOC
prior to exhaustion of state or local remedies, the Commission
refers the complaint to the appropriate local agency. The EEOC then
holds the complaint in "suspended animation."
Id. at
404 U. S. 526.
Upon termination of the state proceedings or expiration of the
60-day deferral period, whichever comes first, the EEOC
automatically assumes concurrent jurisdiction of the complaint.
Ibid. [
Footnote 4]
Of course, the "ultimate authority" to secure compliance with
Title VII resides in the federal courts.
Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36,
415 U. S. 11 15
(1974). The statute
Page 447 U. S. 65
authorizes civil enforcement actions by both the EEOC and the
private plaintiff. After the deferral period, the EEOC assumes
jurisdiction, and, "as promptly as possible," it determines whether
there is probable cause to believe that the charge is true. §
706(b). After an additional 30 days, the EEOC is authorized to
bring an action, in which the complainant has an absolute right to
intervene. § 706(f). If the Commission does not file suit, or enter
into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party,
within 180 days after it reassumes jurisdiction, it must issue a
"right to sue" letter notifying the complainant of his right to
bring an action within 90 days.
Ibid. [
Footnote 5]
It is clear from this scheme of interrelated and complementary
state and federal enforcement that Congress viewed proceedings
before the EEOC and in federal court as supplements to available
state remedies for employment discrimination. Initial resort to
state and local remedies is mandated, and recourse to the federal
forums is appropriate only when the State does not provide prompt
or complete relief.
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. at
415 U. S.
48-50.
The construction of § 706(k) that petitioners advocate clashes
with this congressional design. Complainants unable to recover fees
in state proceedings may be expected to wait out the 60-day
deferral period, while focusing efforts on obtaining federal
relief.
See n 6,
infra. Only authorization of fee awards ensures
incorporation of state procedures as a meaningful part of the Title
VII enforcement scheme.
The District Court felt that granting a fee award to respondent
would be a "windfall" based on the unforeseeable fortuity that
filing a protective federal suit became necessary.
458 F. Supp.
at 81. We agree with the District Court that the
Page 447 U. S. 66
availability of a federal fee award for work done in state
proceedings following EEOC referral and deferral should not depend
upon whether the complainant ultimately finds it necessary to sue
in federal court to obtain relief other than attorney's fees. But
our agreement with the District Court compels us to reject its
conclusion. It would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant
who is unsuccessful or only partially successful in obtaining state
or local remedies, but to deny an award to the complainant who is
successful in fulfilling Congress' plan that federal policies be
vindicated at the state or local level. Since it is clear that
Congress intended to authorize fee awards for work done in
administrative proceedings, we must conclude that § 706(f)(1)'s
authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit
solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in
state and local proceedings. [
Footnote 6]
III
Against the strong considerations favoring an award of fees,
petitioners make three arguments. First, they contend that awarding
fees for work done in state proceedings for
Page 447 U. S. 67
which the State does not authorize fees [
Footnote 7] infringes on the State's powers under the
Tenth Amendment. Second, they argue that Congress' intent to
preempt the state law has not been clearly expressed. Third, they
contend that, even if § 706(k) authorizes fees for work done in
state proceedings in some instances, denial of an award here was
within the District Court's discretion.
We must reject petitioners' Tenth Amendment argument. Congress'
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad, and overrides
any interest the State might have in not authorizing awards for
fees in connection with state proceedings.
See Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U. S. 678
(1978);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.
S. 445 (1976).
Petitioners cite
Florida Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U. S. 132
(1963),
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.
S. 199 (1952), and
Florida v. United States,
282 U. S. 194
(1931), in support of their argument that Congress' intent to
preempt state regulation of the administration of state proceedings
is not clearly expressed in § 706(k) and should not be inferred. We
find these cases inapposite. Section 706(k) does not "preempt"
state law. "Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
at
415 U. S. 449.
Title VII explicitly leaves the States free, and indeed encourages
them, to exercise their regulatory power over discriminatory
employment practices. Title VII merely provides a supplemental
right to sue in federal court if satisfactory relief is not
obtained in state forums. § 706(f)(1). One aspect of complete
relief is an
Page 447 U. S. 68
award of attorney's fees, which Congress considered necessary
for the fulfillment of federal goals. Provision of a federal award
of attorney's fees is not different from any other aspect of the
ultimate authority of federal courts to enforce Title VII. For
example, if state proceedings result in an injunction in favor of
the complainant, but no award for backpay because state law does
not authorize it, the complainant may proceed in federal court to
"supplement" the state remedy. The state law which fails to
authorize backpay has not been preempted. In any event, if it can
be said that § 706(k) preempts the state rule, we believe that
Congress' intent to achieve this result is manifest.
We also find no merit in petitioners' suggestion that denial of
a fee award was within the District Court's discretion. As noted
earlier, the court's discretion to deny a fee award to a prevailing
plaintiff is narrow. Absent "special circumstances,"
see Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 402;
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. at
434 U. S.
416-417, fees should be awarded. Petitioners argue that
the availability of a Division attorney to present the "case in
support of the complaint" is a "special circumstance" which should
deprive a prevailing complainant of a fee award. Clearly, however,
an attorney is needed to assist the complainant during the state
proceedings, and the Division employee does not take the place of
private counsel.
The New York state procedure, to which respondent's charge was
referred, provides for adversary quasi-judicial hearings leading to
findings of fact, administrative appeals, and judicial review. The
first stage of the state administrative action is the
investigation; this results in either a finding of probable cause
or a dismissal of the complaint. N.Y.Exec.Law § 297(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1979). A finding of probable cause after investigation is a
necessary prelude to the public hearing. § 297(4)(a). State law
makes no provision for the participation of a Division attorney in
the investigation, and a complainant is not represented by a
Division attorney
Page 447 U. S. 69
at this preliminary stage.
See Brief for New York State
Attorney General and New York State Division of Human Rights as
Amici Curiae 5.
Following the investigation, the Division attempts to conciliate
the complainant's grievance with the employer. N.Y.Exec.Law §§
297(3)(a), (b), and (c) (McKinney 1972). No Division attorney
participates in the conciliation efforts on behalf of the
complainant, and the Division staff is even empowered to execute a
settlement agreement with the employer over the complainant's
objections. § 297(3)(c).
If efforts at conciliation fail and a hearing is scheduled,
state law provides:
"The case in support of the complaint shall be presented by one
of the attorneys or agents of the division and, at the option of
the complainant, by his attorney. With the consent of the division,
the case in support of the complainant may be presented solely by
his attorney."
§ 297(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). At the time of the hearing on
respondent's complaint, however, the practice of the Division was
to involve one of its attorneys only if the complainant was not
represented by private counsel. Brief for New York State Attorney
General and New York State Division of Human Rights as
Amici
Curiae 5. [
Footnote 8]
Complainants were "encouraged" to obtain private counsel due to a
growing caseload and staff limitations. App. to Pet. for Cert.
A58-A59.
At the appellate level, the Division attorney appears only to
support and seek enforcement of orders issued by the Division and
the Appeal Board. N.Y.Exec.Law § 298 (McKinney Supp. 1979). The
Division attorney does not
Page 447 U. S. 70
represent the complainant on an appeal from an order adverse to
the claimant. In addition, the Division cannot appeal from an order
of the Human Rights Appeal Board reversing a Division order. See
Brief for New York State Attorney General and New York Division of
Human Rights as
Amici Curiae 6.
It is thus obvious that the assistance provided a complainant by
the Division attorney is not fully adequate, and that the attorney
has no obligation to the complainant as a client. In fact, at
times, the position of the Division may be detrimental to the
interests of the complainant and to enforcement of federal rights.
Representation by a private attorney thus assures development of a
complete factual record at the investigative stage and at the
administrative hearing. At both, settlement is possible, and is
encouraged. A Division employee cannot act as the complainant's
attorney for purposes of advising him whether to accept a
settlement. Retention of private counsel will help assure that
federal rights are not compromised in the conciliation process.
If a Division attorney appears at the public hearing, he does
not represent the interests of the complainant, but rather those of
the State.
Id. at 5; App. to Pet. for Cert. A9-A60. He
presents the "case in support of the complaint," not in support of
the complainant. N.Y.Exec.Law § 297(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
Upon appeal, the Division attorney is authorized only to support
the order entered by the Division or the Appeal Board. Without
doubt, the private attorney has an important role to play in
preserving and protecting federal rights and interests during the
state proceedings. [
Footnote
9]
Page 447 U. S. 71
In sum, we conclude that §§ 706(f) and 706(k) of Title VII
authorize a federal court action to recover an award of attorney's
fees for work done by the prevailing complainant in state
proceedings to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the
provisions of Title VII. We also conclude that no special
circumstances exist in this case that would justify denial of a fee
award.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It
is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins the Court s opinion except
footnote 6 thereof; in his view resolution of
the issue dealt with in that footnote is not necessary.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST would reverse the
judgment essentially for the reasons given by Judge Mulligan in
dissenting from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 1]
Respondent was represented by counsel employed by the NAACP
Special Contribution Fund.
[
Footnote 2]
In cases involving federal employees, all the Courts of Appeals
that have considered the question have upheld fee awards under §
706(k) for work done in federal administrative proceedings that
must be exhausted as a condition to filing an action in federal
court.
E. Brown v. Battake, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (CA8 1978);
Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406 (CA1 1978);
Parker v.
Califano, 182 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 561 F.2d 320 (1977);
Foster v. Boorstin, 182 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 561 F.2d 340
(1977);
Johnson v. United States, 554 F.2d 632 (CA4
1977).
[
Footnote 3]
See, e.g., § 706(f)(1), 78 Stat. 260, as redesignated,
86 Stat. 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (court may stay "further
proceedings" pending the termination of "State or local
proceedings"); § 706(i), 78 Stat. 261, as amended, 86 Stat. 107, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (Commission may commence "proceedings" to
compel compliance with court order).
[
Footnote 4]
Other provisions of Title VII also evidence the policy of
promoting federal-state cooperation in enforcement. Section 706(b),
78 Stat. 259, as redesignated, 86 Stat. 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
5(b), requires the EEOC to "accord substantial weight" to a state
administrative determination, and § 709(b), 78 Stat. 262, as
amended, 86 Stat. 108, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 8(b), authorizes the EEOC
to "cooperate with State and local agencies charged with the
administration of State fair employment practices laws" in funding
research and other mutually beneficial projects, and to enter into
work-sharing agreements with those agencies to facilitate the
processing of complaints.
[
Footnote 5]
We thus disagree with the District Court that the propriety of
EEOC's issuance of the right-to-sue letter in this case is "very
doubtful."
458 F. Supp.
79, 80 (SDNY 1978). As we read the statute, the Commission was
required to issue the letter after 18 days, regardless of the
posture of any state proceedings.
[
Footnote 6]
We note that, if fees were authorized only when the complainant
found an independent reason for suing in federal court under Title
VII, such a ground almost always could be found. Section 706(f)(1)
requires the EEOC to give the complainant a "right to sue" letter
if, after it assumes concurrent jurisdiction over the complaint, it
does not sue within 180 days. Thus, after waiting 240 days (60 days
deferral to the state or local agency and 180 days for the EEOC to
act after deferral), the complainant appears to have an absolute
right to resort to an action in federal court. The federal court
may stay the action for a maximum of 60 more days, to permit
completion of state proceedings. § 706(f)(1). It took three years
for the New York proceedings in this case finally to provide
respondent all the relief she desired other than attorney's fees.
It is doubtful that the systems of many States could provide
complete relief within 240 days. The existence of an incentive to
get into federal court, such as the availability of a fee award,
would ensure that almost all Title VII complainants would abandon
state proceedings as soon as possible. This, however, would
undermine Congress' intent to encourage full use of state
remedies.
[
Footnote 7]
The Human Rights Law of the State of New York does not authorize
an award of counsel fees for work done in either state
administrative or judicial proceedings.
See State Commission
for Human Rights v. Speer, 35 App.Div.2d 107, 111-112, 313
N.Y.S.2d 28, 33 (1970),
rev'd on other
grounds, 29
N.Y.2d 555, 272 N.E.2d 884 (1971);
State Division of Human
Rights v. Gorton, 32 App.Div.2d 933, 934, 302 N.Y.S.2d 966,
968 (1969).
[
Footnote 8]
On October 18, 1977, Division regulations were amended to
provide for the presentation of the case in support of the
complaint solely by the attorney for the complainant, upon consent
of the Division. The regulation requires the Division attorney to
submit a statement to the hearing examiner in lieu of appearance. 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 465.11(d)(2) .
[
Footnote 9]
We also reject petitioners' argument, not suggested in the
petition for certiorari, that respondent's representation by a
public interest group is a "special circumstance" that should
result in denial of counsel fees. Federal Courts of Appeals'
decisions are to the contrary.
See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166 (CA1 1978);
Torres v. Sachs,
538 F.2d 10, 13 (CA2 1976). Congress endorsed such decisions
allowing fees to public interest groups when it was considering,
and passed, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90
Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which is legislation similar in
purpose and design to Title VII's fee provision.
See
H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, pp. 5 and 8, n. 16 (1976).
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with most of what is said in the Court's opinion,
it is useful to emphasize that this federal litigation was
commenced in order to obtain relief for respondent on the merits of
her basic dispute with petitioners, and not simply to recover
attorney's fees. Whether Congress intended to authorize a separate
federal action solely to recover costs, including attorney's fees,
incurred in obtaining administrative relief in either a deferral or
a nondeferral State is not only doubtful, but is a question that is
plainly not presented by this record.
Page 447 U. S. 72
On July 13, 1977, when the EEOC issued respondent a letter
notifying her that she had a right to file an action in federal
court, and on September 30, 1977, when she commenced her federal
court action, state judicial review of the state administrative
proceedings had not yet been completed. It was not until sometime
in February, 1978, after the federal judicial proceeding had been
pending for several months, that all questions other than the fee
issue were finally removed from the federal case. It is clear,
therefore, that, under the plain language of § 706(k) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),
* the Federal
District Court then had jurisdiction to allow the prevailing party
to recover attorney's fees as a part of her costs.
A quite different question would be presented if, before any
federal litigation were commenced, an aggrieved party had obtained
complete relief in the administrative proceedings. It is by no
means clear that the statute, which merely empowers a "court" to
award fees, would authorize a fee allowance when there is no need
for litigation in the federal court to resolve the merits of the
underlying dispute. Indeed, it is not even clear that the EEOC has
the authority to issue a "right to sue" letter, empowering the
complainant to bring suit in federal court, after the complainant
has obtained complete relief on the merits of his claim in
administrative proceedings.
See § 706(f)(1) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In any
event, the facts of this case present no occasion for the Court's
resolution of the issue,
ante at
447 U. S. 66.
All that needs to be decided is whether an allowance of fees may
properly cover the work
Page 447 U. S. 73
performed in the administrative proceedings that were a
prerequisite to the court action. I agree with the Court's
disposition of that issue, and would also observe that the same
analysis would apply to work performed in appearing before the
federal agency in a nondeferral State.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
* That section provides in part:
"In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . ."