At respondent's murder trial in a Michigan court resulting in
his conviction, he was asked on cross-examination why he told the
jury on direct examination a different story about stealing the
murder victim's car than he had told the police officers following
his arrest after being given
Miranda warnings. After his
conviction was affirmed on appeal, respondent unsuccessfully sought
a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court, but the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the cross-examination violated due
process under the rule of
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.
S. 610.
Held: The cross-examination did not violate due
process. Doyle, which held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits impeachment on the basis of a
defendant's silence following
Miranda warnings, does not
apply to cross-examination, such as occurred here, that merely
inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes
no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily
speaks after receiving
Miranda warnings has not been
induced to remain silent.
Certiorari granted; 610 F.2d 417, reversed.
PER CURIAM
Respondent Glenn Charles was arrested in Grand Rapids, Mich.,
while driving a stolen car. The car belonged to Theodore Ziefle,
who had been strangled to death in his Ann Arbor home less than a
week earlier. The respondent was charged with first-degree murder.
At his trial in the Circuit Court of Washtenaw County, Mich., the
State presented circumstantial evidence linking the respondent with
the crime. The respondent was found with Ziefle's car and some of
his other personal property. The respondent also owned clothing
like that worn by the man last seen with the victim, and he boasted
to witnesses that he had killed a man and stolen
Page 447 U. S. 405
his car. Police Detective Robert LeVanseler testified that he
interviewed the respondent shortly after his arrest. After giving
the respondent
Miranda warnings, LeVanseler asked him
about the stolen automobile. According to LeVanseler, the
respondent said that he stole the car in Ann Arbor from the
vicinity of Washtenaw and Hill Streets, about two miles from the
local bus station.
The respondent testified in his own behalf. On direct
examination, he stated that he took Ziefle's unattended automobile
from the parking lot of Kelly's Tire Co. in Ann Arbor. On
cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:
"Q. Now, this Kelly's Tire Company, that's right next to the bus
station, isn't it?"
"A. That's correct."
"Q. And, the bus station and Kelly's Tire are right next to the
Washtenaw County Jail are they not?"
"A. They are."
"Q. And, when you're standing in the Washtenaw County Jail
looking out the window you can look right out and see the bus
station and Kelly's Tire, can you not?"
"A. That's correct."
"Q. So, you've had plenty of opportunity from -- well, first you
spent some time in the Washtenaw County Jail, haven't you?"
"A. Quite a bit."
"Q. And, you have had plenty of opportunity to look out that
window and see the bus station and Kelly's Tire?"
"A. That's right."
"Q. And, you've seen cars being parked there, isn't that
right?"
"A. That's correct."
"Q. Is this where you got the idea to come up with the story
that you took a car from that location? "
Page 447 U. S. 406
"A. No, the reason I came up with that is because it's the
truth."
"Q. It's the truth?"
"A. That's right."
"Q. Don't you think it's rather odd that, if it were the truth,
that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the time you were
arrested, where you got that car?"
"A. No, I don't."
"Q. You don't think that's odd?"
"A. I wasn't charged with auto theft, I was charged with
murder."
"Q. Didn't you think at the time you were arrested that possibly
the car would have something to do with the charge of murder?"
"A. When I tried to talk to my attorney, they wouldn't let me
see him, and after that, he just said to keep quiet."
"Q. This is a rather recent fabrication of yours isn't
[
sic] it not?"
"A. No it isn't."
"Q. Well, you told Detective LeVanseler back when you were first
arrested, you stole the car back on Washtenaw and Hill Street?"
"A. Never spoke with Detective LeVanseler."
"Q. Never did?"
"A. Right, except when Detective Hall and Price were there, and
then it was on tape."
Trial Transcript 302-304.
The jury convicted the respondent of first-degree murder. The
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed,
People v. Charles, 58
Mich.App. 371, 227 N.W.2d 348 (1975), and the Michigan Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal, 397 Mich. 815 (1976). The respondent
then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court
withheld the writ, but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit
Page 447 U. S. 407
reversed. The Court of Appeals held that "the prosecutor's
questions about [respondent's] post-arrest failure to tell officers
the same story he told the jury violated due process" under the
rule of
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610
(1976). 610 F.2d 417, 422 (1079) . [
Footnote 1] The prison warden now petitions for a writ of
certiorari. We grant the petition, grant the respondent leave to
proceed
in forma pauperis, and reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
In
Doyle, we held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits impeachment on the basis of a
defendant's silence following
Miranda warnings. The case
involved two defendants who made no postarrest statements about
their involvement in the crime. [
Footnote 2] Each testified at trial that he had been
framed. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendants
why they had not told the frameup story to the police upon arrest.
We concluded that such impeachment was fundamentally unfair,
because
Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to
remain silent and
Page 447 U. S. 408
assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be
used against him. 426 U.S. at
426 U. S.
618-619;
see Jenkins v. Anderson, ante at
447 U. S.
239-240.
Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of
silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances. But
Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely
inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes
no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily
speaks after receiving
Miranda warnings has not been
induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his
statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.
See
United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 354-356 (CA3) (en banc),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979);
United States v.
Mireles, 570 F.2d 1287, 1291-1293 (CA5 1978);
United
States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 503-504 (CA1 1977),
cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978)
In this case, the Court of Appeals recognized that the
respondent could be questioned about prior statements inconsistent
with his trial testimony. The court therefore approved the "latter
portion of the above quoted cross-examination. . . ." 610 F.2d at
421. But the Court of Appeals found that "the earlier portion of
the exchange" concerned the "separate issu[e]" of the respondent's
"failure to tell arresting officers the same story he told the
jury."
Ibid. In the court's view, these questions were
unconstitutional inquiries about postarrest silence. Thus, the
Court of Appeals divided the cross-examination into two parts. It
then applied
Doyle to bar questions that concerned the
respondent's failure to tell the police the story he recounted at
trial.
We do not believe that the cross-examination in this case can be
bifurcated so neatly. The quoted colloquy, taken as a whole,
does
"not refe[r] to the [respondent's] exercise of his right to
remain silent; rather [it asks] the [respondent] why, if [his trial
testimony] were true, he didn't tell the officer that he stole the
decedent's car from the tire store parking lot instead of telling
him that he took it from the
Page 447 U. S. 409
street."
58 Mich. App. at 381, 227 N.W.2d at 354. Any ambiguity in the
prosecutor's initial questioning was quickly resolved by explicit
reference to Detective LeVanseler's testimony, which the jury had
heard only a few hours before. The questions were not designed to
draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior
inconsistent statement.
We conclude that
Doyle does not apply to the facts of
this case. Each of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be
said to involve "silence" insofar as it omits facts included in the
other version. But
Doyle does not require any such
formalistic understanding of "silence," and we find no reason to
adopt such a view in this case.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissents, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the reasons stated in its opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the state courts addressed the
question whether
Doyle should be applied retroactively.
Although the petitioner now claims that
Doyle should be
limited to prospective application,
see Stovall v. Denno,
388 U. S. 293
(1967), there is no indication that this claim was raised in the
courts below. Moreover, the respondent asserts that
Doyle's prohibition against use of postarrest silence was
the law of the Sixth Circuit and of the State of Michigan long
before his arrest. In view of our disposition of the merits of this
controversy, we express no view on the retroactivity question.
[
Footnote 2]
One defendant said nothing at all. The other asked arresting
officers, "[W]hat's this all about?" 426 U.S. at
426 U. S. 615,
n. 5. When told the reason for his arrest, he exclaimed "you got to
be crazy," or "I don't know what you are talking about."
Id. at
426 U. S.
622-623, n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Both the Court
and the dissent in
Doyle analyzed the due process question
as if both defendants had remained silent. The issue was said to
involve cross-examination of a person who "does remain silent"
after police inform him that he is legally entitled to do so.
Id. at
426 U. S. 620
(STEVENS, J., dissenting);
see id. at
426 U. S.
616-619;
id. at
426 U. S. 621,
426 U. S. 622,
426 U. S. 626
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). In any event, neither the inquiry nor
the exclamation quoted above contradicted the defendant's later
trial testimony.