When appellant arrived at the airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico,
police officers, without a warrant or probable cause to suspect
that appellant was carrying contraband, searched his baggage
pursuant to a Puerto Rico statute authorizing the police to search
the luggage of any person arriving in Puerto Rico from the United
States. The search revealed marihuana, and appellant was
subsequently charged with and convicted of a drug violation under
Puerto Rico law. On appeal, he contended that the search violated
the federal constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches; the Puerto Rico Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction.
Held:
1. The constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply
to Puerto Rico. Both Congress' implicit determinations that the
Amendment practically and beneficially may be implemented in Puerto
Rico and long experience establish that the Amendment's
restrictions on searches and seizures may be applied to Puerto Rico
without danger to national interests or risk of unfairness. From
1917 to 1952, Congress by statute afforded equivalent personal
rights to Puerto Rico residents, and the Puerto Rico Constitution,
which was adopted pursuant to Congress' authority and approved by
Congress in 1952, contains the Fourth Amendment's language as well
as language reflecting this Court's exegesis of the Amendment. Pp.
442 U. S.
468-471.
2. The search of appellant's baggage pursuant to statute did not
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment that there be
probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found
and that there be a warrant unless exigent circumstances make
compliance with this requirement impossible. P.
442 U. S.
471.
3. The requirements of a warrant and probable cause are not
subject to any exception that applies generally to persons arriving
in Puerto Rico from the United States. The statute in question
cannot be justified by any analogy to customs searches at a
functional equivalent of the international border of the United
States; Puerto Rico has no sovereign authority to control entry
into its territory. Nor can the statute be sustained by analogy to
state inspection provisions designed to implement health and safety
legislation, the statute having been construed by the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court as one enacted for the purpose of
Page 442 U. S. 466
enforcing criminal laws; moreover, health and safety inspections
are generally subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Pp.
442 U. S.
472-474.
Reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which STEWART,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
442 U. S.
474.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
In 1975, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enacted legislation
authorizing its police to search the luggage of any person arriving
in Puerto Rico from the United States. Pub. Law 22, P. R. Laws
Ann., Tit. 25, § 1051
et seq. (Supp. 1977). [
Footnote 1] The "Statement of Motives" in the
preamble to the statute indicates that it was enacted in response
to a serious increase in the importation of firearms, explosives,
and narcotics from
Page 442 U. S. 467
the mainland, and a concomitant rise in crime on the island. As
construed by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, Public Law 22 does not
require the police to have probable cause to believe that they will
find contraband before they search baggage. However, it does not
appear that the luggage of all travelers arriving from the mainland
is subject to this kind of search.
Appellant Terry Torres, a resident of Florida, arrived at San
Juan's Isla Verde Airport aboard a nonstop commercial flight from
Miami. An officer's suspicions were aroused when he observed that
Torres seemed nervous, and kept looking at an armed, uniformed
officer stationed nearby. There was, however, no articulable reason
to suspect that Torres was carrying contraband. When Torres claimed
his baggage, the officer stopped him, identified himself as an
agent of the Criminal Investigation Bureau, and presented Torres
with a card describing the provisions of Public Law 22. The
uniformed officer approached at the same time; Torres was taken
with his luggage to the Bureau's office at the airport.
Once there, the officer asked Torres if he understood what was
written on the card. Torres said that he did, but he objected to
having his luggage searched and asked to telephone his uncle, a
Puerto Rico attorney. The officer refused to allow him to place the
call, stating that he could contact a lawyer if it appeared that he
had committed a crime. Torres then yielded to the search and
unlocked his bags.
The search revealed one ounce of marihuana, a wooden pipe
bearing marihuana residue, and approximately $250,000 in cash.
Torres was charged, tried, and convicted of violating 404 of the
Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R.Laws Ann., Tit. 24, §
2404 (Supp. 1977). A sentence of from one to three years'
imprisonment was imposed.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Torres contended
that the search pursuant to Public Law 22 violated the federal
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches. Only
seven of the eight justices of the Puerto Rico
Page 442 U. S. 468
Supreme Court participated in considering the appeal; four of
the seven concluded that Public Law 22 violated the Fourth
Amendment. Three justices held Public Law 22 constitutional.
Article V, § 4, of the Puerto Rico Constitution provides that no
law may be held unconstitutional except by a majority of all the
members of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, there being only a
minority of the justices so holding, the court entered a judgment
stating:
"The search of appellant's belongings being based on the
provisions of Act No. 22 of August 6, 1975,
and considering the
absence of the majority vote required by the Constitution to annul
said Act, the judgment appealed is affirmed."
(Emphasis added.) We noted probable jurisdiction. 439 U.S. 815
(1978). [
Footnote 2]
II
Decisions of this Court early in the century limited the
application of the Constitution in Puerto Rico. In
Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244
(1901), we held that Congress could establish a special tariff on
goods imported from Puerto Rico to the United States, and that the
requirement that all taxes and duties imposed by Congress be
uniform throughout the
Page 442 U. S. 469
United States, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, was not applicable to the
island. Mr. Justice Edward White's concurring opinion announced the
doctrine that the United State could acquire territory without
incorporating it into the Nation, and that unincorporated territory
was not subject to all the provisions of the Constitution. 182 U.S.
at
182 U. S.
287-344. In support of this doctrine, the concurring
opinion emphasized that full application of the Constitution to all
territory under the control of the United States would create such
severe practical difficulties under certain circumstances as to
prohibit the United States from exercising its constitutional power
to occupy and acquire new lands.
Id. at 305-311.
The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated
territories was first adopted by a majority of the Court in
Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138
(1904); the Court sustained the refusal of the territorial
government of the Philippines to seek indictments by grand jury or
afford petit juries in criminal cases. The Court emphasized that
imposition of the jury system on people unaccustomed to common law
traditions "may be to work injustice and provoke disturbance,
rather than to aid the orderly administration of justice."
Id. at
195 U. S.
145-146,
195 U. S. 148.
It also suggested that the constitutional guarantees as to juries
should not be construed so as to hamper Congress in exercising its
constitutional authority to govern the territories.
Id. at
195 U. S. 148.
The doctrine that the Constitution does not guarantee grand and
petit juries in unincorporated territories was applied to Puerto
Rico, notwithstanding that its residents theretofore had been
granted United States citizenship, in
Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U. S. 298
(1922).
On the other hand, this Court has held or otherwise indicated
that Puerto Rico is subject to the First Amendment Speech Clause,
id. at
258 U. S. 314; the
Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment,
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.
S. 663,
416 U. S.
668-669, n. 5 (1974); and the equal protection guarantee
of either the Fifth or the
Page 442 U. S. 470
Fourteenth Amendment,
Examining Board v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U. S. 572,
426 U. S.
599-601 (1976). In
Califano v. Torres,
435 U. S. 1,
435 U. S. 4 n. 6
(1978) (per curiam), we assumed without deciding that the
constitutional right to travel extends to the Commonwealth.
Congress may make constitutional provisions applicable to
territories in which they would not otherwise be controlling.
Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415,
342 U. S.
419-420 (1952). Congress generally has left to this
Court the question of what constitutional guarantees apply to
Puerto Rico.
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, supra at
426 U. S. 590.
However, because the limitation on the application of the
Constitution in unincorporated territories is based in part on the
need to preserve Congress' ability to govern such possessions, and
may be overruled by Congress, a legislative determination that a
constitutional provision practically and beneficially may be
implemented in a territory is entitled to great weight.
Both Congress' implicit determinations in this respect and long
experience establish that the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on
searches and seizures may be applied to Puerto Rico without danger
to national interests or risk of unfairness. From 1917 until 1952,
Congress, by statute, afforded equivalent personal rights to the
residents of Puerto Rico. Act of Mar. 2, 1917, § 2, cl. 13-14, 39
Stat. 952, repealed, Act of July 3, 1950, § 5(1), 64 Stat. 320
(effective July 25, 1952). When Congress authorized the people of
Puerto Rico to adopt a constitution, its only express substantive
requirements were that the document should provide for a republican
form of government and "include a bill of rights." Act of July 3,
1950, § 2, 64 Stat. 319, 48 U.S.C. § 731c. A constitution
containing the language of the Fourth Amendment, as well as
additional language reflecting this Court's exegesis thereof,
P.R.Const., Art. II, § 10, was adopted by the people of Puerto Rico
and approved by Congress.
See Act of July 3, 1952, 66
Stat. 327. That constitutional provision remains in effect.
Page 442 U. S. 471
We conclude that the constitutional requirements of the Fourth
Amendment apply to the Commonwealth. [
Footnote 3] As in
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero,
supra at
435 U. S. 601,
we have no occasion to determine whether the Fourth Amendment
applies to Puerto Rico directly or by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III
The search of appellant's baggage pursuant to Public Law 22 did
not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as we
heretofore have construed it. First, the grounds for a search must
satisfy objective standards which ensure that the invasion of
personal privacy is justified by legitimate governmental interests.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648,
440 U. S.
653-655 (1979). The governmental interests to be served
in the detection or prevention of crime are subject to traditional
standards of probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence
will be found. Yet Public Law 22 does not require, and the officers
who made the search challenged here did not have, probable cause
for such belief.
Second, a warrant is normally a prerequisite to a search unless
exigent circumstances make compliance with this requirement
impossible.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385,
437 U. S.
393-394 (1978). Yet Public Law 22 requires no warrant,
and none was obtained before appellant's bags were searched.
[
Footnote 4]
Page 442 U. S. 472
IV
Apparently recognizing that the search of appellant's luggage
pursuant to Public Law 22 cannot be sustained under our previous
decisions, Puerto Rico urges us not to be bound in "the conceptual
prison of
stare decisis." It suggests a novel exception to
the normal Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and probable
cause, referring us to decisions of this and other courts which
have sustained (a) searches by the Border Patrol at a "functional
equivalent" of the international border of the United States, (b)
state inspections of shipments of goods in furtherance of health
and safety regulations, (c) the use of airport metal detectors, and
(d) certain searches on military bases. The Commonwealth asserts
that these decisions recognize a variety of "intermediate borders,"
analogous to the international border of the United States, at
which searches are permitted even though normal Fourth Amendment
requirements are not satisfied.
Puerto Rico then asks us to recognize an "intermediate border"
between the Commonwealth and the rest of the United States. In
support of this proposal, it points to its unique political status,
and to the fact that its borders as an island are, in fact,
international borders with respect to all countries except the
United States. Finally, Puerto Rico urges that, because of the
seriousness of the problems created by an influx of weapons and
narcotics, it should have the same freedom to search persons
crossing its "intermediate border" as does the United States with
respect to incoming international travelers.
The decisions on which Puerto Rico seeks to erect its theory of
"intermediate boundaries" do not reflect any geographical element
of Fourth Amendment doctrine, however, but are based on a variety
of considerations which have no bearing on this case. Public Law 22
cannot be justified by any analogy to customs searches at a
functional equivalent of the international border of the United
States. The authority of the
Page 442 U. S. 473
United States to search the baggage of arriving international
travelers is based on its inherent sovereign authority to protect
its territorial integrity. By reason of that authority, it is
entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must establish the
right to enter and to bring into the country whatever he may carry.
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606,
431 U. S. 620
(1977);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266,
413 U. S. 272
(1973);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132,
267 U. S. 154
(1925). Puerto Rico has no sovereign authority to prohibit entry
into its territory; as with all international ports of entry,
border and customs control for Puerto Rico is conducted by federal
officers. Congress has provided by statute that Puerto Rico must
accord to all citizens of the United States the privileges and
immunities of its own residents. Act of Aug. 5, 1947, § 7, 61 Stat.
772, 48 U.S.C. § 737.
See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S.
at
342 U. S. 419,
n.2.
Public Law 22 also may not be sustained by analogy to state
inspection provisions designed to implement health and safety
legislation. By a vote of four to three, the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court rejected appellee's attempt to characterize Public Law 22 as
a health and safety measure, finding instead that it was enacted
for the purpose of enforcing criminal laws. In any event, health
and safety inspections are subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement unless they fall within one of its recognized
exceptions, and must be based on a "plan containing specific
neutral criteria."
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U. S. 307,
436 U. S. 312,
323 (1978). [
Footnote 5]
Puerto Rico's position boils down to a contention that its law
enforcement problems are so pressing that it should be granted an
exemption from the usual requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Although we have recognized exceptions
Page 442 U. S. 474
to the warrant requirement when specific circumstances render
compliance impracticable, we have not dispensed with the
fundamental Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures simply because of a generalized urgency of
law enforcement.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra,
at
413 U. S.
273-275;
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.
S. 581,
332 U. S. 595
(1948).
In any event, Puerto Rico's law enforcement needs are
indistinguishable from those of many states. Puerto Rico is not
unique because it is an island; like Puerto Rico, neither Alaska
nor Hawaii are contiguous to the continental body of the United
States. Moreover, the majority of all the states have borders which
coincide in part with the international frontier of the United
States; virtually all have international airport facilities subject
to federal customs controls.
We therefore hold that the search pursuant to Public Law 22
violated constitutional guarantees; accordingly, evidence obtained
in the search of appellant's luggage should have been suppressed.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is therefore
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
Public Law 22, § 1, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 25, § 1051 (Supp.
1977), provides:
"The Police of Puerto Rico is hereby empowered and authorized to
inspect the luggage, packages, bundles, and bags of passengers and
crew who land in the airports and piers of Puerto Rico arriving
from the United States; to examine cargo brought into the country,
and to detain, question, and search those persons whom the Police
have ground to suspect of illegally carrying firearms, explosives,
narcotics, depressants or stimulants or similar substances."
[
Footnote 2]
Torres made an untimely motion for reconsideration in the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court, asserting that the application of Art. V, § 4,
to his appeal violated federal constitutional guarantees of due
process. Presumably because of the untimeliness, the court denied
the motion without opinion.
Torres seeks to renew this contention here. Since the judgment
of conviction must be reversed because of the invalidity of the
search,
see infra at
442 U. S.
471-474, we need not address the issue.
The Commonwealth suggests that its Supreme Court should be
allowed to address this issue because, if it were to invalidate the
special majority vote requirement, it would then reverse
appellant's conviction in accordance with the views of the majority
of the justices who participated. We see no purpose in requiring
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to address a second federal
constitutional issue which could not affect our holding.
[
Footnote 3]
The Commonwealth has not denied that it is subject to the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches. However,
even an explicit concession on this point would not "
relieve
this Court of the performance of the judicial function'" of
deciding the issue. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40, 392 U. S. 58
(1968), quoting Young v. United States, 315 U.
S. 257, 315 U. S. 258
(1942).
[
Footnote 4]
Recently, we made clear that, once a locked trunk was seized and
impounded incident to an arrest, there was no exigency justifying
forcibly opening the locked trunk without a search warrant.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1,
433 U. S. 15
(1977). There was no suggestion in
Chadwick, and there is
no suggestion here, that the officers had grounds to believe that
appellant's bags contained an "immediately dangerous
instrumentality."
See id. at
433 U. S. 15 n.
9.
[
Footnote 5]
Use of airport metal detectors with respect to passengers
boarding aircraft and searches of persons entering military bases
involve considerations not relevant to this case.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the
judgment.
Appellant's conviction of violating the Puerto Rico Controlled
Substances Act was based on evidence discovered when police,
admittedly without probable cause, searched appellant's luggage
after he arrived in Puerto Rico from Florida. The Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico has construed Public Law 22 to authorize such searches
without probable cause.
*
Page 442 U. S. 475
I concur in the Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment
applies in full force to Puerto Rico, that the search of
appellant's luggage without a warrant based on probable cause
violated the Fourth Amendment, that Public Law 22 is
unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize what the
Fourth Amendment prohibits, and that the evidence discovered in the
unconstitutional search therefore must be suppressed
Appellee concedes that the Fourth Amendment applies to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Brief for Appellee 12, citing
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.
S. 572,
426 U. S. 599
(1976);
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht leasing Co.,
416 U. S. 663,
416 U. S. 668
n. 5 (1974). Whatever the validity of the old cases such as
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244
(1901),
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.
S. 138 (1904), and
Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U. S. 298
(1922), in the particular historical context in which they were
decided, those cases are clearly not authority for questioning the
application of the Fourth Amendment -- or any other provision of
the Bill of Rights -- to the Commonwealth
Page 442 U. S. 476
of Puerto Rico in the 1970's. As Mr. Justice Black declared in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1,
354 U. S. 14
(1957) (plurality opinion):
"[N]either the cases nor their reasoning should be given any
further expansion. The concept that the Bill of Rights and other
constitutional protections against arbitrary government are
inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine, and, if allowed to
flourish, would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and
undermine the basis of our Government."
* Four of the eight members of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
were of the opinion that Public Law 22 as so construed violated the
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
See ante at
442 U. S. 468.
But Art. V, § 4, of the Puerto Rico Constitution provides that no
law shall be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico except by a majority of the total number of justices of which
the court is composed. Appellant argues that this requirement
violates the Supremacy Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Federal Constitution. In light of our resolution of the merits of
appellant's search and seizure claim, we need not pass on these
contentions.
Cf. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Park Dist.,
281 U. S. 74
(1930).
The Commonwealth's discussion of the impact of Art. V, § 4, on
this case, however, implicitly suggests a claim that this
"super-majority" provision constitutes an adequate and independent
nonfederal ground supporting the judgment reached by the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court. This cannot be. The provision neither supplies
an independent substantive basis for the decision nor controls the
parties' conduct of the litigation. It affects only the internal
"working rules" of the court. While such rules might affect the
decision of cases, they cannot be adequate grounds in support of
those decisions.