Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Act) provides that
the rights granted by § 804 against racial discrimination in the
sales or rental of housing "may be enforced by civil actions in
appropriate United States district courts." Respondents (the
village of Bellwood, one Negro and four white residents of
Bellwood, and one Negro resident of a neighboring municipality)
brought separate actions in District Court under § 812 against
petitioners (two real estate brokerage firms and certain of their
employees), alleging that they had violated § 804 by "steering"
prospective Negro homeowners toward a specified 12- by 13-block
integrated area ("target" area) of Bellwood and by steering white
customers away from the "target" area. It was further alleged that
Bellwood had been injured by having its housing market wrongfully
manipulated to the economic and social detriment of its citizens,
and that the individual respondents had been denied their right to
select housing without regard to race, and had been deprived of the
social and professional benefits of living in an integrated
society. Monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief was sought.
Prior to bringing suit, the individual respondents, purportedly,
but not in fact, seeking to purchase homes, had acted as "testers"
in an attempt to determine whether petitioners were engaged in
racial steering. Four of the six individual respondents reside in
the "target" area. The District Court granted summary judgment for
the petitioners in both cases, holding that respondents, who had
acted only as testers, and thus were, at most, indirect victims of
the alleged violations, lacked standing to sue under § 812, which
was limited to actions by "direct victims" of violations. The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that, although the
individual respondents lacked standing in their capacity as
testers, they were entitled to prove that the discriminatory
practices documented by their testing deprived them, as residents
of the adversely affected area, of the social and professional
benefits of living in an integrated society; that the requirements
of Art. III had been satisfied as to both the individual
respondents and respondent village; that § 810 of the Act -- which
provides that a "person aggrieved" by a violation of the
Page 441 U. S. 92
Act may seek conciliation from the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), and, if conciliation fails, bring suit in
district court -- and § 812 provide alternative remedies available
to precisely the same class of plaintiffs; and that the conclusion
in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.
S. 205,
409 U. S. 209,
that standing under § 810 extends "
as broadly as is permitted
by Article III,'" is applicable to cases brought under §
812.
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly interpreted §§ 810 and 812 as
providing alternative remedies to precisely the same class of
plaintiffs, with the result that standing under § 812, like that
under § 810, is as broad as is permitted by Art. III.
Trafficante, supra. This construction of the Act is
consistent with both its language and its legislative history, and
with the interpretation of HUD, the agency primarily assigned to
implement and administer the Act. Pp.
441 U. S.
100-109.
2. The facts alleged in the complaints and revealed by initial
discovery are sufficient to provide standing to respondents under
Art. III, except with respect to the two individual respondents who
do not reside within the "target" area, and thus summary judgments
for petitioners should not have been entered. Pp.
441 U. S.
109-116.
(a) If, as alleged, petitioners' sales practices actually have
begun to rob Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the
village has standing to challenge the legality of that conduct. Pp.
441 U. S.
109-111.
(b) The allegation that the "target" area is losing its
integrated character because of petitioners' conduct is sufficient
to satisfy Art. III with respect to the individual respondents who
reside in that area. The constitutional limits of these
respondents' standing to protest the intentional segregation of
their community do not vary simply because that community is
defined in terms of city blocks rather than, as in
Trafficante,
supra, by reference to apartment buildings, but instead are
determined by the presence or absence of a "distinct and palpable
injury" to respondents.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.
S. 490,
422 U. S. 501.
Moreover, to the extent that the complaints allege economic injury
to these respondents resulting from a diminution in the value of
their homes due to petitioners' conduct, convincing evidence of
such a decrease in value would be sufficient under Art. III to
allow standing to contest the legality of that conduct. Pp.
441 U. S.
111-115.
569 F.2d 1013, affirmed in part.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined.
Page 441 U. S. 93
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART, J.,
joined,
post, p.
441 U. S.
116.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 81, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3601
et seq., commonly known as the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Act), broadly prohibits discrimination in
housing throughout the Nation. This case presents both statutory
and constitutional questions concerning standing to sue under Title
VIII.
I
Petitioners in this case are two real estate brokerage firms,
Gladstone, Realtors (Gladstone), and Robert A Hintze, Realtors
(Hintze), and nine of their employees. Respondents are the village
of Bellwood, a municipal corporation and suburb of Chicago, one
Negro and four white residents of Bellwood, and one Negro resident
of neighboring Maywood. During
Page 441 U. S. 94
the fall of 1975, the individual respondents and other persons
consulted petitioners, stating that they were interested in
purchasing homes in the general suburban area of which Bellwood is
a part. The individual respondents were not, in fact, seeking to
purchase homes, but were acting as "testers" in an attempt to
determine whether petitioners were engaging in racial "steering,"
i.e., directing prospective home buyers interested in
equivalent properties to different areas according to their
race.
In October, 1975, respondents commenced an action under § 812 of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612, [
Footnote 1] against Gladstone and its employees in the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that
they had violated 804 of Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. [
Footnote 2] Simultaneously, respondents
filed a
Page 441 U. S. 95
virtually identical complaint against Hintze and its salespeople
in the same court. The complaints, as illuminated by subsequent
discovery, charged that petitioners had steered prospective Negro
home buyers toward an integrated area of Bellwood approximately 12
by 13 blocks in dimension and away from other, predominately white
areas. White customer, by contrast, allegedly were steered away
from the integrated area of Bellwood. Four of the six individual
respondents reside in this "target" area of Bellwood described in
the complaint. [
Footnote 3] The
complaints further alleged that the
"Village of Bellwood . . . has been injured by having [its]
housing market . . . wrongfully and illegally manipulated to the
economic and social detriment of the citizens of [the]
village,"
and that the individual respondents
"have been denied their right to select housing without regard
to race and have been deprived of the social and professional
benefits of living in an integrated society."
App. 6, 99. Respondents requested monetary, injunctive, and
declaratory relief.
Petitioners moved for summary judgment in both cases, arguing
that respondents had "no actionable claim or standing to sue" under
the statutes relied upon in the complaint, that there existed "no
case or controversy between the parties within the meaning of
Article III of the Constitution," and that respondents failed to
satisfy the prudential requirements for standing applicable in the
federal courts.
Id. at 78, 143. The District Judge
presiding over the case against Gladstone and its employees decided
that respondents were not within the
Page 441 U. S. 96
class of persons to whom Congress had extended the right to sue
under § 812. The court expressly adopted the reasoning of
TOPIC
v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (CA9 1976), a case involving
facts similar to those here. In
TOPIC, the Ninth Circuit
decided that Congress intended to limit actions under § 812 of the
Act to "direct victims" of Title VIII violations, even though,
under
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U. S. 205
(1972), standing under § 810 [
Footnote 4] of the Act, 42
Page 441 U. S. 97
U.S.C. § 3610, extends to the broadest class of plaintiffs
permitted by Art. III. Since the individual respondents had been
acting only as testers and thus admittedly had not been steered
away from any homes they might have wished to purchase, the court
concluded that they were, at most, only indirect victims of
Gladstone's alleged violations of the Act. As respondents' action
was brought under § 812, the court ruled that they lacked standing
under the terms of the Act. The court did not discuss Gladstone's
contention that respondents lacked standing under Art. III and the
prudential limitations on federal jurisdiction. The District Judge
presiding over the case against Hintze adopted the opinion of the
Gladstone court as his own and also granted summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit consolidated the
cases for appellate review. It first considered the significance of
the fact that the individual respondents were merely testers not
genuinely interested in purchasing homes. The court noted that
while this precluded respondents from arguing that they had been
denied their right to select housing without regard to race,
"the testers did . . . generate evidence suggesting the
perfectly permissible inference that [petitioners] have been
engaging, as the complaints allege, in the
practice of
racial steering with all of the buyer prospects who come through
their doors."
569 F.2d 1013, 1016 (1978) (emphasis in original). Thus,
although the individual respondents lacked standing in their
capacity as testers, they were entitled to prove that the
discriminatory practices documented by
Page 441 U. S. 98
their testing deprived them, as residents of the adversely
affected area, "of the social and professional benefits of living
in an integrated society."
The Court of Appeals then turned to the question whether the
Art. III minima for standing had been satisfied. Observing the
similarity between the allegations of injury here and those
accepted as constitutionally sufficient in
Trafficante, it
concluded that the individual respondents had presented a case or
controversy within the meaning of Art. III. The court also read the
complaints as alleging economic injury to the village itself as a
consequence of the claimed racial segregation of a portion of
Bellwood. Although this aspect of the case was not directly
controlled by
Trafficante, the court found that the
requirements of Art. III had been satisfied. [
Footnote 5]
Having concluded that a case or controversy within the meaning
of Art. III was before it, the Court of Appeals addressed the
District Court's ruling that § 812 of the Act, unlike § 810,
affords standing only to those directly injured by the
discriminatory acts challenged. After considering the legislative
history and recent federal court decisions construing these
provisions, the court concluded, contrary to the decision in
TOPIC v. Circle Realty, supra, that §§ 810 and 812 provide
alternative remedies available to precisely the same class of
plaintiffs. The conclusion of this Court in
Trafficante
that standing under § 810 extends "
as broadly as is permitted
by Article III of the Constitution,'" 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 209,
quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446
(CA3 1971), was seen as applicable to these cases brought under §
812. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the District
Court and remanded for further proceedings.
Petitioners sought review in this Court. We granted
certiorari
Page 441 U. S. 99
to resolve the conflict between the decision of the Court of
Appeals in this case and that of the Ninth Circuit in
TOPIC, and to consider the important questions of standing
raised under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 436 U.S.
956 (1978). With the limitation noted in
n 25,
infra, we now affirm.
II
In recent decisions, we have considered in some detail the
doctrine of standing in the federal courts.
"In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues. This inquiry involves both constitutional
limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential
limitations on its exercise. . . . In both dimensions, it is
founded in concern about the proper -- and properly limited -- role
of the courts in a democratic society."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490,
422 U. S. 498
(1975).
The constitutional limits on standing eliminate claims in which
the plaintiff has failed to make out a case or controversy between
himself and the defendant. In order to satisfy Art. III, the
plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the defendant.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59,
438 U. S. 72
(1978);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252,
429 U. S.
260-261 (1977);
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26,
426 U. S. 38
(1976);
Warth v. Seldin, supra at
422 U. S. 499;
Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.
S. 614,
410 U. S. 617
(1973). Otherwise, the exercise of federal jurisdiction "would be
gratuitous, and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra at
426 U. S.
38.
Even when a case falls within these constitutional boundaries, a
plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles
by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding
Page 441 U. S. 100
questions of broad social import where no individual rights
would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to
those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim. For
example, a litigant normally must assert an injury that is peculiar
to himself or to a distinct group of which he is a part, rather
than one "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 499.
He also must assert his own legal interests, rather than those of
third parties. [
Footnote 6]
Ibid. Accord, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., supra at
429 U. S.
263.
Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent
permitted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one "who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules."
Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 501.
In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: a
plaintiff must always have suffered "a distinct and palpable injury
to himself,"
ibid., that is likely to be redressed if the
requested relief is granted.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., supra, at
426 U. S.
38.
III
Petitioners have insisted throughout this litigation that
respondents lack standing under the terms of the Act. Their
argument, which was accepted by the District Court, is that, while
§ 810 provides standing to the fullest extent permitted by Art.
III,
see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. at
409 U. S. 209,
§ 812, under which respondents proceed, affords standing only to
"direct victims" of the conduct proscribed by Title VIII.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue
Page 441 U. S. 101
that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that §§ 810 and
812 are alternative remedies available to precisely the same class
of plaintiffs. The issue is a critical one, for if the District
Court correctly understood and applied § 812, we do not reach the
question whether the minimum requirements of Art. III have been
satisfied. If the Court of Appeals is correct, however, then the
constitutional question is squarely presented. [
Footnote 7]
Petitioners' argument centers on two points. First, § 810 uses
the term "person aggrieved," defined as "[a]ny person who claims to
have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice," to
describe those who may seek relief under that section. By contrast,
§ 812 lacks this broad definition of potential plaintiffs,
referring explicitly only to civil suits brought to enforce the
rights granted elsewhere in the Act. Second, under § 810, a
plaintiff must first seek informal conciliation of housing
discrimination disputes from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and appropriate state agencies before pursuing a
judicial remedy.
See n
4,
supra. But under § 812, a complainant may proceed
directly to federal court.
From these facts, petitioners infer a congressional plan to
create two distinct, though overlapping, remedial avenues under
Title VIII. Under § 810, they argue, Congress intended to reach all
victims -- both direct and indirect -- of housing discrimination by
referring generally to those "aggrieved." But in order to protect
the courts from the volume of litigation
Page 441 U. S. 102
such plaintiffs might generate, to make available the
administrative expertise of state and federal agencies, and to
involve state and local governments in national fair housing goals,
Congress interposed administrative remedies as a prerequisite to
the invocation of the federal judicial power by "indirect victims"
of Title VIII violations.
Since § 812 does not specifically refer to "persons aggrieved,"
and allows direct access to the courts by those invoking it,
petitioners argue that Congress must have intended this provision
to be available only to those most in need of a quick,
authoritative solution: those directly victimized by a wrongful
refusal to rent or sell a dwelling place or by some other violation
of the Act. The construction of § 812 accepted by the Court of
Appeals, they contend, is illogical, because it would permit a
plaintiff simply to ignore, at his option, the scheme of
administrative remedies set up in § 810. Thus, according to
petitioners, "direct victims" may proceed under either § 810 or §
812, while those injured only indirectly by housing discrimination
may proceed, if at all, under the former provision alone.
Finally, petitioners claim that the legislative history of the
Act supports their view. That history reflects that Congress was
concerned that Title VIII not be used as an instrument of
harassment. [
Footnote 8]
Petitioners contend that permitting individuals such as
respondents, who have not been harmed directly by petitioners'
alleged conduct, to invoke § 812 provides substantial opportunity
for abuse of that kind.
We find this construction of Title VIII to be inconsistent with
the statute's terms and its legislative history. Nothing in the
language of § 812 suggests that it contemplates a more restricted
class of plaintiffs than does § 810. The operative language of §
812 is phrased in the passive voice -- "[t]he rights granted by
sectio[n] 804 . . . may be enforced by civil
Page 441 U. S. 103
actions in appropriate United States district courts" -- simply
avoiding the need for a direct reference to the potential
plaintiff. The absence of "person aggrieved" in § 812, therefore,
does not indicate that standing is more limited under that
provision than under § 810. To the contrary, § 812, on its face,
contains no particular statutory restrictions on potential
plaintiffs. [
Footnote 9]
Contrary to petitioners' contention, § 810 is not structured to
keep complaints brought under it from reaching the federal courts,
or even to assure that the administrative process runs its full
course. Section 810(d) appears to give a complainant the right to
commence an action in federal court whether or not the Secretary of
HUD completes or chooses to pursue conciliation efforts. [
Footnote 10] Thus, a complainant
under § 810 may
Page 441 U. S. 104
resort to federal court merely because he is dissatisfied with
the results or delays of the conciliatory efforts of HUD. [
Footnote 11] The most plausible
inference to be drawn from Title VIII is that Congress intended to
provide all victims of Title VIII violations two alternative
mechanisms by which to seek redress: immediate suit in federal
district court or a simple, inexpensive, informal conciliation
procedure, to be followed by litigation should conciliation efforts
fail. [
Footnote 12]
Page 441 U. S. 105
Although the legislative history gave little help in determining
the proper scope of standing under § 810,
see Trafficante,
409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 210,
it provides substantial and rather specific support for the view
that § 810 and 812 are available to precisely the same class of
plaintiffs. [
Footnote 13]
Early legislative proposals for fair housing legislation contained
no administrative remedies. [
Footnote 14] The nonjudicial avenue of relief was later
added on the theory that it would provide a more expeditious and
less burdensome method of resolving housing complaints. [
Footnote 15]
Page 441 U. S. 106
There is no evidence that Congress intended to condition access
to the courts on a prior resort to the federal agency. To the
contrary, the history suggests that all Title VIII complainants
were to have available immediate judicial review. The alternative,
administrative remedy was then offered as an option to those who
desired to use it.
This apparently was the understanding of Representative Celler,
who, as chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, summarized the
Act on the floor of the House. [
Footnote 16] Similar perceptions were reflected in
reports on the proposed legislation by the Department of Justice
[
Footnote 17] and the House
Judiciary
Page 441 U. S. 107
Committee. [
Footnote 18]
HUD, the federal agency primarily assigned to implement and
administer Title VIII, consistently has treated §§ 810 and 812 as
alternative remedial provisions. [
Footnote 19] Under familiar principles,
see Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551,
439 U. S. 566
n. 20 (1979);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1,
380 U. S. 1 (1965),
and as we stated in
Trafficante, supra at
409 U. S. 210,
the agency's interpretation of the statute ordinarily commands
considerable deference.
Petitioners have identified nothing in the legislative history
contrary to this view. Their reliance on the expressed intent that
Title VIII not be used for harassment is unconvincing. Nowhere does
the history of the Act suggest that Congress attempted to deter
possible harassment by limiting standing under § 812. Indeed, such
an attempt would have been
Page 441 U. S. 108
pointless, given the relatively easy access to the courts
provided by § 810. [
Footnote
20]
Most federal courts that have considered the issue agree that §§
810 and 812 provide parallel remedies to precisely the same
prospective plaintiffs.
E.g., Wheatley Heights Neighborhood
Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F.
Supp. 486, 489-492 (EDNY 1977);
Village of Park Forest v.
Fairfax Realty, P-H 1 EOHC � 13,699, pp. 14,467-14,468 (ND
Ill.1975);
Fair Housing Council v. Eastern Bergen County
Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422
F. Supp. 1071, 1081-1083 (NJ 1976).
See also Howard v. W.
P. Bill Atkinson Enterprises, 412 F.
Supp. 610, 611 (WD Okla.1975);
Miller v.
Poretsky, 409 F.
Supp. 837, 838 (DC 1976);
Young v. AAA Realty
Co., 350 F.
Supp. 1382, 1384-1385 (MDNC 1972);
Crim v.
Glover, 338 F.
Supp. 823, 825 (SD Ohio 1972);
Johnson v.
Decker, 333 F. Supp.
88, 90-92 (ND Cal.1971);
Brown v. Lo
Duca, 307 F.
Supp. 102, 103-104 (ED Wis.1969). The notable exception is the
Ninth Circuit in
TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273
(1976), upon which petitioners rely. For the reasons
Page 441 U. S. 109
stated, we believe that the Court of Appeals in this case
correctly declined to follow
TOPIC. Standing under § 812,
like that under § 810, is "
as broa[d] as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution.'" Trafficante, 409 U.S.
at 409 U. S. 209.
[Footnote 21]
IV
We now consider the standing of the village of Bellwood and the
individual respondents in light of Art. III. We "accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and . . . construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party,"
Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 501,
as standing was challenged largely on the basis of the pleadings.
[
Footnote 22]
A
The gist of Bellwood's complaint is that petitioners' racial
steering effectively manipulates the housing market in the
Page 441 U. S. 110
described area of the village: Some whites who otherwise would
purchase homes there do not do so simply because petitioners
refrain from showing them what is available; conversely, some
Negroes purchase homes in the affected area solely because
petitioners falsely lead them to believe that no suitable homes
within the desired price range are available elsewhere in the
general area. Although the complaints are more conclusory and
abbreviated than good pleading would suggest, construed favorably
to Bellwood, they allege that this conduct is affecting the
village's racial composition, replacing what is presently an
integrated neighborhood with a segregated one.
The adverse consequences attendant upon a "changing"
neighborhood can be profound. If petitioners' steering practices
significantly reduce the total number of buyers in the Bellwood
housing market, prices may be deflected downward. This phenomenon
would be exacerbated if perceptible increases in the minority
population directly attributable to racial steering precipitate an
exodus of white residents.
Cf. Zuch v.
Hussey, 394 F.
Supp. 1028, 1030, 1054 (ED Mich.1975),
order aff'g and
remanding, 547 F.2d 1168 (CA6 1977);
Barrick Realty, Inc.
v. City of Gary, 354 F.
Supp. 126, 135 (ND Ind.1973),
aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (CA7
1974);
United States v. Mitchell, 335 F.
Supp. 1004, 1005 (ND Ga.1971),
aff'd sub nom, United States
v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (CA5),
cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973). [
Footnote 23] A significant reduction in property values
directly injures a
Page 441 U. S. 111
municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its
ability to bear the costs of local government and to provide
services. Other harms flowing from the realities of a racially
segregated community are not unlikely. [
Footnote 24] As we have said before, "[t]here can be
no question about the importance" to a community of "promoting
stable, racially integrated housing."
Linmark Associates, Inc.
v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85,
431 U. S. 94
(1977). If, as alleged, petitioners' sales practices actually have
begun to rob Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the
village has standing to challenge the legality of that conduct.
B
The individual respondents appeared before the District Court in
two capacities. First, they and other individuals had acted as
testers of petitioners' sales practices. In this Court, however,
respondents have not pressed the claim that they have standing to
sue as testers,
see Brief for Respondents 14-15, and we
therefore do not reach this question. Second, the individual
respondents claimed to be injured as homeowners in the community
against which petitioners' alleged steering has been directed. It
is in this capacity that they claim standing to pursue this
litigation.
Four of the individual respondents actually reside within the
target area of Bellwood. They claim that the transformation of
their neighborhood from an integrated to a predominantly Negro
community is depriving them of "the social and professional
benefits of living in an integrated society." This allegation is
similar to that presented in
Trafficante. In that case, a
Negro and a white resident of a large apartment complex
Page 441 U. S. 112
in San Francisco complained that the landlord's exclusion of
nonwhites from the complex stigmatized them as residents of a
"white ghetto" and deprived them of the social and professional
advantages of living in an integrated community. Noting the
importance of the "benefits from interracial associations," 409
U.S. at
409 U. S. 210,
and in keeping with the Court's recent statement that noneconomic
injuries may suffice to provide standing,
Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U. S. 727,
405 U. S.
734-735 (1972), we concluded that this injury was
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of
actual or threatened harm.
Petitioners argue that
Trafficante is distinguishable
because the complainants in that case alleged harm to the racial
character of their "community," whereas respondents refer only to
their "society." Reading the complaints as a whole, and remembering
that we encounter these allegations at the pleading stage, we
attach no particular significance to this difference in word
choice. Although an injury to one's "society" arguably would be an
exceptionally generalized harm, or, more important for Art. III
purposes, one that could not conceivably be the result of these
petitioners' conduct, we are obliged to construe the complaint
favorably to respondents, against whom the motions for summary
judgment were made in the District Court. So construed, and read in
context, the allegations of injury to the individual respondents'
"society" refer to the harm done to the residents of the carefully
described neighborhood in Bellwood in which four of the individual
respondents reside. [
Footnote
25] The question before us,
Page 441 U. S. 113
therefore, is whether an allegation that this particular area is
losing its integrated character because of petitioners' conduct is
sufficient to satisfy Art. III. [
Footnote 26]
Petitioners suggest that there is a critical distinction between
an apartment complex, even one as large as that in
Trafficante, [
Footnote
27] and a 12- by 13-block residential neighborhood. Although
there are factual differences, we do not view them as controlling
in this case. We note first that these differences arguably may run
in favor of standing for the individual respondents, according to
how one views his living environment. Apartment dwellers often are
more mobile, with less attachment to a community as such, and thus
are able to react more quickly to perceived social or economic
changes.
Page 441 U. S. 114
The homeowner in a suburban neighborhood such as Bellwood may
well have deeper community attachments and be less mobile. Various
inferences may be drawn from these and other differences, but, for
the purpose of standing analysis, we perceive no categorical
distinction between injury from racial steering suffered by
occupants of a large apartment complex and that imposed upon
residents of a relatively compact neighborhood such as Bellwood.
[
Footnote 28]
The constitutional limits of respondents' standing to protest
the intentional segregation of their community do not vary simply
because that community is defined in terms of city blocks, rather
than apartment buildings. Rather, they are determined by the
presence or absence of a "distinct and palpable injury,"
Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 501,
to respondents resulting from petitioners' conduct. A
"neighborhood" whose racial composition allegedly is being
manipulated may be so extensive in area, so heavily or even so
sparsely populated, or so lacking in shared social and commercial
intercourse that there would be no actual injury to a particular
resident. The presence of a genuine injury should be ascertainable
on the basis of discrete facts presented at trial. [
Footnote 29]
Page 441 U. S. 115
In addition to claiming the loss of social and professional
benefits to the individual respondents, the complaints fairly can
be read as alleging economic injury to them as well. [
Footnote 30] The most obvious source
of such harm would be an absolute or relative diminution in value
of the individual respondents' homes. This is a fact subject to
proof before the District Court, but convincing evidence that the
economic value of one's own home has declined as a result of the
conduct of another certainly is sufficient under Art. III to allow
standing to contest the legality of that conduct.
V
We conclude that the facts alleged in the complaints and
revealed by initial discovery are sufficient to provide standing
under Art. III. It remains open to petitioners, of course, to
contest these facts at trial. [
Footnote 31] The adequacy of proof of respondents'
standing is not before us, and we express no views on it. [
Footnote 32] We hold only that the
summary judgments should not have been entered on the records
before the District Court, except with respect to respondents Perry
and Sharp.
Page 441 U. S. 116
See n 25,
supra. Subject to this exception, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed. [
Footnote 33]
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 812 provides in part:
"(a) The rights granted by sections 803, 804, 805, and 806 may
be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district
courts without regard to the amount in controversy and in
appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 804 provides:
"As made applicable by section 803 and except as exempted by
sections 803(b) and 807, it shall be unlawful -- "
"(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
"(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
"(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed,
or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect
to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination."
"(d) To represent to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not
available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in
fact so available."
"(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to
sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or
prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a
particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
82 Stat. 83, as amended, 88 Stat. 729.
Respondents also claimed that petitioners had violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982.
[
Footnote 3]
Respondent Perry is a resident of Bellwood, but lives outside
the area allegedly affected by petitioners' steering practices.
Respondent Sharp lives in Maywood. These respondents are
Negroes.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 810 provides in part:
"(a) Any person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be
irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur (hereafter 'person aggrieved') may file a complaint
with the Secretary [of HUD]. . . . Within thirty days after
receiving a complaint, or within thirty days after the expiration
of any period of reference under subsection (c), the Secretary
shall investigate the complaint and give notice in writing to the
person aggrieved whether he intends to resolve it. If the Secretary
decides to resolve the complaint, he shall proceed to try to
eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. . .
."
"
* * * *"
"(c) Wherever a State or local fair housing law provides rights
and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing practices which are
substantially equivalent to the rights and remedies provided in
this title, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate State or
local agency of any complaint filed under this title which appears
to constitute a violation of such State or local fair housing law,
and the Secretary shall take no further action with respect to such
complaint if the appropriate State or local law enforcement
official has, within thirty days from the date the alleged offense
has been brought to his attention, commenced proceedings in the
matter, or, having done so, carries forward such proceedings with
reasonable promptness. In no event shall the Secretary take further
action unless he certifies that in his judgment, under the
circumstances of the particular case, the protection of the rights
of the parties or the interests of justice require such
action."
"(d) If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the
Secretary or within thirty days after expiration of any period of
reference under subsection (c), the Secretary has been unable to
obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the person aggrieved
may, within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court, against the respondent
named in the complaint, to enforce the rights granted or protected
by this title, insofar as such rights relate to the subject of the
complaint:
Provided, That no such civil action may he
brought in any United States district court if the person aggrieved
has a judicial remedy under a State or local fair housing law which
provides rights and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing
practices which are substantially equivalent to the rights and
remedies provided in this title. . . ."
82 Stat. 85.
[
Footnote 5]
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, also a
plaintiff in the two actions in the District Court, lacked
standing. 569 F.2d at 1017. That ruling has not been challenged in
this Court.
[
Footnote 6]
There are other nonconstitutional limitations on standing to be
applied in appropriate circumstances.
See, e.g., Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S.
26,
426 U. S. 39
n.19 (1976) ("the interest of the plaintiff, regardless of its
nature in the absolute, [must] at least be arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated' by the statutory
framework within which his claim arises," quoting
Data
Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150,
397 U. S. 153
(1969)).
[
Footnote 7]
It is not clear whether our opinion in
Trafficante was
intended to construe § 812 as well as § 810. Although certain
intervening plaintiffs in that case asserted standing under § 812,
but not § 810,
see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 322 F.
Supp. 352, 353 (ND Cal.),
aff'd, 446 F.2d 1158, 1161
n. 5 (CA9 1971), and the Court failed to disclaim decision on the
former provision, the opinion focuses exclusively on § 810. Rather
than attempt to reconstruct whatever understanding of the
relationship between §§ 810 and 812 might have been implicit in
Trafficante, we consider the merits of this important
statutory question directly.
[
Footnote 8]
This concern was expressed clearly in connection with an
amendment to § 804 proposed by Senator Allott.
See 114
Cong.Rec. 5515 (1968).
[
Footnote 9]
Both petitioners and the dissenting opinion,
post at
441 U. S. 124,
emphasize the language of § 812 that "[t]he rights granted by
sectio[n] 804 . . . may be enforced by civil actions. . . ."
See n 1,
supra. They argue that, since § 804, on its face, grants
no right to have one's community protected from the harms of racial
segregation, respondents have no substantive rights to enforce
under § 812.
That respondents themselves are not granted substantive rights
by § 804, however, hardly determines whether they may sue to
enforce the § 804 rights of others.
See supra at
441 U. S.
99-100. If, as is demonstrated in the text, Congress
intended standing under § 812 to extend to the full limits of Art.
III, the normal prudential rules do not apply; as long as the
plaintiff suffers actual injury as a result of the defendant's
conduct, he is permitted to prove that the rights of another were
infringed. The central issue at this stage of the proceedings is
not who possesses the legal rights protected by § 804, but whether
respondents were genuinely injured by conduct that violates
someone's § 804 rights, and thus are entitled to seek redress of
that harm under § 812.
[
Footnote 10]
The lower federal courts are divided over the question whether a
Title VIII complainant who has enlisted the aid of HUD under § 810
must commence the civil action referred to in § 810(d) no later
than 60 days after the filing of his administrative complaint, even
if HUD has not completed its conciliatory efforts by that time.
Several courts believe the plain language of § 810(d),
see
n 4,
supra, requires
this result.
Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233, 1240-1243
(CA8 1978);
Tatum v. Myrick, 425 F.
Supp. 809, 810-812 (MD Fla.1977);
Sumlin v.
Brown, 420 F. Supp.
78, 80-82 (ND Fla. 1976);
Brown v. Blake & Bane,
Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 621, 622 (ED Va.1975);
Young v. AAA Realty
Co., 350 F.
Supp. 1382, 1385-1387 (MDNC 1972). Others, following HUD's
interpretation of § 810(d),
see 24 CFR §§ 105.16(a) 105.34
(1978), believe that the only time limitation on one who has
properly complained to HUD is that a civil action be commenced
within 30 days of notice of HUD's failure to negotiate a
settlement.
Logan v. Richard F. Carmack & Assoc., 368 F.
Supp. 121, 122-123 (ED Tenn.1973); Brown v.
Ballas. 331 F.
Supp. 1033, 1036 (ND Tex.1971). This case does not require us
to resolve this conflict, and we express no views on it. But
regardless of which position is correct, it is clear that § 810
does not serve as a screening mechanism to deflect certain classes
of Title VIII grievances from the federal courts.
[
Footnote 11]
Section 810 does appear to restrict access to the federal courts
in one respect not paralleled by § 812. To the extent state or
local remedies prove adequate, a complainant under § 810 is
required to pursue them. Thus, under § 810(c), the Secretary of HUD
must suspend his conciliation efforts if local remedies providing
protection equivalent to that of Title VIII are being carried
forward by the appropriate public officials. Such deferral by the
Secretary apparently delays the availability of judicial review
under § 810(d). Section 810(d) also conditions the availability of
its civil action on the absence of an equivalent state or local
judicial remedy. Section 812 contains no such limitation.
We are convinced that neither these differences nor the
variations between § 810 and § 812 relied upon by the dissent,
see post at
441 U. S.
124-126, imply that § 810 is directed to a larger class
of plaintiffs than is § 812. The legislative history, discussed in
the text, contradicts any such suggestion.
See infra at
441 U. S.
105-108 and n. 20.
[
Footnote 12]
It is instructive to compare the administrative remedy of § 810
with that provided by § 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Under § 810(d), a complainant may simply
bypass the conciliatory efforts of HUD by commencing a civil
action, apparently without notice to the agency, 30 days after
filing his complaint. Under § 706(f)(1), by contrast, a complainant
must allow the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission a full 180
days to negotiate a settlement, and he must obtain a "right-to-sue"
letter before proceeding in federal court. Moreover, under §
706(b), the EEOC is instructed to make a judgment on the merits of
the administrative complaints it receives by dismissing those it
does not have reasonable cause to believe are true. No such
administrative statement on the merits of a § 810 complaint is
required; the Secretary of HUD is asked only to indicate whether he
"intends to resolve" a complaint. Finally, under § 706(f)(1), the
EEOC may elect to bring suit itself, thereby preempting the
individual complainant's right to commence the litigation and
exercising important supervision over the conduct of the case. The
Secretary of HUD enjoys no similar authority under § 810. From
these and other differences between the two statutes, it is
apparent that § 810, unlike § 706, does not provide an effective
administrative buffer between the federal courts and individual
complainants.
[
Footnote 13]
For a general review of the legislative history of Title VIII,
see Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 Washburn L.J. 149 (1969).
[
Footnote 14]
Three bills containing fair housing provisions were introduced
in Congress in 1966: S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 14770,
89th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. As
introduced, they provided for judicial enforcement only.
[
Footnote 15]
Explaining the addition of administrative remedies to H.R.
14765, one of the bills introduced in 1966, Representative Conyers
stated:
"Experience with comparable State and local agencies repeatedly
has shown that the administrative process is quicker and fairer. It
more quickly implements the rights of the person discriminated
against, and also quickly resolves frivolous and otherwise invalid
complaints. Conciliation is easier in an informal administrative
procedure than in the formal judicial process. Also, individual
court suits would place a greater burden of expense, time and
effort on not only the plaintiff but on all other parties involved,
including the seller, broker and mortgage financier, and on the
judicial system itself."
112 Cong.Rec. 18402 (1966).
Fair housing legislation introduced in 1967 similarly provided
for administrative relief, which again was justified in terms of
its perceived advantages to litigants over judicial review.
Hearings on S. 1358
et al. before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (testimony of Roy Wilkins,
Executive Director, NAACP, and Chairman, Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights).
The administrative remedies in the 1966 and 1967 proposals would
have granted substantive enforcement powers to HUD. Although Title
VIII, enacted in 1968, provided for only informal, conciliatory
efforts by that agency, petitioners have identified nothing in the
legislative history suggesting that the purpose for including an
administrative avenue of relief had changed from that stated with
respect to the 1966 and 1967 bills.
[
Footnote 16]
In describing the enforcement provisions of Title VIII,
Representative Celler stated:
"In addition to administrative remedies, the bill authorizes
immediate civil suits by private persons within 180 days after the
alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred. . . ."
114 Cong.Rec. 9560 (1968).
[
Footnote 17]
The Justice Department report explained an amendment to the
proposed Fair Housing Act offered by Senator Dirksen, which
contained the enforcement provisions ultimately enacted as §§ 810
and 812. It states:
"In addition to the administrative remedy provided through the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the bill provides for
an immediate right to proceed by civil action in an appropriate
Federal or State court."
114 Cong.Rec. 4908 (1968).
[
Footnote 18]
The House Judiciary Committee Report states:
"Section 812 states what is apparently an alternative to the
'conciliation then litigation' approach [of § 810]: an aggrieved
person within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory practice
occurred, may, without complaining to HUD, file an action in the
appropriate U.S. district court."
Id. at 9612 (emphasis added).
The use of the term "aggrieved person" to refer to potential
plaintiffs under § 812, as well as the reference to the § 812
remedy as an alternative to that of § 810, indicates that the
authors of this Report believed the two sections were intended to
reach a single class of plaintiffs.
[
Footnote 19]
In its regulations describing the process of administrative
conciliation under § 810, HUD provides that every "person aggrieved
[who files a complaint with HUD] shall be notified of . . . his
right to bring court action under sections 810 and 812." 24 CFR §
105.16(a) (1978). The regulations suggest no distinction between
complainants under § 810 and plaintiffs under § 812.
In a handbook designed for internal agency use, § 812 is
described as an "additional remed[y] for discriminatory housing
practices [that] may be pursued concurrently with the complaint
procedure [of § 810]." Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Title VIII Field Operations Handbook 59 (1971).
[
Footnote 20]
Although the legislative history is not free from some
ambiguity, we do not agree with the view of it taken by the
dissenting opinion.
See post at
441 U. S.
126-128. The fact that, under Senator Miller's
amendment, Title VIII complainants choosing to avail themselves of
the informal, administrative procedures under § 810 are required to
exhaust state remedies equivalent to Title VIII does not compel any
particular conclusion about the size of the class to which § 812
extends. It was not irrational for Congress to conclude that, even
with its limited exhaustion requirement, the incentive of § 810's
simple, inexpensive conciliation procedure, as opposed to the
immediate commencement of a formal lawsuit in federal district
court under § 812, would be an attractive alternative to many of
those aggrieved under Title VIII. Thus, under our construction of §
812, the exhaustion requirement of § 810 is not rendered
meaningless. Apart from the argument based on the Miller amendment,
the dissent relies on nothing more than an isolated, rhetorical
remark by one Senator. Nothing in the legislative history or the
administrative practices of HUD affirmatively supports the view
that standing under § 810 is not identical to that under § 812.
[
Footnote 21]
Petitioners argue that, regardless of the scope of standing
under § 812, the village of Bellwood cannot sue under that
provision, since it is not a "private person" as referred to in the
caption to § 812.
The Court of Appeals noted that,
"[i]n a single sentence at oral argument, counsel for
[petitioners] advanced the argument, not mentioned in their brief,
that the Village lacks standing because it is not a 'person' as
defined in [§ 802(d)]."
569 F.2d at 1020 n. 8. The court rejected this contention,
reasoning that the inclusion of "corporation" in the Act's
definition of person encompassed municipal corporations such as
Bellwood.
Ibid. In this Court, petitioners have not argued
that the village is not a "person," contending instead that it is
not a "private person." Petitioners thus have presented a variant
of the question raised belatedly in the Court of Appeals and given,
perhaps deservedly, only cursory treatment there. Under these
circumstances, the question whether Bellwood is a "private person"
entitled to sue under § 812 is not properly before us, and we
express no views on it.
[
Footnote 22]
In addition to the complaints, the records in these cases
contain several admissions by respondents, answers to petitioners'
interrogatories, and exhibits appended to those answers, including
maps of Bellwood. As did the courts below and the parties
themselves, we accept as true the facts contained in these
discovery materials for the purposes of the standing issue.
[
Footnote 23]
Zuch and
Mitchell were cases in which real
estate brokers were accused of "blockbusting,"
i.e.,
exploiting fears of racial change by directly perpetuating rumors
and soliciting sales in target neighborhoods. Respondents have not
alleged that petitioners engaged in such unprincipled conduct, but
the description in those cases of the reaction of some whites to a
perceived influx of minority residents underscores the import of
Bellwood's allegation that petitioners' sales practices threaten
serious economic dislocation to the village.
[
Footnote 24]
It has been widely recognized, for example, that school
segregation is linked closely to housing segregation.
See,
e.g., Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F.
Supp. 710, 717 (WDNY 1970) (three-judge court),
summarily
aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, Report 237 (1968); 114 Cong.Rec. 2276 (1968)
(remarks of Sen. Mondale).
[
Footnote 25]
As previously indicated,
n
3,
supra, neither respondent Perry nor respondent Sharp
resides within the target neighborhood of Bellwood. We read the
complaints as claiming injury only to that area and its residents,
and we are unable to find any allegations of harm to individuals
residing elsewhere. On the record before us, we therefore conclude
that summary judgment as to these two respondents was appropriate.
We note, however, that the standing issue as framed by the District
Court was simply whether respondents were direct, as opposed to
indirect, victims of the steering practices of petitioners. Viewed
in that context, it made no difference whether Perry and Sharp were
residents of the target area or not, for they would be found to be
without standing in either event. As stated in
441 U.
S. supra, the District Court's perception of
the standing question was incorrect. Only upon reaching this Court
has the failure of the complaints to make sufficient allegations as
to these two individuals been put in issue clearly. Although we
intimate no view as to whether persons residing outside of the
target neighborhood have standing to sue under § 812 of Title VIII,
we do not foreclose consideration of this question if, on remand,
the District Court permits respondents Perry and Sharp to amend
their complaints to include allegations of actual harm.
[
Footnote 26]
Apart from the use of "community" rather than "society," the
complaint in
Trafficante differed from those here in that
it alleged that a segregated community was prevented from becoming
integrated because of the defendant's conduct. Here, by contrast,
respondents claim that an integrated neighborhood is becoming a
segregated community because of petitioners' conduct. We find this
difference unimportant to our analysis of standing. In both
situations, the deprivation of the benefits of interracial
associations constitutes the alleged injury.
[
Footnote 27]
The apartment complex in
Trafficante housed 8,200
tenants. 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 206.
The population of Bellwood, of which the target neighborhood is
only a part, was estimated at 20,969 in 1975. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates and
Projections, Series P-25, No. 661, p. Ill. 15 (1977).
[
Footnote 28]
See Shannon v. HUD, 305 F.
Supp. 205, 208, 211 (ED Pa.1969),
aff'd in part, 436
F.2d 809, 817-818 (CA3 1970) (residents in a neighborhood affected
by urban renewal project have standing to challenge the project's
impact on the neighborhood's racial balance).
Accord, Fox v.
HUD, 416 F.
Supp. 954, 955-956 (ED Pa.1976);
Marin City Council v.
Marin County Redevelopment Agency, 416 F.
Supp. 700, 702, 704 (ND Cal.1975).
See also Comment,
The Fair Housing Act: Standing for the Private Attorney General, 12
Santa Clara Law. 562, 568-571 (1972).
[
Footnote 29]
In addition to evidence about the community, it will be relevant
at trial to consider the nature and extent of the business of the
petitioner real estate brokers. This should include an inquiry into
the extent of their participation in the purchase, sale, and rental
of residences in the target area, the number and race of their
customers, and the type of housing desired by customers. Evidence
of this kind may be relevant to the establishment of the necessary
causal connection between the alleged conduct and the asserted
injury. Respondents apparently attempted to discover such
information, but summary judgment was entered against them before
this was accomplished.
[
Footnote 30]
The complaints state that petitioners have manipulated the
housing market of Bellwood "to the economic and social detriment of
the citizens of [the] village." App. 6, 99.
[
Footnote 31]
Although standing generally is a matter dealt with at the
earliest stages of litigation, usually on the pleadings, it
sometimes remains to be seen whether the factual allegations of the
complaint necessary for standing will be supported adequately by
the evidence adduced at trial.
[
Footnote 32]
The federal courts that have considered the question have
concluded that racial steering is prohibited by Title VIII.
E.g., Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales
Co., 429 F.
Supp. 486, 488 (EDNY 1977);
United States v. Real Estate
One, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 1140, 1144 (ED Mich.1977);
Fair Housing Council v.
Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv.,
Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 1071, 1075 (NJ 1976). We do not reach this issue, as it
is not presented by this case.
[
Footnote 33]
The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to consider
respondents' standing under § 1982. For this reason, and because of
our decision with respect to respondents' standing under Title
VIII, we do not reach the § 1982 issue.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins,
dissenting.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 81, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3601
et seq., which outlaws
discrimination in virtually all aspects of the sale or rental of
housing, provides two distinct and widely different routes into
federal court. Under § 810, 42 U.S.C. § 3610, [
Footnote 2/1] a "person aggrieved,"
Page 441 U. S. 117
that is, "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice," may seek administrative relief
from the Secretary of the Department of Housing and
Page 441 U. S. 118
Urban Development and, if the Secretary cannot within 30 days
resolve the dispute "by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion," may bring a civil action in federal
district court. In
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U. S. 205
(1972), we held that the broad definition given to the term "person
aggrieved" in § 810 evinced "
a congressional intention to
define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution.'" 409 U.S. at 409 U. S.
209.
The second route into federal court under Title VIII -- § 812
[
Footnote 2/2] -- provides simply
that
"[t]he rights granted by sections
Page 441 U. S. 119
803, 804, 805, and 806 of this title may be enforced by civil
actions in appropriate United States district courts. . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 3612. Despite the absence from § 812 of the "person
aggrieved" language so crucial to our holding in
Trafficante regarding standing under § 810, the Court
today holds that "[s]tanding under § 812, like that under § 810, is
as broa[d] as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution.'" Ante at 441 U. S. 109,
quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra
at 409 U. S. 209.
I think that the Court's decision ignores the plain language of §
812 and makes nonsense out of Title VIII's formerly sensible
statutory enforcement scheme.
I
The doctrine of standing is comprised of both constitutional
limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts and prudential
rules of self-restraint designed to bar from federal court those
parties who are ill-suited to litigate the claims they assert. In
its constitutional dimension, the standing inquiry asks whether the
party before the court has
"'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to
warrant
his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and
to justify
Page 441 U. S. 120
exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490,
422 U. S.
498-499 (1975) (emphasis in original), quoting
Baker
v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
369 U. S. 204
(1962). The crucial elements of standing are injury in fact and
causation. To demonstrate the "personal stake" in the litigation
necessary to satisfy the Constitution, the party must suffer "a
distinct and palpable injury,"
Warth v. Seldin, supra at
422 U. S. 501,
that bears a "
fairly traceable' causal connection" to the
challenged action. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59,
438 U. S. 72
(1978), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252,
429 U. S. 261
(1977). Accordingly, when an objection to a party's standing to
litigate in federal court is constitutionally based, "the relevant
inquiry is whether . . . the plaintiff has shown an injury to
himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U. S. 26,
426 U. S. 38
(1976).
A plaintiff who alleges sufficient injury to satisfy these
minimum constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction may
nonetheless be barred from federal court under our prudential
standing rules because he asserts a generalized grievance shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens,
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U. S. 208
(1974), or because he seeks to "rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties," rather than his own.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 499.
These prudential rules, however, are subject to modification by
Congress, which may grant to any person satisfying Art. III's
minimum standing requirements a right "to seek relief on the basis
of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, [to]
invoke the general public interest in support of [his] claim."
Id. at
422 U. S. 501.
Congress did just that in enacting § 810 of Title VIII, which
grants to "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice" a right to seek federal
administrative and judicial relief. In
Trafficante,
Page 441 U. S. 121
supra, we held that the broad definition given "person
aggrieved" in § 810 indicated a congressional intent to accord
apartment dwellers, who had not themselves suffered discrimination,
an actionable right to be free from the adverse consequences
flowing to them from racially discriminatory rental practices
directed at third parties. [
Footnote
2/3] Plaintiffs' alleged "loss of important benefits from
interracial associations," 409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 210,
was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Art
III.
In the case now before us, respondents -- the village of
Bellwood, five of its residents, and one resident of a neighboring
community -- brought suit against petitioner real estate firms,
alleging that the firms had violated both 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and §
804 of Title VIII by "steering" prospective homebuyers to different
areas in and around Bellwood according to their race. Like
plaintiffs in
Trafficante, the individual respondents
allege that petitioners' practice of racial steering has deprived
them of "the social and professional benefits of living in an
integrated society." [
Footnote 2/4]
App. 6, 99. Respondent village of Bellwood alleges that it has been
injured "by having [its] housing market . . . wrongfully and
illegally
Page 441 U. S. 122
manipulated to the economic and social detriment of [its]
citizens."
Ibid. Unlike plaintiffs in
Trafficante, however, respondents have not proceeded under
§ 810 of Title VIII, choosing instead to travel the direct route
into federal court provided by § 812.
In pertinent part, § 812 provides:
"The rights granted by sections 803, 804, 805, and 806 may be
enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district
courts without regard to the amount in controversy and in
appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction."
82 Stat. 88, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). The language of § 812 contains
no indication that Congress intended to authorize the commencement
of suits under Title VIII by persons who would otherwise be barred
from federal court by prudential standing rules. Indeed, were § 812
the only method for enforcing Title VIII, respondents -- who were
not themselves discriminated against by petitioners -- could hardly
argue that they were statutorily authorized to seek relief on the
basis of legal rights and interests of third parties who had been
racially "steered" into and away from certain areas in the
community. The Court, however, in effect, reads the broadly defined
"person aggrieved" language of § 810 into § 812, holding that the
alternative routes into federal court provided under the sections
are available to precisely the same class of plaintiffs. The
language and structure of Title VIII lead me to a contrary
conclusion.
II
The term "person aggrieved" is used throughout § 810 -- no less
than four times -- to denominate the proper § 810 claimant;
[
Footnote 2/5] by contrast, in §
812, Congress wholly avoided use of this broadly defined term,
preferring instead the familiar "plaintiff." Noting that § 812 is
phrased in the passive voice,
Page 441 U. S. 123
the Court concludes that the absence of the "person aggrieved"
language from the provision "does not indicate that standing is
more
limited under that provision than under § 810."
Ante at
441 U. S. 103
(emphasis added). The point of our decision in
Trafficante, however, was that the presence of the "person
aggrieved" language in § 810 demonstrated Congress' affirmative
intent to abrogate prudential standing rules and to expand standing
under the section to the full extent permitted by Art III of the
Constitution. It thus follows that the absence of "person
aggrieved" from § 812 indicates that Congress did not intend to
abrogate the normal prudential rules of standing with regard to §
812.
Consistent with § 810's broad grant of standing is the language
chosen by Congress to define the scope of the civil action that may
be brought under the section:
"[T]he person aggrieved may . . . commence a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court . . . to enforce the
rights granted
or protected by this title. . . ."
82 Stat. 86, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (emphasis added). Section 812,
in contrast, authorizes the commencement of a civil action to
enforce only "[t]he rights granted by," as opposed to "rights
granted or protected by," §§ 803, 804, 805, and 806. Clearly,
Congress contemplated that § 812 suits could be instituted only by
persons alleging injury to rights expressly secured under the
enumerated sections.
Section 804, the provision allegedly offended by petitioners,
provides in pertinent part:
"[I]t shall be unlawful -- "
"(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
"(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or
Page 441 U. S. 124
in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
"
* * * *"
"(d) To represent to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not
available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in
fact so available."
82 Stat. 83, as amended, 88 Stat. 729, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. In
essence, § 804 grants to all persons [
Footnote 2/6] seeking housing the right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Nowhere in the section are the individual
respondents granted a right to reap the "social and professional
benefits of living in an integrated society." Nor does § 804 grant
the village of Bellwood an actionable right not to have its housing
market "wrongfully and illegally manipulated." Accordingly,
respondents have suffered no injury to "rights granted by [§
804]."
The structure of both § 810 and § 812 and the significant
differences between the two enforcement provisions further support
the conclusion that Congress intended to restrict access to federal
courts under § 812 to a more limited class of plaintiffs than that
contemplated under § 810. A "person aggrieved" proceeding under §
810 must first file a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, who is authorized "to try to eliminate or
correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. §
3610(a). The Secretary, however, must defer to the appropriate
state
Page 441 U. S. 125
or local agency whenever state or local fair housing laws
provide rights and remedies substantially equivalent to those
secured under Title VIII. The Secretary may recommence action on
the complaint only upon certification that such action is necessary
to protect the rights of the parties or the interests of justice.
42 U. S.C. § 3610(c). If the Secretary's informal efforts prove
futile, the "person aggrieved" may commence a civil action under
Title VIII in federal district court, but only if he has no
comparable judicial remedy under "substantially equivalent" state
or local fair housing legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d).
The § 812 "plaintiff" is not similarly encumbered. He may
proceed directly into federal court, deferring neither to the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development nor to state
administrative and judicial processes.
See 42 U.S.C. §
3612(a). The District Court is authorized to appoint an attorney
for the § 812 plaintiff and to waive payment of fees, costs, and
security. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b). Additionally, broader relief is
available under § 812. The "prevailing plaintiff" may be awarded
a
"permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order,
or other order, and . . . actual damages and not more than $1000
punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney
fees. . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c). Section 810, by contrast, makes no
allowance for damages costs or counsel fees, limiting the
victorious claimant to injunctive relief and such other affirmative
action as may be appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d). Nor does § 812
contain a provision similar to § 810(e), which provides that, "[i]n
any proceeding brought pursuant to [§ 810], the burden of proof
shall be on the complainant." Given the advantages to the claimant
of proceeding under § 812, it is hard to imagine why anyone would
voluntarily proceed under § 810 if both routes were equally
available.
When the carefully chosen language and the widely variant
provisions of § 810 and § 812 are thus compared, the logic of
Page 441 U. S. 126
Title VIII's private enforcement mechanism becomes clear.
Immediate access to federal judicial power under § 812 was reserved
to those directly victimized by a discriminatory housing practice;
that is, those actually discriminated against on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Only direct victims of
housing discrimination were deemed to suffer injuries of sufficient
magnitude to authorize appointment of counsel and recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees. But
because discrimination in housing can injure persons other than the
direct objects of the discrimination,
Trafficante, 409
U.S. at
409 U. S. 210,
Congress believed that the statute's fair housing goals would be
served by extending standing under § 810 as broadly as
constitutionally permissible. Anyone claiming to have been injured
by a discriminatory housing practice, even if not himself directly
discriminated against, is authorized to seek redress under § 810.
By barring indirect victims of housing discrimination from
immediate access to federal court under § 812, and thus requiring
them to exhaust federal conciliation procedures as well as viable
state and local remedies pursuant to § 810, Congress sought to
facilitate informal resolution of Title VIII disputes, to avoid
federal judicial intervention when possible, and to encourage state
and local involvement in the effort to eliminate housing
discrimination.
The legislative history of Title VIII, while "not too helpful,"
Trafficante, supra at
409 U. S. 210,
supports the view that standing to commence a civil action under §
812 is limited to direct victims of housing discrimination.
Introduced on the Senate floor and approved unchanged by the House,
Title VIII's legislative history must be culled primarily from the
Congressional Record. The brief debate preceding adoption of
Amendment No. 586, which amended § 810 to require exhaustion of
"substantially equivalent" remedies under state or local fair
housing laws as a prerequisite to the filing of a Title
Page 441 U. S. 127
VIII action in federal court, is particularly enlightening.
Senator Miller, who introduced the amendment, explained:
"I provide in the second part of my amendment that no civil
action may be brought in any U.S. district court if the person
aggrieved has a judicial remedy under a State or local fair housing
law which provides substantially equivalent rights and remedies to
this act."
"I believe it is a matter of letting the State and local courts
have jurisdiction. We in the Senate know that our Federal district
court calendars are crowded enough without adding to that load if
there is a good remedy under State law."
114 Cong.Rec. 4987 (1968). Senator Hart added that the
amendment
"recognizes the desire all of us share that the State remedies,
where adequate, be availed of, and that unnecessary burdening
litigation not further clog the court calendars."
Ibid. It seems unlikely that Congress would wholly
frustrate the concerns moving it to adopt § 810's exhaustion
requirement by opening § 812's direct route into federal court to
all "persons aggrieved."
The debate concerning the allowance of attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs under § 812 also indicates a congressional
understanding that standing to proceed immediately into federal
court under § 812 was limited to discriminatees. Senator Hart
commented that §§ 812(b) and (c) -- which authorize the district
court to waive payment of fees, costs, and security in appropriate
cases and to award damages, court costs, and reasonable attorney
fees to prevailing plaintiffs --
"reveal a clear congressional intent to permit, and even
encourage, litigation by those who cannot afford to redress
specific wrongs aimed at them because of the color of their
skin."
114 Cong.Rec. 5514-5515 (1968) (emphasis added).
The meager legislative history marshaled by the Court provides,
at best, thin support for its expansive interpretation of standing
under § 812. References in the legislative history describing § 812
as an "addition[al]" and "alternative" remedial
Page 441 U. S. 128
provision to § 810,
ante at
441 U. S. 106,
and nn. 16, 17, and 18, are hardly dispositive: one need only read
the two sections to conclude that they provide "alternative"
enforcement mechanisms. That § 810 and § 812 are "alternative"
remedial provisions does not, however, compel the conclusion that
they are equally available to all potential Title VIII claimants.
The only piece of legislative history arguably supporting the
Court's interpretation of § 812 is the House Judiciary Committee
staff's use of the term "aggrieved person" to refer to potential §
812 plaintiffs.
Ante at
441 U. S. 107
n. 18. This single, fleeting reference in the legislative history
hardly seems sufficient to overwhelm the contrary indications of
congressional intent found elsewhere in Title VIII's legislative
history and in the carefully worded and structured provisions of §
810 and § 812.
I think that
Trafficante pushed standing to the limit
in construing the "person aggrieved" language of § 810. I cannot
join the Court in pressing the more narrowly confined language of §
812 to the same limit.
III
Respondents also claim standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which
provides:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right . .
. as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
Unlike Title VIII, "§ 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing
law."
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.
S. 409,
392 U. S. 413
(1968). Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
section bars all racial discrimination, both private and public, in
the sale or rental of property.
Ibid.
It is clear that respondents have suffered no injury to the only
right secured under § 1982 -- the right to be free from racially
motivated interference with property rights. Their claim of
standing under § 1982 is thus conceptually indistinguishable from a
similar claim rejected by this Court in
Page 441 U. S. 129
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490
(1975). Plaintiffs in
Warth brought a § 1982 action
against the town of Penfield, N.Y., and members of its Zoning,
Planning, and Town Boards, claiming that the town's zoning
ordinance effectively excluded persons of minority racial and
ethnic groups. One of the plaintiffs, a nonprofit corporation
organized to alleviate the housing shortage for low- and
moderate-income persons in and around Penfield, based its standing
to challenge the zoning ordinance on the loss to its members
residing in Penfield of the "benefits of living in a racially and
ethnically integrated community." 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 512.
This Court rejected plaintiff's claim of standing, distinguishing
Trafficante on the ground that § 1982, unlike § 810 of
Title VIII, does not give residents of certain communities an
actionable right to be free from the adverse consequences of
racially discriminatory practices directed at and immediately
harmful to others. Thus, we held plaintiff's "attempt to raise
putative rights of third parties," 422 U.S. at
422 U. S. 514,
barred by the prudential rules of standing.
Like plaintiffs in
Warth, respondents claim that they
have been injured by racially discriminatory acts practiced on
others. Thus, their claim of standing under § 1982 must also
fail.
Because I think that respondents have no standing to litigate
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and § 812 of the Civil Rights Act of
1958, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Section 810 provides:
"(a) Any person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be
irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur (hereafter 'person aggrieved') may file a complaint
with the Secretary. Complaints shall be in writing and shall
contain such information and be in such form as the Secretary
requires. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the Secretary shall
furnish a copy of the same to the person or persons who allegedly
committed or are about to commit the alleged discriminatory housing
practice. Within thirty days after receiving a complaint, or within
thirty days after the expiration of any period of reference under
subsection (c), the Secretary shall investigate the complaint and
give notice in writing to the person aggrieved whether he intends
to resolve it. If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint,
he shall proceed to try to eliminate or correct the alleged
discriminatory housing practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done in the course of
such informal endeavors may be made public or used as evidence in a
subsequent proceeding under this title without the written consent
of the persons concerned. Any employee of the Secretary who shall
make public any information in violation of this provision shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year."
"(b) A complaint under subsection (a) shall be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory housing
practice occurred. Complaints shall be in writing and shall state
the facts upon which the allegations of a discriminatory housing
practice are based. Complaints may be reasonably and fairly amended
at any time. A respondent may file an answer to the complaint
against him and with the leave of the Secretary, which shall be
granted whenever it would be reasonable and fair to do so, may
amend his answer at any time. Both complaints and answers shall be
verified."
"(c) Wherever a State or local fair housing law provides rights
and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing practices which are
substantially equivalent to the rights and remedies provided in
this title, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate State or
local agency of any complaint filed under this title which appears
to constitute a violation of such State or local fair housing law,
and the Secretary shall take no further action with respect to such
complaint if the appropriate State or local law enforcement
official has, within thirty days from the date the alleged offense
has been brought to his attention, commenced proceedings in the
matter, or, having done so, carries forward such proceedings with
reasonable promptness. In no event shall the Secretary take further
action unless he certifies that in his judgment, under the
circumstances of the particular case, the protection of the rights
of the parties or the interests of justice require such
action."
"(d) If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the
Secretary or within thirty days after expiration of any period of
reference under subsection (c), the Secretary has been unable to
obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the person aggrieved
may, within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court, against the respondent
named in the complaint, to enforce the rights granted or protected
by this title, insofar as such rights relate to the subject of the
complaint:
Provided, That no such civil action may be
brought in any United States district court if the person aggrieved
has a judicial remedy under a State or local fair housing law which
provides rights and remedies for alleged discriminatory housing
practices which are substantially equivalent to the rights and
remedies provided in this title. Such actions may be brought
without regard to the amount in controversy in any United States
district court for the district in which the discriminatory housing
practice is alleged to have occurred or be about to occur or in
which the respondent resides or transacts business. If the court
finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is
about to occur, the court may, subject to the provisions of section
812 of this title, enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
practice or order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate."
"(e) In any proceeding brought pursuant to this section, the
burden of proof shall be on the complainant."
"(f) Whenever an action filed by an individual, in either
Federal or State court, pursuant to this section or section 812 of
this title, shall come to trial, the Secretary shall immediately
terminate all efforts to obtain voluntary compliance."
82 Stat. 85, 42 U.S.C. § 3610.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Section 812 provides:
"(a) The rights granted by sections 803, 804, 805, and 806 of
this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United
States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy
and in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction. A
civil action shall be commenced within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred:
Provided, however, That the court shall continue such
civil case brought pursuant to this section or section 810(d) of
this title from time to time before bringing it to trial if the
court believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary or a
State or local agency are likely to result in satisfactory
settlement of the discriminatory housing practice complained of in
the complaint made to the Secretary or to the local or State agency
and which practice forms the basis for the action in court:
And
provided, however, That any sale, encumbrance, or rental
consummated prior to the issuance of any court order issued under
the authority of this Act, and involving a bona fide purchaser,
encumbrancer, or tenant without actual notice of the existence of
the filing of a complaint or civil action under the provisions of
this Act shall not be affected."
"(b) Upon application by the plaintiff and in such circumstances
as the court may deem just, a court of the United States in which a
civil action under this section has been brought may appoint an
attorney for the plaintiff and may authorize the commencement of a
civil action upon proper showing without the payment of fees,
costs, or security. A court of a State or subdivision thereof may
do likewise to the extent not inconsistent with the law or
procedures of the State or subdivision."
"(c) The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any
permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or
other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not
more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and
reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff:
Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the
court is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees."
82 Stat. 88, 42 U.S.C. § 3612.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Despite suggestions to the contrary by the Court,
ante
at
441 U. S. 101
n. 7, our decision in
Trafficante was clearly not intended
to construe § 812 as well as § 810. The opinion focuses exclusively
on § 810, closing with the following statement:
"We can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous
construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing
unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of
those facilities within the coverage of the statute."
409 U.S. at
409 U. S. 212.
The Court's passing reference in
Trafficante to § 812 can
hardly be construed as an interpretation of that provision.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Alleging injury to "their right to select housing without regard
to race," App. 6, 99, the individual respondents initially sought
to establish standing in their capacity as "testers." Respondents
have abandoned, in this Court, their claim of standing as testers,
electing to stand or fall on their allegations of injury in their
capacity as residents in and around Bellwood.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Indeed, the term is found nowhere else in Title VIII.
[
Footnote 2/6]
"Person" is defined in Title VIII as
"one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships,
associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and
fiduciaries."
42 U.S.C. § 3602(d).