Respondent was convicted of a federal drug offense upon a guilty
plea. Upon accepting the plea, the trial judge explained to
respondent that he could receive a 15-year prison sentence and a
$25,000 fine, but failed to mention a mandatory special parole term
of at least 3 years required by the applicable statute. Respondent
was then sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment plus a 5-year special
parole term, and fined $5,000. Subsequently, respondent moved in
District Court to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
on the ground that the trial judge had violated Fed.Rule Crim.Proc.
11 by accepting the guilty plea without informing respondent of the
mandatory special parole term. The District Court, while
recognizing that a violation of Rule 11 had occurred, held that it
did not justify collateral relief under § 2255. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that a violation of Rule 11 will support
a collateral attack on a conviction based on a guilty plea even
when there is neither constitutional error nor any showing of
special prejudice to the defendant.
Held: A conviction based on a guilty plea is not
subject to collateral attack when all that can be shown is a formal
violation of Rule 11. Such a violation is neither constitutional
nor jurisdictional. Nor can any claim reasonably be made that the
error here resulted in a "complete miscarriage of justice" or in a
proceeding "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure."
Hill v. United States, 368 U.
S. 424,
368 U. S. 428.
Respondent could have raised his claim on direct appeal but did
not, and there is no basis here for allowing collateral attack to
do service for an appeal. Pp.
441 U. S.
783-785.
577 F.2d 372, reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 441 U. S. 781
MR JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a conviction based on a guilty
plea is subject to collateral attack whenever it can be shown that
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was violated
when the plea was accepted.
In this case, acting on the advice of counsel, respondent
pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute various
controlled substances. As required by Rule 11, [
Footnote 1] the District Judge formally addressed
respondent and determined that
Page 441 U. S. 782
there was a factual basis for the plea and that he was acting
voluntarily. The judge explained that respondent could receive a
sentence of 15 years' imprisonment and a $25,000 fine, but the
judge failed to describe the mandatory special parole term of at
least 3 years required by the applicable statute. [
Footnote 2]
The District Judge accepted the guilty plea and, at a later
proceeding, sentenced respondent to 10 years' imprisonment plus a
special parole term of 5 years, and a fine of $5,000. Pursuant to a
plea bargain with the prosecutor, other charges against respondent
were dismissed. No objection to the sentence was raised at the
time, and respondent did not take an appeal from his
conviction.
About two years later, respondent moved to vacate the sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [
Footnote 3] on the ground that the trial judge had
violated Rule 11 by accepting his plea without informing him of the
mandatory special parole term. The District Court held an
evidentiary hearing, at which respondent's lawyer testified that it
was his normal practice to inform his clients about the mandatory
special parole term, but that he could not recall whether or not he
had given such advice to this defendant. Following this hearing,
the District Court denied the motion. The court recognized that a
violation of Rule 11 had occurred, but concluded that it did not
justify collateral relief under § 2255 because respondent
Page 441 U. S. 783
had not suffered any prejudice, inasmuch as he had received a
sentence within the maximum described to him at the time the guilty
plea was accepted.
The Court of Appeals reversed. 577 F.2d 372. It held that a
violation of Rule 11 will support a collateral attack on a
conviction based on a guilty plea even when there is neither
constitutional error nor any showing of special prejudice to the
defendant. Because of the importance of that holding to the
administration of justice, we granted certiorari, 439 U.S. 1065,
and now reverse.
In
Hill v. United States, 368 U.
S. 424, the Court was presented with the question
whether a collateral attack under § 2255 could be predicated on a
violation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 32(a), which gives the defendant
the right to make a statement on his own behalf before he is
sentenced. The Court rejected the claim, stating:
"The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by
an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is
imposed is not, of itself, an error of the character or magnitude
cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is
neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands
of fair procedure. It does not present 'exceptional circumstances
where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus
is apparent.'
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S.
19,
306 U. S. 27.
See Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490;
Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458;
Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U. S. 275;
Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U. S. 101."
368 U.S. at
368 U. S.
428.
The reasoning in
Hill is equally applicable to a formal
violation of Rule 11. Such a violation is neither constitutional
nor jurisdictional: the 1966 amendment to Rule 11
Page 441 U. S. 784
obviously could not amend the Constitution or limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nor can any claim reasonably be
made that the error here resulted in a "complete miscarriage of
justice" or in a proceeding "inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure." Respondent does not argue that he was
actually unaware of the special parole term or that, if he had been
properly advised by the trial judge, he would not have pleaded
guilty. His only claim is of a technical violation of the Rule.
That claim could have been raised on direct appeal,
see
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, but
was not. And there is no basis here for allowing collateral attack
"to do service for an appeal."
Sunal v. Large,
332 U. S. 174,
332 U. S.
178.
Indeed, if anything, this case may be a stronger one for
foreclosing collateral relief than the
Hill case. For the
concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack
[
Footnote 4] has special force
with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.
"Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence
in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume
of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly
administration of justice. The impact is greatest when new grounds
for setting aside guilty pleas are approved, because the vast
majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas. Moreover,
the concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the
conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a
petition to set aside a guilty plea."
United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-529 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) .
As in
Hill, we find it unnecessary to consider whether
§ 2255 relief would be available if a violation of Rule 11 occurred
in
Page 441 U. S. 785
the context of other aggravating circumstances. "We decide only
that such collateral relief is not available when all that is shown
is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Rule."
368 U.S. at
368 U. S.
429.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
At the time of respondent's guilty plea, Rule 11 provided:
"A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent
of the court,
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea
of
nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant
personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of
the plea."
Rule 11 now provides in pertinent part:
"Advice to Defendant."
"Before accepting a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere,
the court must address the defendant personally in open court and
inform him of, and determine that he understands, the
following:"
"(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum
possible penalty provided by law; and"
"(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he
has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of
the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed
to represent him; and"
"(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in
that plea if it has already been made, and he has the right to be
tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance
of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate
himself; and"
"(4) that, if he pleads guilty or
nolo contendere there
will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty
or
nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial;
and"
"(5) that, if he pleads guilty or
nolo contendere, the
court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has
pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the
record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be
used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement."
[
Footnote 2]
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
[
Footnote 3]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides in pertinent part:
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
[
Footnote 4]
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
428 U. S. 491,
and n. 31;
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.
S. 145,
431 U. S. 154
n. 13.