Section 1611(f) of the Social Security Act, which provides that
no benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
for the needy aged, blind, and disabled are to be paid for any
month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United
States, held to be constitutional as having a rational basis and
not to impose an impermissible burden on the freedom of
international travel in violation of the Fifth Amendment. That
section, which merely has an incidental effect on international
travel (
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116;
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.
S. 500; and
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S.
1, distinguished), clearly effectuates the basic
congressional decision to limit SSI payments to residents of the
United States. Moreover, § 1611(f) may represent Congress' decision
simply to limit payments to those who need them in the United
States. While these justifications for the legislation may not be
compelling, its constitutionality, in contrast to the standard
applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, does
not depend on compelling justifications. Pp.
439 U. S.
174-178.
440 F.
Supp. 788, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. MARSHALL and BRENNAN, JJ., filed an opinion concurring
in the result,
post, p.
439 U. S.
178.
Page 439 U. S. 171
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1972, Congress enacted the Supplemental Security Income
program to aid the needy aged, blind, and disabled. The legislation
creating the program provides that benefits are not to be paid for
any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United
States. The primary issue in the present litigation is whether this
restriction is a constitutionally impermissible burden on the
asserted right of international travel.
I
The 1972 Social Security Act Amendments repealed Titles I, X,
and XIV of the Act, which had provided federal aid for state
programs for the aged, blind, and disabled. The amendments replaced
those programs with a new Title XVI, the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program. 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. § 1381
et
seq. This program is administered by the Federal Government
through the Social Security Administration. To be eligible to
receive benefits under the program, a person must be a resident of
the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(b); be either over 65
years old or meet statutory definitions of blindness and
disability, § 1382c(a); and be poor, §§ 1382a (income), 1382b
(resources).
Section 1611(f) of the Social Security Act, as added in 1972,
provides that no person shall receive SSI benefits "for any month
during all of which such individual is outside the United States. .
. ." The section further provides that,
"after an individual has been outside the United States for any
period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as remaining
outside the United States until he has
Page 439 U. S. 172
been in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive days.
[
Footnote 1]"
Thus, if a recipient were to leave the country on May 5 and
return on July 10, he would receive his entire payment for May. He
would, however, lose his benefits for June and July. He would have
been actually away the entire month of June, and, because he had
been gone for more than 30 days, he would be treated as having
remained outside the country until August 9. In August, his
payments would automatically resume.
Grace Aznavorian is an American citizen. In 1974, she was a
resident of California and an eligible recipient of SSI benefits.
On July 21, 1974, she left the United States and traveled to
Guadalajara, Mexico. Because of an unexpected illness, she remained
in Mexico until September 1, 1974. Accordingly, she did not receive
benefits for August or September.
Aznavorian pursued her administrative remedies without success.
She then filed this suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California, seeking judicial review of the
Secretary's decision. [
Footnote
2] Asserting that the suspension of her benefits denied her due
process, equal protection, and the right of international travel,
all as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, she sought declaratory
relief and the benefits
Page 439 U. S. 173
which had been denied because of her visit to Mexico. [
Footnote 3] She moved for certification
of a plaintiff class including all persons denied SSI benefits
because of international travel. The Secretary moved for summary
judgment.
The District Court first considered the motion for class
certification. It concluded that a class action was not barred by
the Social Security Act because the class would be limited to those
who had presented unsuccessful claims to the Secretary. Because the
requirements of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 were otherwise satisfied, it
certified the class. [
Footnote
4]
440 F.
Supp. 788, 792-794.
The court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class.
Because international travel is "a basic constitutional right," the
District Court held that the statute must bear "a fair and
substantial relationship in fact to the governmental purposes that
it seeks to achieve."
Id. at 795, 797. The court concluded
that the limitation on benefits was not sufficiently related to the
Government's interest in making payments only to bona fide
residents of the United States to be constitutionally valid.
The District Court ordered the Secretary to provide notice of
its decision to all class members who were receiving benefits at
the time of the order or would have been receiving benefits except
for § 1611(f). It also ordered the Secretary to pay benefits to
those members of the class whose benefits had been
Page 439 U. S. 174
suspended because of § 1611(f), but who, in fact, continued to
be actual residents of the United States. Because its order was
limited to persons who were still needy within the meaning of the
SSI program, the court believed that its order did not violate the
sovereign immunity of the United States. 440 F. Supp. at
802-803.
The Secretary appealed directly to this Court, and Aznavorian
filed a cross-appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We noted probable
jurisdiction of both appeals and consolidated the cases. 435 U.S.
921.
II
The Secretary raises two questions on his appeal. [
Footnote 5] First, he contends that § 1611(f)
does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Second, he urges that, in any
event, the District Court's award of retroactive monetary relief is
barred by sovereign immunity. Aznavorian's cross-appeal takes the
position that the District Court erred in awarding monetary relief
only to those class members who were eligible for SSI benefits on
the date of its order. Because we conclude that § 1611(f) does not
violate the Constitution, there is no occasion to consider the
remedial issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal.
Social welfare legislation, by its very nature, involves drawing
lines among categories of people, lines that necessarily are
sometimes arbitrary. This Court has consistently upheld the
constitutionality of such classifications in federal welfare
legislation where a rational basis existed for Congress'
choice.
"The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any
constitutional challenge to a law providing for
Page 439 U. S. 175
governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established.
. . . In enacting legislation of this kind, a government does not
deny equal protection"
"merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality.'"
"
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471,
397 U. S. 485."
"To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must
be judged 'is not a toothless one,'
Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U. S.
495,
427 U. S. 510. But the
challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of
constitutionality."
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181,
429 U. S. 185.
See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S.
47;
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.
S. 199,
430 U. S. 210;
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67;
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749;
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535;
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78.
Aznavorian argues that, even though § 1611(f) may, under this
standard, be valid as against an equal protection or due process
attack, a more stringent standard must be applied in a
constitutional appraisal of § 1611(f) because this statutory
provision limits the freedom of international travel. We have
concluded, however, that § 1611(f), fortified by its presumption of
constitutionality, readily withstands attack from that quarter as
well.
The freedom to travel abroad has found recognition in at least
three decisions of this Court. In
Kent v. Dulles,
357 U. S. 116, the
Secretary of State had refused to issue a passport to a person
because of his links with left-wing political groups. The Court
held that Congress had not given the Secretary discretion to deny
passports on such grounds. Although the holding was one of
statutory construction, the Court recognized that freedom of
international travel is "basic in our scheme of values," and an
"important aspect of the
Page 439 U. S. 176
citizen's
liberty.'" Id. at 357 U. S. 126,
357 U. S. 127.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.
S. 500, dealt with § 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 785, which made it a criminal offense for
a member of the Communist Party to apply for a passport. The Court
again recognized that the freedom of international travel is
protected by the Fifth Amendment. Congress had legislated too
broadly by restricting this liberty for all members of the party.
In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, the
Court upheld the Secretary's decision not to validate passports for
travel to Cuba. The Court pointed out that "the fact that a liberty
cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that
it can under no circumstances be inhibited." Id. at
381 U. S.
14.
Aznavorian urges that the freedom of international travel is
basically equivalent to the constitutional right to interstate
travel, recognized by this Court for over 100 years.
Edwards v.
California, 314 U. S. 160;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78,
211 U. S. 97;
Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270,
179 U. S. 274;
Crandall v.
Nevada, 6 Wall. 35,
73 U. S. 43-44;
Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 283,
48 U. S. 492
(Taney, C.J., dissenting). But this Court has often pointed out the
crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally
and the right of interstate travel.
"The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually
unqualified,
United States v. Guest, 383 U. S.
745,
383 U. S. 757-758 (1966);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S.
105-106 (1971). By contrast, the 'right' of
international travel has been considered to be no more than an
aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. As such, this 'right,' the Court has held, can be
regulated within the bounds of due process."
(Citations omitted.)
Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S.
1,
435 U. S. 4 n. 6.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
394 U. S. 643
n. 1 (concurring opinion). Thus, legislation which is said to
infringe the freedom
Page 439 U. S. 177
to travel abroad is not to be judged by the same standard
applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, such
as durational residency requirements imposed by the States.
See
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.
S. 250,
415 U. S.
254-262;
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330,
405 U. S.
338-342;
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at
394 U. S.
634.
Unlike cases involving the right of interstate travel, this case
involves legislation providing governmental payments of monetary
benefits that has an incidental effect on a protected liberty,
similar to the legislation considered in
Califano v. Jobst,
supra. There, another section of the Social Security Act was
challenged because it "penalized" some beneficiaries upon their
marriage. The Court recognized that the statutory provisions "may
have an impact on a secondary beneficiary's desire to marry, and
may make some suitors less welcome than others," 434 U.S. at
434 U. S. 5, but
nonetheless upheld the constitutional validity of the challenged
legislation. [
Footnote 6]
The statutory provision in issue here does not have nearly so
direct an impact on the freedom to travel internationally as
occurred in the
Kent, Aptheker, or
Zemel cases.
It does not limit the availability or validity of passports. It
does not limit the right to travel on grounds that may be in
tension with the First Amendment. It merely withdraws a
governmental benefit during and shortly after an extended absence
from this country. Unless the limitation imposed by Congress is
wholly irrational, it is constitutional in spite of its incidental
effect on international travel.
It is to be noted that Aznavorian does not question the
constitutional validity of the basic decision of Congress to limit
SSI payments to residents of the United States, as provided in §
1614(a)(1)(B) of the Social Security Act, as
Page 439 U. S. 178
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B). The statutory provision in
issue, § 1611(f), clearly effectuates this basic congressional
decision. Certainly, the longer a person is out of the country, the
greater the possibility that he is no longer a resident. The 30-day
period provided in § 1611(f) is no more arbitrary than any similar
time period would be. The additional provision of § 1611(f) that,
once a person has been outside the country for 30 consecutive days
or more, he will not be eligible for SSI payments until he has
spent 30 consecutive days in the United States, simply adds
assurance that the beneficiary's residency here is genuine.
Moreover, as the Secretary argues, Congress may simply have decided
to limit payments to those who need them in the United States. The
needs to which this program responds might vary dramatically in
foreign countries. The Social Security Administration would be
hard-pressed to monitor the continuing eligibility of persons
outside the country. And, indeed, Congress may only have wanted to
increase the likelihood that these funds would be spent inside the
United States. These justifications for the legislation in question
are not, perhaps, compelling. But its constitutionality does not
depend on compelling justifications. It is enough if the provision
is rationally based.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471,
397 U. S. 487.
Section 1611(f) meets that test. Accordingly, the judgment of the
District Court is reversed.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 77-5999,
Aznavorian v. Califano,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, also on appeal
from the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The section reads in full:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no
individual shall be considered an eligible individual for purposes
of this title for any month during all of which such individual is
outside the United States (and no person shall be considered the
eligible spouse of an individual for purposes of this title with
respect to any month during all of which such person is outside the
United States). For purposes of the preceding sentence, after an
individual has been outside the United States for any period of 30
consecutive days, he shall be treated as remaining outside the
United States until he has been in the United States for a period
of 30 consecutive days."
86 Stat. 1468, 42 U.S.C. § 1382(f).
[
Footnote 2]
Jurisdiction was based on two provisions of the Social Security
Act: §§ 205(g) and 1631(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3).
[
Footnote 3]
Her original complaint requested injunctive relief and moved
that a three-judge court be convened. The motion for a three-judge
court was later withdrawn along with the request for an
injunction.
[
Footnote 4]
The certified class was defined as:
"All individuals otherwise eligible for Supplemental Security
Income, who have had such SSI denied, suspended, terminated, or
interrupted pursuant to an initial written determination, an
administration reconsideration, an administrative hearing, or an
Appeals Council review, based solely on 42 U.S.C. § 1382(f) and
regulations promulgated thereunder, from September 26, 1975 until
the entry of this Order."
[
Footnote 5]
The Secretary's jurisdictional statement also claimed that a
class action could not be maintained under § 205(g) of the Social
Security Act. That question was raised, but not decided, in
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524.
While not abandoning his position, the Secretary has chosen not to
argue the question in this case. The question is pending in
Califano v. Elliott, No. 77-1511,
cert. granted,
post, p. 816. It is conceded that Aznavorian, as an
individual, met the jurisdiction requirements of § 205(g).
[
Footnote 6]
In contrast to the monetary benefits legislation upheld in the
Jobst case, a state law that burdened the freedom to marry
was held constitutionally invalid later the same Term in
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the
result.
We concur in the Court's conclusion that § 1611(f) of the Social
Security Act is constitutional. We do not, however, understand the
Court to imply that welfare legislation not involving a fundamental
interest or suspect classification is subject to a lesser standard
of review than the traditional rational basis test. To sustain
classifications in welfare legislation
Page 439 U. S. 179
that are "arbitrary,"
ante at
439 U. S. 174,
so long as they are not "wholly irrational,"
ante at
439 U. S. 177,
would be inconsistent with the settled principle that the "standard
by which [welfare] legislation . . . must be judged
is not a
toothless one.'" Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.
S. 181, 429 U. S. 185
(1976), quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.
S. 495, 427 U. S. 510
(1976).