After respondent was found guilty of murder, the Arizona trial
court granted a new trial because the prosecution had withheld
exculpatory evidence from the defense. At the beginning of the new
trial, the trial judge, after extended argument, granted the
prosecutor's motion for a mistrial predicated on improper and
prejudicial comment during defense counsel's opening statement that
evidence had been hidden from respondent at the first trial, but
the judge did not expressly find that there was "manifest
necessity" for a mistrial or expressly state that he had considered
alternative solutions. The Arizona Supreme Court refused to review
the mistrial ruling, and respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus
in Federal District Court. While agreeing that defense counsel's
opening statement was improper, that court held that respondent
could not be placed in further jeopardy and granted the writ
because the state trial judge had failed to find "manifest
necessity" for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Although the extent of the possible juror bias cannot be
measured and some trial judges might have proceeded with the trial
after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions,
nevertheless the overriding interest in the evenhanded
administration of justice requires that the highest degree of
respect be accorded to the trial judge's decision to declare a
mistrial based on his assessment of the prejudicial impact of
defense counsel's opening statement. Pp.
434 U. S.
503-514.
2. The record supports the conclusion that the trial judge
exercised "sound discretion" in declaring a mistrial, it appearing
that he acted responsibly and deliberately and accorded careful
consideration to respondent's interest in having the trial
concluded in a single proceeding, and therefore the mistrial order
is supported by the "high degree" of necessity required in a case
of this kind. Pp.
434 U. S.
514-516.
3. Since the record provides sufficient justification for the
trial judge's mistrial ruling, that ruling is not subject to
collateral attack in a federal court simply because the judge
failed to make an explicit finding of "manifest necessity" for a
mistrial that would avoid a valid double jeopardy plea or to
articulate on the record all the factors that informed the
deliberate exercise of his discretion. Pp.
434 U. S.
516-517.
546 F.2d 829, reversed.
Page 434 U. S. 498
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. WHITE, J., filed a
dissenting opinion,
post, p.
434 U. S. 517.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined,
post, p.
434 U. S.
519.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
An Arizona trial judge granted the prosecutor's motion for a
mistrial predicated on improper and prejudicial comment during
defense counsel's opening statement. In a subsequent habeas corpus
proceeding, a Federal District Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protected the defendant from another trial. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. [
Footnote 1] The questions presented are whether the
record reflects the kind of "necessity" for the mistrial ruling
that will avoid a valid plea of double jeopardy, and if so, whether
the plea must nevertheless be allowed because the Arizona trial
judge did not fully explain the reasons for his mistrial
ruling.
I
In 1971, respondent was found guilty of murdering a hotel night
clerk. In 1973, the Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., ordered a
new trial because the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence
from the defense. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the new trial
order in an unpublished opinion.
Respondent's second trial began in January, 1975. During the
voir dire examination of prospective jurors, the
prosecutor made reference to the fact that some of the witnesses
whose testimony the jurors would hear had testified in
proceedings
Page 434 U. S. 499
four years earlier. [
Footnote
2] Defense counsel told the prospective jurors "that there was
evidence hidden from [respondent] at the last trial." In his
opening statement, he made this point more forcefully:
"You will hear testimony that, notwithstanding the fact that we
had a trial in May of 1971 in this matter, that the prosecutor hid
those statements and didn't give those to the lawyer for George
saying the man was Spanish speaking, didn't give those statements
at all, hid them."
"You will hear that that evidence was suppressed and hidden by
the prosecutor in that case. You will hear that that evidence was
purposely withheld. You will hear that, because of the misconduct
of the County Attorney at that time and because he withheld
evidence, that the Supreme Court of Arizona granted a new trial in
this case."
App. 18181, 184.
After opening statements were completed, the prosecutor moved
for a mistrial. In colloquy during argument of the motion, the
trial judge expressed the opinion that evidence concerning the
reasons for the new trial, and specifically the ruling of the
Arizona Supreme Court, was irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence, and therefore inadmissible. Defense counsel asked for an
opportunity "to find some law" that would support his belief that
the Supreme Court opinion would be admissible. [
Footnote 3] After further argument, the judge
stated that
Page 434 U. S. 500
he would withhold ruling on the admissibility of the evidence
and denied the motion for mistrial. Two witnesses then
testified.
The following morning, the prosecutor renewed his mistrial
motion. Fortified by an evening's research, he argued that there
was no theory on which the basis for the new trial ruling could be
brought to the attention of the jury, that the prejudice to the
jury could not be repaired by any cautionary instructions, and that
a mistrial was a "manifest necessity." Defense counsel stated that
he still was not prepared with authority supporting his belief that
the Supreme Court opinion was admissible. [
Footnote 4] He argued that his comment was invited by
the prosecutor's reference to the witnesses' earlier testimony
Page 434 U. S. 501
and that any prejudice could be avoided by curative
instructions. During the extended argument, the trial judge
expressed his concern about the possibility that an erroneous
mistrial ruling would preclude another trial. [
Footnote 5]
Ultimately the trial judge granted the motion, stating that his
ruling was based upon defense counsel's remarks in his opening
statement concerning the Arizona Supreme Court opinion. The trial
judge did not expressly find that there was "manifest necessity"
for a mistrial; nor did he expressly state that he had considered
alternative solutions and concluded that none would be adequate.
The Arizona Supreme Court refused to review the mistrial ruling.
[
Footnote 6]
Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
alleging that another trial would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. After reviewing the transcript of the state proceeding, and
hearing the arguments of counsel, the Federal District Judge noted
that the Arizona trial judge had not canvassed on the record the
possibility of alternatives to a mistrial and expressed the view
that before granting a mistrial motion the judge was required "to
find that manifest necessity exists for the granting of it."
[
Footnote 7] Because the record
contained no such finding, and because the federal judge was not
prepared to
Page 434 U. S. 502
make such a finding himself, he granted the writ. [
Footnote 8] He agreed with the State,
however, that defense counsel's opening statement had been
improper.
The Ninth Circuit also characterized the opening statement as
improper, but affirmed because, absent a finding of manifest
necessity or an explicit consideration of alternatives, [
Footnote 9] the court was unwilling to
infer that the jury was prevented from arriving at a fair and
impartial verdict. [
Footnote
10] In a concurring opinion, two judges noted that, while the
question of manifest necessity had been argued, most of the
argument on the mistrial motion had concerned the question whether
the opening statement was improper. They concluded that,
"absent findings that manifest necessity existed, it . . . [was]
quite possible that the grant of mistrial was based on the fact
that the impropriety of counsel's conduct had been established
Page 434 U. S. 503
without reaching the question whether there could, nevertheless,
be a fair trial."
546 F.2d at 833.
We are persuaded that the Court of Appeals applied an
inappropriate standard of review to mistrial rulings of this kind,
and attached undue significance to the form of the ruling. We
therefore reverse.
II
A State may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same
offense.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.
S. 784. The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an
acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal
judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be
retried even though "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously
erroneous foundation."
See Fong Foo v. United States,
369 U. S. 141,
369 U. S. 143.
If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial would be unfair.
Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the
constitutional protection also embraces the defendant's "valued
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal."
[
Footnote 11] The reasons
why this "valued right" merits constitutional protection are worthy
of repetition. Even if the first trial is not completed, a second
prosecution may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and
emotional burden
Page 434 U. S. 504
on the accused, [
Footnote
12] prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an
unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, [
Footnote 13] and may even enhance the risk that an
innocent defendant may be convicted. [
Footnote 14] The danger of such unfairness to the
defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it is
completed. [
Footnote 15]
Page 434 U. S. 505
Consequently, as a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to
one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand
trial.
Unlike the situation in which the trial has ended in an
acquittal or conviction, retrial is not automatically barred when a
criminal proceeding is terminated without finally resolving the
merits of the charges against the accused. Because of the variety
of circumstances that may make it necessary to discharge a jury
before a trial is concluded, and because those circumstances do not
invariably create unfairness to the accused, his valued right to
have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes
subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one
full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial
jury. [
Footnote 16] Yet, in
view of the importance of the right, and the fact that it is
frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden
of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy
bar. His burden is a heavy one. The prosecutor must demonstrate
"manifest necessity" for any mistrial declared over the objection
of the defendant.
The words "manifest necessity" appropriately characterize the
magnitude of the prosecutor's burden. [
Footnote 17] For that reason
Page 434 U. S. 506
Mr. Justice Story's classic formulation of the test [
Footnote 18] has been quoted over
and over again to provide guidance in the decision of a wide
variety of cases. [
Footnote
19] Nevertheless, those words do not describe a standard that
can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular
problem confronting the trial judge. [
Footnote 20] Indeed, it is manifest that the key word
"necessity" cannot be interpreted literally; instead, contrary to
the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees of
necessity, and we require a "high degree" before concluding that a
mistrial is appropriate. [
Footnote 21]
Page 434 U. S. 507
The question whether that "high degree" has been reached is
answered more easily in some kinds of cases than in others. At one
extreme are cases in which a prosecutor requests a mistrial in
order to buttress weaknesses in his evidence. Although there was a
time when English judges served the Stuart monarchs by exercising a
power to discharge a jury whenever it appeared that the Crown's
evidence would be insufficient to convict, [
Footnote 22] the prohibition against double
jeopardy
Page 434 U. S. 508
as it evolved in this country was plainly intended to condemn
this "abhorrent" practice. [
Footnote 23] As this Court noted in
United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600,
424 U. S.
611:
"The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against
governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and
thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by
multiple prosecutions. It bars retrials where 'bad-faith conduct by
judge or prosecutor' . . . threatens the '[h]arassment of an
accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so
as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to
convict' the defendant."
Thus, the strictest scrutiny is appropriate when the basis for
the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution
evidence, [
Footnote 24] or
when there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the
superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical
advantage over the accused. [
Footnote 25]
Page 434 U. S. 509
At the other extreme is the mistrial premised upon the trial
judge's belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict, long
considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial. [
Footnote 26] The argument that a jury's
inability to agree establishes reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, and therefore requires acquittal, has been
uniformly rejected in this country. Instead, without exception, the
courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely
deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second
trial. This rule accords recognition to society's interest in
giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those
who have violated its laws.
Moreover, in this situation there are especially compelling
reasons for allowing the trial judge to exercise broad discretion
in deciding whether or not "manifest necessity" justifies a
discharge of the jury. On the one hand, if he discharges the jury
when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the
defendant is deprived of his "valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal." But if he fails to discharge a
jury which is unable to reach a verdict after protracted and
exhausting deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a
verdict may result from pressures inherent in the situation rather
than the considered judgment of all the jurors. If retrial of the
defendant were barred whenever an appellate
Page 434 U. S. 510
court views the "necessity" for a mistrial differently from the
trial judge, there would be a danger that the latter, cognizant of
the serious societal consequences of an erroneous ruling, would
employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a rule
would frustrate the public interest in just judgments. [
Footnote 27] The trial judge's
decision to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury
deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a reviewing
court. [
Footnote 28]
We are persuaded that, along the spectrum of trial problems
which may warrant a mistrial and which vary in their amenability to
appellate scrutiny, the difficulty which led to the mistrial in
this case also falls in an area where the trial judge's
determination is entitled to special respect.
In this case, the trial judge ordered a mistrial because the
defendant's lawyer made improper and prejudicial remarks during his
opening statement to the jury. Although respondent
Page 434 U. S. 511
insists that evidence of prosecutorial misconduct [
Footnote 29] was admissible as a
matter of Arizona law, and therefore that the opening statement was
proper, we regard this issue as foreclosed by respondent's failure
to proffer any Arizona precedent supportive of his contention
[
Footnote 30] and by the
state court's interpretation of its own law, buttressed by the
consistent opinion of the Federal District Court and the Court of
Appeals.
Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.
S. 341,
426 U. S.
346-347. We therefore start from the premise that
defense counsel's comment was improper and may have affected the
impartiality of the jury.
We recognize that the extent of the possible bias cannot be
measured, and that the District Court was quite correct in
believing that some trial judges might have proceeded with the
trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions. In
a strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not "necessary."
Nevertheless, the overriding interest in the evenhanded
administration of justice requires that we accord the highest
degree of respect to the trial judge's evaluation of the likelihood
that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected
by the improper comment.
Page 434 U. S. 512
The consistent course of decision in this Court in cases
involving possible juror bias supports this conclusion.
Simmons
v. United States, 142 U. S. 148,
involved the possibility of bias caused by a newspaper story
describing a letter written by defense counsel denying a charge by
a third party that one of the jurors was acquainted with the
defendant. Without determining the truth or falsity of the charge,
and without examining the jurors to ascertain what influence the
story had upon them, the trial judge declared a mistrial because he
considered it
"'impossible that in the future consideration of this case by
the jury there can be that true independence and freedom of action
on the part of each juror which is necessary to a fair trial of the
accused.'"
Id. at
142 U. S. 150.
This Court affirmed, holding that the judge was justified in
concluding that the publication of the letter had made it
impossible for the jury "to act with the independence and freedom
on the part of each juror requisite to a fair trial of the issue
between the parties."
Id. at
142 U. S. 155.
In
Thompson v. United States, 155 U.
S. 271,
155 U. S. 279,
the Court concluded that a mistrial was required when it was
revealed that one of the trial jurors had served on the grand jury
that indicted the defendant. Since it is possible that the grand
jury had heard no more evidence -- and perhaps even less -- than
was presented at the trial, and since the juror in question may
have had no actual bias against the defendant, the record did not
demonstrate that the mistrial was strictly "necessary." There can
be no doubt, however, about the validity of the conclusion that the
possibility of bias justified the mistrial.
An improper opening statement unquestionably tends to frustrate
the public interest in having a just judgment reached by an
impartial tribunal. Indeed, such statements create a risk, often
not present in the individual juror bias situation, [
Footnote 31] that the entire panel may be
tainted. The trial judge, of
Page 434 U. S. 513
course, may instruct the jury to disregard the improper comment.
In extreme cases, he may discipline counsel, or even remove him
from the trial as he did in
United States v. Dinitz,
424 U. S. 600.
Those actions, however, will not necessarily remove the risk of
bias that may be created by improper argument. Unless unscrupulous
defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage, the trial
judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in appropriate
cases. The interest in orderly, impartial procedure would be
impaired if he were deterred from exercising that power by a
concern that any time a reviewing court disagreed with his
assessment of the trial situation a retrial would automatically be
barred. The adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in
this area, therefore, would seriously impede the trial judge in the
proper performance of his "duty, in order to protect the integrity
of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop . . .
professional misconduct."
Id. at
424 U. S. 612.
[
Footnote 32]
There are compelling institutional considerations militating in
favor of appellate deference to the trial judge's evaluation of the
significance of possible juror bias. [
Footnote 33] He has seen and
Page 434 U. S. 514
heard the jurors during their
voir dire examination. He
is the judge most familiar with the evidence and the background of
the case on trial. He has listened to the tone of the argument as
it was delivered, and has observed the apparent reaction of the
jurors. In short, he is far more "conversant with the factors
relevant to the determination" than any reviewing court can
possibly be.
See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.
S. 684,
336 U. S.
687.
III
Our conclusion that a trial judge's decision to declare a
mistrial based on his assessment of the prejudicial impact of
improper argument is entitled to great deference does not, of
course, end the inquiry. As noted earlier, a constitutionally
protected interest is inevitably affected by any mistrial decision.
The trial judge, therefore,
"must always temper the decision whether or not to abort the
trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able,
once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society
through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably
disposed to his fate."
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at
400 U. S. 486
(Harlan, J.). In order to ensure that this interest is adequately
protected, reviewing courts have an obligation to satisfy
themselves that, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, the trial judge
exercised "sound discretion" in declaring a mistrial.
Thus, if a trial judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly,
cf. United States v. Jorn, supra; see Illinois v.
Somerville, 410 U.S. at
410 U. S. 469,
his action cannot be condoned. But our review of this record
indicates that this was not such a case. [
Footnote 34] Defense
Page 434 U. S. 515
counsel aired improper and highly prejudicial evidence before
the jury, the possible impact of which the trial judge was in the
best position to assess. The trial judge did not act precipitately
in response to the prosecutor's request for a mistrial. On the
contrary, evincing a concern for the possible double jeopardy
consequences of an erroneous ruling, he gave both defense counsel
and the prosecutor full opportunity to explain
Page 434 U. S. 516
their positions on the propriety of a mistrial. We are therefore
persuaded by the record that the trial judge acted responsibly and
deliberately, and accorded careful consideration to respondent's
interest in having the trial concluded in a single proceeding.
Since he exercised "sound discretion" in handling the sensitive
problem of possible juror bias created by the improper comment of
defense counsel, the mistrial order is supported by the "high
degree" of necessity which is required in a case of this kind.
[
Footnote 35] Neither party
has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted
by bias; [
Footnote 36] in
these circumstances, "the public's interest in fair trials designed
to end in just judgements" [
Footnote 37] must prevail over the defendant's "valued
right" to have his trial concluded before the first jury
impaneled.
IV
One final matter requires consideration. The absence of an
explicit finding of "manifest necessity" appears to have been
determinative for the District Court, and may have been so for the
Court of Appeals. If those courts regarded that omission as
critical, [
Footnote 38] they
required too much. Since the record provides
Page 434 U. S. 517
sufficient justification for the state court ruling, the failure
to explain that ruling more completely does not render it
constitutionally defective.
Review of any trial court decision is, of course, facilitated by
findings and by an explanation of the reasons supporting the
decision. No matter how desirable such procedural assistance may
be, it is not constitutionally mandated in a case such as this.
Cf. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141,
414 U. S. 146.
The basis for the trial judge's mistrial order is adequately
disclosed by the record, which includes the extensive argument of
counsel prior to the judge's ruling. The state trial judge's
mistrial declaration is not subject to collateral attack in a
federal court simply because he failed to find "manifest necessity"
in those words or to articulate on the record all the factors which
informed the deliberate exercise of his discretion. [
Footnote 39]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
546 F.2d 829 (1977). The order discharging respondent from
custody has been stayed pending completion of appellate review.
[
Footnote 2]
The prosecutors reference was in the context of asking the
venire whether they would be able to credit the testimony of a
witness if there were inconsistencies between his present testimony
and that given in earlier proceedings.
[
Footnote 3]
"THE COURT: I cannot conceive how the opinion of the Arizona
Supreme Court in this case would be admissible on any basis
whatsoever."
"MR. BOLDING: I'll really try to do some additional work, then
your Honor, to try to find some law for it. I believe it would be
admissible. It's corroborative of the testimony that the jury will
hear."
"THE COURT: I'm afraid, and I don't know how we stop it, were
getting to the point where were trying the county Attorney's office
and the County Attorney's office, conduct, whatever it was in the
last case, and I simply, I am not going to allow it if this trial
goes on and I'm very sorely tempted to grant the State's motion at
this time."
"MR. BOLDING: Well your Honor, that's -- I will be -- sorry if
that happens and if the Court tells me now that I cannot examine
any witness about that Supreme Court decision until I furnish you
some law that says yes, that can come in, then I will abide by that
decision, your Honor. I will be working on it and I would like to
reserve my right to present that to the Court outside the hearing
of the jury at another time. I just, I believe that it is, it's
credible evidence. It's, thinking, you know, off the top of my head
here, it's opinion evidence from experts. It's evidence that I
believe is truly corroborative of the evidence that the jury will
hear and I would certainly like to reserve my right to present
some, if I can find you some written law, which would allow this
type of testimony, your Honor, as evidence."
App. 209-210. Later, the trial judge expressed disagreement with
defense counsel's argument that evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct could be admitted on an impeachment theory:
"I don't think you're entitled to prove all this misconduct if
such is the case, to impeach every witness, ad I think that's what
you're saying to me."
Id. at 217-218.
[
Footnote 4]
"I have not worked on that, because I'm not at that stage yet
where I think it's necessary to bring that into evidence."
Id. at 243. Apparently when counsel made his opening
statement, he was not prepared to support the admissibility of the
testimony with legal authority.
[
Footnote 5]
"[Prosecutor:] The only cure, your Honor, is a mistrial. The
State is well aware that, if the position I'm taking is wrong, if a
mistrial is not proper, that man walks, I know that."
"THE COURT: And I expressed my concern about that, Mr.
Butler."
Id. at 253.
[
Footnote 6]
Respondent filed both a "special action" -- a proceeding in the
nature of a common law writ of mandamus or prohibition,
see 17A Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann., Rules of Procedure for Special
Actions, Rule 1 (1973) -- and a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Respondent also moved in the trial court to dismiss or
quash the information. Petitioner does not raise any question about
the adequacy of respondent's exhaustion of available state
remedies.
[
Footnote 7]
App. 129.
[
Footnote 8]
The District Court indicated that a simple statement by the
trial judge to the effect that there was "manifest necessity" for
the mistrial would have sufficed to defeat the double jeopardy
claim.
Id. at 130-140.
[
Footnote 9]
In his opinion for the Court of Appeals, Judge Kilkenny
stated:
"In the absence of clear abuse, we are normally inclined to
uphold discretionary orders of this nature. In the usual case, the
trial judge has observed the complained-of event, heard counsel,
and made specific findings. Under such circumstances, a mistrial
declaration accompanied by a finding that the jury could no longer
render an impartial verdict would not be lightly set aside."
546 F.2d at 832. The importance of the absence of express
findings or reasons to the decision below seems apparent. The
Arizona trial judge "observed the complained-of event" and
patiently "heard counsel." Had he taken the additional step of
making an express finding of "manifest necessity," it appears that
Judge Kilkenny would have reviewed the mistrial ruling under a less
exacting abuse of discretion standard.
[
Footnote 10]
In its opinion as originally released, the court stated: "[W]e
decline to imply from this impropriety that the jury was completely
prevented from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict." App.
29-30. The court subsequently amended its opinion to delete the
word "completely" from that sentence. As originally written, the
opinion implied that the probability of jury prejudice would not be
a sufficient ground for mistrial; only the certainty of prejudice
would suffice.
[
Footnote 11]
This description of the right, which was quoted by Mr. Justice
Harlan in his plurality opinion in
United States v. Jorn,
400 U. S. 470,
400 U. S. 484,
and by the Court in
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.
S. 458,
410 U. S. 466,
was formulated by Mr. Justice Black in his opinion for the Court in
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684,
336 U. S. 689.
His complete sentence identifies that right as sometimes
subordinate to a larger interest in having the trial end in a just
judgment:
"What has been said is enough to show that a defendant's valued
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in
some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair
trials designed to end in just judgments."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 12]
"Reprosecution after a mistrial has unnecessarily been declared
by the trial court obviously subjects the defendant to the same
personal strain and insecurity regardless of the motivation
underlying the trial judge's action."
United States v. Jorn, supra at
400 U. S.
483.
[
Footnote 13]
As Mr. Justice Black stated in
Green v. United States,
355 U. S. 184,
355 U. S.
187-188:
"The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State, with
all its resources and power, should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even
though innocent, he may be found guilty."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 14]
In
Carsey v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 205,
208-209, 392 F.2d 810, 813-814 (1967), Judge Leventhal described
how subtle changes in the State's testimony, initially favorable to
the defendant, may occur during the course of successive
prosecutions:
"[T]he Government witnesses came to drop from their testimony
impressions favorable to defendant. Thus, a key prosecution
witness, the last person to see appellant and the deceased
together, who began by testifying that they had acted that evening
like newlyweds on a honeymoon, without an unfriendly word spoken,
ended up by saying for the first time in four trials that the words
between them had been 'firm,' and possibly harsh and 'cross.'"
"We also note that the police officer who readily acquiesced in
the two 'hung jury' trials that appellant was 'hysterical,' later
withheld that characterization. This shift, though less dramatic,
was by no means inconsequential in view of the significance of
appellant's condition at the time he made a statement inconsistent
with what he later told another officer."
See also n 13,
supra.
[
Footnote 15]
As the Court stated in
Illinois v. Somerville, supra at
410 U. S.
471:
"The determination by the trial court to abort a criminal
proceeding where jeopardy has attached is not one to be lightly
undertaken, since the interest of the defendant in having his fate
determined by the jury first impaneled is itself a weighty one. . .
. Nor will the lack of demonstrable additional prejudice preclude
the defendant's invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the
absence of some important countervailing interest of proper
judicial administration."
[
Footnote 16]
In his opinion announcing the Court's judgment in
United
States v. Jorn, supra at
400 U. S.
479-480, Mr. Justice Harlan explained why a rigid
application of the "particular tribunal" principle is
unacceptable:
"[A] criminal trial is, even in the best of circumstances, a
complicated affair to manage. . . . [It is] readily apparent that a
mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel
the discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be
too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal
security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a
mechanical rule would provide."
[
Footnote 17]
Whether the phrase "manifest necessity," "evident necessity,"
see Winsor v. The Qeen, L.R. 1 Q.B. 289, 305 (1866)
(Cockburn, C.J.), or "imperious necessity,"
see Downum v.
United States, 372 U. S. 734,
372 U. S. 736,
is used, the meaning is apparently the same.
[
Footnote 18]
"We think, that, in all cases of this nature, the law has
invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury
from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for
the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is
impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it
proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with
the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very
plain and obvious causes. . . . But, after all, they have the right
to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for
the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion,
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the
Judges, under their oaths of office."
United States v.
Perez, 9 Wheat. 579,
22 U. S.
580.
[
Footnote 19]
See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.
S. 684 (court-martial proceeding terminated because of
military necessity);
Simmons v. United States,
142 U. S. 148
(possible juror bias);
United States v. Perez, supra,
(hung jury).
[
Footnote 20]
As the Court noted in
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
at
410 U. S. 462,
the
Perez
"formulation, consistently adhered to . . . in subsequent
decisions, abjures the application of any mechanical formula by
which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying
and often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal
trial."
[
Footnote 21]
The English courts have long recognized the truth of this
proposition in the "hung jury" context:
"This rule if taken literally seems to command the confinement
of the jury till death if they do not agree, and to avoid any such
consequence an exception was introduced in practice which
Blackstone has described by the words 'except in case of evident
necessity.'"
"But the exception so expressed has given rise to further
doubts, because necessity is an equivocal word, meaning either
irresistible compulsion or a high degree of need. Those who have
been interested in objecting to a discharge of a jury before
verdict, have disputed whether the discharge was necessary in the
stricter sense of the word. The same dispute about the meaning of
the word necessity in the exception to this rule is the source of
the main questions raised upon this writ of error, and they are in
substance answered when we decide on the meaning of that word in
the exception to this rule, and apply that meaning to the facts
appearing on this record. We assume it to be clear that the
discharge of the jury before verdict may be lawful at some time and
under some circumstances. Then with reference to the facts on this
record, we hold that the judge at the first trial had by law power
to discharge the jury before verdict, when a high degree of need
for such discharge was made evident to his mind from the facts
which he had ascertained. We cannot define the degree of need
without some standard for comparison; we cannot approach nearer to
precision than by describing the degree as a high degree such as in
the wider sense of the word might be denoted by necessity."
Winsor v. The Queen, supra at 390, 394.
[
Footnote 22]
E.g., Whitebread, 7 How. St. Tr. 311 (1679).
See
also The Queen v. Charlesworth, 1 B. & S. 460, 500, 121
Eng.Rep. 786, 801 (Q.B. 1861); Friedland, Double Jeopardy 13-14,
21-25 (1969); Sigler, Double Jeopardy 87 (1969); Douglas, An
Almanac of Liberty 143 (1954). In reaction, the rule developed in
England that the judge should not discharge the jury prior to
verdict except in cases of "evident necessity."
Winsor v. The
Queen, supra at 304-305. However, if, for example, the judge
discharged the jury because a key witness for the Crown refused to
testify,
see The Queen v. Charlesworth, supra, the accused
could nevertheless be retried because jeopardy had not attached
under the English rule.
Winsor v. The Queen, supra at 390;
The Queen v. Charlesworth, supra; Friedland, supra, at
22-23.
[
Footnote 23]
"[I]n the reigns of the latter sovereigns of the Stuart family,
a different rule prevailed, that a jury in such case might be
discharged for the purpose of having better evidence against him at
a future day; and this power was exercised for the benefit of the
crown only; but it is a doctrine so abhorrent to every principle of
safety and security that it ought not to receive the least
countenance in the courts of this country. In the time of James II,
and since the Revolution, this doctrine came under examination, and
the rule as laid down by my Lord Coke was revived. . . ."
State v. Garrigues, 2 N.C. 188, 189 (1795).
[
Footnote 24]
If, for example, a prosecutor proceeds to trial aware that key
witnesses are not available to give testimony and a mistrial is
later granted for that reason, a second prosecution is barred.
Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734. The
prohibition against double jeopardy unquestionably "forbids the
prosecutor to use the first proceeding as a trial run of his case."
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262, 287-288 (1965).
[
Footnote 25]
As Mr. Justice Douglas noted in
Downum v. United States,
supra at
372 U. S.
736:
"Harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or
declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict are examples when jeopardy
attaches."
Yet, as Mr. Justice Douglas further noted, "those extreme cases
do not mark the limits of the guarantee."
Ibid. The
"particular tribunal" principle is implicated whenever a mistrial
is declared over the defendant's objection and without regard to
the presence or absence of governmental overreaching. If the
"right to go to a particular tribunal is valued, it is because,
independent of the threat of bad-faith conduct by judge or
prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the
decision whether or not to take the case from the jury."
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at
400 U. S. 485.
See discussion in
434 U. S.
infra.
[
Footnote 26]
Downum v. United States, supra at
372 U. S.
735-736.
[
Footnote 27]
This public interest in fair judgments is not of recent
origin:
"We do take upon ourselves, without the consent of the parties .
. . to discharge the jury when we are satisfied that they have
fully considered the case and cannot agree; and I hope no Judge
will shrink from taking that course; for, if a jury cannot agree,
we ought not to coerce them by personal suffering, nor ought we to
expose parties to the danger of a verdict which is not the result
of conviction in the minds of the jury, but produced by suffering
of mind or body."
The Queen v. Charlesworth, 1 B. & S., at 503-504,
121 Eng.Rep. at 802.
[
Footnote 28]
United States v.
Perez, 9 Wheat. 579;
Logan v. United
States, 144 U. S. 263;
Moss v. Glenn, 189 U.S. 506;
Keerl v. Montana,
213 U. S. 135;
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71. It
should be noted, however, that the rationale for this deference in
the "hung" jury situation is that the trial court is in the best
position to assess all the factors which must be considered in
making a necessarily discretionary determination whether the jury
will be able to reach a just verdict if it continues to deliberate.
If the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise
the "sound discretion" entrusted to him, the reason for such
deference by an appellate court disappears. Thus, if the trial
judge acts for reasons completely unrelated to the trial problem
which purports to be the basis for the mistrial ruling, close
appellate scrutiny is appropriate.
Cf. United States v.
Gordy, 526 F.2d 631 (CA5 1976).
[
Footnote 29]
Of course, we express no opinion regarding whether the failure
of the prosecutor to hand over
Brady (
Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83)
material to the defense at the first trial was deliberate or
inadvertent. The decision of the Arizona Supreme Court granting
respondent a new trial, in our opinion, does not specifically
address the matter. We simply accept for the purpose of analysis
respondent's characterization of the failure to disclose the
evidence as misconduct.
[
Footnote 30]
Respondent relies on
State v. Burruell, 98 Ariz. 37,
401 P.2d 733
(1965), as the Arizona decision most supportive of admissibility.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. This case, however, simply stands for the well
accepted proposition that a witness may be impeached with evidence
tending to show that he has an interest in giving testimony
favorable to the State and against the defendant. It undoubtedly
would have been proper for defense counsel to use the statements
suppressed at the first trial during the second trial, but there is
nothing in
Burruell which would suggest that the fact of
the suppression would have been admissible for any purpose at the
second trial.
[
Footnote 31]
For example, if there is a suggestion of individual juror bias,
it may be possible to replace that juror with an alternate.
[
Footnote 32]
In his concurring opinion in Dinitz, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER
emphasized the narrow purpose and scope of a legitimate opening
statement: .
"It is to state what evidence will be presented, to make it
easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to
relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not
an occasion for argument. To make statements which will not or
cannot be supported by proof is, if it relates to significant
elements of the case, professional misconduct. Moreover, it is
fundamentally unfair to an opposing party to allow an attorney,
with the standing and prestige inherent in being an officer of the
court, to present to the jury statements not susceptible of proof
but intended to influence the jury in reaching a verdict."
424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 612.
Our identification of this reason for according deference to the
trial judge in juror bias cases generally is not intended as a
comment upon the conduct of defense counsel in this case.
[
Footnote 33]
These considerations must be at least as weighty where a federal
court, in considering a state prisoner's collateral challenge to
his conviction on the ground that it violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause, reviews the determination of a state trial judge as to
juror bias.
[
Footnote 34]
In this case, defense counsel made brief reference during
voir dire to the fact that evidence was withheld from the
defense at the previous trial. Later in the
voir dire, the
prosecutor expressed his concern to the trial judge that, if the
jurors were aware of the fact that respondent obtained a new trial
because the prosecution failed to produce some evidence, they might
be prejudiced against the State. In response to the prosecutor's
concern, the trial judge conducted an inquiry into whether the
jurors knew the reason for the new trial. The inquiry revealed that
the jurors were not then aware of the reason for the new trial.
During the opening statements which followed, however, defense
counsel did not leave the matter to the jurors' conjecture;
instead, he explicitly stated that they would hear testimony
showing that the Supreme Court of Arizona granted respondent a new
trial because the prosecutor deliberately withheld exculpatory
evidence from the defense. Following completion of opening
argument, the prosecutor moved for a mistrial.
During argument on the prosecutor's motion, defense counsel
insisted that evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in a prior
proceeding was admissible for impeachment purposes; although he
could offer no authority to support this novel proposition, he
indicated to the judge that he would appreciate an opportunity to
"find . . . some written law, which would allow this type of
testimony . . . as evidence."
Supra at
434 U. S. 500
n. 3. While the trial judge remarked that he could conceive of no
basis for the admission of such evidence and that he was tempted to
grant the prosecutor's request immediately because of defense
counsel's injection of the prosecutorial misconduct issue into the
trial,
supra at
434 U. S.
499-500, n. 3, he did not act precipitately. Rather,
proceeding with caution and giving defense counsel the benefit of
the doubt, App. 223, the trial judge reserved ruling on the
admissibility question and at first denied the mistrial motion. In
avoiding a hasty decision despite his conviction that the evidence
was improper, the trial judge was plainly acting out of concern for
the double jeopardy interests implicated by an improvident
mistrial.
Id. at 225, 253.
The following day the prosecutor renewed his motion. The trial
judge heard extensive argument from both sides regarding both the
propriety of defense counsel's opening statement and the need for a
mistrial. Defense counsel contended that any prejudice which might
have resulted from the references to prosecutorial misconduct could
be cured by cautionary instructions; the prosecutor argued that
such an alternative would be inadequate to remove the risk of
taint.
[
Footnote 35]
Two considerations, while not determinative, add support to this
conclusion. First, crowded calendars throughout the Nation impose a
constant pressure on our judges to finish the business at hand.
Generally they have an interest in having the trial completed as
promptly as possible, an interest which frequently parallels the
constitutionally protected interest of the accused in having the
trial concluded by a particular tribunal. Second, respondent does
not attempt to demonstrate specific prejudice from the mistrial
ruling, other than the harm which always accompanies retrial.
Cf. McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1147 (CA5
1973).
[
Footnote 36]
In
United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No.
15,815) (CC Mass. 1851), Mr. Justice Curtis held that, even after
the jury had been sworn, it was not too late to challenge a juror
for bias. He pointed out that neither party "can have a vested
right to a corrupt or prejudiced juror, who is not fit to sit in
judgment in the case."
Id. at 1328.
[
Footnote 37]
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. at
336 U. S.
689.
[
Footnote 38]
See nn.
7-10 and
accompanying text supra.
[
Footnote 39]
The Court of Appeals was concerned that the trial judge may have
granted the State's mistrial motion because the comments of defense
counsel were improper without considering the possible impact of
those comments on the impartiality of the jurors. We think this
concern was unwarranted. Shortly after defense counsel made his
first, brief reference to the withholding of evidence in the
earlier trial, the judge indicated his concern regarding the
possible "poisoning of the panel." In addition, both sides argued
the question of juror bias and offered their views on whether
action short of a mistrial would suffice to eliminate the risk of
taint. Finally, the trial judge indicated his awareness of the
grave consequences of an erroneous mistrial ruling. We are
unwilling to assume that a judge, who otherwise acted responsibly
and deliberately, simply neglected to consider one of the central
issues presented by the mistrial motion and argued by the parties
when he made his ruling.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
I cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the failure of a
state trial judge to express the legal standard under which
Page 434 U. S. 518
he has declared a mistrial is, in itself and without further
examination of the record, sufficient reason to infer
constitutional error foreclosing a second trial. The Court's
opinion in
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.
S. 293 (1963), is to the contrary. There, in the course
of a full scale exposition of the proper approach to be followed by
a federal court in determining whether a writ of habeas corpus
should be issued on the petition of a state prisoner, the Court
addressed the situation where the state trial judge, in making the
challenged ruling, did not articulate the constitutional standard
under which he acted. The Court concluded that
"the coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges in the
administration of federal constitutional law are such that we think
the district judge may, in the ordinary case in which there has
been no articulation, properly assume that the state trier of fact
applied correct standards of federal law to the facts, in the
absence of evidence . . . that there is reason to suspect that an
incorrect standard was in fact applied."
Id. at
372 U. S.
314-315. A silent record is not a sufficient basis for
concluding that the state judge has committed constitutional error;
the mere possibility of error is not enough to warrant habeas
corpus relief.
The Court of Appals, as well as the District Court, was
therefore in error in granting relief without further examination
of the record to determine whether the use of an incorrect legal
standard was sufficiently indicated by something beyond mere
silence and, if not, whether the declaration of a mistrial, which
the Court of Appeals said it was "normally inclined to uphold," at
least in the absence of "clear abuse of discretion," was
constitutionally vulnerable. I would not, however, undertake an
examination of the record here in the first instance. Rather, I
would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and direct that
court to remand the case to the District Court to make the initial
judgment, under the correct legal standard, as to whether the writ
should issue.
Page 434 U. S. 519
This disagreement with the Court's disposition leads me to
dissent.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
The Court today holds that another trial of respondent,
following a mistrial declared over his vehement objection, is not
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. To reach this result, my
Brethren accord a substantial degree of deference to a trial court
finding that the Court simply assumes was made but that appears
nowhere in the record. Because of the silence of the record on the
crucial question whether there was "manifest necessity" for a
mistrial, I believe that another trial of respondent would violate
his constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. I therefore dissent.
My disagreement with the majority is a narrow one. I fully
concur in its view that the constitutional protection of the Double
Jeopardy Clause "embraces the defendant's
valued right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal,'" since a second
prosecution inevitably
"increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused,
prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved
accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance the risk that an
innocent defendant may be convicted."
Ante at
434 U. S.
503-504 (footnotes omitted). For these reasons, I also
agree that, where a mistrial is declared over a defendant's
objections, a new trial is permissible only if the termination of
the earlier trial was justified by a "manifest necessity," and that
the prosecution must shoulder the "heavy" burden of demonstrating
such a "high degree" of necessity.
Ante at
434 U. S.
505-506. Nor do I quarrel with the proposition that
reviewing courts must accord substantial deference to a trial
judge's determination that the prejudicial impact of an improper
opening statement is so
Page 434 U. S. 520
great as to leave no alternative but a mistrial to secure the
ends of public justice.
Ante at
434 U. S. 510,
434 U. S.
513-514. [
Footnote
2/1]
Where I part ways from the Court is in it assumption that an
"assessment of the prejudicial impact of improper argument,"
ante at
434 U. S. 514,
sufficient to support the need for a mistrial, may be implied from
this record. As the courts below found, [
Footnote 2/2] it is not apparent on the face of the
record that termination of the trial was justified by a "manifest
necessity" or was the only means by which the "ends of public
justice" could be fulfilled,
United States v.
Perez, 9 Wheat. 579,
22 U. S. 580
(1824).
Page 434 U. S. 521
See also ante at
434 U. S. 511.
Defense counsel's improper remarks occupied only one page of a
lengthy opening statement. Despite the fact that the prosecutor had
vigorously interrupted the opening statement at numerous points to
assert various objections, [
Footnote
2/3] he made no objection to the remarks that formed the basis
for the mistrial. If the argument of defense counsel had had a
visibly obvious impact on the jurors when uttered, it is hard to
believe that this prosecutor would have waited until after the
opening statement was finished and the luncheon recess concluded
before making his objection known.
Although, from this distance and in the absence of express
findings, it is impossible to determine the precise extent to which
defense counsel's remarks may have prejudiced the jury against the
State, the circumstances set forth above suggest that any such
prejudice may have been minimal and subject to cure through less
drastic alternatives. [
Footnote
2/4] For example, the jury could have been instructed to
disregard any mention of prior legal rulings as irrelevant to the
issues at hand, and to consider as evidence only the testimony and
exhibits admitted through witnesses on the stand. [
Footnote 2/5] Were there doubt
Page 434 U. S. 522
whether such instructions alone would suffice to cure the taint,
the jury could have been questioned about the extent of any
prejudice. Given the anticipated length of the trial (almost two
weeks), [
Footnote 2/6] it is not
unlikely that, had the jury been appropriately instructed when the
court first found defense counsel to have erred in his opening
statement, any prejudice would have dissipated before deliberations
were to begin. For these reasons, it is impossible to conclude that
finding of necessity was implicit in the mere grant of the
mistrial. [
Footnote 2/7]
Page 434 U. S. 523
As the majority concedes,
ante at
434 U. S. 501,
there was no express determination or evaluation by the trial court
of the degree of prejudice caused by the improper remarks; nor was
there any exploration of possible alternatives to the drastic
solution of declaring a mistrial; nor, indeed, any express
indication on the face of the record that the trial court was aware
of the dictates of the
Perez doctrine. Over the two days
during which the mistrial motion was argued, the entire thrust of
the trial court's questions and comments was to determine whether
there was any legal basis for admitting into evidence the Arizona
Supreme Court's ruling that the prosecution in an earlier trial had
suppressed evidence exculpatory of respondent, to which ruling
defense counsel had adverted in opening statement. [
Footnote 2/8] The tenor of the court's remarks
throughout -- including its statement in declaring the mistrial
[
Footnote 2/9] -- suggests that the
only question considered was that of admissibility. [
Footnote 2/10]
Page 434 U. S. 524
There is no doubt that the trial court's exploration of the
evidentiary question was conscientious and deliberate. The majority
infers from this care that the trial court must have been aware of
the correct legal standard governing the permissibility of retrials
following mistrials, and must impliedly, though not expressly, have
made the requisite findings of necessity. The deliberation with
which the trial court dealt with the evidentiary issue, however,
only highlights its failure to address what I believe must be the
key inquiry: whether a mistrial, and its abrogation of a
defendant's constitutionally protected interest in completing his
trial before a particular tribunal,
United States v. Jorn,
400 U. S. 470,
400 U. S. 486
(1971) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.);
Wade v. Hunter,
336 U. S. 684,
336 U. S. 689
(1949), is the only way to secure the public interest in a just
disposition of the charges.
I do not propose that the Constitution invariably requires a
trial judge to make findings of necessity on the record to justify
the declaration of a mistrial over a defendant's objections.
Page 434 U. S. 525
For example, where the nature of the error is one that "would
make reversal [of any conviction] on appeal a certainty,"
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458,
410 U. S. 464
(1973), the appropriate finding may be implied from the declaration
of a mistrial. [
Footnote 2/11]
What the "manifest necessity" doctrine does require, in my view, is
that the record make clear either that there were no meaningful and
practical alternatives to a mistrial, or that the trial court
scrupulously considered available alternatives and found all
wanting but a termination of the proceedings.
See United States
v. Jorn, supra at
400 U. S. 485;
Illinois v. Somerville, supra at
410 U. S.
478-479 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The record here, as
demonstrated above, does neither.
Where the need for a mistrial is not "plain and obvious,"
United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. at
22 U. S. 580,
the importance of an affirmative indication that the trial court
made the relevant findings is apparent. In the chaos of conducting
a trial, with the welter of administrative as well as legal
concerns that must occupy the mind of the trial judge, it is all
too easy to overlook a legal rule or relevant factor in rendering
decision. A requirement of some statement on the record addressed
to the need for a mistrial would ensure that appropriate
consideration is given to the efficacy of other alternatives and
that mistrial decisions are not based upon improper, or only partly
adequate, criteria. Of particular relevance here, moreover, it
would facilitate proper appellate and habeas review, avoiding the
need to speculate on the basis for the decision to terminate the
trial. [
Footnote 2/12] These
considerations have special force when a
Page 434 U. S. 526
mistrial is sought on the ground of jury bias resulting from
trial counsel's error. The trial court is uniquely situated to
evaluate the seriousness of any such prejudice,
see ante
at
434 U. S.
513-514, and its failure contemporaneously to do so may
preclude meaningful subsequent determination of whether the
mistrial was properly granted over the defendant's objection. Thus,
where the necessity for a mistrial is not manifest on the face of
the record, I would hold that the record must clearly indicate that
the trial court made a considered choice among the available
alternatives. [
Footnote 2/13]
Had the court here explored alternatives on the record, or made
a finding of substantial and incurable prejudice or other "manifest
necessity," this would b a different case and one in which I would
agree with both the majority's reasoning and its result. [
Footnote 2/14] On this ambiguous record,
however, the
Page 434 U. S. 527
absence of any such finding -- and indeed of any express
indication that the trial court applied the manifest necessity
doctrine -- leaves open the substantial possibility that there was
in fact no need to terminate the proceedings. While the Court
states that a "high degree" of necessity is required before a
mistrial may properly be granted, its reading of the record here is
inconsistent with this principle.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 2/1]
This proposition is essentially unremarkable. It is a truism
that findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside on
appeal unless "clearly erroneous," and that, on review, appropriate
deference must be given to the trial court's opportunity to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.
See, e.g., Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 52(a);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U. S. 100,
395 U. S. 123
(1969). While the determination that there is no alternative but a
mistrial to cure prejudice created by an improper opening statement
is in part one of law, in a case of this sort, it is based
primarily on a factual evaluation of the extent to which the
particular jury has been prejudiced.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Contrary to the majority's implication,
ante at
434 U. S. 502
nn. 8-9, the courts below did not hold that the absence of express
findings relating to the necessity for a mistrial was by itself
dispositive. Rather, the rulings of the District Court and the
Court of Appeals were based on their respective conclusions that on
this record it could not independently be determined that "the jury
was prevented from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict," and
therefore that a finding of manifest necessity was not implicit in
this record. 546 F.2d 832;
see App. 128-129 (District
Court's view that any prejudice could have been cured by cautionary
instruction).
Nor can I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals
applied an inappropriate standard of review. It expressly
recognized that "[t]he power to discharge a jury . . . is
discretionary with the trial court" and that, "[i]n the absence of
clear abuse, we . . . normally . . . uphold discretionary orders of
this nature." 546 F.2d at 832. But this is so, noted the court,
where
"[i]n the usual case, the trial judge has observed the
complained-of event, heard counsel, and made specific findings.
Under such circumstances, a mistrial declaration accompanied by a
finding that the jury could no longer render an impartial verdict
would not lightly be set aside."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See App. 173, 176, 178, 182, 183.
[
Footnote 2/4]
As is recognized by the majority in its search for an implied
finding that the prejudice was sufficient to warrant a mistrial,
mere error by either the prosecutor or the defense is insufficient
by itself to provide the "high degree" of necessity,
ante
at
434 U. S. 506,
required to permit a retrial following the grant of a mistrial over
the defendant's objections.
See United States v. Dinitz,
424 U. S. 600,
424 U. S. 608
(1976), quoting
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.
S. 470,
400 U. S. 484
(1971) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.) .
[
Footnote 2/5]
I do not mean to suggest that curative instructions are always
or even generally sufficient to cure prejudice resulting from
evidentiary errors,
see Bruton v. United States,
391 U. S. 123,
391 U. S. 129
(1968), quoting
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.
S. 440,
336 U. S. 453
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring), particularly where the error is
one by the prosecutor and must be shown to have been harmless
beyond any reasonable doubt in order for the conviction to be
sustained,
see Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18,
386 U. S. 21-24
(1967). However, it must be recognized that the cases are legion in
which convictions have been upheld despite the jury's exposure to
improper material relating to the defendant's past conduct, often
because curative instructions have been found sufficient to dispel
any prejudice.
See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 538 F.2d
704, 710 (CA5 1976);
id. at 711 (Tuttle, J., concurring);
United States v. Plante, 472 F.2d 829, 831-832 (CA1),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973);
United States v.
Roland, 449 F.2d 1281 (CA5 1971);
Driver v. United
States, 441 F.2d 276 (CA5 1971);
Beasley v. United
States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 406, 218 F.2d 366 (1954),
cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955).
See also United States v.
Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 21 (CA7),
cert. denied, 396
U.S. 958 (1969) (prosecutor's closing argument referring to accused
as "liar, crook, and wheeler and dealer" was improper but harmless
error). If instructions may be found to have cured prosecutorial
error relating to the defendant's past misconduct beyond a
reasonable doubt, they ought surely to be considered in deciding
whether to subject a defendant to a second trial because of defense
error in referring to past misconduct by the prosecution.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See Tr. of
Voir Dire by Defendant's Counsel
22.
[
Footnote 2/7]
In this respect, the instant case differs markedly from the
situation in
Thompson v. United States, 155 U.
S. 271 (1894), discussed
ante at
434 U. S. 512.
There, upon discovery that one of the petit jurors had served on
the grand jury indicting the defendant, the trial court immediately
announced that, "[if it] is insisted on by the gentlemen, there is
no way left but for the court to discharge the jury on that ground.
. . ." Record in No. 637, O.T. 1893, p. 20. Defense counsel
objected to the juror's participation, but also objected to a
discharge of the jury, arguing that he was entitled to an acquittal
once having been placed in jeopardy. The trial court was of the
view, clearly correct, that, had the juror remained on the panel
despite counsel's objection, any conviction would have been
reversed.
Id. at 21-22. That being the case, the trial
court held that the jury could be discharged and a new jury
impaneled without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Court
affirmed.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Thus, while the trial court repeatedly challenged defense
counsel on his theories for admissibility of the Arizona Supreme
Court's ruling,
see App. 204, 205, 209, 211, 217, 248, not
once did the court refer to "manifest necessity"; question defense
counsel as to the nature of any curative instructions that might be
propounded; or otherwise indicate a consciousness that mere error
on either side is insufficient to warrant the grant of a mistrial
over defense objections,
see 434
U.S. 497fn2/4|>n. 4,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/9]
"Based upon defense counsel's remarks in his opening statement
concerning the Arizona Supreme Court opinion and its effect for the
reasons for the new trial, the motion for mistrial will be
granted."
App. 271-272. As was noted in the Court of Appeals, the
circumstances of the argument on the mistrial motion and the ruling
itself make it
"quite possible that the grant of mistrial was based on the fact
that the impropriety of counsel's conduct had been established
without reaching the question whether there could, nevertheless, be
a fair trial."
546 F.2d at 833 (Merrill, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 2/10]
The majority relies on three aspects of the record to support
its conclusion that the trial court did make an evaluation of the
prejudicial impact of counsel's remarks and of the need for a
mistrial to correct the error.
Ante at
434 U. S.
514-515, n. 34,
434 U. S. 517 n. 39. The first is that the trial court
was aware of the double jeopardy consequences of an improvidently
granted mistrial, namely, that the defendant may not be tried
again. While this is true, none of the comments by the court
suggests a concern with the propriety of anything other than its
ruling on the evidentiary question.
See App. 225, 253.
Second, the majority points to the fact that counsel each argued
whether the prejudice could be cured by means other than a
mistrial. But such argument occupied only a minuscule portion of
each side's discussion and elicited no comment or response from the
court.
Finally, the Court notes that at the
voir dire of the
jury, the trial court expressed concern about "poisoning of the
panel" and that to allay this concern, the jury was questioned as
to its knowledge of the reasons for a new trial. The transcript of
the
voir dire, however, suggests that this questioning had
two purposes: to determine whether any jurors knew why there was a
second trial, and to determine whether such knowledge would
prejudice them in their deliberations. Tr. of
Voir Dire,
supra at 35. Since no jurors knew of the reason for the new
trial, no inquiry was made as to prejudice -- recognized at this
time by the court and by counsel as a separate issue. None of these
portions of the record establishes that the trial court at any time
made a determination that the prejudice from counsel's opening
statement could not be cured by an instruction, or that the court
had any basis, such as through a
voir dire, on which to
make such a determination.
[
Footnote 2/11]
See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, discussed
ante at
434 U. S. 512,
and in
434
U.S. 497fn2/7|>n. 7,
supra. Although not every
error that would require reversal upon conviction necessitates a
mistrial, frequently the "high degree of necessity" required by the
Perez doctrine is present, and may be implied from the
record if not expressed thereon, when an error of such magnitude
prompts a mistrial.
See Illinois v. Somerville,
410 U. S. 458,
410 U. S.
477-483 (173) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 2/12]
Moreover, given the wide variety of situations in which it may
be appropriate to grant a mistrial, and the difficulty in setting
forth a single standard that can provide meaningful guidance on
each occasion, a statement of reasons by the trial court would
contribute to the development of a body of rules, precedents, and
principles that might be useful in providing guidance to other
courts.
Cf. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 928-934 (CA2),
vacated
as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
[
Footnote 2/13]
Given the importance of respondent's constitutionally protected
interest in avoiding unnecessary second trials,
United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at
400 U. S. 486,
it might even be argued that a statement of reasons explicitly
relating to the need for a mistrial is always required. I do not go
this far here, but only observe that we have held in numerous
contexts that governmental decisionmakers must state their reasons
for decision, particularly where the decision is adverse to the
constitutionally or statutorily protected interests of an
individual.
See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.
S. 471,
408 U. S. 489
(1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254,
397 U. S. 271
(1970).
[
Footnote 2/14]
In
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.
S. 148 (1891), discussed
ante at
434 U. S. 512,
the trial court had explained at length the reasons for its
conclusion that there was a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial.
142 U.S. at
142 U. S.
149-150. Indeed, even in
Thompson v. United
States, discussed
ante at
434 U. S. 512,
and in n. 7,
supra, the trial court's finding that there
was "no [other] way" to respond to the grand juror's presence on
the petit jury sufficiently indicated on the record an exercise of
discretion informed by the "manifest necessity" standard.