After respondent's car had been impounded for multiple parking
violations the police, following standard procedures, inventoried
the contents of the car. In doing so, they discovered marihuana in
the glove compartment, for the possession of which respondent was
subsequently arrested. His motion to suppress the evidence yielded
by the warrantless inventory search was denied, and respondent was
thereafter convicted. The State Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth.
Held: The police procedures followed in this case did
not involve an "unreasonable" search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The expectation of privacy in one's automobile is
significantly less than that relating to one's home or office,
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583,
417 U. S. 590.
When vehicles are impounded, police routinely follow caretaking
procedures by securing and inventorying the cars' contents. These
procedures have been widely sustained as reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. This standard practice was followed here, and
there is no suggestion of any investigatory motive on the part of
the police. Pp.
428 U. S.
367-376.
89 S.D. ___ ,
228
N.W.2d 152, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
428 U. S. 376.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting statement,
post, p.
428 U. S. 396.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
STEWART, JJ., joined,
post, p.
428 U. S.
384.
Page 428 U. S. 365
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We review the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Dakota,
holding that local police violated the Fourth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, as applicable to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment, when they conducted a routine inventory
search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations
of municipal parking ordinances.
(1)
Local ordinances prohibit parking in certain areas of downtown
Vermillion, S.D. between the hours of 2 am. and 6 a.m. During the
early morning hours of December 10, 1973, a Vermillion police
officer observed respondent's unoccupied vehicle illegally parked
in the restricted zone. At approximately 3 a.m., the officer issued
an overtime parking ticket and placed it on the car's windshield.
The citation warned:
"Vehicles in violation of any parking ordinance may be towed
from the area."
At approximately 10 o'clock on the same morning, another
Page 428 U. S. 366
officer issued a second ticket for an overtime parking
violation. These circumstances were routinely reported to police
headquarters, and after the vehicle was inspected, the car was
towed to the city impound lot.
From outside the car at the impound lot, a police officer
observed a watch on the dashboard and other items of personal
property located on the back seat and back floorboard. At the
officer's direction, the car door was then unlocked and, using a
standard inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures, the
officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents
of the glove compartment, which was unlocked. There he found
marihuana contained in a plastic bag. All items, including the
contraband, were removed to the police department for safekeeping.
[
Footnote 1] During the late
afternoon of December 10, respondent appeared at the police
department to claim his property. The marihuana was retained by
police.
Respondent was subsequently arrested on charges of possession of
marihuana. His motion to suppress the evidence yielded by the
inventory search was denied; he was convicted after a jury trial
and sentenced to a fine of $100 and 14 days' incarceration in the
county jail. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
reversed
Page 428 U. S. 367
the conviction. 89 S.D. ___,
228 N.W.2d
152. The court concluded that the evidence had been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. We granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 923 (1975),
and we reverse.
(2)
This Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between
automobiles and homes or offices in relation to the Fourth
Amendment. Although automobiles are "effects," and thus within the
reach of the Fourth Amendment,
Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U. S. 433,
413 U. S. 439
(1973), warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in
circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583,
417 U. S. 589
(1974);
Cady v. Dombrowski, supra at
413 U. S.
439-440;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42,
399 U. S. 48
(1970).
The reason for this well settled distinction is twofold. First,
the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such
exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of
the warrant requirement is impossible.
Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132,
267 U. S.
153-154 (1925);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443,
403 U. S.
459-460 (1971). But the Court has also upheld
warrantless searches where no immediate danger was presented that
the car would be removed from the jurisdiction.
Chambers v.
Maroney, supra at
399 U. S. 51-52;
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58
(1967). Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant
requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect
to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to
one's home or office. [
Footnote
2] In discharging their varied responsibilities
Page 428 U. S. 368
for ensuring the public safety, law enforcement officials are
necessarily brought into frequent contact with automobiles. Most of
this contact is distinctly noncriminal in nature.
Cady v.
Dombrowski, supra at
413 U. S. 442.
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic
inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence,
police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection
stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust
fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other
safety equipment are not in proper working order.
The expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further
diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel.
Only two Terms ago, the Court noted:
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. . . . It
travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its
contents are in plain view."
Cardwell v. Lewis, supra at
417 U. S.
590.
In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court
has called "community caretaking functions,"
Cady v.
Dombrowski, supra at
413 U. S. 441,
automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. Vehicle
accidents present one such occasion. To permit the uninterrupted
flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence,
disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the
highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in
caretaking and traffic control activities.
Page 428 U. S. 369
Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which
violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the
public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.
[
Footnote 3] The authority of
police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding
traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond
challenge.
When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally
follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the
automobiles' contents. These procedures developed in response to
three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while
it remains in police custody,
United States v. Mitchell,
458 F.2d 960, 961 (CA9 1972); the protection of the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property,
United States
v. Kelehar, 470 F.2d 176, 178 (CA5 1972); and the protection
of the police from potential danger,
Cooper v. California,
supra at
386 U. S. 61-62.
The practice has been viewed as essential to respond to incidents
of theft or vandalism.
See Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212
Va. 520, 522, 184 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1971),
cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1073 (1972);
Warrix v. State, 50 Wis.2d 368, 376,
184 N.W.2d
189, 194 (1971). In addition, police frequently attempt to
determine whether a vehicle has been stolen, and thereafter
abandoned.
These caretaking procedures have almost uniformly been upheld by
the state courts, which, by virtue of the localized nature of
traffic regulation, have had considerable occasion to deal with the
issue. [
Footnote 4] Applying
the
Page 428 U. S. 370
Fourth Amendment standard of "reasonableness," [
Footnote 5] the state courts have
overwhelmingly concluded that, even if an inventory is
characterized as a "search," [
Footnote 6] the
Page 428 U. S. 371
intrusion is constitutionally permissible.
See, e.g., City
of St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 300-301,
218 N.W.2d
697, 699 (1974);
State v. Tully, 166 Conn.126, 136,
348 A.2d 603, 609 (1974);
People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 291,
296-297,
516 P.2d 423,
425-426 (1973);
People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 73, 272
N.E.2d 464, 466 (1971);
Cabbler v. Commonwealth, supra; Warrix
v. State, supra; State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44,
173 N.W.2d
372,
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970);
State v.
Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272,
444 P.2d 517
(1968);
State v. Montague, 73 Wash.
2d 381,
438 P.2d
571 (1968);
People v. Clark, 32 Ill.App.3d 898, 336
N.E.2d 892 (1975);
State v. Achter, 512 S.W.2d
894 (Mo.Ct.App. 1974);
Bennett v.
State, 507
P.2d 1252 (Okla.Crim.App. 1973);
People v. Willis, 46
Mich.App. 436, 208 N.W.2d 204 (1973);
State v. All, 17
N.C. App. 284,
193
S.E.2d 770,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
Godbee v. State, 224 So. 2d 441 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1969).
Even the seminal state decision relied on by the South Dakota
Supreme Court in reaching the contrary result,
Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699,
484 P.2d 84 (1971), expressly approved police caretaking activities
resulting in the securing of property within the officer's plain
view.
The majority of the Federal Courts of Appeals have likewise
sustained inventory procedures as reasonable police intrusions. As
Judge Wisdom has observed:
"[W]hen the police take custody of any sort of container [such
as] an automobile . . . , it is reasonable to search the container
to itemize the property to be held by the police. [This reflects]
the underlying principle that the fourth amendment proscribes only
unreasonable searches."
United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (CA5 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974) (emphasis in
original).
Page 428 U. S. 372
See also Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142 (CA4
1975),
cert. pending, No. 75-1463;
Barker v.
Johnson, 484 F.2d 941 (CA6 1973);
United States v.
Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (CA9 1972);
United States v.
Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (CA5 1970),
cert. denied, 401
U.S. 980 (1971);
United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249
(CA5),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971);
United
States v. Boyd, 436 F.2d 1203 (CA5 1971);
Cotton v. United
States, 371 F.2d 385 (CA9 1967).
Accord, Lowe v.
Hopper, 400 F.
Supp. 970, 976-977 (SD Ga.1975);
United States v.
Spitalieri, 391 F.
Supp. 167, 169-170 (ND Ohio 1975);
United States v.
Smith, 340 F.
Supp. 1023 (Conn.1972);
United States v.
Fuller, 277 F. Supp.
97 (DC 1967),
conviction aff'd, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 375,
433 F.2d 533 (1970). These cases have recognized that standard
inventories often include an examination of the glove compartment,
since it is a customary place for documents of ownership and
registration,
United States v. Pennington, supra at 251,
as well as a place for the temporary storage of valuables.
(3)
The decisions of this Court point unmistakably to the conclusion
reached by both federal and state courts that inventories pursuant
to standard police procedures are reasonable. In the first such
case, Mr. Justice Black made plain the nature of the inquiry before
us: .
"But the question here is not whether the search was
authorized by state law. The question is rather whether
the search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 61
(emphasis added).
And, in his last writing on the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Justice
Black said:
"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require that every search be
made pursuant to a warrant. It
Page 428 U. S. 373
prohibits only '
unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The relevant test
is not the reasonableness of the opportunity
to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure
under all the circumstances. The test of reasonableness cannot be
fixed by
per se rules; each case must be decided on its
own facts."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S.
509-510 (concurring and dissenting) (emphasis
added).
In applying the reasonableness standard adopted by the Framers,
this Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into
automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where
the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its
contents. In
Cooper v. California, supra, the Court upheld
the inventory of a car impounded under the authority of a state
forfeiture statute. Even though the inventory was conducted in a
distinctly criminal setting [
Footnote 7] and carried out a week after the car had been
impounded, the Court nonetheless found that the car search,
including examination of the glove compartment where contraband was
found, was reasonable under the circumstances. This conclusion was
reached despite the fact that no warrant had issued and probable
cause to search for the contraband in the vehicle had not been
established. The Court said in language explicitly applicable
here:
"It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to
retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no
right, even for their own protection, to search it."
386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 61-62.
[
Footnote 8]
Page 428 U. S. 374
In the following Term, the Court in
Harris v. United
States, 390 U. S. 234
(1968), upheld the introduction of evidence, seized by an officer
who, after conducting an inventory search of a car and while taking
means to safeguard it, observed a car registration card lying on
the metal stripping of the car door. Rejecting the argument that a
warrant was necessary, the Court held that the intrusion was
justifiable, since it was "taken to protect the car while it was in
police custody."
Id. at
390 U. S. 236.
[
Footnote 9] Finally, in
Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, the Court upheld a warrantless
search of an automobile towed to a private garage even though no
probable cause existed to believe that the vehicle contained fruits
of a crime. The sole justification for the warrantless incursion
was that it was incident to the caretaking function of the local
police to protect the community's safety. Indeed, the protective
search was instituted solely because local police "were under the
impression" that the incapacitated driver, a Chicago police
officer, was required to carry his service revolver at all times;
the police had reasonable grounds to believe a weapon might be in
the car, and thus available to vandals. 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 436.
The Court carefully noted that the protective search was
Page 428 U. S. 375
carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local
police department,
ibid., a factor tending to ensure that
the intrusion would be limited in scope to the extent necessary to
carry out the caretaking function.
See United States v.
Spitalieri, 391 F. Supp. at 169. In reaching this result, the
Court in
Cady distinguished
Preston v. United
States, 376 U. S. 364
(1964), on the grounds that the holding, invalidating a car search
conducted after a vagrancy arrest, "stands only for the proposition
that the search challenged there could not be justified as one
incident to an arrest." 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 444.
Preston therefore did not raise the issue of the
constitutionality of a protective inventory of a car lawfully
within police custody.
The holdings in
Cooper, Harris, and
Cady point
the way to the correct resolution of this ease. None of the three
cases, of course, involves the precise situation presented here;
but, as in all Fourth Amendment cases, we are obliged to look to
all the facts and circumstances of this case in light of the
principles set forth in these prior decisions.
"[W]hether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. . . ."
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S.
59.
The Vermillion police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking
search of a lawfully impounded automobile.
Cf. United States
v.Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 471 (CA8 1973). The inventory was
conducted only after the car had been impounded for multiple
parking violations. The owner, having left his car illegally parked
for an extended period, and thus subject to impoundment, was not
present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his
belongings. The inventory itself was prompted by the presence in
plain view of a number of
Page 428 U. S. 376
valuables inside the car. As in
Cady, there is no
suggestion whatever that this standard procedure, essentially like
that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an
investigatory police motive. [
Footnote 10]
On this record, we conclude that, in following standard police
procedures prevailing throughout the country and approved by the
overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the police was not
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the South Dakota Supreme Court is therefore
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
At respondent's trial, the officer who conducted the inventory
testified as follows:
"Q. And why did you inventory this car?"
"A. Mainly for safekeeping, because we have had a lot of trouble
in the past of people getting into the impound lot and breaking
into cars and stealing stuff out of them."
"Q. Do you know whether the vehicles that were broken into . . .
were locked or unlocked?"
"A. Both of them were locked, they would be locked."
Record 74. In describing the impound lot, the officer
stated:
"A. It's the old county highway yard. It has a wooden fence
partially around part of it, and kind of a dilapidated wire fence,
a makeshift fence."
Id. at 73.
[
Footnote 2]
In
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 (1967), and
See v. City of Seattle,
387 U. S. 541
(1967), the Court held that a warrant was required to effect an
unconsented administrative entry into and inspection of private
dwellings or commercial premises to ascertain health or safety
conditions. In contrast, this procedure has never been held
applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes.
[
Footnote 3]
The New York Court of Appeals has noted that, in New York City
alone, 108,332 cars were towed away for traffic violations during
1969.
People v. Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 71, 272 N.E.2d
464, 465 (1971).
[
Footnote 4]
In contrast to state officials engaged in everyday caretaking
functions:
"The contact with vehicles by federal law enforcement officers
usually, if not always, involves the detection or investigation of
crimes unrelated to the operation of a vehicle."
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433,
413 U. S. 440
(1973).
[
Footnote 5]
In analyzing the issue of reasonableness
vel non, the
courts have not sought to determine whether a protective inventory
was justified by "probable cause." The standard of probable cause
is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine,
noncriminal procedures.
See generally Note, Warrantless
Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 835, 850-851
(1974). The probable cause approach is unhelpful when analysis
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative
caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the
protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal
investigations.
In view of the noncriminal context of inventory searches, and
the inapplicability in such a setting of the requirement of
probable cause, courts have held -- and quite correctly -- that
search warrants are not required, linked as the warrant requirement
textually is to the probable cause concept. We have frequently
observed that the warrant requirement assures that legal inferences
and conclusions as to probable cause will be drawn by a neutral
magistrate unrelated to the criminal investigative enforcement
process. With respect to noninvestigative police inventories of
automobiles lawfully within governmental custody, however, the
policies underlying the warrant requirement, to which MR. JUSTICE
POWELL refers, are inapplicable.
[
Footnote 6]
Given the benign noncriminal context of the intrusion,
see
Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309,
400 U. S. 317
(1971), some courts have concluded that an inventory does not
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
See, e.g.,
People v. Sullivan, supra at 77, 272 N.E.2d at 469;
People
v. Willis, 46 Mich.App. 436, 208 N.W.2d 204 (1973);
State
v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 49-50,
173 N.W.2d
372, 376,
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970). Other
courts have expressed doubts as to whether the intrusion is
classifiable as a search.
State v. All, 17 N.C. App. 284,
286,
193
S.E.2d 770, 772,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
Petitioner, however, has expressly abandoned the contention that
the inventory in this case is exempt from the Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5.
[
Footnote 7]
In
Cooper, the owner had been arrested on narcotics
charges, and the car was taken into custody pursuant to the state
forfeiture statute. The search was conducted several months before
the forfeiture proceedings were actually instituted.
[
Footnote 8]
There was, of course, no certainty at the time of the search
that forfeiture proceedings would ever be held. Accordingly, there
was no reason for the police to assume automatically that the
automobile would eventually be forfeited to the State. Indeed, as
the California Court of Appeal stated, "[T]he instant record
nowhere discloses that forfeiture proceedings were instituted in
respect to defendant's car. . . ."
People v.
Cooper, 234 Cal. App.
2d 587, 596, 44 Cal. Rptr. 483, 489 (1965). No reason would
therefore appear to limit
Cooper to an impoundment
pursuant to a forfeiture statute.
[
Footnote 9]
The Court expressly noted that the legality of the inventory was
not presented, since the evidence was discovered at the point when
the officer was taking protective measures to secure the automobile
from the elements. But the Court clearly held that the officer
acted properly in opening the car for protective reasons.
[
Footnote 10]
The inventory was not unreasonable in scope. Respondent's motion
to suppress in state court challenged the inventory only as to
items inside the car not in plain view. But once the policeman was
lawfully inside the car to secure the personal property in plain
view, it was not unreasonable to open the unlocked glove
compartment, to which vandals would have had ready and unobstructed
access once inside the car.
The "consent" theory advanced by the dissent rests on the
assumption that the inventory is exclusively for the protection of
the car owner. It is not. The protection of the municipality and
public officers from claims of lost or stolen property and the
protection of the public from vandals who might find a firearm,
Cady v. Dombrowski, or, as here, contraband drugs, are
also crucial.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I add this opinion to
express additional views as to why the search conducted in this
case is valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. This
inquiry involves two distinct questions: (i) whether routine
inventory searches are impermissible, and (ii) if not, whether they
must be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
Page 428 U. S. 377
I
The central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
government officials.
See, e.g., United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873,
422 U. S. 878
(1975);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523,
387 U. S. 528
(1967). None of our prior decisions is dispositive of the issue
whether the Amendment permits routine inventory "searches"
[
Footnote 2/1] Of automobiles.
[
Footnote 2/2] Resolution of
this
Page 428 U. S. 378
question requires a weighing of the governmental and societal
interests advanced to justify such intrusions against the
constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in
the privacy of his effects.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
post at
428 U.S. 555;
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at
422 U. S.
878-879;
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.
S. 891,
422 U. S. 892
(1975);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433,
413 U. S. 447
8 (1973);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
392 U. S. 20-21
(1968).
Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra at
387 U. S.
534-535. As noted in the Court's opinion,
see
ante at
428 U. S. 369,
three interests generally have been advanced in support of
inventory searches: (i) protection of the police from danger; (ii)
protection of the police against claims and disputes over lost or
stolen property; and (iii) protection of the owner's property while
it remains in police custody.
Except in rare cases, there is little danger associated with
impounding unsearched automobiles. But the occasional danger that
may exist cannot be discounted entirely.
See Cooper v.
California, 386 U. S. 58,
386 U. S. 61-62
(1967). The harmful consequences in those rare cases may be great,
and there does not appear to be any effective way of identifying in
advance those circumstances or classes of automobile impoundments
which represent a greater risk. Society also has an important
interest in minimizing the number of false claims filed against
police, since they may diminish the community's respect for law
enforcement generally and lower department morale, thereby
impairing the effectiveness of the police. [
Footnote 2/3] It
Page 428 U. S. 379
is not clear, however, that inventories are a completely
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there remains
the possibility of accompanying such claims with an assertion that
an item was stolen prior to the inventory or was intentionally
omitted from the police records.
The protection of the owner's property is a significant interest
for both the policeman and the citizen. It is argued that an
inventory is not necessary, since locked doors and rolled-up
windows afford the same protection that the contents of a parked
automobile normally enjoy. [
Footnote
2/4] But many owners might leave valuables in their automobile
temporarily that they would not leave there unattended for the
several days that police custody may last. There is thus a
substantial gain in security if automobiles are inventoried and
valuable items removed for storage. And, while the same security
could be attained by posting a guard at the storage lot, that
alternative may be prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller
jurisdictions. [
Footnote 2/5]
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen's interest
in the privacy of the contents of his automobile. Although the
expectation of privacy in an automobile is significantly less than
the traditional expectation of privacy associated with the home,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, post at
428 U. S.
561-562;
United States v. Ortiz, supra at
422 U. S. 896
n. 2;
see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.
S. 583,
417 U. S.
590-591 (1974) (plurality opinion), the unrestrained
search
Page 428 U. S. 380
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a serious
intrusion upon the privacy of the individual in many circumstances.
But such a search is not at issue in this case. As the Court's
opinion emphasizes, the search here was limited to an inventory of
the unoccupied automobile, and was conducted strictly in accord
with the regulations of the Vermillion Police Department. [
Footnote 2/6] Upholding searches of this
type provides no general license for the police to examine all the
contents of such automobiles. [
Footnote
2/7]
I agree with the Court that the Constitution permits routine
inventory searches, and turn next to the question whether they must
be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
Page 428 U. S. 381
II
While the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly in terms of
"unreasonable searches and seizures," [
Footnote 2/8] the decisions of this Court have
recognized that the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at least
in part, on the more specific dictates of the Warrant Clause.
See United States v. United States District Court,
407 U. S. 297,
407 U. S. 315
(1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347,
389 U. S. 356
(1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 528.
As the Court explained in
Katz v. United States, supra at
389 U. S.
357,
"[s]earches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful
'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,'
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20,
269 U. S. 33, for the
Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a
judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the
police. . . .'
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S.
471,
371 U. S. 481-482."
Thus, although
"[s]ome have argued that '[t]he relevant test is not whether it
is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search
was reasonable,'
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56,
339 U. S. 66 (1950),"
"[t]his view has not been accepted."
United States v. United
States District Court, supra at
407 U. S. 315,
and n. 16.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 (1969). Except in a few carefully defined classes
of cases, a search of private property without valid consent is
"unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant.
See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U. S. 266,
413 U. S. 269
(1973);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.
S. 483,
376 U. S. 486
(1964);
Page 428 U. S. 382
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra at
387 U. S. 528;
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48,
342 U. S. 51
(1951);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20,
269 U. S. 30
(1925).
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches of
automobiles in circumstances that would not justify a search of a
home or office,
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 (1973);
Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U. S. 42
(1970);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925), these decisions establish no general
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement.
See Preston
v. United States, 376 U. S. 364
(1964). Rather, they demonstrate that, "
for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, there is a constitutional difference between
houses and cars,'" Cady v. Dombrowski, supra at
413 U. S. 439,
quoting Chambers v. Maroney, supra at 399 U. S. 52, a
difference that may, in some cases, justify a warrantless search.
[Footnote 2/9]
The routine inventory search under consideration in this case
does not fall within any of the established exceptions to the
warrant requirement. [
Footnote
2/10] But examination of the interests which are protected when
searches are
Page 428 U. S. 383
conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may issue only
upon "probable cause." In the criminal context, the requirement of
a warrant protects the individual's legitimate expectation of
privacy against the overzealous police officer.
"Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
[concerning probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10,
333 U. S. 14
(1948).
See, e.g., United States v. United States District
Court, supra at
407 U. S.
316-318. Inventory searches, however, are not conducted
in order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does not make a
discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that
certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in
accordance with established police department rules or policy, and
occur whenever an automobile is seized. There are thus no special
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.
A related purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent
hindsight from affecting the evaluation of the reasonableness of a
search.
See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, post at
428 U. S. 565;
cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.
S. 411,
423 U. S. 455
n. 22 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In the case of an
inventory search conducted in accordance with standard police
department procedures, there is no significant danger of hindsight
justification. The absence of a warrant will not impair the
effectiveness of post-search review of the reasonableness of a
particular inventory search.
Warrants also have been required outside the context of a
criminal investigation. In
Camara v. Municipal Court, the
Court held that, absent consent, a warrant was necessary to conduct
an area-wide building code inspection,
Page 428 U. S. 384
even though the search could be made absent cause to believe
that there were violations in the particular buildings being
searched. In requiring a warrant, the Court emphasized that
"[t]he practical effect of [the existing warrantless search
procedures had been] to leave the occupant subject to the
discretion of the official in the field,"
since
"when [an] inspector demands entry, the occupant ha[d] no way of
knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved
require[d] inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful
limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing
whether the inspector himself [was] acting under proper
authorization."
387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 532.
In the inventory search context, these concerns are absent. The
owner or prior occupant of the automobile is not present, nor, in
many cases, is there any real likelihood that he could be located
within a reasonable period of time. More importantly, no
significant discretion is placed in the hands of the individual
officer: he usually has no choice as to the subject of the search
or its scope. . [
Footnote
2/11]
In sum, I agree with the Court that the routine inventory search
in this case is constitutional.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon an area in which
the private citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347,
389 U. S. 360
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, despite their benign
purpose, when conducted by government officials, they constitute
"searches" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
392 U. S. 18 n.
15 (1968);
United States v.Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (CA8
1973);
Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699,
709-710, 484 P.2d 84, 90-91 (1971) (en banc).
Cf. Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U. S. 583,
417 U. S. 591
(1974) (plurality opinion).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The principal decisions relied on by the State to justify the
inventory search in this case,
Harris v. United States,
390 U. S. 234
(1968);
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58 (1967); and
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 (1973), each relied in part on significant
factors not found here.
Harris only involved an
application of the "plain view" doctrine. In
Cooper, the
Court validated an automobile search that took place one week after
the vehicle was impounded on the theory that the police had a
possessory interest in the car based on a state forfeiture statute
requiring them to retain it some four months until the forfeiture
sale.
See 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 61-62.
Finally, in
Cady, the Court held that the search of an
automobile trunk "which the officer reasonably believed to contain
a gun" was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 448.
See also id. at
413 U. S.
436-437. The police in a typical inventory search case,
however, will have no reasonable belief as to the particular
automobile's contents. And, although the police in this case knew
with certainty that there were items of personal property within
the exposed interior of the car --
i.e., the watch on the
dashboard --
see ante at
428 U. S. 366,
this information alone did not, in the circumstances of this case,
provide additional justification for the search of the closed
console glove compartment in which the contraband was
discovered.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The interest in protecting the police from liability for lost or
stolen property is not relevant in this case. Respondent's motion
to suppress was limited to items inside the automobile not in plain
view. And the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that the
removal of objects in plain view, and the closing of windows and
locking of doors, satisfied any duty the police department owed the
automobile's owner to protect property in police possession. 89
S.D. ___, ___,
228
N.W.2d 152, 159 (1975).
[
Footnote 2/4]
See Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra at 709-710, 484
P.2d at 991.
[
Footnote 2/5]
See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 835, 853 (1974).
[
Footnote 2/6]
A complete "inventory report" is required of all vehicles
impounded by the Vermillion Police Department. The standard
inventory consists of a survey of the vehicle's exterior --
windows, fenders, trunk, and hood -- apparently for damage, and its
interior, to locate "valuables" for storage. As part of each
inventory a standard report form is completed. The report in this
case listed the items discovered in both the automobile's interior
and the unlocked glove compartment. The only notation regarding the
trunk was that it was locked. A police officer testified that all
impounded vehicles are searched, that the search always includes
the glove compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in
this case because it was locked.
See Record 33-34,
73-79.
[
Footnote 2/7]
As part of their inventory search, the police may discover
materials such as letters or checkbooks that "touch upon intimate
areas of an individual's personal affairs," and "reveal much about
a person's activities, associations, and beliefs."
California
Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21,
416 U. S. 78-79
(1974) (POWELL, J., concurring).
See also Fisher v. United
States, 425 U. S. 391,
425 U. S. 401
n. 7 (1976). In this case, the police found,
inter alia,
"miscellaneous papers," a checkbook, an installment loan book, and
a social security status card. Record 77. There is, however, no
evidence in the record that, in carrying out their established
inventory duties, the Vermillion police do other than search for
and remove for storage such property without examining its
contents.
[
Footnote 2/8]
The Amendment provides that
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
[
Footnote 2/9]
This difference turns primarily on the mobility of the
automobile and the impracticability of obtaining a warrant in many
circumstances,
e.g., Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S. 132,
267 U. S.
153-154 (1925). The lesser expectation of privacy in an
automobile also is important.
See United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S. 891,
422 U. S. 896
n. 2 (1975);
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at
417 U. S. 590;
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266,
413 U. S. 279
(1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
See Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. at
413 U. S.
441-442.
[
Footnote 2/10]
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 (1969);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294,
387 U. S.
298-300 (1967);
Cooper v. California,
386 U. S. 58
(1967);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160,
338 U. S.
174-177 (1949);
Carroll v. United States, supra
at
267 U. S. 153,
267 U. S. 156.
See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451,
335 U. S.
454-456 (1948);
United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d
67, 76 (CA2 1973) (listing then-recognized exceptions to warrant
requirement: (i) hot pursuit; (ii) plain view doctrine; (iii)
emergency situation; (iv) automobile search; (v) consent; and (vi)
incident to arrest).
[
Footnote 2/11]
In this case, for example, the officer who conducted the search
testified that the offending automobile was towed to the city
impound lot after a second ticket had been issued for a parking
violation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to
the lot are searched in accordance with a "standard inventory
sheet," and "all items [discovered in the vehicles] are removed for
safekeeping." Record 74.
See 428
U.S. 364fn2/6|>n. 6,
supra.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment permits a
routine police inventory search of the closed
Page 428 U. S. 385
glove compartment of a locked automobile impounded for ordinary
traffic violations. Under the Court's holding, such a search may be
made without attempting to secure the consent of the owner and
without any particular reason to believe the impounded automobile
contains contraband, evidence, or valuables, or presents any danger
to its custodians or the public. [
Footnote 3/1] Because I believe this holding to be
contrary to sound elaboration of established Fourth Amendment
principles, I dissent.
As MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes, the requirement of a warrant
aside, resolution of the question whether an inventory search of
closed compartments inside a locked automobile can ever be
justified as a constitutionally "reasonable" search [
Footnote 3/2] depends upon a reconciliation
of the owner's constitutionally protected privacy interests against
governmental intrusion, and legitimate governmental interests
furthered by securing the car and its contents.
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
392 U. S. 20-21
(1968);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523,
387 U. S.
534-535,
387 U. S.
536-537 (1967). The Court fails clearly to articulate
the reasons for its reconciliation of these interests in this case,
but it is at least clear to me that the considerations
Page 428 U. S. 386
alluded to by the Court, and further discussed by MR. JUSTICE
POWELL, are insufficient to justify the Court's result in this
case.
To begin with, the Court appears to suggest by reference to a
"diminished" expectation of privacy,
ante at
428 U. S. 368,
that a person's constitutional interest in protecting the integrity
of closed compartments of his locked automobile may routinely be
sacrificed to governmental interests requiring interference with
that privacy that are less compelling than would be necessary to
justify a search of similar scope of the person's home or office.
This has never been the law. The Court correctly observes that some
prior cases have drawn distinctions between automobiles and homes
or offices in Fourth Amendment cases; but even as the Court's
discussion makes clear, the reasons for distinction in those cases
are not present here. Thus,
Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U. S. 42
(1970), and
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925), permitted certain probable cause searches
to be carried out without warrants in view of the exigencies
created by the mobility of automobiles, but both decisions
reaffirmed that the standard of probable cause necessary to
authorize such a search was no less than the standard applicable to
search of a home or office.
Chambers, supra at
399 U. S. 51;
Carroll, supra at
267 U. S. 155-156. [
Footnote
3/3] In other contexts, the Court has recognized that
automobile travel sacrifices some privacy interests to the
publicity of plain view,
e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U. S. 583,
417 U. S. 590
(1974) (plurality opinion);
cf. Harris v. United States,
390 U. S. 234
(1968). But this recognition, too, is inapposite here, for there is
no question of plain view in
Page 428 U. S. 387
this case. [
Footnote 3/4] Nor
does this case concern intrusions of the scope that the Court
apparently assumes would ordinarily be permissible in order to
insure the running safety of a car. While it may be that privacy
expectations associated with automobile travel are in some regards
less than those associated with a home or office,
see United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, post at
428 U. S.
561-52, it is equally clear that "[t]he word
automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away . . . ," Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S.
443,
Page 428 U. S. 388
403 U. S. 461
(1971). [
Footnote 3/5] Thus, we
have recognized that "[a]
search, even of an automobile,
is a substantial invasion of privacy,"
United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891,
422 U. S. 896
(1975) (emphasis added), and, accordingly, our cases have
consistently recognized that the nature and substantiality of
interest required to justify a
search of private areas of
an automobile is no less than that necessary to justify an
intrusion of similar scope into a home or office.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Ortiz, supra; Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266,
413 U. S.
269-270 (1973);
Coolidge, supra; Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U. S. 216,
391 U. S.
221-222 (1968);
Preston v. United States,
376 U. S. 364
(1964). [
Footnote 3/6]
Page 428 U. S. 389
The Court's opinion appears to suggest that its result may, in
any event, be justified because the inventory search procedure is a
"reasonable" response to
"three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property
while it remains in police custody . . . ; the protection of the
police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property . .
. ; and the protection of the police from potential danger."
Ante at
428 U. S. 369.
[
Footnote 3/7] This suggestion is
flagrantly misleading, however, because the record of this case
explicitly belies any relevance of the last two concerns. In any
event, it is my view that none of these "needs," separately or
together, can suffice to justify the inventory search procedure
approved by the Court.
First, this search cannot be justified in any way as a safety
measure, for -- though the Court ignores it -- the sole purpose
given by the State for the Vermillion police's inventory procedure
was to secure
valuables, Record 75, 98. Nor is there any
indication that the officer's search in this case was tailored in
any way to safety concerns, or that ordinarily it is so
circumscribed. Even aside from the actual basis for the police
practice in this case, however, I do not believe that any blanket
safety argument could justify a program of routine
Page 428 U. S. 390
searches of the scope permitted here. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL
recognizes, ordinarily "there is little danger associated with
impounding unsearched automobiles,"
ante at
428 U. S. 378.
[
Footnote 3/8] Thus, while the
safety rationale may not be entirely discounted when it is actually
relied upon, it surely cannot justify the search of every car upon
the basis of undifferentiated possibility of harm; on the contrary,
such an intrusion could ordinarily be justified only in those
individual cases where the officer's inspection was prompted by
specific circumstances indicating the possibility
Page 428 U. S. 391
of a particular danger.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 21,
392 U. S. 27;
cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433,
413 U. S. 448
(1973)
Second, the Court suggests that the search for valuables in the
closed glove compartment might be justified as a measure to protect
the police against lost property claims. Again, this suggestion is
belied by the record, since -- although the Court declines to
discuss it -- the South Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of
state law explicitly absolves the police, as "gratuitous
depositors," from any obligation beyond inventorying objects in
plain view and locking the car. 89 S.D. ___,
228
N.W.2d 152, 159 (1975). [
Footnote
3/9] Moreover, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL notes,
ante at
428 U. S.
378-379, it may well be doubted that an inventory
procedure would, in any event, work significantly to minimize the
frustrations of false claims. [
Footnote 3/10]
Finally, the Court suggests that the public interest in
protecting valuables that may be found inside a closed compartment
of an impounded car may justify the inventory procedure. I
recognize the genuineness of this governmental interest in
protecting property from pilferage. But even if I assume that the
posting of a guard would be fiscally impossible as an alternative
means to
Page 428 U. S. 392
the same protective end, [
Footnote
3/11] I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion. The Court's
result authorizes -- indeed it appears to require -- the routine
search of nearly every [
Footnote
3/12] car impounded. [
Footnote
3/13] In my view, the Constitution does not permit such
searches as a matter of routine; absent specific consent, such a
search is permissible only in exceptional circumstances of
particular necessity.
It is at least clear that any owner might prohibit the police
from executing a protective search of his impounded car, since, by
hypothesis, the inventory is conducted for the owner's benefit.
Moreover, it is obvious that not everyone whose car is impounded
would want it to be searched. Respondent himself proves this;
but
Page 428 U. S. 393
one need not carry contraband to prefer that the police not
examine one's private possessions. Indeed, that preference is the
premise of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, according to the
Court's result, the law may presume that each owner in respondent's
position consents to the search. I cannot agree. In my view, the
Court's approach is squarely contrary to the law of consent;
[
Footnote 3/14] it ignores the
duty, in the absence of consent, to analyze in each individual case
whether there is a need to search a particular car for the
protection of its owner which is sufficient to outweigh the
particular invasion. It is clear to me under established principles
that, in order to override the absence of explicit consent, such a
search must at least be conditioned upon the fulfillment of two
requirements. [
Footnote 3/15]
First, there must be specific cause to believe that a search of the
scope to be undertaken is necessary in order to preserve the
integrity of particular valuable property threatened by the
impoundment:
"[I]n justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which . .
reasonably warrant that intrusion."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 21.
Such a requirement of
"specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence,"
id. at
392 U. S. 21 n.
18, for
"[t]he basic purpose of this
Page 428 U. S. 394
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court,
is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 528.
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.
S. 873,
422 U. S.
883-884 (1975);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 448;
Terry v. Ohio, supra at
392 U. S. 27.
Second, even where a search might be appropriate, such an intrusion
may only follow the exhaustion and failure of reasonable efforts
under the circumstances to identify and reach the owner of the
property in order to facilitate alternative means of security or to
obtain his consent to the search, for in this context the right to
refuse the search remains with the owner.
Cf. Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U. S. 543
(1968). [
Footnote 3/16]
Because the record in this case shows that the procedures
followed by the Vermillion police in searching respondent's car
fall far short of these standards, in my view, the search was
impermissible, and its fruits must be suppressed. First, so far as
the record shows, the police in this case had no reason to believe
that the glove compartment of the impounded car contained
particular property of any substantial value. Moreover, the owner
had apparently thought it adequate to protect whatever he left in
the car overnight on the street in a business area simply to lock
the car, and there is nothing in the record to show that the
impoundment
Page 428 U. S. 395
lot would prove a less secure location against pilferage,
[
Footnote 3/17]
cf. Mozzetti
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 2d 699, 707, 484 P.2d 84, 89 (1971),
particularly when it would seem likely that the owner would claim
his car and its contents promptly, at least if it contained
valuables worth protecting. [
Footnote
3/18] Even if the police had cause to believe that the
impounded car's glove compartment contained particular valuables,
however, they made no effort to secure the owner's consent to the
search. Although the Court relies, as it must, upon the fact that
respondent was not present to make other arrangements for the care
of his belongings,
ante at
428 U. S. 375,
in my view, that is not the end of the inquiry. Here, the police
readily ascertained the ownership of the vehicle, Record 98-99, yet
they searched it immediately without taking any steps to locate
respondent and procure his consent to the inventory or advise him
to make alternative arrangements to safeguard his property,
id. at 32, 72, 73, 79. Such a failure is inconsistent with
the rationale that the inventory procedure is carried out for the
benefit of the owner.
The Court's result in this case elevates the conservation of
property interests -- indeed mere possibilities of property
interests -- above the privacy and security interests
Page 428 U. S. 396
protected by the Fourth Amendment. For this reason, I dissent.
On the remand, it should be clear in any event that this Court's
holding does not preclude a contrary resolution of this case or
others involving the same issues under any applicable state law.
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714,
420 U. S. 726
(1975) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
[
Footnote 3/1]
The Court does not consider, however, whether the police might
open and search the glove compartment if it is locked, or whether
the police might search a locked trunk or other compartment.
[
Footnote 3/2]
I agree with MR. JUSTICE POWELL's conclusion,
ante at
428 U. S. 377
n. 1, that, as petitioner conceded, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, the
examination of the closed glove compartment in this case is a
"search."
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523,
387 U. S. 530
(1967):
"It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
See also Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58,
386 U. S. 61
(1967), quoted in
428
U.S. 364fn3/5|>n. 5,
infra. Indeed, the Court
recognized in
Harris v. United States, 390 U.
S. 234,
390 U. S. 236
(1968), that the procedure invoked here would constitute a search
for Fourth Amendment purposes.
[
Footnote 3/3]
This is, of course, "probable cause in the sense of specific
knowledge about a particular automobile."
Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 266,
413 U. S. 281
(1973) (POWELL, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 3/4]
In its opinion below, the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated
that, in its view, the police were constitutionally justified in
entering the car to remove, list, and secure objects in plain view
from the outside of the car. 89 S.D. ___, ___,
228
N.W.2d 152, 158-159 (1975). This issue is not presented on
certiorari here.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, however,
ante at
428 U. S.
375-376, the search of respondent's car was not in any
way "prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of
valuables inside the car." In fact, the record plainly states that
every vehicle taken to the city impound lot was inventoried, Record
33, 74, 75, and that, as a matter of "standard procedure," "every
inventory search" would involve entry into the car's closed glove
compartment.
Id. at 43, 44.
See also Tr. of Oral
Arg. 7. In any case, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes,
ante at
428 U. S.
377-378, n. 2, entry to remove plain view articles from
the car could not justify a further search into the car's closed
areas.
Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752,
395 U. S. 763,
395 U. S.
764-768 (1969). Despite the Court's confusion on this
point -- further reflected by its discussion of
Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699,
484 P.2d 84 (1971),
ante at
428 U. S. 371,
and its reliance on state and lower federal court cases approving
nothing more than inventorying of plain view items,
e.g.,
Barker v. Johnson, 484 F.2d 941 (CA6 1973);
United States
v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960' (CA9 1972);
United States v.
Fuller, 277 F. Supp.
97 (DC 1967),
conviction aff'd, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 375,
433 F.2d 533 (1970);
State v. Tully, 166 Conn.126, 348
A.2d 603 (1974);
State v. Achter, 512 S.W.2d
894 (Mo.Ct.App. 1974);
State v. All, 17 N.C.App. 284,
193
S.E.2d 770,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) -- I
must conclude that the Court's holding also permits the intrusion
into a car and its console even in the absence of articles in plain
view.
[
Footnote 3/5]
Moreover, as the Court observed in
Cooper v. California,
supra at
386 U. S. 61:
"
[L]awful custody of an automobile does not, of itself,
dispense with constitutional requirements of searches thereafter
made of it.'"
[
Footnote 3/6]
It would be wholly unrealistic to say that there is no
reasonable and actual expectation in maintaining the privacy of
closed compartments of a locked automobile when it is customary for
people in this day to carry their most personal and private papers
and effects in their automobiles from time to time.
Cf. Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347,
389 U. S. 352
(1967) (opinion of the Court);
id. at
389 U. S. 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, this fact is implicit in the very
basis of the Court's holding -- that such compartments may contain
valuables in need of safeguarding.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL observes,
ante at
428 U. S. 380,
and n. 7, that the police would not be justified in sifting through
papers secured under the procedure employed here. I agree with
this, and I note that the Court's opinion does not authorize the
inspection of suitcases, boxes, or other containers which might
themselves be sealed, removed, and secured without further
intrusion.
See, e.g., United States v.Lawson, 487 F.2d 468
(CA8 1973);
State v. McDougal, 68 Wis.2d 399,
228 N.W.2d
671 (1975);
Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra. But
this limitation does not remedy the Fourth Amendment intrusion when
the simple inventorying of closed areas discloses tokens,
literature, medicines, or other things which on their face may
"reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and
beliefs,"
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S.
21,
416 U. S. 78-79
(1974) (POWELL, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 3/7]
The Court also observes that, "[i]n addition, police frequently
attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and
thereafter abandoned."
Ante at
428 U. S. 369.
The Court places no reliance on this concern in this case, however,
nor could it. There is no suggestion that the police suspected that
respondent's car was stolen, or that their search was directed at,
or stopped with, a determination of the car's ownership. Indeed,
although the police readily identified the car as respondent's,
Record 98-99, the record does not show that they ever sought to
contact him.
[
Footnote 3/8]
The very premise of the State's chief argument, that the cars
must be searched in order to protect valuables because no guard is
posted around the vehicles, itself belies the argument that they
must be searched at the city lot in order to protect the police
there. These circumstances alone suffice to distinguish the dicta
from
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 61-62,
recited by the Court,
ante at
428 U. S.
373.
The Court suggests a further "crucial" justification for the
search in this case: "protection of the
public from
vandals who might find a firearm,
Cady v.
Dombrowski, [
413 U.S.
433 (1973)], or as here, contraband drugs" (emphasis added).
Ante at
428 U. S. 376
n. 10. This rationale, too, is absolutely without support in this
record. There is simply no indication the police were looking for
dangerous items. Indeed, even though the police found shotgun
shells in the interior of the car, they never opened the trunk to
determine whether it might contain a shotgun.
Cf. Cady,
supra. Aside from this, the suggestion is simply untenable as
a matter of law. If this asserted rationale justifies search of all
impounded automobiles, it must logically also justify the search of
all automobiles, whether impounded or not, located in a similar
area, for the argument is not based upon the custodial role of the
police.
See also Cooper v. California, supra at
386 U. S. 61,
quoted in
428
U.S. 364fn3/5|>n. 5,
supra. But this Court has
never permitted the search of any car or home on the mere
undifferentiated assumption that it might be vandalized and the
vandals might find dangerous weapons or substances. Certainly
Cady v. Dombrowski, permitting a limited search of a
wrecked automobile where,
inter alia, the police had a
reasonable belief that the car contained a specific firearm, 413
U.S. at
413 U. S. 448,
does not so hold.
[
Footnote 3/9]
Even were the State to impose a higher standard of custodial
responsibility upon the police, however, it is equally clear that
such a requirement must be read in light of the Fourth Amendment's
preeminence to require protective measures other than interior
examination of closed areas.
[
Footnote 3/10]
Indeed, if such claims can be deterred at all, they might more
effectively be deterred by sealing the doors and trunk of the car,
so that an unbroken seal would certify that the car had not been
opened during custody.
See Cabbler v.
Superintendent, 374 F.
Supp. 690, 700 (ED Va.1974),
rev'd, 528 F.2d 1142 (CA4
1975),
cert. pending, No. 75-1463.
[
Footnote 3/11]
I do not believe, however, that the Court is entitled to make
this assumption, there being no such indication in the record.
Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra at
413 U. S.
447.
[
Footnote 3/12]
The Court makes clear,
ante at
428 U. S. 375,
that the police may not proceed to search an impounded car if the
owner is able to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his
belongings. Additionally, while the Court does not require consent
before a search, it does not hold that the police may proceed with
such a search in the face of the owner's denial of permission. In
my view, if the owner of the vehicle is in police custody or
otherwise in communication with the police, his consent to the
inventory is prerequisite to an inventory search.
See Cabbler
v. Superintendent, supra at 700;
cf. State v.
McDougal, 68 Wis.2d at 413, 228 N.W.2d at 678;
Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d at 708, 484 P.2d at 89.
[
Footnote 3/13]
In so requiring, the Court appears to recognize that a search of
some, but not all, cars which there is no specific cause to believe
contain valuables would itself belie any asserted property-securing
purpose.
The Court makes much of the fact that the search here was a
routine procedure, and attempts to analogize
Cady v.
Dombrowski. But it is quite clear that the routine in
Cady was only to search where there was a reasonable
belief that the car contained a dangerous weapon, 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 443;
see Dombrowski v. Cady, 319 F. Supp. 530, 532 (ED
Wis.1970), not, as here, to search every car in custody without
particular cause.
[
Footnote 3/14]
Even if it may be true that many persons would ordinarily
consent to a protective inventory of their car upon its
impoundment, this fact is not dispositive since even a majority
lacks authority to consent to the search of all cars in order to
assure the search of theirs.
Cf. United States v. Matlock,
415 U. S. 164,
415 U. S. 171
(1974);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.
S. 483 (1964).
[
Footnote 3/15]
I need not consider here whether a warrant would be required in
such a case.
[
Footnote 3/16]
Additionally, although not relevant on this record, since the
inventory procedure is premised upon benefit to the owner, it
cannot be executed in any case in which there is reason to believe
the owner would prefer to forgo it. This principle, which is fully
consistent with the Court's result today, requires, for example,
that, when the police harbor suspicions (amounting to less than
probable cause) that evidence or contraband may be found inside the
automobile, they may not inventory it, for they must presume that
the owner would refuse to permit the search.
[
Footnote 3/17]
While evidence at the suppression hearing suggested that the
inventory procedures were prompted by past thefts at the impound
lot, the testimony refers to only two such thefts,
see
ante at
428 U. S. 366
n. 1, over an undisclosed period of time. There is no reason on
this record to believe that the likelihood of pilferage at the lot
was higher or lower than that on the street where respondent left
his car with valuables in plain view inside. Moreover, the failure
of the police to secure such frequently stolen items as the car's
battery, suggests that the risk of loss from the impoundment was
not, in fact, thought severe.
[
Footnote 3/18]
In fact respondent claimed his possessions about five hours
after his car was removed from the street. Record 39, 93.
Statement of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
Although I do not subscribe to all of my Brother MARSHALL's
dissenting opinion, particularly some aspects of his discussion
concerning the necessity for obtaining the consent of the car
owner, I agree with most of his analysis and conclusions, and
consequently dissent from the judgment of the Court.