Petitioner, an enrolled Chippewa Indian, brought this suit in
state court seeking a declaratory judgment that the State of
Minnesota and respondent county lacked authority to impose a
personal property tax on his mobile home located on land held in
trust for members of his tribe, and that imposition of such a tax
contravened federal law. The trial court rejected the contention.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the grant of
civil jurisdiction to the State in § 4(a) of Pub.L. 280 includes
taxing authority, and, since § 4(b) does not exempt nontrust
property from such authority, the county had power to assess the
tax. Section 4(a) gave various States, including Minnesota, with
respect to all Indian country within the State except as
specifically exempted,
"jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country listed . . . to the same extent that such State . . . has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil
laws of such State . . . that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State.
. . ."
Though tax laws are not specifically mentioned, the State
Supreme Court concluded that they were included, since the
exempting provision, § 4(b), does not exempt nontrust property, but
states that
"[n]othing in this section shall authorize the . . . taxation of
any real or personal property . . . belonging to any Indian or any
Indian tribe . . . that is held in trust by the United States. . .
."
Held: Public Law 280 did not grant States the authority
to impose taxes on reservation Indians. Pp.
426 U. S.
379-393.
(a) The central focus of Pub.L. 280, embodied in § 2 of the Act,
was to confer on the States criminal jurisdiction with respect to
crimes involving Indians, and no mention was made of a
congressional intent to authorize the States to tax Indians or
Indian property on Indian reservations, a significant omission in
light of applying the canons of construction to statutes affecting
Indian immunities, where some mention would normally be expected
had Congress contemplated sweeping change in the status of
reservation Indians. Pp.
426 U. S.
379-383.
Page 426 U. S. 374
(b) Section 4(a) seems to have been intended primarily to
provide a state forum for resolving private legal disputes
involving Indians. Pp.
426 U. S.
383-386.
(c) When Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended Pub.L.
280 to require tribal consent to any new state jurisdiction,
Congress in effect characterized the relevant part of Pub.L. 280 as
conferring the power to resolve private civil controversies, and
the legislative history of Title IV would make it difficult to
construe § 4 jurisdiction acquired pursuant to that Title as
extending general state regulatory power, including taxing power,
to govern Indian reservations. Pp.
426 U. S.
386-387.
(d) Public L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total
assimilation, and nothing in its legislative history suggests
otherwise. The same Congress that enacted Pub.L. 280 also enacted
several termination Acts, indicating that Congress well knew how
directly to express its intent to confer upon the States general
civil regulatory powers, including taxation. Pp.
426 U. S.
387-390.
(e) Section 4(b), which is "entirely consistent with, and in
effect . . . a reaffirmation of, the law as it stood prior to its
enactment,"
Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863, 866 (CA9),
should, as an admittedly ambiguous statute, be construed in favor
of the Indians and against abolishing their tax immunities by
implication. Pp.
426 U. S.
390-393.
303 Minn. 395,
228 N.W.2d
249, reversed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 426 U. S. 375
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question reserved in
McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164,
411 U. S. 178
n. 18 (1973): whether the grant of civil jurisdiction to the States
conferred by § 4 of Pub.L. 280, 67 Stat. 589, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, is
a congressional grant of power to the States to tax reservation
Indians except insofar as taxation is expressly excluded by the
terms of the statute.
Petitioner Russell Bryan, an enrolled member of the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, [
Footnote 1]
resides in a mobile home on land held in trust by the United States
for the Chippewa Tribe on the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota.
In June, 1972, petitioner received notices from the auditor of
respondent Itasca County, Minn., that he had been assessed personal
property tax liability on the mobile home totaling § 147.95.
Thereafter, in September, 1972, petitioner brought this suit in the
Minnesota District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the
State and county were without authority to levy such a tax on
personal property of a reservation Indian on the reservation, and
that imposition of such a tax was contrary to federal law. The
Minnesota District Court rejected the contention and entered
judgment for respondent county. The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, 303 Minn. 395,
228 N.W.2d
249 (1975). We granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 923 (1975), and now
reverse.
I
Principles defining the power of States to tax reservation
Page 426 U. S. 376
Indians and their property and activities on federally
established reservations were clarified in
McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra. As summarized in its
companion case,
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U. S. 145
(1973),
McClanahan concluded:
"[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of
jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has
been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries
of the reservation, and
McClanahan . . . lays to rest any
doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not
permissible absent Congressional consent."
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra at
411 U. S. 148.
[
Footnote 2]
Page 426 U. S. 377
McClanahan held that Arizona was disabled, in the
absence of congressional consent, from imposing a state income tax
on the income of a reservation Indian earned solely on the
reservation. On the authority of
McClanahan, Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463
(1976), held this Term that, in the absence of congressional
consent, the State was disabled from imposing a personal property
tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal members living on the
reservation, or a vendor license fee applied to a reservation
Indian conducting a business for the tribe on reservation land, or
a sales tax a applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to
Indians.
Thus,
McClanahan and
Moe preclude any
authority in respondent county to levy a personal property tax upon
petitioner's mobile home in the absence of congressional consent.
Our task therefore is to determine whether § 4 of Pub.L. 280, 28
U.S.C. § 1360, constitutes such consent.
Section 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), provides:
"Each of the States . . . listed in the following table shall
have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country listed . . . to the same extent that such State . . . has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil
laws of such State . . . that are of general application to private
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State
. . . : "
Page 426 U. S. 378
"
* * * *"
"Minnesota . . . All Indian country within the State, except the
Red Lake Reservation."
The statute does not, in terms, provide that the tax laws of a
State are among "civil laws . . . of general application to private
persons or private property." The Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded, however, that they were, finding in § 4(b) of the
statute a negative implication of inclusion in § 4(a) of a general
power of tax. Section 4(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b), provides:
"Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property,
including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian
tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in
probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to
possession of such property or any interest therein."
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that,
"unless paragraph (a) is interpreted as a general grant of the
power to tax, then the exceptions contained in paragraph (b) are
limitations on a nonexistent power."
303 Minn. at 402, 228 N.W.2d at 253. [
Footnote 3] Therefore, the state court held: "Public
Law 280 is a clear grant of the power
Page 426 U. S. 379
to tax."
Id. at 406, 228 N.W.2d at 256. [
Footnote 4] We disagree. That conclusion is
foreclosed by the legislative history of Pub.L. 280 and the
application of canons of construction applicable to congressional
statutes claimed to terminate Indian immunities.
II
The primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub.L. 280 that
emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the problem of
lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of
adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.
See
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 535, 541-542 (1975). The
House Report states:
"These States lack jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for most
offenses committed on Indian reservations or other Indian country,
with limited exceptions. The applicability of Federal criminal laws
in States having Indian reservations is also limited. The United
States district courts have a measure of jurisdiction over offenses
committed on Indian reservations or other Indian country by or
against Indians, but, in cases of offenses committed by Indians
against Indians, that jurisdiction is limited to the so-called 10
major crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with
intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary,
robbery, and larceny."
"As a practical matter, the enforcement of law
Page 426 U. S. 380
and order among the Indians in the Indian country has been left
largely to the Indian groups themselves. In many States, tribes are
not adequately organized to perform that function; consequently,
there has been created a hiatus in law enforcement authority that
could best be remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on
States indicating an ability and willingness to accept such
responsibility."
H.R.Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1953). [
Footnote 5] Thus, provision for state
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians
on the reservations was the central focus of Pub. L 280, and is
embodied in § 2 of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1162. [
Footnote 6]
Page 426 U. S. 381
In marked contrast in the legislative history is the virtual
absence of expression of congressional policy or intent respecting
§ 4's grant of civil jurisdiction to the States. Of special
significance for our purposes, however, is the total absence of
mention or discussion regarding a congressional intent to confer
upon the States an authority to tax Indians or Indian property on
reservations. Neither the Committee Reports nor the floor
discussion in either House mentions such authority. [
Footnote 7] This omission has significance in
the application of the canons of construction applicable to
statutes affecting Indian immunities, as some mention would
normally be expected if such a sweeping change in the status of
tribal government and reservation Indians had been contemplated by
Congress. [
Footnote 8] The only
mention of taxation authority is in a colloquy between Mr. Sellery,
Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Congressman
Young during House committee hearings on Pub.L. 280. That colloquy
strongly suggests that Congress did not mean to grant tax authority
to the States:
"Mr. Young. Does your bill limit the provision
Page 426 U. S. 382
for Federal assistance to States in defraying.the increased
expenses of the courts in connection with the widening of the
jurisdiction that the bill encompasses?"
"Mr. Sellery. No; it does not."
"Mr. Young. Do you think it would be necessary to provide for
some payment, inasmuch as the great portion of Indian lands are not
subject to taxation?"
"Mr. Sellery. . . . Generally, the Department's views are that,
if we started on the processes of Federal financial assistance or
subsidization of law enforcement activities among the Indians, it
might turn out to be a rather costly program, and it is a problem
which the States should deal with and accept without Federal
financial assistance; otherwise, there will be some tendency, the
Department believes, for the Indian to be thought of, and perhaps
to think of himself, because of the financial assistance which
comes from the Federal Government, as still somewhat a member of a
race or group which is set apart from other citizens of the State.
And it is desired to give him and the other citizens of the State
the feeling of a conviction that he is in the same status and has
access to the same services, including the courts, as other
citizens of the State who are not Indians."
"Mr. Young. That would not quite be true, though, would it?
Because, for the most part, he does not pay any taxes."
"Mr. Sellery. No. There is that difference."
"Mr. Young. A rather sizable difference in not paying for the
courts or paying for the increased expenses for judicial
proceedings."
"Mr. Sellery. The Indians, of course, do pay other forms of
taxes. I do not know how the courts
Page 426 U. S. 383
of Nevada are supported financially, but the Indians do pay the
sales tax and other taxes."
"Mr. Young. But no income tax or corporation tax or profits tax.
You understand a large portion of the land is held in trust, and
therefore is not subject to tax."
"Mr. Sellery. That is correct."
"Mr. Young. S o far as my State is concerned, it would be a
large burden on existing costs of judicial procedure. I think it is
only right that the Federal Government should make some
contribution for that. You seem to differentiate. I think there is
a differentiation, too, in that they are not paying taxes."
"Mr. Sellery. I will concede your point that they are not paying
taxes. The Department has recommended, nevertheless, that no
financial assistance be afforded to the States."
App. 55-56. [
Footnote 9]
Piecing together as best we can the sparse legislative history
of § 4, subsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended to
redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private
legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and
other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to
decide such disputes; this is definitely the import of the
statutory wording conferring upon a State
"jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in . . . Indian country . . .
to the same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action."
With this as the primary
Page 426 U. S. 384
focus of § 4(a), the wording that follows in § 4(a) --
"and those civil laws of such State . . . that are of general
application to private persons or private property shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State"
-- authorizes application by the state courts of their rules of
decision to decide such disputes. [
Footnote 10]
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1652. This
construction finds support in the consistent and uncontradicted
references in the legislative history to "permitting" "
State
courts to adjudicate civil controversies" arising on Indian
reservations, H.R.Rep. No. 848, pp. 5, 6 (emphasis added), and the
absence of anything remotely resembling an intention to confer
general state civil regulatory control over Indian reservations.
[
Footnote 11] In
Page 426 U. S. 385
short, the consistent and exclusive use of the terms "civil
causes of action," "aris[ing] on," "civil laws . . . of general
application to private persons or private property," and
"adjudicat[ion]" in both the Act and its legislative history
virtually compels our conclusion that the primary intent of § 4 was
to grant jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving
reservation Indians in state court.
Furthermore, certain tribal reservations were completely
exempted from the provisions of Pub.L. 280 precisely because each
had a "tribal law and order organization that functions in a
reasonably satisfactory manner." H.R.Rep. No. 848, p. 7. [
Footnote 12] Congress plainly
Page 426 U. S. 386
meant only to allow state courts to decide criminal and civil
matters arising on reservations not so organized. Accordingly,
rather than the expansive reading given § 4(a) by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, we feel that the construction we give the section is
much more consonant with the revealed congressional intent.
Moreover, our construction is consistent with our prior references
to § 4 as "the extension of state jurisdiction over civil causes of
action by or against Indians arising in Indian country."
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.
S. 423,
400 U. S. 427
(1971).
See also id. at
400 U. S. 424
n. 1;
id. at
400 U. S.
430-431 (STEWART, J., dissenting);
Warren Trading
Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685,
380 U. S. 687
n. 3 (1965);
Menominee Tribe v. United States,
391 U. S. 404,
391 U. S. 416
n. 8 (1968) (STEWART, J., dissenting).
Our construction is also more consistent with Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U.S.C. § § 1321-1326.
Title IV repeals § 7 of Pub.L. 280, and requires tribal consent as
a condition to further state assumptions of the jurisdiction
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360. Section 402 of
Title IV, 25 U.S.C. § 1322, tracks the language of § 4 of Pub.L.
280. Section 406 of Title IV, 25 U.S.C. § 1326, which provides for
Indian consent, refers to "State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to
this subchapter with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes
of action. . . ." It is true, of course, that the primary
interpretation of § 4 must have reference to the legislative
history of the Congress that enacted it, rather than to the history
of Acts of a later Congress. Nevertheless, Title IV of the 1968 Act
is intimately related to § 4, as it provides the method for further
state assumptions of the jurisdiction conferred by § 4, and we
previously have construed the effect of legislation affecting
reservation Indians in light of "intervening" legislative
enactments.
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
at
425 U. S.
472-475. It would be
Page 426 U. S. 387
difficult to suppose that Congress, in 1968, intended the
meaning of § 4 to vary depending upon the time and method by which
particular States acquired jurisdiction. And certainly the
legislative history of Title IV makes it difficult to construe § 4
jurisdiction acquired pursuant to Title IV as extending general
state civil regulatory authority, including taxing power, to govern
Indian reservations. Senator Ervin, who offered and principally
sponsored Title IV,
see Kennerly v. District Court of Montana,
supra at
400 U. S. 429
n. 5, referred to § 1360 civil jurisdiction as follows:
"Certain representatives of municipalities have charged that the
repeal of [§ 7 of] Public Law 280 would hamper air and water
pollution controls and provide a haven for undesirable,
unrestricted business establishments within tribal land borders.
Not only does this assertion show the lack of faith that certain
cities have in the ability and desire of Indian tribes to better
themselves and their environment, but,
most importantly, it is
irrelevant, since Public Law 280 relates primarily to the
application of state civil and criminal law in court
proceedings, and has no bearing on programs set up by the
States to assist economic and environmental development in Indian
territory."
(Emphasis added.) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, No.
90-23, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1968).
III
Other considerations also support our construction. Today's
congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly
than in 1953 favor their assimilation, but Pub.L. 280 was plainly
not meant to effect total assimilation. Public L. 280 was only one
of many types of assimilationist legislation under active
consideration
Page 426 U. S. 388
in 1953. H.R.Rep. No. 848, pp. 5;
Santa Rosa Band of Indians
v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 662 (CA9 1975). [
Footnote 13] And nothing in its legislative
history remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act's extension
of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the
undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did exist
and a conversion of the affected tribes into little more than
"
private, voluntary organizations,'" United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544,
419 U. S. 557
(1975) -- a possible result if tribal governments and reservation
Indians were subordinated to the full panoply of civil regulatory
powers, including taxation, of state and local governments.
[Footnote 14] The Act itself
refutes such an
Page 426 U. S. 389
inference: there is notably absent any conferral of state
jurisdiction over the tribes themselves, and § 4(c), 28 U.S.C. §
1360(c), providing for the "full force and effect" of any tribal
ordinances or customs "heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian
tribe . . . if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of
the State," contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal
government.
Moreover, the same Congress that enacted Pub.L. 280 also enacted
several termination Acts [
Footnote 15] -- legislation which is cogent proof that
Congress knew well how to express its intent directly when that
intent was to subject reservation Indians to the full sweep of
state laws and state taxation.
Cf. Board of Comm'rs v.
Seber, 318 U. S. 705,
318 U. S. 713
(1943);
Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146,
203 U. S. 149
(1906). These termination enactments provide expressly for
subjecting distributed property
"and any income derived therefrom by the individual,
corporation, or other legal entity . . . to the same taxes, State
and Federal, as in the case of non-Indians, 25 U.S.C.
Page 426 U. S. 390
§§ 564j, 749, 898, and provide that"
"all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because
of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the
members of the tribe, and the laws of the several States shall
apply to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply
to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction."
25 U.S.C. §§ 564q, 757, 899;
cf. 25 U.S.C. § 726. These
contemporaneous termination Acts are
in pari materia with
Pub.L. 280.
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 411.
Reading this express language respecting state taxation and
application of the full range of state laws to tribal members of
these contemporaneous termination Acts, the negative inference is
that Congress did not mean in § 4(a) to subject reservation Indians
to state taxation. Thus, rather than inferring a negative
implication of a grant of general taxing power in § 4(a) from the
exclusion of certain taxation in § 4(b), we conclude that
construing Pub.L. 280
in pari materia with these Acts
shows that, if Congress, in enacting Pub.L. 280, had intended to
confer upon the States general civil regulatory powers, including
taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have expressly said
so.
IV
Additionally, we note that § 4(b), excluding
"taxation of any real or personal property . . . belonging to
any Indian or any Indian tribe . . . that is held in trust by the
United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation
imposed by the United States,"
is not obviously the narrow exclusion of state taxation that the
Minnesota Supreme Court read it to be. On its face, the statute is
not clear whether the exclusion is applicable only to taxes levied
directly on the trust property specifically or whether it also
excludes taxation on activities
Page 426 U. S. 391
taking place in conjunction with such property and income
deriving from its use. And even if read narrowly to apply only to
taxation levied against trust property directly, § 4(b) certainly
does not expressly authorize all other state taxation of
reservation Indians.
Moreover, the express prohibition of any "alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation" of any trust property can be read as
prohibiting state courts, acquiring jurisdiction over civil
controversies involving reservation Indians pursuant to § 4, from
applying state laws or enforcing judgments in ways that would
effectively result in the "alienation, encumbrance, or taxation" of
trust property. Indeed, any other reading of this provision of §
4(b) is difficult to square with the identical prohibition
contained in § 2(b) of the Act, which applies the same restrictions
upon States exercising criminal jurisdiction over reservation
Indians. It would simply make no sense to infer from the identical
language of § 2(b) a general power in § 2(a) to tax Indians in all
other respects, since § 2(a) deals only with criminal
jurisdiction.
Indeed, § 4(b) in its entirety may be read as simply a
reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal Government
relationship in all respects save the conferral of state court
jurisdiction to adjudicate private civil causes of action involving
Indians. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
that § 4(b) "is entirely consistent with, and in effect is a
reaffirmation of, the law as it stood prior to its enactment."
Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F.2d 863, 865-866 (1957). The
absence of more precise language respecting state taxation of
reservation Indians is entirely consistent with a general
uncertainty in 1953 of the precise limits of state power to tax
reservation Indians respecting other than their trust property, and
a congressional
Page 426 U. S. 392
intent merely to reaffirm the existing law whatever subsequent
litigation might determine it to be. [
Footnote 16]
Finally, in construing this "admittedly ambiguous" statute,
Board of Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. at
318 U. S. 713,
we must be guided by that "eminently sound and vital canon,"
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.
S. 649,
425 U. S. 655
n. 7 (1976), that
"statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . .
. are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being
resolved in favor of the Indians."
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S.
78,
248 U. S. 89
(1918).
See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.
S. 665,
224 U. S. 675
(1912);
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.
S. 194,
420 U. S.
199-200 (1975). This principle of statutory construction
has particular force in the face of claims that ambiguous statutes
abolish by implication Indian tax immunities.
McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 174;
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1,
351 U. S. 6-7
(1956);
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.
S. 363,
280 U. S.
366-367 (1930).
"This is so because . . . Indians stand in a special relation to
the federal government from which the states are excluded unless
the Congress has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax]
immunity and allow states to treat Indians as part of the general
community."
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.
S. 598,
319 U. S.
613-614 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting). What we
recently said of a claim that
Page 426 U. S. 393
Congress had terminated an Indian reservation by means of an
ambiguous statute is equally applicable here to the respondent's
claim that § 4(a) of Pub.L. 280 is a clear grant of power to tax,
and hence a termination of traditional Indian immunity from state
taxation:
"Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination
could be effected. But clear termination language was not employed
in the . . . Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an
intent to terminate. . . . A congressional determination to
terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from
the surrounding circumstances and legislative history."
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481,
412 U. S.
504-505 (1973).
The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a federally recognized tribe
with a constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Memorandum for United States as
Amicus Curiae 2 n. 2. Its
reservation was established by the Treaty of Feb. 22, 1855, 10
Stat. 1165.
[
Footnote 2]
The
McClanahan principle derives from a general
preemption analysis, 411 U.S. at
411 U. S. 172,
that gives effect to the plenary and exclusive power of the Federal
Government to deal with Indian tribes.
United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544,
419 U. S. 554
n. 11 (1975);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.
S. 535,
417 U. S.
551-552 (1974);
Board of Comm'rs v. Seber,
318 U. S. 705,
318 U. S.
715-716 (1943), and "to regulate and protect the Indians
and their property against interference even by a state,"
id. at
318 U. S. 715.
This preemption analysis draws support from "the
backdrop' of
the Indian sovereignty doctrine," Moe v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U. S. 463,
425 U. S. 475
(1976); "`[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state
jurisdiction and control [which] is deeply rooted in the Nation's
history,'" McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 168;
and the extensive federal legislative and administrative regulation
of Indian tribes and reservations, id. at 411 U. S.
173-179. "Congress has . . . acted consistently upon the
assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of
Indians on a reservation," Williams v. Lee, 358 U.
S. 217, 358 U. S. 220
(1959), and therefore
"'state laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on
an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided
that State laws shall apply.'"
McClanahan, supra at
411 U. S.
170-171 (quoting United States Department of the
Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958)).
Of course, this preemption model usually yields different
conclusions as to the application of state laws to tribal Indians
who have left or never inhabited federally established
reservations, or Indians "who do not possess the usual
accoutrements of tribal self-government,"
McClanahan,
supra at
411 U. S.
167-168;
see Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S.
at
411 U. S.
148-149.
[
Footnote 3]
The State Supreme Court relied upon
Omaha Tribe of Indians
v. Peters, 382 F.
Supp. 421 (1974),
aff'd, 516 F.2d 133 (CA8 1975),
where the District Court for the District of Nebraska gave the same
construction to Pub.L. 280 in upholding a state income tax levied
against reservation Indian income.
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioner had not properly raised a claim that his mobile home
was in fact annexed to tribal trust land, and therefore a part of
the real property expressly excluded from taxation by § 4(b). The
Minnesota Supreme Court found, therefore, that the mobile home was
personal property taxable as such under Minnesota law.
[
Footnote 5]
This House Report and the Senate Report, S.Rep. No. 699, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), are in all material respects identical.
All citations herein are to the House Report.
[
Footnote 6]
Section 2 of Pub.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, provides:
"State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in the Indian country."
"(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following
table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of
the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or
Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within
the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or
Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian
country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:"
"State or Territory of Indian country affected"
"
* * * *"
"Minnesota. All Indian country within the State,"
"except the Red Lake Reservation."
"
* * * *"
"(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property,
including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian
tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United
States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community
of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing
or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof."
"(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter
shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed
in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which the several
States have exclusive jurisdiction."
[
Footnote 7]
99 Cong.Rec. 9962, 10782-10784, 10928 (1953).
[
Footnote 8]
See Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal
Sovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N.D.L.Rev. 267, 292
(1973).
[
Footnote 9]
Unpublished Transcript of Hearings on H.R. 1063 before the
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The transcript
was produced by the United States during the briefing of
Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U. S. 451
(1973). The portion quoted in the text is reproduced in the
Appendix in the instant case.
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. Israel & Smithson,
supra, n 8, at 296:
"A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that Congress
never intended 'civil laws' to mean the entire array of state
noncriminal laws, but rather that Congress intended 'civil laws' to
mean those laws which have to do with private rights and status.
Therefore, 'civil laws . . . of general application to private
persons or private property' would include the laws of contract,
tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., but would not
include laws declaring or implementing the states' sovereign
powers, such as the power to tax, grant franchises, etc. These are
not within the fair meaning of 'private' laws."
[
Footnote 11]
Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the title of
Pub.L. 280, H.R.Rep. No. 848, p. 3:
"A bill to confer jurisdiction on the States . . with respect to
criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed or arising
on Indian reservations within such States, and for other
purposes"
(the other purposes being § 8's withdrawal from the affected
areas of the operation of the Federal Indian Liquor Laws, and §§
6-7's provision of a method whereby additional States could assume
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations).
Additionally, this interpretation is buttressed by § 4(c), which
provides that
"any tribal ordinance or custom . . . adopted by an Indian tribe
. . . in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall,
if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be
given full force and effect
in the determination of civil
causes of action pursuant to this section."
(Emphasis added.) Finally, reading § 4(a) as an integrated
whole, with the reference to state civil law as intended to provide
the rules of decision for the private civil causes of action over
which state courts were granted jurisdiction is consistent with § 3
of Pub.L. 280, which codifies § 4 in Title 28 of the United States
Code. That Title collects Acts of Congress governing jurisdiction
and the judiciary. Section 4 would be expected to be codified in
Title 25, governing Indian affairs if general state regulatory
power over Indian reservations were being granted. Indeed, § 4 is
entitled, as provided in Pub.L. 280 and codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1360, "State civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are
parties."
[
Footnote 12]
Tribal groups in the affected States which were exempted from
the coverage of Pub.L. 280 because they had "reasonably
satisfactory law and order" organizations, had objected to the
extension of state criminal and civil jurisdiction on various
grounds. Three of the tribes exempted objected due to their fear of
inequitable treatment of reservation Indians in the state courts.
H.R.Rep. No. 848, pp. 7-8. Two of the objecting tribes expressed
the fear that "the extension of State law to their reservations
would result in the loss of various rights."
Id. at 8. One
tribe objected on the ground that its members were "not yet ready
to be subjected to State laws."
Ibid. Certainly if
abolition of traditional Indian immunity from state taxation,
except insofar as expressly excluded, was an anticipated result of
Pub.L. 280's extension of civil jurisdiction, vehement Indian
objections on this specific ground would also have been voiced.
[
Footnote 13]
The legislative history of Pub.L. 280 does contain a
congressional expression that
"the Indians of several States have reached a stage of
acculturation and development that makes desirable extension of
State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country."
H.R.Rep. No. 848, p. 6. But not too much can be made of this
unelaborated statement; its thrust is too difficult to reconcile
with the focus of Pub.L. 280 -- extending state jurisdiction to
those reservations with the least developed and most inadequate
tribal legal institutions; presumably those tribes evincing the
least "acculturation and development" in terms of the mainstream of
American society.
See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits
of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.L.Rev.
535, 543 (1975)
[
Footnote 14]
Much has been written on the subject of a devastating impact on
tribal governments that might result from an interpretation of § 4
as conferring upon state and local governments general civil
regulatory control over reservation Indians.
Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 662-663, 666-668 (CA9
1975); Goldberg,
supra; Note, The Extension of County
Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280
and the Ninth Circuit, 25 Hastings L.J. 1451 (1974); Comment,
Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59
Calif.L.Rev. 1261 (1971). The suggestion is that, since tribal
governments are disabled under many state laws from incorporating
as local units of government, Goldberg,
supra at 581,
general regulatory control might relegate tribal governments to a
level below that of counties and municipalities, thus essentially
destroying them, particularly if they might raise revenue only
after the tax base had been filtered through many governmental
layers of taxation. Present federal policy appears to be returning
to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-government,
see,
e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §
1451
et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V); Indian
Self-Determination and education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat.
2203, 25 U.S.C. § 450
et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that
courts
"are not obliged in ambiguous instances to strain to implement
[an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, particularly
where to do so will interfere with the present congressional
approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship."
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, supra at
663.
[
Footnote 15]
68 Stat. 718, 25 U.S.C. § 564 (Klamath Tribe); 68 Stat. 768, 25
U.S.C. § § 721-728 (Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas); 68
Stat. 1099, 25 U.S.C. § § 741-760 (Paiute Indians of Utah); 68
Stat. 250, 25 U.S.C. § § 891-901 (Menominee Tribe of
Wisconsin).
[
Footnote 16]
Congress would have been fully justified in 1953 in being
uncertain as to state power to levy a personal property tax on
reservation Indians. No decision of this Court directly resolved
the issue until
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
425 U. S. 463
(1976), decided earlier this Term. It appears that the only
decision of this Court prior to 1953 dealing with state power to
levy a personal property tax on reservation Indians was
United
States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432,
188 U. S.
443-444 (1903), which held exempt from state taxation
personal Indian property purchased with federal funds.
See
United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 865
(1958).