The timely filing of an employment discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, pursuant to § 706 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not toll the
running of the limitation period applicable to an action, based on
the same facts, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Thus, in this case,
where petitioner waited over 3 1/2 years after his cause of action
for racial employment discrimination accrued before instituting an
action under § 1981, that suit is time-barred by the one-year
limitation period imposed by applicable state law notwithstanding
the fact that petitioner had filed the Title VII charge before that
limitation period had expired. Pp.
421 U. S.
457-467.
489 F.2d 525, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined, and in Parts I-III of which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL,
JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
421 U. S.
468.
Page 421 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether the timely filing of a
charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to § 706 of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5,
tolls the running of the period of limitation applicable to an
action, based on the same facts, instituted under 42 U.S.C. §
1981.
I
Petitioner, Willie Johnson, Jr., is a Negro. He started to work
for respondent Railway Express Agency, Inc., now, by change of
name, REA Express, Inc. (REA), in Memphis, Tenn. in the spring of
1964 as an express handler. On May 31, 1967, while still employed
by REA, but now as a driver, rather than as a handler, petitioner,
with others, timely filed with the EEOC a charge that REA was
discriminating against its Negro employees with respect to
seniority rules and job assignments. He also charged the respondent
unions, Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Tri-State Local and
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks Lily of the Valley Local, with
maintaining racially segregated memberships (white and Negro
respectively). Three weeks later, on June 20, REA terminated
petitioner's employment. Petitioner then amended his charge to
include an allegation that he had been discharged because of his
race.
The EEOC issued its "Final Investigation Report" on December 22,
1967. App. 14a. The report generally supported petitioner's claims
of racial discrimination. It was not until more than two years
later, however, on March 31, 1970, that the Commission rendered its
decision finding reasonable cause to believe petitioner's charges.
And 9 1/2 more months went by before the
Page 421 U. S. 456
EEOC, on January 15, 1971, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(e), as
it then read, gave petitioner notice of his right to institute a
Title VII civil action against the respondents within 30 days.
[
Footnote 1]
After receiving this notice, petitioner encountered some
difficulty in obtaining counsel. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee, on February 12, 1971,
permitted petitioner to file the right-to-sue letter with the
court's clerk as a complaint, in satisfaction of the 30-day
requirement. The court also granted petitioner leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, and it appointed counsel to represent
him. On March 18, counsel filed a "Supplemental Complaint" against
REA and the two unions, alleging racial discrimination on the part
of the defendants, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Act and of
42 U.S.C. § 1981. The unions and REA respectively moved for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, for dismissal of all claims.
The District Court dismissed the § 1981 claims as barred by
Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations. Tenn.Code Ann. §
28-304 (Supp. 1974). [
Footnote
2] Petitioner's remaining claims were dismissed on other
grounds. [
Footnote 3]
Page 421 U. S. 457
In his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, petitioner, with respect to his § 1981 claims,
argued that the running of the one-year period of limitation was
suspended during the pendency of his timely filed administrative
complaint with the EEOC under Title VII. The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument. 489 F.2d 525 (1973).
See also Jenkins
v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 1040, 1045-1046 (Del.1973). Because of an apparent
conflict between that ruling, and language and holdings in cases
from other Circuits, [
Footnote
4] we granted certiorari restricted to the limitation issue. We
invited the Solicitor General to file a brief as
amicus
curiae expressing the views of the United States. 417 U.S. 929
(1974).
II
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted
"to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 44
(1974). It creates statutory rights against invidious
Page 421 U. S. 458
discrimination in employment and establishes a comprehensive
scheme for the vindication of those rights.
Anyone aggrieved by employment discrimination may lodge a charge
with the EEOC. That Commission is vested with the
"authority to investigate individual charges of discrimination,
to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII,
and to institute civil actions against employers or unions named in
a discrimination charge."
415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 44.
Thus, the Commission itself may institute a civil action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). If, however, the EEOC is not
successful in obtaining "voluntary compliance" and, for one reason
or another, chooses not to sue on the claimant's behalf, the
claimant, after the passage of 180 days, may demand a right-to-sue
letter and institute the Title VII action himself without waiting
for the completion of the conciliation procedures. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III).
See H.R.Rep. No.
92-238, p. 12 (1971);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U. S. 792
(1973).
In the claimant's suit, the federal district court is empowered
to appoint counsel for him, to authorize the commencement of the
action without the payment of fees, costs, or security, and even to
allow an attorney's fee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp.
III) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Where intentional engagement in
unlawful discrimination is proved, the court may award backpay and
order "such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1970 ed., Supp. III). The backpay, however, may not be
for more than the two-year period prior to the filing of the charge
with the Commission.
Ibid. Some District Courts have ruled
that neither compensatory nor punitive damages may be awarded in
the Title VII suit. [
Footnote
5]
Page 421 U. S. 459
Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive
solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment,
the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies
he possesses, and is not limited to Title VII in his search for
relief.
"[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a
congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently
his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and
federal statutes."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 48. In
particular, Congress noted
"that the remedies available to the individual under Title VII
are coextensive with the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and
that the two procedures augment each other, and are not mutually
exclusive."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971).
See also S.Rep. No.
9215, p. 24 (1971). Later, in considering the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, the Senate rejected an amendment that
would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue under § 1981.
118 Cong.Rec. 3371-3373 (1972).
B. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, being the present codification of §
16 of the century-old Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144, on
the other hand, on its face relates primarily to racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. Although
this Court has not specifically so held, is well settled among the
Federal Courts of Appeals [
Footnote
6] -- and we now join them -- that § 1981
Page 421 U. S. 460
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race. An individual who establishes a
cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and
legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain
circumstances, punitive damages.
See, e.g., Caperci v.
Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (CA1),
cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968);
Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (CA5 1967).
And a backpay award under § 1981 is not restricted to the two years
specified for backpay recovery under Title VII.
Section 1981 is not coextensive in its coverage with Title VII.
The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Also, Title VII offers assistance
in investigation, conciliation, counsel, waiver of court costs, and
attorneys' fees, items that are unavailable at least under the
specific terms of § 1981.
III
Petitioner, and the United States a
amicus curiae,
concede, as they must, the independence of the avenues of relief
respectively available under Title VII and the older § 1981.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.
S. 409,
392 U. S.
416-417, n. 20 (1968). Further, it has been noted that
the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's
administrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution
of a § 1981 action.
Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500,
503-504 (CA6 1974);
Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443
F.2d 1044, 1046 (CA5 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916
(1972);
Young v. International
Page 421 U. S. 461
Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 761-763 (CA3 1971).
Cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 487
(CA7),
cert. denied sub nom. International Harvester Co. v.
Waters, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
We are satisfied, also, that Congress did not expect that a §
1981 court action usually would be resorted to only upon completion
of Title VII procedures and the Commission's efforts to obtain
voluntary compliance. Conciliation and persuasion through the
administrative process, to be sure, often constitute a desirable
approach to settlement of disputes based on sensitive and emotional
charges of invidious employment discrimination. We recognize, too,
that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at
conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could weaken
the Commission's efforts to induce voluntary compliance, and that a
suit is privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in
application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But these are
the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to
the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative
and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one. Under some
circumstances, the administrative route may be highly preferred
over the litigatory; under others, the reverse may be true. We are
disinclined, in the face of congressional emphasis upon the
existence and independence of the two remedies, to infer any
positive preference for one over the other without a more definite
expression in the legislation Congress has enacted, as, for
example, a proscription of a § 1981 action while an EEOC claim is
pending.
We generally conclude, therefore, that the remedies available
under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although
directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and
independent. With this base established, we turn to the limitation
issue.
Page 421 U. S. 462
IV
A. Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant
federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under § 1981,
the controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropriate one
provided by state law.
See O'Sullivan v. Felix,
233 U. S. 318
(1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1871);
Auto Workers v. Hoosier
Corp., 383 U. S. 696,
383 U. S.
701-704 (1966) (Labor Management Relations Act);
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461
(1947) (National Bank Act);
Chattanooga Foundry v.
Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390
(1906) (Sherman Act);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.
S. 610 (1895) (Patent Act). For purposes of this case,
the one-year limitation period in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-304 (Supp.
1974) clearly and specifically has application. [
Footnote 7]
See Warren v. Norman Realty
Co., 513 F.2d 730 (CA8 1975). The cause of action asserted by
petitioner accrued, if at all, not later than June 20, 1967, the
date of his discharge. Therefore, in the absence of some
circumstance that suspended the running of the limitation period,
petitioner's cause of
Page 421 U. S. 463
action under § 1981 was time-barred after June 20, 1968, over 2
1/2 years before petitioner filed his complaint.
B. Respondents argue that the only circumstances that would
suspend or toll the running of the limitation period under § 28-304
are those expressly provided under state law.
See
Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 28-106 to 28-115 (1955 and Supp. 1974) and 28-301
(1955). Petitioner concedes, at least implicitly, that no tolling
circumstance described in the State's statutes was present to toll
the period for his § 1981 claim. He argues, however, that state law
should not be given so broad a reach. He claims that, although the
duration of the limitation period is bottomed on state law, it is
federal law that governs other limitations aspects, such as
tolling, of a § 1981 cause of action. Without launching into an
exegesis on the nice distinctions that have been drawn in applying
state and federal law in this area, [
Footnote 8] we think it suffices to say that petitioner
has overstated his case. Indeed, we may assume that he would argue
vigorously in favor of applying state law if any of the Tennessee
tolling provisions could be said to assist his cause. [
Footnote 9]
Any period of limitation, including the one-year period
specified by § 28-304, is understood fully only in the context of
the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a
particular cause of action. Although any statute of limitations is
necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period allowed for
instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning
the point
Page 421 U. S. 464
at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale
ones. In virtually all statutes of limitations, the chronological
length of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions
regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application. In
borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal
cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State's wisdom
in setting a limit, and exceptions thereto, on the prosecution of a
closely analogous claim.
There is nothing anomalous or novel about this. State law has
been followed in a variety of cases that raised questions
concerning the overtones and details of application of the state
limitation period to the federal cause of action.
Auto Workers
v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 706
(characterization of the cause of action);
Cope v.
Anderson, 331 U.S. at
331 U. S. 465-467 (place where cause of action arose);
Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U. S. 529
(1891) (absence from State as a tolling circumstance). Nor is there
anything peculiar to a federal civil rights action that would
justify special reluctance in applying State law. Indeed, the
express terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 [
Footnote 10] suggest that the contrary is true.
Page 421 U. S. 465
C. Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is
not, to be sure, our exclusive guide. As the Court noted in
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. at
383 U. S.
706-707, considerations of state law may be displaced
where their application would be inconsistent with the federal
policy underlying the cause of action under consideration.
Petitioner argues that a failure to toll the limitation period
in this case will conflict seriously with the broad remedial and
humane purposes of Title VII. Specifically, he urges that Title VII
embodies a strong federal policy in support of conciliation and
voluntary compliance as a means of achieving the statutory mandate
of equal employment opportunity. He suggests that failure to toll
the statute on a § 1981 claim during the pendency of an
administrative complaint in the EEOC would force a plaintiff into
premature and expensive litigation that would destroy all chances
for administrative conciliation and voluntary compliance.
We have noted this possibility above, and, indeed, it is
conceivable, and perhaps almost to be expected, that failure to
toll will have the effect of pressing a civil rights complainant
who values his § 1981 claim into court before the EEOC has
completed its administrative proceeding. [
Footnote 11] One answer to this, although perhaps not
a highly satisfactory one, is that the plaintiff, in his § 1981
suit, may ask the court to stay proceedings until the
administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance
have been completed. But the fundamental answer to petitioner's
argument lies in the fact -- presumably
Page 421 U. S. 466
a happy one for the civil rights claimant -- that Congress
clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against private employment
discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate
and time-consuming procedures of Title VII. Petitioner freely
concedes that he could have filed his § 1981 action at any time
after his cause of action accrued; in fact, we understand him to
claim an unfettered right so to do. Thus, in a very real sense,
petitioner has slept on his § 1981 rights. The fact that his
slumber may have been induced by faith in the adequacy of his Title
VII remedy is of little relevance, inasmuch as the two remedies are
truly independent. Moreover, since petitioner's Title VII court
action now also appears to be time-barred because of the peculiar
procedural history of this case, petitioner, in effect, would have
us extend the § 1981 cause of action well beyond the life of even
his Title VII cause of action. We find no policy reason that
excuses petitioner's failure to take the minimal steps necessary to
preserve each claim independently.
V
Petitioner cites
American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah, 414 U. S. 538
(1974), and
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.,
380 U. S. 424
(1965), in support of his position. Neither case is helpful. The
respective periods of limitation in those cases were derived
directly from federal statutes, rather than by reference to state
law. Moreover, in each case, there was a substantial body of
relevant federal procedural law to guide the decision to toll the
limitation period, and significant underlying federal policy that
would have conflicted with a decision not to suspend the running of
the statute. [
Footnote 12]
In the
Page 421 U. S. 467
present case, there is no relevant body of federal procedural
law to guide our decision, and there is no conflicting federal
policy to protect. [
Footnote
13] Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tolling effect
given to the timely prior filings in
American Pipe and in
Burnett depended heavily on the fact that those filings
involved exactly the same cause of action subsequently asserted.
This factor was more than a mere abstract or theoretical
consideration, because the prior filing in each case necessarily
operated to avoid the evil against which the statute of limitations
was designed to protect. [
Footnote 14]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Page 421 U. S. 468
[
Footnote 1]
The applicable statute later was amended to allow a period of 90
days, after issuance of the notice, in which to bring the Title VII
action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. III), as amended
by Pub.L. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 106.
[
Footnote 2]
"28-304. Personal tort actions -- Malpractice of attorneys --
Civil rights actions -- Statutory penalties. -- Actions for libel,
for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, criminal conversation, seduction, breach of marriage
promise, actions and suits against attorneys for malpractice
whether said actions are grounded or based in contract or tort,
civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both,
brought under the federal civil rights statutes, and actions for
statutory penalties shall be commenced within one (1) year after
cause of action accrued."
[
Footnote 3]
The District Court also based its dismissal of petitioner's §
1981 claim against REA on the alternative ground that he had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act,
44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. App. 102a. The Court
of Appeals did not address the exhaustion argument. Inasmuch as we
limited our grant of certiorari to the limitation issue, 417 U.S.
929 (1974), we have no occasion here to express a view as to
whether a § 1981 claim of employment discrimination is ever subject
to a requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.
The claims against the unions were dismissed on
res
judicata grounds. App. 101a. The Court of Appeals agreed with
that disposition. 489 F.2d 525, 530 n. 1 (CA6 1973). This issue
also was not included in our grant of certiorari.
[
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting
Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n. 16 (CA5 1971);
Macklin v.
Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 84-86, n.
30, 478 F.2d 979, 994-996, n. 30 (1973).
[
Footnote 5]
Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F.
Supp. 1338, 1341-1342 (Haw.1974);
Howard v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F.
Supp. 854, 855-856 (ND Ga.1974);
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp., 368 F.
Supp. 829, 835-838 (ND Cal.1973).
Cf. Humphrey v.
Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F.
Supp. 832, 842-843 (WD Tex.1973),
rev'd on other
grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (CA5 1974).
[
Footnote 6]
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d
757 (CA3 1971);
Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co.,
457 F.2d 1377 (CA4),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972);
Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (CA5
1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972);
Long v. Ford
Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (CA6 1974);
Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (CA7),
cert. denied sub nom.
International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U.
S. 91 1 (1970);
Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc.,
459 F.2d 621 (CA8 1972);
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems,
Inc., supra.
[
Footnote 7]
In the petition for certiorari, it was argued that § 28-304 was
inapplicable to petitioner's claim because that statute is limited
to claims for damages, whereas petitioner sought injunctive relief
as well as backpay. Our limited grant of certiorari foreclosed our
considering whether some other Tennessee statute, such as Tenn.Code
Ann. § 28-309 (1955) (six years for an action on a contract) or §
28-310 (1955) (10 years on an action not otherwise provided for),
might be the appropriate one. We also have no occasion to consider
whether Tennessee's express application of the one-year limitation
period to federal civil rights actions is an impermissible
discrimination against the federal cause of action,
see
Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 546-547 (CA8
1945),
aff'd, 327 U.S. 757 (1946), or whether the
enactment of the limitation period after the cause of action
accrued, Tenn. Pub.Acts 1969, c. 28, did not touch the preexisting
federal claim.
[
Footnote 8]
See generally Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal
Nondiversity Litigation, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 66 (1955).
[
Footnote 9]
At oral argument, petitioner advanced just such a proposition
with respect to the applicability of Tennessee's saving statute,
Tenn.Code Ann. § 2106 (1955). Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.
See
also Pet. for Cert. 21 n. 27.
[
Footnote 10]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides:
"The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the
district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for
the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced
in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in
the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found
guilty."
[
Footnote 11]
We are not unmindful of the significant delays that have
attended administrative proceedings in the EEOC.
See, e.g.,
Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (CA5 1972);
EEOC v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F.
Supp. 1321, 1329 (Del.1974).
[
Footnote 12]
In
Burnett, the Court considered the effect of a prior
filing of an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in
state court on the applicable three-year FELA period of limitation.
The action had been dismissed because, under state law, the venue
was improper. In view of the express federal policy liberally
allowing transfer of improper venue cases,
see 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a), and the desirability of uniformity in the enforcement of
FELA claims, the Court concluded that the prior filing tolled the
statute. In
American Pipe, we considered the effect that a
timely filed civil antitrust purported class action should have on
the applicable four-year federal period of limitation. The District
Court found the suit an inappropriate one for class action status.
In the light of the history of Fed.Rule Civ Proc. 23 and the
purposes of litigatory efficiency served by class actions, we
concluded that the prior filing had a tolling effect.
[
Footnote 13]
We note expressly how little is at stake here. We are not really
concerned with the broad question whether these respondents can be
compelled to conform their practices to the nationally mandated
policy of equal employment opportunity. If the respondents, or any
of them, presently are actually engaged in such conduct, there
necessarily will be claimants who are in a position now either to
file a charge under Title VII or to sue under § 1981. The question
in this case is only whether this particular petitioner has waited
so long that he has forfeited his right to assert his § 1981 claim
in federal court.
[
Footnote 14]
Petitioner argues that the timely filing of a charge with the
EEOC has the effect of placing the charged employer on notice that
a claim of discrimination is being asserted. Thus, petitioner
argues, the employer has the opportunity to protect itself against
the loss of evidence, the disappearance and fading memories of
witnesses, and the unfair surprise that could result from a sudden
revival of a claim that long has been allowed to slumber.
See
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.
S. 342,
321 U. S.
348-349 (1944).
Even if we were to ignore the substantial span of time that
could result from tacking the § 1981 limitation period to the
frequently protracted period of EEOC consideration, we are not at
all certain that a Title VII charge affords the charged party the
protection that petitioner suggests.
See, e.g., Tipler v. E. I.
duPont de Nemours Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (CA6 1971). Only
where there is complete identity of the causes of action will the
protections suggested by petitioner necessarily exist, and will the
courts have an opportunity to assess the influence of the policy of
repose inherent in a limitation period.
See generally
Developments in the Law -- Statutes of Limitation, 63 Harv.L.Rev.
1177, 1185-1186 (1950).
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
In recognizing that Congress intended to supply aggrieved
employees with independent but related avenues of relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 16 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C.1981, the Court emphasizes the
importance of a full arsenal of weapons to combat unlawful
employment discrimination in the private as well as the public
sector. The majority stands on firm ground in recognizing that both
remedies are available to victims of discriminatory practices.
Accordingly, I concur in Parts I-III of the Court's opinion.
But the Court stumbles in its analysis of the relation between
the two statutes on the tolling question. The majority concludes
that the filing of a Title VII charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) does not toll the applicable statute
of limitations. It relies exclusively on state law for the period
and effect of the limitation and discounts the importance of the
federal policies of conciliation and avoidance of
Page 421 U. S. 469
unnecessary litigation in this area. The majority recognizes
these policies, but concludes that tolling the statute of
limitations for a § 1981 suit during the pendency of Title VII
proceedings is not an appropriate means of furthering them. I
disagree. The congressional purpose of discouraging premature
judicial intervention and the absence of any real risk of reviving
stale claims suggest the propriety of tolling here. On balance, I
view the failure to apply the tolling principle as undermining the
foundation of Title VII and frustrating the congressional policy of
providing alternative remedies. I must, therefore, dissent from
Parts
421 U. S. S.
466|>V of the opinion.
The Court sets out the circumstances that suspend a statute of
limitations without close examination of the statute's equitable
underpinnings. According to the majority, the federal court is
deprived of authority to toll the state statute because it borrows
both "the State's wisdom in setting a limit, [as well as]
exceptions thereto,"
ante at
421 U. S. 464,
and offers no special reason for reluctance to apply the
"overtones" of the period to a federal civil rights action. As a
general practice, where Congress has created a federal right
without prescribing a period for enforcement, the federal courts
uniformly borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations.
The applicable period of limitations is derived from that which the
State would apply if the action had been brought in a state court.
See, e.g., Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.
S. 696 (1966);
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U. S. 392
(1946);
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.
S. 318 (1914).
See also American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
414 U. S. 556
n. 27 (1974). For the purposes of this case, the § 1981 action is
governed by the District Court's application of the one-year
Tennessee provision for "actions . . . brought under the federal
civil rights statutes." Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-304 (Supp. 1974).
See ante at
421 U. S. 462
n. 7.
Page 421 U. S. 470
Congress' failure to include a built-in limitations period in §
1981 does not automatically warrant "an imprimatur on state law"
and sanction the borrowing of both the effect as well as the
duration from state law.
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp.,
supra at
383 U. S. 709
(WHITE, J., dissenting);
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra at
327 U. S.
394-395;
Board of Comm'rs v. United States,
308 U. S. 343
(1939). It is well settled that, when federal courts sit to enforce
federal rights, they have an obligation to apply federal equity
principles:
"When Congress leaves to the federal courts the formulation of
remedial details, it can hardly expect them to break with historic
principles of equity in the enforcement of federally created
equitable rights."
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra, at
327 U. S. 395.
See also Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d
80 (CA2),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961).
The effect to be given the borrowed statute is thus a matter of
judicial implication. Simply stated, we must determine whether the
national policy considerations favoring the continued availability
of the § 1981 cause of action outweigh the interests protected by
the State's statute of limitations.
See Auto Workers v. Hoosier
Corp., supra, at
383 U. S. 708;
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra, at
327 U. S.
395.
I
Title VII and now § 1981 both express the federal policy against
discriminatory employment practices.
Emporium Capwell Co. v.
WACO, 420 U. S. 50,
420 U. S. 66
(1975);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 44
(1974);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.
S. 792,
411 U. S. 800
(1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.
S. 424,
401 U. S.
429-430 (1971). As we have recently observed,
"legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a
Page 421 U. S. 471
general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra at
415 U. S. 47. It
is this general legislative intent that must guide us in
determining whether congressional purpose with respect to a
particular statute is effectuated by tolling the statute of
limitations.
A full exposition of the statutory origins of § 1981 with
respect to prohibition against private acts of discrimination is
set out in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.
S. 409 (1968). In construing § 1982, a sister provision
to § 1981, we concluded that Congress intended to prevent private
discriminatory deprivations of all the rights enumerated in § 1 of
the 1866 Act, including the right to contract. 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 426.
The Court's recognition of a proscription in § 1981 against private
acts of employment discrimination,
ante at
421 U. S.
459-460, reaffirms that the early Civil Rights Acts
reflect congressional intent to "speak . . . of all deprivations .
. . whatever their source."
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S. 97
(1971);
see also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U. S. 229
(1969).
The legislative history of Title VII and its 1972 amendments
demonstrates that Congress intended to provide a coordinated but
comprehensive set of remedies against employment discrimination.
The short statute of limitations and the procedural prerequisites
to Title VII actions emphasized the need to preserve the remedy of
a suit under the 1870 legislation, which did not suffer from the
same procedural restrictions as the latter enactment.
See
H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971); S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971).
See also 118 Cong.Rec. 3370 (1972). Congressional
sentiment was that,
"[b]y strengthening the administrative remedy, [it] should not
also eliminate preexisting rights which the Constitution and [the
Congress had] accorded to aggrieved individuals. "
Page 421 U. S. 472
Id. at 3371. While encouragement of private settlement
to avoid unnecessary litigation under Title VII and the
preservation of an independent § 1981 action may appear somewhat at
odds, the two themes are reconciled in the context of their joint
remedial purpose: devising a flexible network of remedies to
guarantee equal employment opportunities.
See, e.g., Guerra v.
Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 650 (CA5 1974);
Boudreaux v. Baton Roue Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d
1011, 1017 (CA5 1971);
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems,
Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 84-86, n. 30, 478 F.2d 979,
994-996, n. 30 (1973).
See also Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 421 F.2d 888 (CA5 1970).
In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, supra, we examined the
relationship between compulsory arbitration and litigation under
Title VII, a relationship analogous to that between the EEOC
factfinding and conciliation process and litigation under § 1981,
and accommodated both avenues of redress. The reasoning leading to
that result is equally compelling here. Forced compliance with a
short statute of limitations during the pendency of a charge before
the EEOC would discourage and/or frustrate recourse to the
congressionally favored policy of conciliation,
Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 44,
and
"[t]he possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of
Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well
be more litigation, not less."
Id. at
415 U. S. 59.
Cf. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
555-556.
Congressional effort, with the 1972 amendments, to strengthen
the administrative remedy by increasing EEOC's ability to
conciliate complaints is frustrated by the majority's requirement
that an employee file the § 1981 action prior to the conclusion of
the Title VII conciliation efforts in order to avoid the bar of
the
Page 421 U. S. 473
statute of limitations. [
Footnote
2/1] Legislative pains to avoid unnecessary and costly
litigation by making the informal investigatory and conciliatory
offices of EEOC readily available to victims of unlawful
discrimination cannot be squared with the formal mechanistic
requirement of early filing for the technical purpose of tolling a
limitations statute. In sum, the federal policies weigh strongly in
favor of tolling.
II
Examination of the purposes served by the statute of limitations
indicates that they would not be frustrated by adoption of the
tolling rule. Statutes of limitations are designed to insure
fairness to defendants by preventing the revival of stale claims in
which the defense is hampered by lost evidence, faded memories, and
disappearing witnesses, and to avoid unfair surprise. None of these
factors exists here.
Respondents were informed of the petitioner's grievances through
the complaint filed with the Commission and conciliation
negotiations. The charge filed with the EEOC and the § 1981 claim
arise out of the same factual circumstances. The petitioner in this
case diligently pursued the informal procedures before the
Commission and adhered to the congressional preference for
conciliation prior to litigation. Now, when Johnson asserts his
right to proceed with litigation under § 1981 after his good faith,
albeit unnecessary, compliance with Title VII procedures, the
majority interposes the bar of the Tennessee statute of
limitations, which clearly was not designed to include such cases.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Page 421 U. S. 474
In my judgment, following the anti-tolling position of the Court
to its logical conclusion produces an inequitable result. Aggrieved
employees will be forced into simultaneously prosecuting premature
§ 1981 actions in the federal courts. In essence, the litigant who
first explores conciliation prior to resort to litigation must file
a duplicative claim in the district court on which the court will
either take no action until the Title VII proceedings are concluded
or proceed in frustration of the EEOC attempts to conciliate. No
federal policy considerations warrant this waste of judicial time
and derogation of the conciliation process.
Adoption of the tolling principle, however, protects the federal
interest in both preserving multiple remedies for employment
discrimination and in the proper function of the limitations
statute. As a normal consequence, tolling works to suspend the
operation of a statute of limitations during the pendency of an
event or condition.
See American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. at
414 U. S.
560-561;
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.,
380 U. S. 424,
380 U. S. 427
(1965). In
American
Page 421 U. S. 475
Pipe, we held that the initiation of a timely class
action tolled the running of the limitation period as to individual
members of the class, enabling them to institute separate actions
after the District Court found class action an inappropriate
mechanism for the litigation. In similar manner, the
Burnett court viewed the initiation of a timely Federal
Employers' Liability Act suit in state court as tolling the statute
of limitations for the later filing of a federal action following
dismissal of the state proceeding for improper venue. The Court's
analysis in both cases rested on the conclusion that each plaintiff
had, by his prior action, given the defendant timely notice in a
manner that "fulfilled the policies of repose and certainty
inherent in the limitation provisions and tolled the running of the
period."
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
supra, at
414 U. S.
558.
Although the length of the limitation in these cases was fixed
by federal statute, the tolling rationale is equally adaptable to
protect subsequent litigation when the duration period is
established by state statute. The federal policy in favor of
continuing availability of multiple remedies for persons subject to
employment discrimination is inconsistent with the majority's
decision not to suspend the operation of the statute. As long as
the claim arising under § 1981 is essentially limited to the Title
VII claim, staleness and unfair surprise disappear as justification
for applying the statute. [
Footnote
2/3] Additionally, the difference in statutory origin for the
right asserted under the EEOC charge and the subsequent § 1981 suit
is of no consequence, since the claims are
Page 421 U. S. 476
essentially equivalent in substance.
Cf. Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, supra. Since the EEOC charge gives notice that
petitioner also has a grievance under § 1981, that filing, like the
initial litigation in
Burnett and
American Pipe,
satisfied the equitable policies underlying the limitation
provision.
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
supra, at
414 U. S.
558.
Neither the legislative history of these Acts nor the avowed
purposes of statutes of limitations foreclose good faith resort to
the administrative procedures of the EEOC. Adoption of the tolling
theory avoids the Draconian choice of losing the benefits of
conciliation or giving up the right to sue, yet preserves the
independent nature of the § 1981 action. Accordingly, I would
reverse the court below on this point.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Loss of the § 1981 cause of action would deprive the aggrieved
employee of the opportunity to recover punitive damages and more
ample backpay.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Under the Court's no-tolling principle petitioner's discharge on
June 20, 1967, activated the statute which subsequently ran on June
20, 1968 -- two years prior to his receipt of the right-to-sue
letter! The majority suggests that, even if the statute were tolled
during the consideration of the EEOC charge and the initial court
proceedings, petitioner's Title VII action may be time-barred
because of the unusual procedural history of the case, requiring
the Court to extend his § 1981 claim beyond that arising out of
Title VII. But our limited grant of certiorari forecloses
consideration of the timeliness of the Title VII claim.
In any event, this case reflects no departure from the normal
rule of tolling. Consistent with the common understanding that
tolling entails a suspension, rather than an extension, of a period
of limitations, petitioner is allowed whatever time remains under
the applicable statute, as well as the benefit of any state saving
statute. Under Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-106 (1955), an action dismissed
without prejudice may be reinstituted within a year of dismissal.
The filing here falls well within that timeframe.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Where there are differences between the § 1981 claim and the
Title VII complaint, the district courts could easily limit the
tolling to those portions of the § 1981 claim that overlapped the
Title VII allegations.
Cf. EEOC v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 505 F.2d 610, 617 (CA5 1974);
Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, 431 F.2d 455, 466 (CA5 1970).