Respondent brought this action to enjoin discontinuance of
certain passenger trains on the ground that such discontinuance was
prohibited by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act).
The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that
respondent lacked standing under § 307(a) of the Amtrak Act, which
confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to grant equitable
relief on petition of the Attorney General or, in a case involving
a labor agreement, on petition of any affected employee, including
authorized employee representatives, if Amtrak or any railroad acts
inconsistently with the Act or fails to discharge its
responsibilities thereunder. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that respondent did have standing, and that § 307(a) does not
otherwise bar such a suit by an allegedly aggrieved private
party.
Held: Section 307(a), in light of its express language,
and the legislative history of that provision and of the Act as a
whole, provides the exclusive remedies for breaches of any duties
or obligations imposed by the Act, and no additional private cause
of action to enforce compliance with the Act can properly be
inferred. Pp.
414 U. S.
455-465.
154 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 475 F.2d 325, reversed and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result,
post, p.
414 U. S. 465.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
414 U. S. 466.
POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 414 U. S. 454
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, the National Association of Railroad Passengers
(NARP), brought this action in the District Court to enjoin the
announced discontinuance of certain passenger trains that had
previously been operated by the Central of Georgia Railway Co.
(Central). Named as defendants were Central, its parent, Southern
Railway Co. (Southern), and the National Railroad Passenger Corp.
(Amtrak), all of which are the petitioners in this Court. The
question before us is whether this action is maintainable under
applicable federal law.
After the enactment of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970
(Amtrak Act), 84 Stat. 1327, 45 U.S.C. § 501
et seq.,
Central contracted with Amtrak for the latter to assume Central's
inter-city rail passenger service responsibilities. [
Footnote 1] Southern has not entered into any
contract with Amtrak. The train discontinuances that precipitated
this action were announced by Amtrak pursuant to § 404(b)(2) of the
Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C. § 564(b)(2). [
Footnote 2] The gravamen of the respondent's complaint
Page 414 U. S. 455
was that these discontinuances are not authorized by, and, in
fact, are prohibited by, the Amtrak Act. [
Footnote 3] The District Court concluded that the
respondent lacks standing under § 307 of the Amtrak Act, 4a U.S.C.
§ 547, and accordingly dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals
reversed, and held that the respondent has standing and that § 307
does not otherwise bar such a suit by a private party who is
allegedly aggrieved. [
Footnote
4] We granted certiorari to decide whether such a private cause
of action can be maintained in light of § 307(a) of the Amtrak Act.
411 U.S. 981 (1973).
In this Court and in the Court of Appeals, the parties have
approached the question from several perspectives. The issue has
been variously stated to be whether the Amtrak Act can be read to
create a private right of action to enforce compliance with its
provisions; whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under
the terms of
Page 414 U. S. 456
the Act to entertain such a suit; and whether the respondent has
standing to bring such a suit. Because the reference in each
instance is to § 307(a) of the Act and the legislative history
behind that provision, these questions overlap in the context of
this case even more than they ordinarily would. But, however
phrased, the threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak Act
or any other provision of law creates a cause of action whereby a
private party such as the respondent can enforce duties and
obligations imposed by the Act; for it is only if such a right of
action exists that we need consider whether the respondent had
standing to bring the action and whether the District Court had
jurisdiction to entertain it.
The respondent has pointed to no provision of law outside the
Amtrak Act itself that can be read to create or imply the cause of
action that it seeks to bring against the petitioner. It follows
that support for the bringing of this action must be found, if at
all, within the four corners of that Act. The only section of the
Act that authorizes any suits to enforce duties and obligations is
§ 307(a), which provides:
"If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any
action, practice, or policy inconsistent with the policies and
purposes of this chapter, obstructs or interferes with any
activities authorized by this chapter, refuses, fails, or neglects
to discharge its duties and responsibilities under this chapter, or
threatens any such violation, obstruction, interference, refusal,
failure, or neglect, the district court of the United States for
any district in which the Corporation or other person resides or
may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise
prohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General of the
United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon
petition of any employee affected
Page 414 U. S. 457
thereby, including duly authorized employee representatives, to
grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate to
prevent or terminate any violation, conduct, or threat."
45 U.S.C. § 547(a).
In terms, § 307(a) purports only to confer jurisdiction, not to
create a cause of action. The legislative history, however, makes
clear that the congressional purpose was to authorize certain types
of suits for the enforcement of the Act's provisions. The House
Report explained the section as follows:
"Section 307 authorizes the Attorney General of the United
States to sue the corporation or any railroad to prevent acts of
omission or commission in violation of this legislation. In the
case of labor agreements, individual employees or duly authorized
employee representatives may sue for equitable relief."
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1580, p. 9 (1970).
In light of the language and legislative history of § 307(a), we
read it as creating a public cause of action, maintainable by the
Attorney General, to enforce the duties and responsibilities
imposed by the Act. The only private cause of action created by
that provision, however, is explicitly limited to "a case involving
a labor agreement." Thus, no authority for the action the
respondent has brought can be found in the language of § 307(a).
The argument is made, however, that § 307(a) serves only to
authorize certain suits against Amtrak, and that it should
not be read to
preclude other. private causes of action
for the enforcement of obligations imposed by the Act. The
respondent claims that railroad passengers are the intended
beneficiaries of the Act, and that the courts should therefore
imply a private cause of action whereby they can enforce compliance
with the Act's provisions.
See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U. S. 426,
377 U. S.
431-432 (1964). It goes without saying,
Page 414 U. S. 458
however, that the inference of such a private cause of action
not otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the
evident legislative intent and, of course, with the effectuation of
the purposes intended to be served by the Act.
A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that,
when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or
remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to
subsume other remedies. "When a statute limits a thing to be done
in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode."
Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.
S. 282,
278 U. S. 289
(1929). This principle of statutory construction reflects an
ancient maxim --
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the Act creates a public cause of action for the enforcement
of its provisions and a private cause of action only under very
limited circumstances, this maxim would clearly compel the
conclusion that the remedies created in § 307(a) are the exclusive
means to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Act. But
even the most basic general principles of statutory construction
must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.
Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U. S.
83,
311 U. S. 88
(1940). Accordingly, we turn to the legislative history of §
307(a).
The original draft of § 307(a) differed from its present form in
several respects. It conferred upon federal district courts
jurisdiction to entertain suits against Amtrak (but not individual
railroads)
"upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States or,
in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any
individual affected thereby. . . . [
Footnote 5]"
At the hearings of the House
Page 414 U. S. 459
Committee, representatives of organized labor took issue with
certain aspects of the draft provision and proposed several
changes. One of these proposals would have authorized suits against
the railroads as well as Amtrak. Another would have authorized
private suits by
"any person adversely affected or aggrieved thereby, including
the representatives of the employees of any railroad or of the
Corporation."
In support of the latter proposal, one labor spokesman
testified:
"The . . . amendment we propose would modify the language of
section 307(a). . . so as to provide that any aggrieved party,
including employee representatives, could institute legal
proceedings for violations of the law."
"
* * * *"
"
As the bill now reads, only the Attorney General, except in
cases involving a labor agreement, could bring such
actions."
Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S. 3706 before the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 91-62, p. 134 (1970) (emphasis added).
The Secretary of Transportation, who was to be the primary
administrative officer responsible for the implementation of the
Act, sent a letter to the Subcommittee chairman commenting on these
proposed changes. His letter stated that he did not object to
allowing suits against railroads as well as Amtrak. [
Footnote 6] As to the proposal
Page 414 U. S. 460
to amend the bill to permit suits by any "aggrieved person,"
however, he stated:
"Sanctions are normally imposed by the Government. Consequently,
I would be opposed to permitting 'any person' to seek enforcement
of section 307. I would have no objection, however, if the section
were revised to permit employee representatives, as well as
employees adversely affected, to seek equitable relief."
Hearings,
supra, at 85. Thereafter, the Committee
redrafted § 307(a) in conformity with the Secretary's
recommendations. The Committee's redraft and the bill as finally
enacted authorized suits against railroads as well as Amtrak, and
permitted suits involving labor agreements by "duly authorized
employee representatives" as well as by affected employees, but did
not authorize suits by "any person adversely affected or
aggrieved."
Both the Secretary of Transportation and the representatives of
organized labor thus interpreted § 307(a) in its present form as
precluding private actions other than those specifically authorized
therein. Although the transcript of the House Committee hearings
does not indicate that any Committee member voiced explicit
affirmative agreement with this interpretation, it is surely most
unlikely that the members of the Committee would have stood mute if
they had disagreed with it. Especially in light of the Secretary's
substantial role in the eventual implementation of the Act,
[
Footnote 7] we cannot conclude
that his interpretation of its draft provisions was not accorded
significant weight by the Committee.
The members of the Committee had before them a specific proposal
that would have altered the interpretation that was being placed on
§ 307(a), and would have
Page 414 U. S. 461
explicitly permitted suit to enforce the Act's provisions by
"any person adversely affected or aggrieved." The Committee's
deliberate failure to adopt that proposal, after learning of the
Secretary's views, cannot but give weight to the conclusion that
the Committee agreed with the Secretary's interpretation of the
meaning and effect of the existing language, as well as with his
opposition to the proposed change. These factors are substantial
indicia that the legislators understood that § 307(a), as written,
would preclude private causes of action to enforce compliance with
the Act, other than in the limited area of cases "involving a labor
agreement." We have found no contrary indication in any of the
hearings or committee reports. Thus, the explicit legislative
history of § 307(a), such as it is, serves to support the same
interpretation of its language that would be accorded by settled
rules of statutory construction.
This construction of § 307(a) is also completely consistent with
the Act as a whole, and with its more generalized legislative
history. In outlining the purpose of the Amtrak Act, the House
Report referring to a comment by the Secretary of Transportation,
noted that, "[i]n order to achieve economic viability in a basic
rail passenger system, . . . there will have to be a
paring of
uneconomic routes.'" H.R.Rep. No. 91-1580, p. 3 (1970). Thus,
Congress concluded that "a rational reduction of present service
will be required in order to save any passenger service."
Ibid. (emphasis in original). In § 404 of the Act,
Congress provided an efficient means whereby Amtrak could eliminate
uneconomic routes (other than a "basic system" designated and from
time to time augmented by the Secretary of Transportation) without
the necessity of submitting to the time-consuming proceedings of
state regulatory bodies or the Interstate Commerce Commission that
had been required
Page 414 U. S. 462
before the Act's passage. [
Footnote 8] If, however, § 307(a) were to be interpreted
as permitting private lawsuits to prevent the discontinuance of
passenger trains, then the only effect of the Act in this regard
would have been to substitute the federal district courts for the
state or federal administrative bodies formerly required to pass
upon proposed discontinuances. [
Footnote 9]
Page 414 U. S. 463
If the respondent's view of the Act were to prevail, a private
plaintiff could secure injunctive process to prevent the
discontinuance of an "uneconomic" passenger train
pendente
lite, which would force Amtrak to continue the train's
operation and to incur the resulting deficits and dislocations
within its entire system while the court considered the propriety
of the proposed discontinuance. [
Footnote 10] Since suits could be brought in any district
through which Amtrak trains pass, and since there would be a myriad
of possible plaintiffs, the potential would exist for a barrage of
lawsuits that, either individually or collectively, could frustrate
or severely delay any proposed passenger train discontinuance. Even
if one court eventually upheld the discontinuance, its judgment
would not control a suit brought in another district, and would
not, in any event, obviate the loss in the interim of substantial
sums and the diversion of rolling stock from more heavily traveled
routes. This would completely undercut the efficient apparatus that
Congress sought to provide for Amtrak to use in the "paring of
uneconomic routes." It would also produce the anomalous result of a
discontinuance
Page 414 U. S. 464
procedure under the Act considerably less efficient than that
which existed before, since there would no longer be a single forum
that could finally determine the permissibility of a proposed
discontinuance. In the place of the state or federal regulatory
bodies, the Congress would have substituted any and all federal
district courts through whose jurisdictions an Amtrak train might
run.
Congress clearly did not intend to replace the delays often
inherent in the administrative proceedings contemplated by § 13a of
the Interstate Commerce Act with the probably even greater delays
inherent in multiple federal court proceedings. [
Footnote 11] Instead, it clothed the
Attorney General with the exclusive (except in cases involving
labor agreements) authority to police the Amtrak system and to
enforce the various duties and obligations imposed by the Act. In
light of the substantial scrutiny to which Amtrak operations are
subject by both Congress and the Executive, Congress could quite
rationally suppose that this remedy will effectively prevent and
correct any Amtrak breaches of obligations under the Act. [
Footnote 12]
For these reasons we hold that § 307(a) provides the exclusive
remedies for breaches of any duties or obligations
Page 414 U. S. 465
imposed by the Amtrak Act, and that no additional private cause
of action to enforce compliance with the Act's provisions can
properly be inferred. [
Footnote
13] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 401 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 561, authorizes Amtrak to
contract with any railroad to undertake its entire responsibility
for inter-city rail passenger service. Upon entering such a
contract, a railroad can discontinue any inter-city passenger train
by merely filing a 30-day notice of intent with the Interstate
Commerce Commission, in accordance with the notice requirements of
§ 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13a.
[
Footnote 2]
Except in certain limited situations not here pertinent, 45
U.S.C. § 564(b)(2) authorizes Amtrak to discontinue any passenger
service, other than that contained in a "basic system" designated
by the Secretary of Transportation, upon its own initiative.
[
Footnote 3]
The respondent's position on the merits is based on the fact
that Central, which entered a contract with Amtrak, is a subsidiary
of Southern, which did not enter a contract with Amtrak. The
respondent contends that the contract between Amtrak and Central
does not comply with § 401(a)(1) of the Amtrak Act because
Southern, the parent company, has not contracted with Amtrak. Since
§ 401(a)(1) authorizes only a contract for Amtrak to undertake a
railroad's
entire responsibility for inter-city rail
passenger service, the respondent contends that Southern cannot
relieve itself of only
part of this responsibility by
allowing a subsidiary to contract with Amtrak while declining
itself to do so. Accordingly, the respondent argues that Southern
and Central, having entered no statutorily authorized contract with
Amtrak, are prohibited by § 404(a), 45 U.S.C. § 564(a), from
discontinuing any passenger train before January 1, 1975.
[
Footnote 4]
The decision of the District Court is unreported. The opinion of
the Court of Appeals appears at 154 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 475 F.2d 325
(1973).
[
Footnote 5]
Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S. 3706 before the
Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 91-62, p. 44 (1970).
[
Footnote 6]
Although the Secretary did not oppose this amendment, he
expressed the opinion that it might be unnecessary to make
sanctions applicable to any railroad in light of other, existing
statutes and in light of Amtrak's amenability to suit under §
307(a) as it was then written.
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522, 548(c), 563(a), 602,
621, and 645 (1970 ed. and Supp. II).
[
Footnote 8]
See 414 U. S. 2,
supra.
[
Footnote 9]
Before 1958, railroads desiring to discontinue uneconomic
passenger routes were required to secure the permission of state
regulatory commissions. In 1958, in an effort to reduce losses on
passenger train operations, Congress enacted § 13a of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 13a, which gave the railroads
the option of bypassing state agencies and petitioning the
Interstate Commerce Commission for permission to discontinue
passenger trains. Under § 13a, after the railroad has filed a
notice of discontinuance with the Commission, an aggrieved person
may file a complaint. Either upon such complaint or on its own
initiative, the Commission may institute an investigation of the
proposed discontinuance. If the Commission does begin an
investigation, it may delay the discontinuance for as long as four
months. If it finds that the discontinuance is contrary to the
public interest, the Commission may require the continuance of the
route for a period of one year. Orders approving or disapproving
proposed discontinuances are subject to judicial review.
See,
e.g., Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina, 376 U. S.
93 (1964). If, on the other hand, the Commission decides
that the discontinuance is clearly permissible under § 13a of the
Act, and decides not to conduct an investigation or decides to
terminate an investigation already begun, an aggrieved person has
no recourse to the courts to review the Commission's decision.
New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 32 (NJ 1958),
aff'd, 359 U. S. 27
(1959);
City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.
S. 162 (1969).
Thus, if the Commission takes no action on a complaint by a
passenger, under § 13a, there is no recourse to the courts. Only if
the Commission conducts an investigation and issues an order, a
procedure that Congress explicitly eliminated for routes subject to
the Amtrak Act but outside the basic system, is judicial review
available. It thus appears that the Amtrak Act has, in effect,
substituted, in matters covered by that statute, the scrutiny of
the Attorney General for that of the Commission under § 13a. Just
as an aggrieved passenger has no access to the courts when the
Commission, under § 13a, takes no action on a complaint, so
likewise under the Amtrak Act, an aggrieved passenger has no access
to the courts when the Attorney General has refused to object to a
proposed passenger train discontinuance by bringing an action under
§ 307(a) to enjoin it. There is no reason apparent from the Amtrak
Act, its legislative history, or its underlying purposes to think
that Congress intended to create a private remedy substantially
equivalent to one that had been eliminated under preexisting
federal law.
[
Footnote 10]
That this is a very real possibility is demonstrated by Amtrak's
experience in
Wood v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp., 341 F.
Supp. 908 (Conn.1972), where the court granted and then
extended a temporary restraining order while it considered the
merits of a challenge to a proposed discontinuance. The restraining
order was dissolved when Amtrak prevailed on the merits.
[
Footnote 11]
The Amtrak Act was, in significant part, a response to
congressional dissatisfaction with the administrative delays
inherent in passenger route discontinuances under existing
legislation. As the Senate Report observed,
"trains which clearly served no useful purpose were either
required to be kept in operation or were allowed to be discontinued
only after protracted administrative and judicial proceedings."
S.Rep. No. 91-765, p. 2 (1970). It is evident that Congress
intended to eliminate the possibility of such "protracted
proceedings" from the procedures it created in § 404 of the Act for
efficient discontinuance of uneconomic routes.
[
Footnote 12]
See 45 U.S.C. § 644, authorizing the Comptroller
General to audit Amtrak's books and records, and § 548, requiring
periodic reports to Congress and to the President concerning
Amtrak's operations.
[
Footnote 13]
Since we hold that no right of action exists, questions of
standing and jurisdiction become immaterial. In finding that the
respondent had standing, the Court of Appeals relied primarily upon
Data Processing service v. Camp, 397 U.
S. 150 (1970). In finding jurisdiction, the court relied
upon 28 U.S.C. § 1337.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result.
Although I am in agreement that the legislative history of the
Amtrak Act provides a clear and convincing expression of Congress'
intent to preclude anyone except the Attorney General and, in
certain situations, an employee or his duly authorized
representative, from maintaining an action under the Act against
petitioners, I would leave open the question whether a private suit
for mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 might be maintained against the
Attorney General if his refusal to act under § 307 -- even though
within the letter of his authority -- went "beyond any rational
exercise of discretion."
United States ex rel. Schonbrun v.
Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F.2d 371, 374 (CA2
1968);
see Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus
and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 308, 333-335 (1967).
Page 414 U. S. 466
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Discontinuance procedures contained in 49 U.S.C. § 13 A. 45
U.S.C. § 501
et seq., authorized the creation of Amtrak to
provide inter-city rail passage. With "the expectation that the
rendering of such [rail] service along certain corridors [could] be
made a profitable commercial undertaking," the Act established
Amtrak as a private for-profit corporation. 45 U.S.C. § 541;
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1580, p. 1 (1970). Amtrak has until January 1,
1975, to tender a contract to a railroad to release the latter of
its entire responsibility for the provision of inter-city rail
passenger service. 45 U.S.C. § 564(a). Unless a railroad has a
contract with Amtrak to render the service, it may not discontinue
inter-city passenger service prior to January 1, 1975,
"the provisions of any other Act, the laws or constitution of
any State, or the decision or order of, or the pendency of any
proceeding before, a Federal or State court, agency, or authority
to the contrary notwithstanding."
Ibid. Those inter-city services are not yet a part of
"the basic system" put together by Amtrak, a system which by § 202
of the Act is unique in the sense that it "shall not be reviewable
in any Court." [
Footnote 2/1] 45
U.S.C. § 522.
Our problem concerns not "the basic system" created by Amtrak,
but what were called on oral argument the "excess" lines that,
absent a contract with Amtrak, are
Page 414 U. S. 467
under a congressional mandate not to discontinue "any inter-city
passenger train whatsoever prior to January 1, 1975." 45 U.S.C. §
564(a).
The Court phrases the question in terms of whether a "right of
action" exists, saying that no question of "standing" or
"jurisdiction" is presented. Whatever the merits of the distinction
between these three concepts may be in some situations, the
difference here is only a matter of semantics. The District Court
dismissed the cause for lack of "standing." The Court of Appeals
reversed, ruling that there was "standing." The parties argue the
case on the basis of "standing." Even the Solicitor General, who
appeared as
amicus curiae in support of granting the
petition for certiorari, conceives of the issue in terms of
"standing." By the Court's own admission, this is not a case where
all judicial review is foreclosed. For § 307(a), 45 U.S.C. §
547(a), does create a cause of action. May that cause of action be
enforced by passengers, or only by the Attorney General, or by
individual employees or railroad unions? Standing of passengers to
sue or the existence of a cause of action in passengers is
identical in that posture of the case.
Whatever the semantics, the question is whether respondent,
National Association of Railroad Passengers, a national
organization of railroad patrons, may bring this action to enjoin
the discontinuance by Central of Georgia Railway Co. [
Footnote 2/2] of passenger trains
between
Page 414 U. S. 468
Savannah and Atlanta, Georgia, and between Albany, Georgia, and
Birmingham, Alabama.
Section 307(a), 45 U.S.C. § 547(a), gives the Attorney General
of the United States and employees under labor agreements the power
to obtain from a district court equitable relief against either
Amtrak or any railroad acting in violation of the Act. [
Footnote 2/3] Petitioners argue that §
307(a) restricts suits to the Attorney General and to employees.
That seems a strained construction. The most, I think, that can be
drawn from the words of § 307(a) and the legislative history is
that Congress wanted to make sure that some federal agency had some
oversight over the public activity of this private-for-profit
corporation. Hence, the grant of standing, or cause of action, to
the Attorney General. Moreover, it took out of the penumbra of
aggrieved persons employees having rights under collective
agreements. Congress left untouched 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any
Act of Congress regulating commerce. . . ."
Page 414 U. S. 469
Aggrieved passengers are the most obvious complainants when it
comes to saving passenger trains from extinction. Certainly
passengers of discontinued trains suffer injury, in fact, and are
within the zone of interests protected by the Amtrak Act, and thus
satisfy two of the three requirements of
Data Processing
Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150. As
to the third -- that judicial review has not been precluded -- it
seems as plain to me as it did to the Court of Appeals. Where, as
here, there is no express denial of judicial review, the test is
whether "nonreviewability can fairly be inferred."
Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U. S. 159,
397 U. S. 166.
And since judicial review "is the rule, and nonreviewability an
exception which must be demonstrated," preclusion of judicial
review "is not lightly to be inferred."
Ibid. "[O]nly upon
a showing of
clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial
review." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.
S. 136, 387 U. S.
141.
The grant of jurisdiction to the Attorney General to screen
state voting right procedures that might have a discriminatory
effect did not, we held in
Allen v. State Board of
Elections, 393 U. S. 544,
deprive individual citizens of standing to sue.
"The achievement of the Act's laudable goal could be severely
hampered, however, if each citizen were required to depend solely
on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General.
For example, the provisions of the Act extend to States and the
subdivisions thereof. The Attorney General has a limited
staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new regulations
and enactments passed at the varying levels of state government. It
is consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the
individual citizen standing to insure that his city or county
government complies with the § 5 approval requirements."
Id. at 556-557 (footnotes omitted).
Page 414 U. S. 470
The Attorney General is a busy person, and it is not credible to
believe that a grant of power to him to sue precludes the standing
of passengers who are the prime casualties when passenger service
is discontinued.
Each case involving the availability of judicial review stands
on its own feet. In
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U. S. 297, we
denied judicial review since the collective bargaining right was
being protected by a neutral agency, the National Mediation Board.
There is no such body standing between the passengers and Amtrak.
Amtrak is a private for-profit corporation which is only construing
its own enabling Act. If passengers are denied standing to sue,
Amtrak is largely on its own. Especially is this so in light of the
Attorney General's own view that the grant of power in § 307(a) is
limited, and does not authorize him to seek correction of all
violations of the Act. [
Footnote
2/4] So far as I can ascertain, the Attorney General has not
intruded in any case. [
Footnote
2/5] To leave the complete oversight
Page 414 U. S. 471
to employees is to make nonreviewable most of Amtrak's
decisions. Congress specifically did that when it came to "the
basic group" of carriers. But its mandate not to discontinue
passenger service until January 1, 1975, except on a contract with
Amtrak is clear. If, in that interim, there can be no policing of
the Act, we have given a corporation which is private and operating
for a profit an administrative absolution we seldom have been
willing to conclude that Congress has bestowed even on federal
agencies. I cannot believe the Congress had any such purpose.
We deal here with a federal cause of action, and it is the
judicial tradition "for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned."
Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S. 457.
The fact that a private suit to enforce a federal law is not
specifically sanctioned by Congress seldom means that standing to
sue is foreclosed. The purpose of the Amtrak Act was to preserve
and improve train service. The object was not to protect trains
per se, nor to create an
in rem action. The
purpose, which the Court, in its dedication to legalisms,
overlooks, was to protect the people who ride the trains. The case
is very much on all fours with
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U. S. 426,
where Congress made it unlawful to solicit proxies in violation of
rules prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. No
standing, no cause of action, was expressly given stockholders who
might suffer from corporate action pursuant to a deceptive proxy
solicitation. Yet we held that the Commission was not granted an
exclusive role to play in policing the area:
"Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble damages
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief
serves as a most
Page 414 U. S. 472
effective weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements.
The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy statements
annually, and each of them must necessarily be expedited. Time does
not permit an independent examination of the facts set out in the
proxy material, and this results in the Commission's acceptance of
the representations contained therein at their face value unless
contrary to other material on file with it."
Id. at
377 U. S.
432.
The Court is in the mood to close all possible doors to judicial
review so as to let the existing bureaucracies roll on to their
goal of administrative absolutism. When the victims of
administrative venality or administrative caprice are not allowed
even to be heard, the abuses of the monsters we have created will
become intolerable. The separation of powers was designed to
provide not for judicial supremacy, but for checks and balances.
When we turn back this respondent, we turn back passengers who are
the victims of the present transportation debacle. Those who
complain are not adventurers who seek personal aggrandizement as do
jackals who historically have fattened on some economic debacles.
The passengers are the victims of the transportation crisis out of
which Amtrak seeks to make a fortune. These passengers should be
heard. They satisfy the stringent test we laid down in
Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186;
they have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues. . . ."
Id. at
369 U. S.
204.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals whether the
rationalization be based on standing, cause of action, or
jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Amtrak may eliminate service which is part of the "basic system"
only by filing notice with the ICC in accordance with the pre-Act
discontinuance procedures contained in 49 U; S.C. § 13 A. 45 U.S.C.
§ 564(b)(3). Rail service which is undertaken by Amtrak on its own
initiative, but which is not part of the basic system, may be
discontinued at any time. 45 U.S.C. § 564(b)(2). Excess lines,
however, even though undertaken by Amtrak on its own initiative,
become part of the basic system, and thus subject to the ICC
discontinuance procedures if operated by Amtrak for a continuous
period of two years. 45 U.S.C. § 563(a).
[
Footnote 2/2]
Central is a subsidiary of Southern Railway Co. While Central
has entered into a contract with Amtrak to relieve it of
responsibility for all inter-city passenger service, Southern has
not. Whether that failure of Southern bars the discontinuance of
this passenger train service goes to the merits of the complaint
was not passed upon below, and has no relevance to the question of
standing to sue, the only issue before us.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Title 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) provides:
"If the Corporation or any railroad engages in or adheres to any
action, practice, or policy inconsistent with the policies and
purposes of this chapter, obstructs or interferes with any
activities authorized by this chapter, refuses, fails, or neglects
to discharge its duties and responsibilities under this chapter, or
threatens any such violation, obstruction, interference, refusal,
failure, or neglect, the district court of the United States for
any district in which the Corporation or other person resides or
may be found shall have jurisdiction, except as otherwise
prohibited by law, upon petition of the Attorney General of the
United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon
petition of any employee affected thereby, including duly
authorized employee representatives, to grant such equitable relief
as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate any
violation, conduct, or threat."
[
Footnote 2/4]
In refusing to become involved in the case consolidated with
this one in the Court of Appeals, the Attorney General's Office
expressed the view that
"the statutory mandate of section 307(a) [45 U.S.C. § 547(a)]
does not give the Attorney General the authority to sue for a
construction of the Act or to enjoin a purely technical
violation."
Letter from Assistant Attorney General L. Patrick Gray III to
Congressman John Slack, Nov.19, 1971, in Brief for Respondent 29,
30.
[
Footnote 2/5]
As the Court of Appeals noted, the petitioners
"have been unable to refer us to a single instance in which the
Attorney General has either instigated or participated in
litigation under the Amtrak Act, except for a few cases brought by
other parties in which he intervened solely to support the defense
that parties other than labor and the Attorney General did not have
standing to sue."
Potomac Passengers Assn. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.
Co., 154 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 227, 475 F.2d 325, 338 (1973). On
oral argument, respondent informed us of two instances in which it
obtained injunctive relief against rail service discontinuance
after the Attorney General declined to act.