Respondent had a one-car accident near a small Wisconsin town,
while driving a rented Ford. The police had the car towed to a
garage seven miles from the police station, where it was left
unguarded outside. Respondent was arrested for drunken driving.
Early the next day, an officer, looking for a service revolver
which respondent (who had identified himself as a Chicago
policeman) was thought to possess, made a warrantless search of the
car and found in the trunk several items, some bloodied, which he
removed. Later, on receipt of additional information emanating from
respondent, a blood-stained body was located on respondent's
brother's farm in a nearby county. Thereafter, through the windows
of a disabled Dodge which respondent had left on the farm before
renting the Ford, an officer observed other bloodied items.
Following issuance of a search warrant, materials were taken from
the Dodge, two of which (a sock and floor mat) were not listed in
the return on the warrant among the items seized. Respondent's
trial for murder, at which items seized from the cars were
introduced in evidence, resulted in conviction which was upheld on
appeal. In this habeas corpus action, the Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court and held that certain evidence at the trial had
been unconstitutionally seized.
Held:
1. The warrantless search of the Ford did not violate the Fourth
Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. The
search was not unreasonable, since the police had exercised a form
of custody of the car, which constituted a hazard on the highway,
and the disposition of which by respondent was precluded by his
intoxicated and later comatose condition; and the revolver search
was standard police procedure to protect the public from a weapon's
possibly falling into improper hands.
Preston v. United
States, 376 U. S. 364,
distinguished;
Harris v. United States, 390 U.
S. 234, followed. Pp.
413 U. S.
439-448.
2. The seizure of the sock and floor mat from the Dodge was not
invalid, since the Dodge, the item "particularly described," was
the subject of a proper search warrant. It is not constitutionally
significant that the sock and mat were not listed in the
Page 413 U. S. 434
warrant's return, which (contrary to the assumption of the Court
of Appeals) was not filed prior to the search, and the warrant was
thus validly outstanding at the time the articles were discovered.
Pp.
413 U. S.
448-450.
471 F.2d 280, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, STEWART, and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
413 U. S.
450.
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, announced by MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN.
Respondent Chester J. Dombrowski, was convicted in a Wisconsin
state court of first-degree murder of Herbert McKinney and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on
appeal,
State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis.2d 486,
171 N.W.2d
349 (1969), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejecting respondent's
contention that certain evidence admitted at the trial had been
unconstitutionally seized. Respondent then filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, asserting the same
constitutional claim. The District Court denied the petition, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that one of the searches was unconstitutional
under
Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364 (1964), and the other unconstitutional
Page 413 U. S. 435
for unrelated reasons. 471 F.2d 280 (1972). We granted
certiorari, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
I
On September 9, 1969, respondent was a member of the Chicago,
Illinois, police force and either owned or possessed a 1960 Dodge
automobile. That day, he drove from Chicago to West Bend,
Wisconsin, the county seat of Washington County, located some
hundred-odd miles northwest of Chicago. He was identified as having
been in two taverns in the small town of Kewaskum, Wisconsin, seven
miles north of West Bend, during the late evening of September 9
and the early morning of September 10. At some time before noon on
the 10th, respondent's automobile became disabled, and he had it
towed to a farm owned by his brother in Fond du Lac County, which
adjoins Washington County on the north. He then drove back to
Chicago early that, afternoon with his brother in the latter's
car.
Just before midnight of the same day, respondent rented a maroon
1967 Ford Thunderbird at O'Hare Field outside of Chicago, and
apparently drove back to Wisconsin early the next morning. A tenant
on his brother's farm saw a car answering the description of the
rented car pull alongside the disabled 1960 Dodge at approximately
4 a.m. At approximately 9:30 a.m. on September 11, respondent
purchased two towels, one light brown and the other blue, from a
department store in Kewaskum.
From 7 to 10:15 p.m. of the 11th, respondent was in a steak
house or tavern in West Bend. He ate dinner and also drank,
apparently quite heavily. He left the tavern and drove the 1967
Thunderbird in a direction away from West Bend toward his brother's
farm. On the way, respondent had an accident, with the Thunderbird
breaking through a guard rail and crashing into a
Page 413 U. S. 436
bridge abutment. A passing motorist drove him into Kewaskum,
and, after being let off in Kewaskum, respondent telephoned the
police. Two police officers picked him up at a tavern and drove to
the scene of the accident. On the way, the officers noticed that
respondent appeared to be drunk; he offered three conflicting
versions of how the accident occurred.
At the scene, the police observed the 1967 Thunderbird and took
various measurements relevant to the accident. Respondent was, in
the opinion of the officers, drunk. He had informed them that he
was a Chicago police officer. The Wisconsin policemen believed that
Chicago police officers were required by regulation to carry their
service revolvers at all times. After calling a tow truck to remove
the disabled Thunderbird, and not finding the revolver on
respondent's person, one of the officers looked into the front seat
and glove compartment of that car for respondent's service
revolver. No revolver was found. The wrecker arrived and the
Thunderbird was towed to a privately owned garage in Kewaskum,
approximately seven miles from the West Bend police station. It was
left outside by the wrecker, and no police guard was posted. At
11:33 p.m. on the 11th, respondent was taken directly to the West
Bend police station from the accident scene, and, after being
interviewed by an assistant district attorney, to whom respondent
again stated he was a Chicago policeman, respondent was formally
arrested for drunken driving. Respondent was "in a drunken
condition" and "incoherent at times." Because of his injuries
sustained in the accident, the same two officers took respondent to
a local hospital. He lapsed into an unexplained coma, and a doctor,
fearing the possibility of complications, had respondent
hospitalized overnight for observation. One of the policemen
remained at the hospital as a guard, and the other, Officer Weiss,
drove at some time after
Page 413 U. S. 437
2 a.m. on the 12th to the garage to which the 1967 Thunderbird
had been towed after the accident.
The purpose of going to the Thunderbird, as developed on the
motion to suppress, was to look for respondent's service revolver.
Weiss testified that respondent did not have a revolver when he was
arrested, and that the West Bend authorities were under the
impression that Chicago police officers were required to carry
their service revolvers at all times. He stated that the effort to
find the revolver was "standard procedure in our department."
Weiss opened the door of the Thunderbird and found, on the floor
of the car, a book of Chicago police regulations and, between the
two front seats, a flashlight which appeared to have "a few spots
of blood on it." He then opened the trunk of the car, which had
been locked, and saw various items covered with what was later
determined to be type O blood. These included a pair of police
uniform trousers, a pair of gray trousers, a nightstick with the
name "Dombrowski" stamped on it, a raincoat, a portion of a car
floor mat, and a towel. The blood on the car mat was moist. The
officer removed these items to the police station.
When, later that day, respondent was confronted with the
condition of the items discovered in the trunk, he requested the
presence of counsel before making any statement. After conferring
with respondent, a lawyer told the police that respondent
"authorized me to state he believed there was a body lying near the
family picnic area at the north end of his brother's farm."
Fond du Lac County police went to the farm and found, in a dump,
the body of a male, later identified as the decedent McKinney, clad
only in a sport shirt. The deceased's head was bloody; a white sock
was found near the body. In observing the area, one officer looked
through the window of the disabled 1960 Dodge, located
Page 413 U. S. 438
not far from where the body was found, and saw a pillowcase,
back seat, and-briefcase covered with blood. Police officials
obtained, on the evening of the 12th, returnable within 48 hours,
warrants to search the 1960 Dodge and the 1967 Thunderbird, as well
as orders to impound both automobiles. The 1960 Dodge was examined
at the farm on the 12th and then towed to the police garage, where
it was held as evidence. On the 13th, criminologists came from the
Wisconsin Crime Laboratory in Madison and searched the Dodge; they
seized the back and front seats, a white sock covered with blood, a
part of a bloody rear floor mat, a briefcase, and a front floor
mat. A return of the search warrant was filed in the county court
on the 14th, but it did not recite that the sock and floor mat had
been seized. At a hearing held on the 14th, the sheriff who
executed the warrant did not specifically state that these two
items had been seized.
At the trial, the State introduced testimony tending to
establish that the deceased was first hit over the head and then
shot with a .38-caliber gun, dying approximately an hour after the
gunshot wound was inflicted; that death occurred at approximately 7
a.m. on the 11th, with a six-hour margin of error either way; that
respondent owned two .38-caliber guns; that respondent had type A
blood; that the deceased had type O blood and that the bloodstains
found in the 1960 Dodge and on the items found in the two cars were
type O.
The prosecution introduced the nightstick discovered in the 1967
Thunderbird, and testimony that it had traces of type O blood on
it; the portion of the floor mat found in the 1967 car, with
testimony that it matched the portion of the floor mat found in the
1960 Dodge; the bloody towel found in the 1967 car, with testimony
that it was identical to one of the towels purchased by respondent
on the 11th; the police uniform trousers; and the sock
Page 413 U. S. 439
found in the 1960 Dodge, with testimony that it was identical in
composition and stitching to that found near the body of the
deceased.
The State's case was based wholly on circumstantial evidence.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in reviewing the conviction on
direct appeal, stated that,
"even though the evidence that led to his conviction was
circumstantial, we have seldom seen a stronger collection of such
evidence assembled and presented by the prosecution."
State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis.2d at 507, 171 N.W.2d at
360.
II
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. In construing this command, there has been general
agreement that,
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search
of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523,
387 U. S.
528-529 (1967).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443,
403 U. S.
454-455 (1971). One class of cases which constitutes at
least a partial exception to this general rule is automobile
searches. Although vehicles are "effects" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, "for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, there
is a constitutional difference between houses and cars."
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42,
399 U. S. 52
(1970).
See Carroll
v.
Page 413 U. S. 440
United States, 267 U. S. 132,
267 U. S.
153-154 (1925). In
Cooper v. California,
386 U. S. 58,
386 U. S. 59
(1967), the identical proposition was stated in different
language:
"We made it clear in
Preston [v. United States] that
whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case, and pointed out, in particular, that searches of cars
that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a
warrant a reasonable one although the result might be the opposite
in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property.
376 U.S. at
376 U. S. 366-367."
While these general principles are easily stated, the decisions
of this Court dealing with the constitutionality of warrantless
searches, especially when those searches are of vehicles, suggest
that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless
web.
Since this Court's decision in
Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643
(1961), which overruled
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25 (1949), and held that the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment were applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the application of Fourth
Amendment standards, originally intended to restrict only the
Federal Government, to the States presents some difficulty when
searches of automobiles are involved. The contact with vehicles by
federal law enforcement officers usually, if not always, involves
the detection or investigation of crimes unrelated to the operation
of a vehicle. Cases such as
Carroll v. United States,
supra, and
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 (1949), illustrate the typical situations in
which federal officials come into contact with and search vehicles.
In both cases, members of a special federal unit charged with
enforcing a particular federal criminal
Page 413 U. S. 441
statute stopped and searched a vehicle when they had probable
cause to believe that the operator was violating that statute.
As a result of our federal system of government, however, state
and local police officers, unlike federal officers, have much more
contact with vehicles for reasons related to the operation of
vehicles themselves. All States require vehicles to be registered
and operators to be licensed. States and localities have enacted
extensive and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner in
which motor vehicles may be operated on public streets and
highways.
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and
traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can
become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the
extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be
substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or
office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may
believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more
will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal
officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there
is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a
better term, may be described as community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition
of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Although the original justification advanced for treating
automobiles differently from houses, insofar as warrantless
searches of automobiles by federal officers was concerned, was the
vagrant and mobile nature of the former,
Carroll v. United
States, supra; Brinegar v. United States, supra; cf. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, supra; Chambers v. Maroney, supra, warrantless
searches of vehicles by state officers have been sustained in cases
in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being removed
Page 413 U. S. 442
or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent.
See Harris v. United States, 390 U.
S. 234 (1968) (District of Columbia police),
Cooper
v. California, supra. The constitutional difference between
searches of and seizures from houses and similar structures and
from vehicles stems both from the ambulatory character of the
latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal
contact with automobiles will bring local officials in "plain view"
of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime, or
contraband.
Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.
S. 311 (1972).
Here we must decide whether a "search" of the trunk of the 1967
Ford was unreasonable solely because the local officer had not
previously obtained a warrant. And, if that be answered in the
negative, we must then determine whether the warrantless search was
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In answering these questions, two factual
considerations deserve emphasis. First, the police had
exercised
Page 413 U. S. 443
a form of custody or control over the 1967 Thunderbird.
Respondent's vehicle was disabled as a result of the accident, and
constituted a nuisance along the highway. Respondent, being
intoxicated (and later comatose), could not make arrangements to
have the vehicle towed and stored. At the direction of the police,
and for elemental reasons of safety, the automobile was towed to a
private garage. Second, both the state courts and the District
Court found as a fact that the search of the trunk to retrieve the
revolver was "standard procedure in [that police] department," to
protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall
into untrained or perhaps malicious hands. Although the trunk was
locked, the car was left outside, in a lot seven miles from the
police station to which respondent had been taken, and no guard was
posted over it. For reasons not apparent from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, that court concluded that, as "no further
evidence was needed to sustain" the drunk driving charge, "[t]he
search must therefore have been for incriminating evidence of other
offenses." 471 F.2d at 283. While that court was obligated to
exercise its independent judgment on the underlying constitutional
issue presented by the facts of this case, it was not free on this
record to disregard these findings of fact. Particularly in
nonmetropolitan jurisdictions such as those involved here,
enforcement of the traffic laws and supervision of vehicle traffic
may be a large part of a police officer's job. We believe that the
Court of Appeals should have accepted, as did the state courts and
the District Court, the findings with respect to Officer Weiss'
specific motivation and the fact that the procedure he followed was
"standard."
The Court of Appeals relied, and respondent now relies,
primarily on
Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364
Page 413 U. S. 444
(1964), to conclude that the warrantless search was
unconstitutional and the seized items inadmissible. In that case,
the police received a telephone all at 3 a.m. from a caller who
stated that "three suspicious men acting suspiciously" had been in
a car in the business district of Newport, Kentucky, for five
hours; four policemen investigated and, after receiving evasive
explanations and learning that the suspects were unemployed and
apparently indigent, arrested the three for vagrancy. The
automobile was cursorily searched, then towed to a police station
and ultimately to a garage, where it was searched after the three
men had been booked. That search revealed two revolvers in the
glove compartment; a subsequent search of the trunk resulted in the
seizure of various items later admitted in a prosecution for
conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank. In that case, the
respondent attempted to justify the warrantless search of the trunk
and seizure of the items therein "as incidental to a lawful
arrest."
Id. at
376 U. S. 367.
The Court rejected the asserted "search incident" justification for
the warrantless search in the following terms:
"But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in
time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and
in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant
is simply not incident to the arrest."
Ibid. It would be possible to interpret
Preston broadly, and to argue that it stands for the
proposition that, on those facts there could have been no
constitutional justification advanced for the search. But we take
the opinion as written, and hold that it stands only for the
proposition that the search challenged there could not be justified
as one incident to an arrest.
See Chambers v. Maroney, supra;
Cooper v. California, supra. We believe that the instant case
is controlled by principles
Page 413 U. S. 445
that may be extrapolated from
Harris v. United States,
supra, and
Cooper v. California, supra.
In
Harris, petitioner was arrested for robbery. As
petitioner's car had been identified leaving the site of the
robbery, it was impounded as evidence. A regulation of the District
of Columbia Police Department required that an impounded vehicle be
searched, that all valuables be removed, and that a tag detailing
certain information be placed on the vehicle. In compliance with
this regulation, and without a warrant, an officer searched the car
and, while opening one of the doors, spotted an automobile
registration card, belonging to the victim, lying face up on the
metal door stripping. This item was introduced into evidence at
petitioner's trial for robbery. In rejecting the contention that
the evidence was inadmissible, the Court stated:
"The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search
under the police regulation is not presented by this case. The
precise and detailed findings of the District Court, accepted by
the Court of Appeals, were to the effect that the discovery of the
card was not the result of a search of the car, but of a measure
taken to protect the car while it was in police custody. Nothing in
the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in
these narrow circumstances."
"Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card .
. . was plainly visible. It has long been settled that objects
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence."
390 U.S. at
390 U. S.
236.
In
Cooper, the petitioner was arrested for selling
heroin, and his car impounded pending forfeiture proceedings. A
week later, a police officer searched the car
Page 413 U. S. 446
and found, in the glove compartment, incriminating evidence
subsequently admitted at petitioner's trial. This Court upheld the
validity of the warrantless search and seizure with the following
language:
"This case is not
Preston, nor is it controlled by it.
Here, the officers seized petitioner's car because they were
required to do so by state law. They seized it because of the crime
for which they arrested petitioner. They seized it to impound it,
and they had to keep it until forfeiture proceedings were
concluded. Their subsequent search of the car -- whether the State
had 'legal title' to it or not -- was closely related to the reason
petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and
the reason it was being retained. The forfeiture of petitioner's
car did not take place until over four months after it was lawfully
seized. It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to
retain the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no
right, even for their own protection, to search it."
386 U.S. at
386 U. S.
61-62.
These decisions, while not on all fours with the instant case,
lead us to conclude that the intrusion into the trunk of the 1967
Thunderbird at the garage was not unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments solely because a warrant
had not been obtained by Officer Weiss after he left the hospital.
The police did not have actual, physical custody of the vehicle, as
in
Harris and
Cooper, but the vehicle had been
towed there at the officers' directions. These officers in a rural
area were simply reacting to the effect of an accident -- one of
the recurring practical situations that results from the operation
of motor vehicles and with which local police officers must deal
every day. The Thunderbird was not parked adjacent
Page 413 U. S. 447
to the dwelling place of the owner, as in
Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443
(1971), nor simply momentarily unoccupied on a street. Rather, like
an obviously abandoned vehicle, it represented a nuisance, and
there is no suggestion in the record that the officers' action in
exercising control over it by having it towed away was unwarranted
either in terms of state law or sound police procedure.
In
Harris, the justification for the initial intrusion
into the vehicle was to safeguard the owner's property, and in
Cooper, it was to guarantee the safety of the custodians.
Here, the justification, while different, was as immediate and
constitutionally reasonable as those in
Harris and
Cooper: concern for the safety of the general public who
might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the
trunk of the vehicle. The record contains uncontradicted testimony
to support the findings of the state courts and District Court.
Furthermore, although there is no record basis for discrediting
such testimony, it was corroborated by the circumstantial fact
that, at the time the search was conducted, Officer Weiss was
ignorant of the fact that a murder, or any other crime, had been
committed. While perhaps, in a metropolitan area, the
responsibility to the general public might have been discharged by
the posting of a police guard during the night, what might be
normal police procedure in such an area may be neither normal nor
possible in Kewaskum, Wisconsin. The fact that the protection of
the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by "less
intrusive" means does not, by itself, render the search
unreasonable.
Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, supra.
The Court's previous recognition of the distinction between
motor vehicles and dwelling places leads us to conclude that the
type of caretaking "search" conducted here of a vehicle that was
neither in the custody nor on
Page 413 U. S. 448
the premises of its owner, and that had been placed where it was
by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely
because a warrant had not been obtained. The Framers of the Fourth
Amendment have given us only the general standard of
"unreasonableness" as a guide in determining whether searches and
seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a
warrant is not required. Very little that has been said in our
previous decisions,
see Cooper v. California, supra, Harris v.
United States, supra, Chambers v. Maroney, supra, and very
little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of
the Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for
judging cases such as this. Where, as here, the trunk of an
automobile, which the officer reasonably believed to contain a gun,
was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, we hold that the search was
not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
III
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the sock and the portion
of the floor mat were validly seized from the 1960 Dodge. The Fond
du Lac county officer who looked through the window of the Dodge
after McKinney's body had been found saw the bloody seat and
briefcase, but not the sock or floor mat. Consequently, these two
items were not listed in the application for the warrant, but the
Dodge was the item "particularly described" to be searched in the
warrant. The warrant was validly issued, and the police were
authorized to search the car. The reasoning of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was that, although these items were not listed to be
seized in the warrant, the warrant was valid and, in executing it,
the officers discovered the sock and mat in plain view, and
therefore could constitutionally seize them without a warrant.
Page 413 U. S. 449
The Court of Appeals held that the seizure of the two items on
September 13 could not be justified under the plain view doctrine.
The reasoning of that court hinged on its understanding that the
warrant to search the Dodge had been returned and was
functus
officio by the time Officer Mauer of the Crime Laboratory came
upon the sock and the floor mat. The court stated:
"There was no continuing authority under the warrant issued the
previous night [the 12th]. First, these items were not described in
the warrant, and presumably were not observed that night [the
12th]. Second, when the warrant was returned -- before Mauer came
on the scene -- it was
functus officio. A 'new ball game,'
so to speak, began when Mauer made his 'inspection.'"
471 F.2d at 286.
The record is so indisputably clear that the return of the
warrant was filed on the 14th, not sometime prior to Mauer's search
on the 13th, that we are somewhat at a loss to understand how the
Court of Appeals arrived at its factual conclusion. The warrant to
search the Dodge was issued on the 12th, and, although a return of
the warrant was prepared by a Fond du Lac County officer at some
time on the 13th (whether before or after Mauer's search is
impossible to determine), it was not filed in the state court until
the 14th, at which time a hearing was held. The seizures of the
sock and the floor mat occurred while a valid warrant was
outstanding, and thus could not be considered unconstitutional
under the theory advanced below. As these items were
constitutionally seized, we do not deem it constitutionally
significant that they were not listed in the return of the warrant.
The ramification of that "defect," if such it was, is purely a
question of state law.
We therefore need not reach the question of whether the seizure
of the two items from the Dodge would have
Page 413 U. S. 450
been valid because the entire car had been validly seized as
evidence and impounded pursuant to a valid warrant,
cf. Harris
v. United States, supra; Cooper v. California, supra, or
whether a search of the back seat of this car, located as it was in
an open field, required a search warrant at all.
See Hester v.
United States, 265 U. S. 57,
265 U. S. 59
(1924)
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
* Petitioner argued before this Court that unlocking the trunk
of the Ford did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The thesis is that only an intrusion into an area
in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
with the specific intent of discovering evidence of a crime,
constitutes a search.
Compare Haerr v. United States, 240
F.2d 533 (CA5 1957),
with District of Columbia v. Little,
85 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13 (1949),
aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U. S. 1 (1950).
But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 (1967). Arguing that the officer's conduct
constituted an "inspection," rather than a "search," petitioner
relies on our decision in
Harris v. United States,
390 U. S. 234
(1968), to validate the initial intrusion into the trunk, and then
the plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless seizure of the
items.
We need not decide this issue. Petitioner conceded in the Court
of Appeals that this intrusion was a search. Inasmuch as we believe
that
Harris and other decisions control this case even if
the intrusion is characterized as a search, we need not deal with
petitioner's belated contention.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE
STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In upholding the warrantless search of respondent's rented
Thunderbird, the Court purports merely to rely on our prior
decisions dealing with automobile searches. It is clear to me,
however, that nothing in our prior decisions supports either the
reasoning or the result of the Court's decision today. I therefore
dissent, and would hold the search of the Thunderbird
unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The relevant facts are these. Respondent, an off-duty Chicago
policeman, was arrested by police on a charge of drunken driving
following a one-car automobile accident in which respondent
severely damaged his rented 1967 Thunderbird. The car was towed
from the scene of the accident to a private garage and, some two
and one-half hours later, one of the arresting officers drove to
the garage and, without a search warrant or respondent's consent,
conducted a thorough search of the car for the alleged purpose of
finding respondent's service revolver, which was not on
respondent's person and had not been found during an initial search
of the car at the scene of the accident. In the trunk of the car,
the officer found and seized numerous items that eventually linked
respondent to the death of one Herbert McKinney and
Page 413 U. S. 451
ultimately contributed to respondent's conviction for
murder.
The Court begins its analysis by recognizing, as clearly it
must, that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable
searches and seizures" is shaped by the warrant clause, and thus
that a warrantless search of private property is
per se
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment unless within one of the
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, ante, p.
413 U. S. 266;
Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347,
389 U. S. 357
(1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523,
387 U. S.
528-529 (1967). At the same time, the Court also
recognizes that one of the established exceptions to the warrant
requirement is the search of an automobile on the highway where
there is probable cause to support the search and
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132,
267 U. S. 153
(1925).
See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971);
Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U. S. 42
(1970);
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.
S. 216 (1968). But the search of the Thunderbird plainly
cannot be sustained under the "automobile exception," for our prior
decisions make it clear that, where, as in this case, there is no
reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved,
the "automobile exception" is simply irrelevant.
Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, supra, at
403 U. S. 461;
Carroll v. United States, supra, at
267 U. S.
156.
Another established exception to the warrant requirement is a
search incident to a valid arrest.
Chimel v. California,
395 U. S. 752
(1969). But the search of the Thunderbird cannot be sustained under
this exception, because even assuming that such a search would have
been within the permissible scope of a search incident to
Page 413 U. S. 452
an arrest for drunken driving, it is clear that, under
Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364,
376 U. S. 368
(1964), "the search was too remote in time or place to have been
made as incidental to the arrest."
A third exception to the warrant requirement is the seizure of
evidence in "plain view." Thus, in
Harris v. United
States, 390 U. S. 234
(1968), we upheld the seizure of an automobile registration card
that fell within plain view of a police officer as he opened the
door of an impounded automobile to roll up the windows. But, as we
cautioned in
Coolidge, supra, at
403 U. S.
466,
"[w]hat the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion
in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused."
In
Harris, the prior justification for the intrusion by
the police was to roll up the windows and lock the doors "to
protect the car while it was in police custody." 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 236.
"[T]he discovery of the card was not the result of a search," we
said, and, "in these narrow circumstances," the "plain view"
exception to the warrant requirement was fully applicable. In the
present case, however, the sole purpose for the initial intrusion
into the vehicle was to
search for the gun. Thus, the
seizure of the evidence from the trunk of the car can be sustained
under the "plain view" doctrine only if the search for the gun was
itself constitutional. Reliance on the "plain view" doctrine in
this case is therefore misplaced, since the antecedent search
cannot be sustained.
Another exception to the warrant requirement is that which
sustains a search in connection with the seizure of an automobile
for purposes of forfeiture proceedings. In
Cooper v.
California, 386 U. S. 58
(1967), the Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile
after it had been lawfully impounded pursuant to a California
statute mandating the seizure and forfeiture of any
Page 413 U. S. 453
vehicle used to facilitate the possession or transportation of
narcotics. There, however, the police were authorized to treat the
car in their custody as if it were their own, and the search was
sustainable as an integral part of their right of retention. This
case, of course, is poles away from
Cooper. The
Thunderbird was not subject to forfeiture proceedings. On the
contrary, ownership of the car remained exclusively in respondent's
lessor, and the sole reason that the police took even temporary
possession of the car was to remove it from the highway until
respondent could claim it.
Clearly, therefore, the Court's decision today finds no support
in any of the established exceptions. The police knew what they
were looking for, and had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant.
Under those circumstances, our prior decisions make it clear that
the Fourth Amendment required the police to obtain a warrant prior
to the search.
Carroll v. Unit States, supra, at
413 U. S. 15. Thus,
despite the Court's asserted adherence to the principles of our
prior decisions, in fact, the decision rests on a subjective view
of what is deemed acceptable in the way of investigative functions
performed by rural police officers. But the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment cannot turn on fine-line distinctions between
criminal and investigative functions. On the contrary,
"[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior,"
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at
387 U. S. 530,
for
"[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials."
Id. at
387 U. S. 528.
Thus, the fact that the professed purpose of the contested search
was to protect the public safety rather than to gain incriminating
evidence
Page 413 U. S. 454
does not of itself eliminate the necessity for compliance with
the warrant requirement. Although a valid public interest may
establish probable cause to search,
Camara, supra, and
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541
(1967), make clear that, absent exigent circumstances, the search
must be conducted pursuant to a "suitably restricted search
warrant."
Camara, supra, at
387 U. S. 539.
See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra. And
certainly there were no exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless search made of the Thunderbird. For even assuming that
the officer had reason to believe that respondent's service
revolver was in the Thunderbird, the police had left the car in the
custody of a private garage and did not return to look for the gun
until two and one-half hours later. Moreover, although the
arresting officers were at all times aware that respondent was an
off-duty Chicago policeman, the officers never once inquired of
respondent as to whether he was carrying a gun and, if so, where it
was located. I can only conclude, therefore, that what the Court
does today in the name of an investigative automobile search is in
fact, a serious departure from established Fourth Amendment
principles. And since, in my view, that departure is totally
unjustified, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
invalidating the search of the Thunderbird and remand the case to
the District Court for determination whether the evidence seized
during the search of the Dodge and the farm was the fruit of the
unlawful search of the Thunderbird.
See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 165
(1969);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963).