Respondent, expelled from his union for deliberate and malicious
vilification of union management following his resolutions
unsuccessfully condemning that management's alleged undemocratic
actions and shortsighted policies, regained his union membership in
a suit under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA) and was awarded $5,500 in legal fees. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Respondent's suit under § 102 of the LMRDA vindicated not
only his own rights of free speech guaranteed by the statute but
furthered the interests of the union and its members as well. As a
result, the award to respondent of attorneys' fees under these
circumstances comported with the trial court's inherent equitable
power of making such an award whenever "overriding considerations
indicate the need for such a recovery."
Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375,
396 U. S.
391-392. Pp.
412 U. S. 4-9.
2. The allowance of counsel fees to the successful plaintiff in
a suit brought under § 102 is not precluded by that statutory
provision and, indeed, is supported by the legislative history of
the LMRDA. Pp.
412 U. S.
9-14.
3. Under all the facts of the case, the District Court did
not
Page 412 U. S. 2
abuse its discretion in awarding counsel fees to respondent. Pp.
412 U. S.
14-15.
462 F.2d 777, affirmed.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. WHITE, J. filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST,
J., joined,
post, p.
412 U. S. 16.
MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the propriety of an award of
counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under §
102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 412. [
Footnote 1] On August 6, 1962, at a regular meeting of the
membership of petitioner Seafarers International Union of North
America -- Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District,
respondent introduced a set of resolutions alleging various
instances of undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies on the
part of union officers.
Page 412 U. S. 3
The resolutions were defeated and, on November 26, 1962,
respondent was expelled from the union on the ground that his
presentation of the resolutions violated a union rule proscribing
"deliberate or malicious vilification with regard to the execution
or the duties of any office or job." After exhausting his
intra-union remedies, respondent filed this suit under § 102 of the
LMRDA, claiming that his expulsion under these circumstances
violated his right of free speech as secured by § 101(a)(2) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). [
Footnote 2]
On May 27, 1964, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York issued a temporary injunction
restoring respondent's membership in the union, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 339 F.2d
881 (1965). Some five years later, the case came on for trial and
the District Court, finding a violation of respondent's rights
under § 101-(a)(2), ordered him permanently reinstated to
membership in the union and, although denying respondent's damages
claims, [
Footnote 3] granted
him counsel fees in the sum of $5,500 against the union. The Court
of
Page 412 U. S. 4
Appeals affirmed in all respects, 462 F.2d 777 (1972). We
granted certiorari limited to the questions whether (1) an award of
attorneys' fees is permissible under § 102 of the LMRDA, and (2) if
so, whether such an award under the facts of this case constituted
an abuse of the District Court's discretion. 409 U.S. 1074. We
affirm.
I
Although the traditional American [
Footnote 4] rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance of
attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory [
Footnote 5] or contractual authorization,
[
Footnote 6] federal
courts,
Page 412 U. S. 5
in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys'
fees when the interests of justice so require. Indeed, the power to
award such fees "is part of the original authority of the
chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,"
Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161,
307 U. S. 166
(1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this
inherent equitable power whenever "overriding considerations
indicate the need for such a recovery."
Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375,
396 U. S.
391-392 (1970);
see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714,
386 U. S. 718
(1967).
Thus, it is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel
fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted "in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 6 J.
Moore, Federal Practice � 54.77[2], p. 1709 (2d ed.1972);
see,
e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.
S. 400,
390 U. S. 402
n. 4 (1968);
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.
S. 527 (1962);
Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan
County, 321 F.2d 494 (CA4 1963);
Rolax v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (CA4 1951). In this class of cases,
the underlying rationale of "fee-shifting" is, of course, punitive,
and the essential element in triggering the award of fees is
therefore the existence of "bad faith" on the part of the
unsuccessful litigant.
Another established exception involves cases in which the
plaintiff's successful litigation confers
"a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class,
and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs
proportionately among them."
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, supra, at
396 U. S.
393-394. [
Footnote
7] "Fee shifting"
Page 412 U. S. 6
is justified in these cases not because of any "bad faith" of
the defendant but, rather, because
"[t]o allow the others to obtain full benefit from the
plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation
expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's
expense."
Id. at
396 U. S. 392;
see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
supra, at
386 U. S. 719;
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527,
105 U. S. 532
(1882). Thus, in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lit Co., supra, we
approved an award of attorneys' fees to successful shareholder
plaintiffs in
Page 412 U. S. 7
a suit brought to set aside a corporate merger accomplished
through the use of a misleading proxy statement in violation of §
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 Stat. 895, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a). In reaching this result, we reasoned that, since
the dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations jeopardized
important interests of both the corporation and "
the
stockholders as a group,'" [Footnote 8] the successful enforcement of the statutory
policy necessarily "rendered a substantial service to the
corporation and its shareholders." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., supra, at 396 U. S. 396.
Under these circumstances, reimbursement of the plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees out of the corporate treasury simply shifted the
costs of litigation to "the class that has benefited from them and
that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit."
Id. at 396 U. S.
397.
The instant case is clearly governed by this aspect of
Mills. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 was based, in part, on a congressional finding
"from recent investigations in the labor and management fields
that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust,
corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and
other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and
ethical conduct. . . ."
29 U.S.C. § 401(b). In an effort to eliminate these abuses,
Congress recognized that it was imperative that all union members
be guaranteed at least "minimum standards of democratic process. .
. ." [
Footnote 9] Thus, Title I
[
Footnote 10] of the LMRDA
-- the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations" as
specifically designed to promote the "full and active
participation
Page 412 U. S. 8
by the rank and file in the affairs of the union," [
Footnote 11] and, as the Court of
Appeals noted, the rights enumerated in Title I [
Footnote 12] were deemed
"vital to the independence of the membership and the effective
and fair operation of the union as the representative of its
membership."
462 F.2d at 780.
See also International Assn. of Machinists
v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (CA5 1969);
Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (CA2 1963).
Viewed in this context, there can be no doubt that, by
vindicating his own right of free speech guaranteed by § 101(a)(2)
of Title I of the LMRDA, respondent necessarily rendered a
substantial service to his union as an institution, and to all of
its members. When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of
any of the rights protected by Title I, the rights of all members
of the union are threatened. And, by vindicating his own right, the
successful litigant dispels the "chill" cast upon the rights of
others. Indeed, to the extent that such lawsuits contribute to the
preservation of union democracy, they frequently prove beneficial
"not only in the immediate impact of the results achieved, but in
their implications for the future conduct of the union's affairs."
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 150
U.S.App.D.C. 253, 260, 466 F.2d 424, 431 (1972). Thus, as in
Mills, reimbursement of respondent's attorneys' fees
Page 412 U. S. 9
out of the union treasury [
Footnote 13] simply shifts the costs of litigation to
"the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to
pay them had it brought the suit."
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., supra, at
396 U. S. 397.
See also Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, supra;
Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F.
Supp. 525 (SDNY 1971);
Cefalo v. International Union of
District 50 United Mine Workers, 311 F.
Supp. 946 (DC 1970);
Sands v. Abelli, 290 F.
Supp. 677 (SDNY 1968). We must therefore conclude that an award
of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in an action under § 102
of the LMRDA falls squarely within the traditional equitable power
of federal courts to award such fees whenever "overriding
considerations indicate the need for such a recovery."
Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at
396 U. S.
391-392.
II
This does not end our inquiry, however, for even where
"fee-shifting" would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress
has the power to circumscribe such relief. In
Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra, for example, we
held that § 35 of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 439, 15 U.S.C. § 1117,
precluded an award of attorneys' fees as a separate element of
recovery in a suit for deliberate infringement of a trademark. In
reaching that result, we reasoned that, since § 35 "meticulously
detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff
Page 412 U. S. 10
who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed,"
Congress must have intended the express remedial provisions of § 35
"to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in
cases arising under the Act."
Id. at 719, 721. Petitioners
contend that this reasoning dictates a similar conclusion with
respect to § 102 of the LMRDA. We do not agree. Unlike § 35 of the
Lanham Act, which specifically "provided not only for injunctive
relief but also for compensatory recovery measured by the profits
that accrued to the defendant by virtue of his infringement, the
costs of the action, and damages which may be trebled," [
Footnote 14] § 102 of the LMRDA
broadly authorizes the courts to grant "such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 412. Thus, § 102
does not "meticulously detail the remedies available to a
plaintiff," and we cannot fairly infer from the language of that
provision an intent to deny to the courts the traditional equitable
power to grant counsel fees in "appropriate" situations.
Petitioners argue further, however, that, because Congress
expressly authorized the recovery of counsel fees in §§ 201(c) and
501(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431(c), 501(b), the absence of a
similar express provision in § 102 indicates an intent to preclude
"fee-shifting" in suits brought under that section. Sections 201(c)
and 501(b), which are not a part of Title I, deal with narrowly
defined problems under the Act, and specifically authorize such
limited remedies as an examination of the union's books and records
and an accounting. [
Footnote
15] By contrast, § 102 was premised upon the fact
Page 412 U. S. 11
that Title I litigation necessarily demands that remedies "be
tailored to fit facts and circumstances admitting of almost
infinite variety," [
Footnote
16] and § 102 was therefore cast as a broad mandate to the
courts to fashion "appropriate" relief. Indeed, any attempt on the
part of Congress to spell out all of the remedies available under §
102 would create the
"danger that those [remedies] not listed might be proscribed,
with the result that the courts would be fettered in their efforts
to 'grant relief according to the necessities of the case.'"
Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 353 (CA3 1967).
See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
supra. Confronted with a virtually identical situation in
Mills, we explained that the inclusion in certain sections
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of express provisions for
recovery of attorneys' fees
"should not be read as denying to the courts the power to award
counsel fees in suits under other sections of the Act when
circumstances make such an award appropriate. . . ."
396 U.S. at
396 U. S.
390-391. That reasoning is equally persuasive today.
[
Footnote 17]
Finally, petitioners call our attention to two isolated comments
in the legislative history of Title I -- one by Senator Goldwater
in his testimony before a House Committee [
Footnote 18]
Page 412 U. S. 12
and the other contained in a dissenting statement to a House
Committee Report [
Footnote
19] -- expressing the fear that, in the absence of a specific
provision for the award of counsel fees, such relief would be
unavailable in suits brought under § 102. Although these statements
plainly indicate
"a feeling by some members of the Congress that it would have
been desirable and prudent to spell out unmistakably a right to
attorney's fees,"
they
"hardly amount to a definitive and absolute setting of the
Congressional face against the giving of such incidental relief by
the courts where compatible with sound and established equitable
principles."
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 150
U.S.App.D.C. at 258, 46 F.2d at 429.
See Gartner v. Soloner,
supra, at 352. Indeed, both of these comments expressly
favored the allowance of counsel fees in Title I litigation, and
there is no suggestion anywhere in the
Page 412 U. S. 13
legislative history that even a single member of Congress was
opposed to such relief or desired the words "such relief . . . as
may be appropriate" to restrict the historic equity powers of the
federal courts. On the contrary, there are numerous expressions by
sponsors and other supporters of the Act indicating that § 102 was
intended to afford the courts "a wide latitude to grant relief
according to the necessities of the case," [
Footnote 20] and "to give such relief as [the
court] deems equitable under all the circumstances." [
Footnote 21]
Moreover, the award of attorneys' fees under § 102 is clearly
consonant with Congress' express desire to adopt "legislation that
will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of
employees and the public generally. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 401(b). As
the Court of Appeals recognized:
"Not to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be
tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic
purpose. It is difficult for individual members of labor unions to
stand up and fight those who are in charge. The latter have the
treasury of the union at their command and the paid union counsel
at their beck and call while the member is on his own. . . . An
individual union member could not carry such a heavy financial
burden. Without counsel fees, the grant of federal jurisdiction is
but a gesture for few union members could avail themselves of
it."
462 F.2d at 780-781. Thus, it is simply
"untenable to assert that in establishing the bill of rights
under the Act Congress intended to have those rights diminished by
the unescapable fact that
Page 412 U. S. 14
an aggrieved union member would be unable to finance litigation.
. . ."
Gartner v. Soloner, supra at 355.
See Yablonski v.
United Mine Workers of America, supra, at 259, 466 F.2d at
430;
Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. at 531;
Sands
v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. at 686;
cf. Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 402.
We therefore hold that the allowance of counsel fees to the
successful plaintiff in a suit brought under § 102 of the LMRDA is
consistent with both the Act and the historic equitable power of
federal courts to grant such relief in the interests of
justice.
III
Finally, petitioners maintain that the award of counsel fees to
respondent under the facts of this case constituted an abuse of the
District Court's discretion. Specifically, petitioners argue that
the District Court's finding that some of respondent's actions
"were, in part, motivated by [his] political ambitions for union
office" represents a finding of "bad faith" on the part of
respondent. The District Court clearly rejected the "logic" of this
contention, and we agree. Title I of the LMRDA was specifically
designed to protect the union member's right to seek higher office
within the union, [
Footnote
22] and we can hardly accept the proposition that the exercise
of that right is tantamount to "bad faith."
See Yablonski v.
United Mine Workers of America, supra, at 259-260, 466 F.2d at
430-431.
Page 412 U. S. 15
Petitioners also contend that the award of attorneys' fees in
this case was improper because the District Court, in denying
respondent's claim for punitive damages, found that "the
defendants, in good faith, believed that they had a right to charge
and discipline [respondent] for his actions." It is clear, however,
that "bad faith" may be found not only in the actions that led to
the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation. And, as the
Court of Appeals noted, the conduct of this particular litigation
was marked by "the dilatory action of the union and its officers. .
. ." 462 F.2d at 780. Moreover, although the presence of "bad
faith" is essential to "fee-shifting" under a "punishment"
rationale, neither the presence nor absence of "bad faith" is in
any sense dispositive where attorneys' fees are awarded to the
successful plaintiff under the "common benefit" rationale
recognized in
Mills and operative today. Under that
theory, counsel fees are granted not because of the "bad faith" of
the defendant, but rather because the litigation confers
substantial benefits on an ascertainable class of beneficiaries. In
that situation, the element of "bad faith" of the defendant is
simply one of many considerations best addressed to the sound
discretion of the District Court. [
Footnote 23] Under the facts of this case, we cannot say
that the District Court abused that discretion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Page 412 U. S. 16
[
Footnote 1]
Section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412, provides in pertinent
part:
"Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this
subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter
may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States
for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 101(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2),
provides:
"Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to
meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any
views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the
labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the
labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable
rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings:
Provided,
That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a
labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the
responsibility of every member toward the organization as an
institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere
with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations."
[
Footnote 3]
In its unreported opinion, the District Court found that
respondent "suffered no loss of wages as a result of his expulsion
from the union." And although respondent "was deprived of his right
to attend meetings, and run for union office" during the period of
his expulsion, the District Court concluded that "[t]he record is
barren of any proof on which the court might make a determination
of the value of [these rights]." Finally, the court denied
respondent's claim for punitive damages on the ground that the
union's decision to expel respondent was motivated neither by
malice nor bad faith.
[
Footnote 4]
The American rule, it might be noted, is more restrictive than
the general rule that prevails in most other nations.
See,
e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 Calif.L.Rev. 792, 793 (1966). Many commentators have
argued for a "liberalization" of the American rule.
See,
e.g., Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U.Colo.L.Rev. 202 (1966); Ehrenzweig,
supra; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of
Litigation?, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and
Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
Minn.L.Rev. 619 (1931); Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees
After
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 316
(1971); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 Vand.L.Rev. 1216 (1967).
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Clayton Act, § 4, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. §
15; Communications Act of 1934, § 206, 48 Stat. 1072, 47 U.S.C. §
206; Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, 34 Stat. 590, 49 U.S.C. §
16(2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 18(a), 48 Stat.
890, 897, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a).
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U. S. 714,
386 U. S. 717
(1967);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.
S. 483 (1880);
Day v.
Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852).
[
Footnote 7]
This exception has its origins in the "common fund" cases, which
have traditionally awarded attorneys' fees to the successful
plaintiff when his representative action creates or traces a
"common fund," the economic benefit of which is shared by all
members of the class.
See, e.g., Central Railroad & Banking
Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116
(1885);
Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.
S. 527 (1882). In
Sprague v. Ticonic National
Bank, 307 U. S. 161
(1939), the rationale of these cases was extended to authorize an
award of attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff who, although
suing on her own behalf, rather than as representative of a class,
nevertheless established the right of others to recover out of
specific assets of the same defendant through the operation of
stare decisis. In reaching this result, the Court
explained that the beneficiaries of the plaintiff's litigation
could be made to contribute to the costs of the suit by an order
reimbursing the plaintiff out of the defendant's assets from which
the beneficiaries eventually would recover. Finally, in
Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375
(1970), we held that the rationale of these cases must logically
extend not only to litigation that confers a monetary benefit on
others, but also to litigation "
which corrects or prevents an
abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests'" of
those others. Id. at 396 U. S. 396,
quoting Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power
Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 366-367, 101 N.W.2d 423, 427
(1960).
Citing our decisions in
Mills, supra, and
Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.
S. 400 (1968), respondent contends that the award of
attorneys' fees in this case might also be justified on the ground
that, by successfully prosecuting this litigation, respondent acted
as a "
private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority." Id. at
390 U. S. 402.
See also Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (CA1 1972);
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (CA5 1971).
In light of our conclusion with respect to the "common benefit"
rationale, however, we have no occasion to consider that
question.
[
Footnote 8]
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at
396 U. S. 392,
quoting
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.
S. 426,
377 U. S. 432
(1964).
[
Footnote 9]
105 Cong.Rec. 6471 (1959) (Sen. McClellan).
[
Footnote 10]
29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415.
[
Footnote 11]
American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein,
379 U. S. 171,
379 U. S.
182-183 (1964).
[
Footnote 12]
In addition to the Tit. I guarantee of freedom of speech and
assembly involved in this case, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2),
see
n 2,
supra, Tit. I
also guarantees equal "political" rights to all union members, 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(1); stability and fairness in the assessment of
dues, initiation fees, and other assessments, 29 U.S.C. §
411(a)(3); the right of all union members to sue and to participate
in litigation, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4); and procedural fairness in
the discipline process, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).
[
Footnote 13]
Petitioners contend that the payment of counsel fees out of the
union treasury might deplete union funds to such an extent as to
impair the union's ability to operate as an effective collective
bargaining agent and to endanger union stability. Although this
consideration is undoubtedly an important one, it is relevant not
to the power of federal courts to award counsel fees generally,
but, rather, to the exercise of the District Court's discretion on
a case-by-case basis.
See n 23,
infra.
[
Footnote 14]
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
supra, at
386 U. S.
719.
[
Footnote 15]
Section 201(c) provides for the award of counsel fees in a suit
brought by a union member to obtain access to union books, records,
and accounts to verify annual financial statements. 29 U.S.C. §
431(c). Section 501(b) authorizes "fee-shifting" in a suit brought
by a member against a union official to recover damages or for an
accounting for the benefit of the union on the ground that the
official is violating his duties. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b).
[
Footnote 16]
Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348, 353 (CA3 1967).
[
Footnote 17]
Indeed, the
Mills reasoning may be particularly
appropriate with respect to the LMRDA. As Professor Cox has
noted,
"because much of the bill was written on the floor of the Senate
or House of Representatives, and because many sections contain
calculated ambiguities or political compromises . . . , the courts
would be well advised to seek out the underlying rationale without
placing great emphasis upon close construction of the words,"
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act
of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 852 (1960).
[
Footnote 18]
In his testimony before the House Committee on Education and
Labor, after passage of the Senate version of the LMRDA, Senator
Goldwater stated that
"the bill does not grant [the union member], even where
successful in his suit, reasonable counsel fees or other costs. It
thus forces him to assume the entire financial burden of the
litigation. For an ordinary rank-and-file union member, who is
generally a wage worker, such a litigation thus becomes an
impossible financial burden."
105 Cong.Rec. 10095 (1959).
[
Footnote 19]
In opposing the reporting of the Elliott bill, H.R. 8342, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), to the House, the nine dissenting Members
of the House Committee on Education and Labor protested that,
"[u]nder that bill, the individual member must shoulder the burden
of litigation costs himself." H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 95 (1959). At the end of their criticisms of the Elliott
bill, the dissenters explained that, "[f]or the reasons outlined
above, we intend to support . . . the so-called Landrum-Griffin
bill (H.R. 8400 and 8401)."
Id. at 98. Thus, although the
enforcement provisions of the Elliott bill and the Landrum-Griffin
bill were virtually identical, the dissenters apparently believed
that the latter, which eventually was enacted, allowed the union
member to recover counsel fees.
[
Footnote 20]
105 Cong.Rec. 15548 (1959) (Rep. Elliott).
[
Footnote 21]
Id. at 6717 (Sen. Kuchel).
See id. at 15864
et seq. (Rep. O'Hara);
see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 413,
523(a).
[
Footnote 22]
In describing to the Senate the various "offenses" for which a
union member could be expelled under then-existing union
constitutions, Senator McClellan pointed out in particular the
"offense" of "applying for the position of another union man in
office." He observed, with evident sarcasm, that:
"A member had better not do that. The officers have squatters'
rights. Members had better not offer any competition. They had
better not seek election. They had better not aspire to the
presidency or the secretaryship, or they will be expelled or
disciplined."
105 Cong.Rec. 6478 (1959).
[
Footnote 23]
Another such consideration is, of course, the extent to which
the payment of the plaintiff's counsel fees out of the union
treasury might impair the union's ability to operate effectively.
See n 13,
supra. Here, petitioners do not, and indeed cannot,
contend that the award of only $5,500 would in any sense jeopardize
union stability.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST Joins,
dissenting.
I would need a far clearer signal from Congress than we have
here to permit awarding attorneys' fees in member-union litigation,
which so often involves private feuding having no general
significance. The award of fees in the occasionally successful and
meritorious case will not be worth the litigation the Court's
decision will invite and foster.