Appellee district exists for the purpose of acquiring, storing,
and distributing water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. Only
landowners are qualified to elect the district's board of
directors, votes being apportioned according to the assessed
valuation of the lands. A three-judge District Court, against
challenge by appellants, held that the limitation of the franchise
to landowners comported with equal protection requirements.
Held:
1. Restricting the voters to landowners who may or may not be
residents does not violate the principle enunciated in such cases
as
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.
S. 621, that governing bodies should be selected in a
popular election in which every person's vote is equal. Pp. 726-
410 U. S.
730.
(a) The activities of appellee district fall so
disproportionately on landowners as a group that it is not
unreasonable that the statutory framework focuses on the land
benefited, rather than on people as such. Pp.
410 U. S.
726-728.
(b) Although appellee district has some governmental powers, it
provides none of the general public services ordinarily attributed
to a governing body. Pp.
410 U. S.
728-729.
2. Since assessments against landowners are the sole means by
which expenses of appellee district are paid, it is not irrational
to repose the franchise in landowners, but not residents. Pp.
410 U. S.
730-731.
3. The exclusion of lessees from voting does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, since the short-term lessee's interest may
be substantially less than that of a landowner and, the franchise
being exercisable by proxy, other lessees may negotiate to have the
franchise included in their leases. Pp.
410 U. S.
731-733.
4. Weighting the vote according to assessed valuation of the
land does not evade the principle that wealth has no relation to
voter qualifications where, as here, the expense as well as the
benefit is proportional to the land's assessed value. Pp.
410 U. S.
733-735.
342 F. Supp. 144, affirmed.
Page 410 U. S. 720
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART WHITE BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
410 U. S.
735.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is another in the line of cases in which the Court has had
occasion to consider the limits imposed by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on legislation apportioning
representation in state and local governing bodies and establishing
qualifications for voters in the election of such representatives.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533
(1964), enunciated the constitutional standard for apportionment of
state legislature. Later cases such as
Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U. S. 474
(1968), and
Hadley v. Junior College District,
397 U. S. 50
(1970), extended the
Reynolds rule to the governing bodies
of a county and of a junior college district, respectively. We are
here presented with the issue expressly reserved in
Avery,
supra:
"Were the [county's governing body] a special purpose unit of
government assigned the performance of functions affecting
definable groups of constituents
Page 410 U. S. 721
more than other constituents, we would have to confront the
question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give
greater influence to the citizens most affected by the
organization's functions."
390 U.S. at
390 U. S.
483-484.
The particular type of local government unit whose organization
is challenged on constitutional grounds in this case is a water
storage district, organized pursuant to the California Water
Storage District Act, Calif.Water Code § 39000
et seq. The
peculiar problems of adequate water supplies faced by most of the
western third of the Nation have been described by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, who was himself intimately familiar with them, in
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
295 U. S. 142,
295 U. S.
156-157 (1935):
"These states and territories comprised the western third of the
United States -- a vast empire in extent, but still sparsely
settled. From a line east of the Rocky Mountains almost to the
Pacific Ocean, and from the Canadian border to the boundary of
Mexico -- an area greater than that of the original thirteen states
-- the lands capable of redemption, in the main, constituted a
desert, impossible of agricultural use without artificial
irrigation."
"In the beginning, the task of reclaiming this area was left to
the unaided efforts of the people who found their way by painful
effort to its inhospitable solitudes. These western pioneers,
emulating the spirit of so many others who had gone before them in
similar ventures, faced the difficult problem of wresting a living
and creating homes from the raw elements about them, and threw down
the gage of battle to the forces of nature. With imperfect tools,
they built dams, excavated canals, constructed ditches, plowed and
cultivated the soil, and transformed
Page 410 U. S. 722
dry and desolate lands into green fields and leafy orchards. . .
."
Californians, in common with other residents of the West, found
the State's rivers and. streams in their natural state to present
the familiar paradox of feast or famine. With melting snow in the
high mountains in the spring, small streams became roaring freshets
and the rivers they fed carried the potential for destructive
floods. But with the end of the rainy season in the early spring,
farmers depended entirely upon water from such streams and rivers
until the rainy season again began in the fall. Long before that
time, however, rivers which ran bank full in the spring had been
reduced to a bare trickle of water.
It was not enough, therefore, for individual farmers or groups
of farmers to build irrigation canals and ditches which depended
for their operation on the natural flow of these streams. Storage
dams had to be constructed to impound in their reservoirs the flow
of the rivers at flood stage for later release during the dry
season regimen of these streams. For the construction of major dams
to facilitate the storage of water for irrigation of large areas,
the full resources of the State and frequently of the Federal
Government were necessary. [
Footnote 1]
But for less costly projects which would benefit a more
restricted geographic area, the State was frequently either unable
or unwilling to pledge its credit or its resources. The California
Legislature therefore has authorized a number of instrumentalities,
including water storage districts such as the appellee here, to
provide a local response to water problems.
Some history of the experience of California and the other
Western States with the problems of water distribution
Page 410 U. S. 723
is contained in
Fallbrook Irrigation District v.
Bradley, 164 U. S. 112,
164 U. S.
151-154 (1896), in which the constitutionality of
California's Wright Act was sustained against claims of denial of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. While the irrigation district was apparently the
first local governmental unit authorized to deal with water
distribution, it is by no means the only one. General legislation
in California authorizes the creation not only of irrigation
districts, but of water conservation districts, water storage and
conservation districts, flood control districts, and water storage
districts such as appellee. [
Footnote 2]
Appellee district consists of 193,000 acres of intensively
cultivated, highly fertile farm land located in the Tulare Lake
Basin. Its population consists of 77 persons, including 18
children, most of whom are employees of one or another of the four
corporations that farm 85% of the land in the district.
Such districts are authorized to plan projects and execute
approved projects "for the acquisition, appropriation, diversion,
storage, conservation, and distribution of water. . . ."
Calif.Water Code § 42200
et seq. [
Footnote 3] Incidental to this general power, districts
may "acquire, improve, and operate" any necessary works for the
storage
Page 410 U. S. 724
and distribution of water as well as any drainage or reclamation
works connected therewith, and the generation and distribution of
hydroelectric power may be provided for. [
Footnote 4]
Id. §§ 43000, 43025. They may fix
tolls and charges for the use of water and collect them from all
persons receiving the benefit of the water or other services in
proportion to the services rendered.
Id. § 43006. The
costs of the projects are assessed against district land in
accordance with the benefits accruing to each tract held in
separate ownership.
Id. §§ 46175, 46176. And land that is
not benefited may be withdrawn from the district on petition.
Id. § 48029.
Governance of the districts is undertaken by a board of
directors.
Id. § 40658. Each director is elected from one
of the divisions within the district,
id. § 39929, and
each must take an official oath and execute a bond.
Id. §
40301. General elections for the directors are to be held in
odd-numbered years.
Id. §§ 39027, 41300
et
seq.
It is the voter qualification for such elections that appellants
claim invidiously discriminates against them and persons similarly
situated. Appellants are landowners, a landowner-lessee, and
residents within the area included in the appellee's water storage
district. They brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief in an effort to prevent appellee
from giving effect to certain provisions of the California Water
Code. They allege that §§ 41000 [
Footnote 5] and 41001 [
Footnote 6]unconstitutionally deny to them the equal
protection
Page 410 U. S. 725
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that only
landowners are permitted to vote in water storage district general
elections, and votes in those elections are apportioned according
to the assessed valuation of the land. A three-judge court was
convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and the case was submitted
on factual statements of the parties and briefs, without testimony
or oral argument. A majority of the District Court held that both
statutes comported with the dictates of the Equal Protection
Clause, and appellants have appealed that judgment directly to this
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
In
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S.
23 (1968), a case in which the Ohio legislative scheme
for regulating the electoral franchise was challenged, the Court
said:
"[T]his Court has firmly established the principle that the
Equal Protection Clause does not make every minor difference in the
application of laws to different groups a violation of our
Constitution. But we have also held many times that 'invidious'
distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. In determining whether or not a state law
violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts
and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification."
Id. at
393 U. S.
30.
We therefore turn now to the determination of whether the
California statutory scheme establishing water storage districts
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Page 410 U. S. 726
I
It is first argued that § 41000, limiting the vote to district
landowners, is unconstitutional since non-landowning residents have
as much interest in the operations of a district as landowners who
may or may not be residents. Particularly, it is pointed out that
the homes of residents may be damaged by floods within the
district's boundaries, and that floods may, as with appellant
Ellison, cause them to lose their jobs. Support for this position
is said to come from the recent decisions of this Court striking
down various state laws that limited voting to landowners,
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204
(1970),
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.
S. 701 (1969), and
Kramer v. Union School
District, 395 U. S. 621
(1969).
In
Kramer, the Court was confronted with a voter
qualification statute for school district elections that limited
the vote to otherwise qualified district residents who were either
(1) the owners or lessees of taxable real property located within
the district, (2) spouses of persons owning qualifying property, or
(3) parents or guardians of children enrolled for a specified time
during the preceding year in a local district school. Without
reaching the issue of whether or not a State may in some
circumstances limit the exercise of the franchise to those
primarily interested or primarily affected by a given governmental
unit, it was held that the above classifications did not meet that
state-articulated goal, since they excluded many person who had
distinct and direct interests in school meeting decisions, and
included many persons who had, at best, remote and indirect
interests.
Id. at
395 U. S. 632-633.
Similarly, in
Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, decided
the same day, provisions of Louisiana law which gave only property
taxpayer the right to vote in elections
Page 410 U. S. 727
called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal
utility were declared violative of the Equal Protection Clause
since the operation of the utility systems affected virtually every
resident of the city, not just the 40% of the registered voters who
were also property taxpayers, and since the bonds were not in any
way financed by property tax revenue. 395 U.S. at
395 U. S. 705.
And the rationale of
Cipriano was expanded to include
general obligation bonds of municipalities in
Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, supra. It was there noted that not only did
those persons excluded from voting have a great interest in
approving or disapproving municipal improvements, but they also
contributed both directly through local taxes and indirectly
through increased rents and costs to the servicing of the bonds.
399 U.S. at
399 U. S.
210-211.
Cipriano and
Phoenix involved application of
the "one person, one vote" principle to residents of units of local
governments exercising general governmental power, as that term was
defined in
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.
S. 474 (1968).
Kramer and
Hadley v. Junior
College District, 397 U. S. 50 (970),
extended the "one person, one vote" principle to school districts
exercising powers which,
"while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County
Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees perform important
governmental functions within the districts, and we think these
powers are general enough and have sufficient impact throughout the
district to justify the conclusion that the principle which we
applied in
Avery should also be applied here."
397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
53-54.
But the Court was also careful to state that:
"It is, of course, possible that there might be some case in
which a State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far
removed from normal governmental
Page 410 U. S. 728
activities and so disproportionately affect different groups
that a popular election in compliance with
Reynolds,
supra, might not be required, but certainly we see nothing in
the present case that indicates that the activities of these
trustees fit in that category. Education has traditionally been a
vital governmental function, and these trustees, whose election the
State has opened to all qualified voters, are governmental
officials in every relevant sense of that term."
Id. at
397 U. S.
56.
We conclude that the appellee water storage district, by reason
of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect
of its activities on landowners as a group, is the sort of
exception to the rule laid down in
Reynolds which the
quoted language from
Hadley, supra, and the decision in
Avery, supra, contemplated.
The appellee district in this case, although vested with some
typical governmental powers, [
Footnote 7] has relatively limited authority. Its primary
purpose, indeed the reason for its existence, is to provide for the
acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the
Tulare Lake Basin. [
Footnote 8]
It provides no other general public
Page 410 U. S. 729
services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities,
roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a
municipal body. App. 86. There are no towns, shops, hospitals, or
other facilities designed to improve the quality of life within the
district boundaries, and it does not have a fire department,
police, buses, or trains.
Ibid.
Not only does the district not exercise what might be thought of
as "normal governmental" authority, but its actions
disproportionately affect landowners. All of the costs of district
projects are assessed against land by assessors in proportion to
the benefits received. Likewise, charges for services rendered are
collectible from persons receiving their benefit in proportion to
the services. When such persons are delinquent in payment, just as
in the case of delinquency in payments of assessments, such charges
become a lien on the land. Calif.Water Code §§ 47183, 46280. In
short, there is no way that the economic burdens of district
operations can fall on residents
qua residents, and the
operations of the districts primarily affect the land within their
boundaries. [
Footnote 9]
Under these circumstances, it is quite understandable that the
statutory framework for election of directors
Page 410 U. S. 730
of the appellee focuses on the land benefited, rather than on
people as such. California has not opened the franchise to all
residents, as Missouri had in
Hadley, supra, nor to all
residents, with some exceptions, as New York had in
Kramer,
supra. The franchise is extended to landowners, whether they
reside in the district or out of it, and indeed whether or not they
are natural persons who would be entitled to vote in a more
traditional political election. Appellants do not challenge the
enfranchisement of nonresident landowners or of corporate
landowners for purposes of election of the directors of appellee.
Thus, to sustain their contention that all residents of the
district must be accorded a vote would not result merely in the
striking down of an exclusion from what was otherwise a delineated
class, but would instead engraft onto the statutory scheme a wholly
new class of voters in addition to those enfranchised by the
statute.
We hold, therefore, that the popular election requirements
enunciated by
Reynolds, supra, and succeeding cases are
inapplicable to elections such as the general election of appellee
Water Storage District.
II
Even though appellants derive no benefit from the
Reynolds and
Kramer lines of cases, they are, of
course, entitled to have their equal protection claim assessed to
determine whether the State's decision to deny the franchise to
resident of the district while granting it to landowners was
"wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's objectives,"
Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'r, 330 U.
S. 552,
330 U. S. 556
(1947). No doubt residents within the district may be affected by
its activities. But this argument proves too much. Since
assessments imposed by the district become a cost of doing business
for those who farm within it, and that
Page 410 U. S. 731
cost must ultimately be passed along to the consumers of the
produce, food shoppers in far away metropolitan areas are to some
extent likewise "affected" by the activities of the district.
Constitutional adjudication cannot rest on any such "house that
Jack built" foundation, however. The California Legislature could
quite reasonably have concluded that the number of landowners and
owners of sufficient amounts of acreage whose consent was necessary
to organize the district would not have subjected their land to the
lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a
dominant voice in its control. Since the subjection of the owners'
lands to such liens was the basis by which the district was to
obtain financing, the proposed district had as a practical matter
to attract landowner support. Nor, since assessments against
landowners were to be the sole means by which the expenses of the
district were to be paid, could it be said to be unfair or
inequitable to repose the franchise in landowners but not
residents. Landowners as a class were to bear the entire burden of
the district's costs, and the State could rationally conclude that
they, to the exclusion of residents, should be charged with
responsibility for its operation. We conclude, therefore, that
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precluded California from
limiting the voting for directors of appellee district by totally
excluding those who merely reside within the district.
III
Appellants assert that, even if residents may be excluded from
the vote, lessees who farm the land have interests that are
indistinguishable from those of the landowners. Like landowners,
they take an interest in increasing the available water for farming
and, because the costs of district projects may be passed on to
them
Page 410 U. S. 732
either by express agreement or by increased rentals, they have
an equal interest in the costs.
Lessees undoubtedly do have an interest in the activities of
appellee district analogous to that of landowners in many respects.
But in the type of special district we now have before us, the
question for our determination is not whether or not we would have
lumped them together had we been enacting the statute in question,
but, instead, whether "if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify" California's decision to deny the franchise
to lessees while granting it to landowners.
McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
366 U. S. 426
(1961).
The term "lessees" may embrace the holders of a wide spectrum of
leasehold interests in land, from the month-to-month tenant holding
under an oral lease, on the one hand, to the long-term lessee
holding under a carefully negotiated written lease, on the other.
The system which permitted a lessee for a very short term to vote
might easily lend itself to manipulation on the part of large
landowners because of the ease with which such landowners could
create short-term interests on the part of loyal employees. And,
even apart from the fear of such manipulation, California may well
have felt that landowners would be unwilling to join in the forming
of a water storage district if short-term lessees whose fortunes
were not, in the long run, tied to the land were to have a major
vote in the affairs of the district.
The administration of a voting system which allowed short-term
lessees to vote could also pose significant difficulties.
Apparently, assessment rolls as well as state and federal land
lists are used by election boards in determining the qualifications
of the voters. Calif.Water Code § 41016. Such lists, obviously,
would not ordinarily disclose either long- or short-term
leaseholds.
Page 410 U. S. 733
While reference could be made to appropriate conveyancing
records to determine the existence of leases which had been
recorded, leases for terms less than one year need not be recorded
under California law in order to preserve the right of the lessee.
Calif.Civil Code § 1214.
Finally, we note that California has not left the lessee without
remedy for his disenfranchised state. Sections 41002 and 41005 of
the California Water Code provide for voting in the general
election by proxy. To the extent that a lessee entering into a
lease of substantial duration, thereby likening his status more to
that of a landowner, feels that the right to vote in the election
of directors of the district is of sufficient import to him, he may
bargain for that right at the time he negotiates his lease. And the
longer the term of the lease, and the more the interest of the
lessee becomes akin to that of the landowner, presumably the more
willing the lessor will be to assign his right. Just as the lessee
may by contract be required to reimburse the lessor for the
district assessments, so he may by contract acquire the right to
vote for district directors.
Under these circumstances, the exclusion of lessees from voting
in general elections for the directors of the district does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
IV
The last claim by appellants is that § 41001, which weights the
vote according to assessed valuation of the land, is
unconstitutional. They point to the fact that several of the
smaller landowners have only one vote per person, whereas the J. G.
Boswell Company has 37,825 votes, and they place reliance on the
various decisions of this Court holding that wealth has no relation
to resident-voter qualifications and that equality of voting power
may not be evaded.
See, e.g., 372 U. S.
Sanders,
Page 410 U. S. 734
372 U. S. 368
(1963);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U. S. 663
(1966).
Appellants' argument ignores the realities of water storage
district operation. Since its formation in 1926, appellee district
has put into operation four multi-million dollar projects. The last
project involved the construction of two laterals from the Basin to
the California State Aqueduct at a capital cost of about
$2,500,000. Three small landowners having land aggregating somewhat
under four acres with an assessed valuation of under $100 were
given one vote each in the special election held for the approval
of the project. The J. G. Boswell Company, which owns 61,665.54
acres with an assessed valuation of $3,782,220 was entitled to cast
37,825 votes in the election. By the same token, however, the
assessment commissioners determined that the benefits of the
project would be uniform as to all of the acres affected, and
assessed the project equally as to all acreage. Each acre has to
bear $13.26 of cost and the three small landowners, therefore, must
pay a total of $46, whereas the company must pay $817,685 for its
part. [
Footnote 10] Thus, as
the District Court found, "the benefits and burdens to each
landowner . . . are in proportion to the assessed value of the
land." 342 F. Supp. 144, 146. We cannot say that the California
legislative decision to permit voting in the same proportion is not
rationally based.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the three-judge District
Court and hold that the voter qualification statutes for California
water storage district elections
Page 410 U. S. 735
are rationally based, and therefore do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The history of the vast Central Valley Project in California is
recounted in
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U. S. 725
(1950).
[
Footnote 2]
4 Waters and Water Rights § 345.3 (R. Clark ed.1970).
[
Footnote 3]
The actual adoption of district projects is long and involved.
After a district undertakes a project, it must be approved by the
California Department of Water Resources. Calif.Water Code § 42200
et seq. A report and the estimated cost of the project
must be submitted to the California State Treasurer, who undertakes
an independent investigation before declaring the project abandoned
or approving the report.
Id. § 42275
et seq. If
the report is approved, a "special election" is called.
Id. § 42325
et seq. In order for the project to
be finally adopted, a majority of the votes and a majority of the
voters must approve it.
Id. §§ 42355-42550.
[
Footnote 4]
There is no evidence that the appellee district engages in the
generation, sale, or distribution of hydroelectric power.
[
Footnote 5]
Calif.Water Code § 41000 provides:
"Only the holders of title to land are entitled to vote at a
general election."
[
Footnote 6]
Calif.Water Code § 41001 provides:
"Each voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land
owned by him is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred
dollars ($100), or fraction thereof, worth of his land, exclusive
of improvements, minerals, and mineral rights therein, in the
precinct."
[
Footnote 7]
The board has the power to employ and discharge persons on a
regular staff and to contract for the construction of district
projects. Calif.Water Code § 43152. It can condemn private property
for use in such projects,
id. §§ 43530-43533, and may
cooperate (including contract) with other agencies, state and
federal.
Id. § 43151. Both general obligation bonds and
interest-bearing warrants may be authorized.
Id. §§
44900-45900.
[
Footnote 8]
Appellants strongly urge that districts have the power to, and
do, engage in flood control activities. The interest of such
activities to residents is said to be obvious, since houses may be
destroyed and, as in the case of appellant Ellison, jobs may
disappear. But Calif.Water Code § 43151 provides that any agreement
entered into with the State or the United States must be "for a
purpose appertaining to or beneficial to the project of the
district. . . ." And the statute which assertedly gives support to
the flood control activities,
id., § 44000, simply states
that a district "may cooperate and contract with the state . . . or
the United States" for the purpose of "flood control."
Id.
§ 44001. Thus, any flood control activities are incident to the
exercise of the district's primary functions of water storage and
distribution.
[
Footnote 9]
Appellants point out that, since the flood of 1969, the district
has received about $250,000 in flood relief funds from the federal
Government, and that the residents, like other American citizens,
have paid their share of that money, and are therefore entitled to
vote.
Cf. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.
S. 204 (1970). But their status as district residents
bears no more relation to the flood relief money than that of any
other United States citizen, and would seem to provide no more
compelling reason for granting such residents the right to vote
than the citizenry at large.
[
Footnote 10]
As was pointed out in
n 3,
small landowners are protected from crippling assessments resulting
from district projects by the dual vote which must be taken in
order to approve a project. Not only must a majority of the votes
be cast for approval, but also a majority of the voters must
approve. In this case, about 189 landowners constitute a majority
and 189 of the smallest landowners in the district have only 2.34%
of the land.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting.
The vices of this case are fourfold.
First. Lessees of farmlands, though residents of the
district, are not given the franchise.
Second. Residents who own no agricultural lands but
live in the district and face all the perils of flood which the
district is supposed to control are disfranchised.
Third. Only agricultural landowners are entitled to
vote, and their vote is weighted, one vote for each one hundred
dollars of assessed valuation as provided in § 41001 of the
California Water Code.
Fourth. The corporate voter is put in the saddle.
There are 189 landowners who own up to 80 acres each. These 189
represent 2.34% of the agricultural acreage of the district. There
are 193,000 acres in the district. Petitioner Salyer Land Co. is
one large operator, West Lake Farms and South Lake Farms are also
large operators. The largest is J. G. Boswell Co. These four farm
almost 85% of all the land in the district. Of these, J. G. Boswell
Co. commands the greatest number of votes, 37,825, which are enough
to give it a majority of the board of directors. As a result, it is
permanently in the saddle. Almost all of the 77 residents of the
district are disfranchised. The hold of J. G. Boswell Co. is so
strong that there has been no election since 1947, making little
point of the provision in § 41300 of the California Water Code for
an election every other year.
The result has been calamitous to some who, though landless,
have even more to fear from floods than the ephemeral
corporation.
Page 410 U. S. 736
I
In
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.
S. 204,
399 U. S. 209,
we set out the following test for state election schemes which
selectively distribute the franchise:
"Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in important ways
by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the
Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of
otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise."
Provisions authorizing a selective franchise are disfavored,
because they "always pose the danger of denying some citizens any
effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially
affect their lives."
Kramer v. Union School District,
395 U. S. 621,
395 U. S. 627.
In order to overcome this strong presumption, it had to be shown up
to now (1) that there is a compelling state interest for the
exclusion, and (2) that the exclusions are necessary to promote the
State's articulated goal.
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra;
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701;
Kramer v. Union School District, supra. See also
Police Jury of Vermillion Parish v. Hebert, 404 U.
S. 807;
Stewart v. Parish School Board of St.
Charles, 310 F.
Supp. 1172,
aff'd, 400 U.S. 884. In my view,
appellants in this case have made a sufficient showing to invoke
the above principles, and the presumption thus established has not
been overcome.
Assuming,
arguendo, that a State may, in some
circumstances, limit the franchise to that portion of the
electorate "primarily affected" by the outcome of an election,
Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at
395 U. S. 632,
the limitation may only be upheld if it is demonstrated that "all
those excluded are in fact, substantially less interested or
affected than those the [franchise] includes."
Ibid. The
majority concludes that "there is no way that the
Page 410 U. S. 737
economic burdens of district operations can fall on residents
qua residents, and the operations of the districts
primarily affect the land within their boundaries."
But, with all respect, that is a great distortion. In these arid
areas of our Nation, a water district seeks water in time of
drought and fights it in time of flood. One of the functions of
water districts in California is to manage flood control. That is
general California statutory policy. [
Footnote 2/1] It is expressly stated in the Water Code
that governs water districts. [
Footnote
2/2] The California Supreme Court ruled some years back that
flood control and irrigation are different but complementary
aspects of one problem. [
Footnote
2/3]
From its inception in 1926, this district has had repeated flood
control problems. Four rivers, Kings, Kern, Tule, and Kaweah, enter
Tulare Lake Basin. South of Tulare Lake Basin is Buena Vista Lake.
In the past, Buena Vista has been used to protect Tulare Lake Basin
by storing Kern River water in the former. That is how Tulare Lake
Basin was protected from menacing floods in 1952. But that was not
done in the great 1969 flood, the result being that 88,000 of the
193,000 acres in respondent district were flooded. The board of the
respondent district -- dominated by the big landowner J. G. Boswell
Co. -- voted 6-4 to table the motion that would put into operation
the machinery to divert the flood waters to the Buena Vista Lake.
The reason is that J. G. Boswell Co. had a long-term agricultural
lease in the Buena Vista Lake Basin, and flooding it would have
interfered with the planting, growing, and harvesting of crops the
next season.
The result was that water in the Tulare Lake Basin rose to 192.5
USGS datum. Ellison, one of the appellants
Page 410 U. S. 738
who lives in the district, is not an agricultural landowner. But
his residence was 15 1/2 feet below the water level of the crest of
the flood in 1969.
The appellee district has large levees; and if they are broken,
damage to houses and loss of life are imminent.
Landowners -- large or small, resident or nonresident lessees or
landlords, sharecroppers [
Footnote
2/4] or owners -- all should have a say. But irrigation, water
storage, the building of levees, and flood control, implicate the
entire community. All residents of the district must be granted the
franchise.
This case, as I will discuss below, involves the performance of
vital and important governmental functions by water districts
clothed with much of the paraphernalia of government. The weighting
of votes according to one's wealth is hostile to our system of
government.
See
Page 410 U. S. 739
Stewart v. Parish School Board of St.
Charles, 310 F.
Supp. 1172,
aff'd, 400 U.S. 884. As a non-landowning
bachelor was held to be entitled to vote on matters affecting
education,
Kramer v. Union School District, supra, so all
the prospective victims of mismanaged flood control projects should
be entitled to vote in water district elections, whether they be
resident non-landowners, resident or nonresident lessees, and
whether they own 10 acres or 10,000 acres. Moreover, their votes
should be equal regardless of the value of their holdings, for when
it comes to performance of governmental functions, all enter the
polls on an equal basis.
The majority, however, would distinguish the water storage
district from "units of local government having general
governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body,"
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.
S. 474,
390 U. S. 485,
and fit this case within the exception contemplated for
"a special purpose unit of government assigned the performance
of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than
other constituents."
Id. at
390 U. S.
483-484. The
Avery test was significantly
liberalized in
Hadley v. Junior College District,
397 U. S. 50. At
issue was an election for trustees of a special purpose district
which ran a junior college. We said,
"[S]ince the trustees can levy and collect taxes, issue bonds
with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make contracts,
collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions
to annex school districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in
general manage the operations of the junior college, their powers
are equivalent, for apportionment purposes, to those exercised by
the county commissioners in
Avery. . . . [T]hese powers,
while not fully as broad as those of the Midland County
Commissioners, certainly show that the trustees
perform
important governmental functions . . . and have
sufficient
Page 410 U. S. 740
impact throughout the district to justify the
conclusion that the principle which we applied in Avery should also
be applied here."
Id. at
397 U. S. 53-54.
(Emphasis added; footnote omitted) Measured by the
Hadley
test, the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District surely performs
"important governmental functions" which "have sufficient impact
throughout the district" to justify the application of the Avery
principle.
Water storage districts in California are classified as
irrigation, reclamation, or drainage districts. [
Footnote 2/5] Such state agencies "are considered
exclusively governmental," and their property is "held only for
governmental purpose," not in the "proprietary sense." [
Footnote 2/6] They are a "public entity,"
just as "any other political subdivision." [
Footnote 2/7] That is made explicit in various ways. The
Water Code of California states that "[a]ll waters and water
rights" of the State "within the district are given, dedicated, and
set apart for the uses and purposes of the district." [
Footnote 2/8] Directors of the district are
"public officers of the state." [
Footnote 2/9] The district possesses the power of
eminent domain. [
Footnote 2/10]
Its works may not be taxed. [
Footnote
2/11] It carries a governmental immunity against suit.
[
Footnote 2/12] A district has
powers that relate to irrigation, storage of water, drainage, flood
control, and generation of hydroelectric energy. [
Footnote 2/13]
Whatever may be the parameters of the exception alluded to in
Avery and
Hadley, I cannot conclude that
Page 410 U. S. 741
this water storage district escapes the constitutional
restraints relative to a franchise within a governmental unit.
II
When we decided
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533, and discussed the problems of malapportionment,
we thought and talked about people -- of population, of the
constitutional right of "qualified citizens to vote," (
id.
at
377 U. S. 554)
of "the right of suffrage," (
id. at
377 U. S. 555)
of the comparison of "one man's vote" to that of another man's
vote.
Id. at
377 U. S. 559.
We said:
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators
are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.
As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our
legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly
by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect
legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our
political system."
Id. at
377 U. S.
562.
It is indeed grotesque to think of corporations voting within
the framework of political representation of people. Corporations
were held to be "persons" for purposes both of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [
Footnote 2/14] and of the Equal Protection Clause.
[
Footnote 2/15] Yet, it is
unthinkable in terms of the American tradition that corporations
should be admitted to the franchise. Could a State allot voting
rights to its corporations, weighting each vote according to the
wealth of the corporation? Or could it follow the rule of one
corporation, one vote?
Page 410 U. S. 742
It would be a radical and revolutionary step to take, as it
would change our whole concept of the franchise. California takes
part of that step here by allowing corporations to vote in these
water district matters [
Footnote
2/16] that entail performance of vital governmental functions.
One corporation can outvote 77 individuals in this district. Four
corporations can exercise these governmental powers as they choose,
leaving every individual inhabitant with a weak, ineffective voice.
The result is a corporate political kingdom undreamed of by those
who wrote our Constitution.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Calif.Stat. 1921, C. 914, § 58.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Calif.Water Code § 44001.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 P. 983.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Since 1938, sharecroppers have been included in federal
regulations defining "farmers" who are entitled to vote on
referenda concerning marketing quotas under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.
"
Farmers engaged in the production of a commodity. For
purposes of referenda with respect to marketing quotas for tobacco,
extra long staple cotton, rice and peanuts, the phrase 'farmers
engaged in the production of a commodity' includes any person who
is entitled to share in a crop of the commodity, or the proceeds
thereof because he shares in the risks of production of the crop as
an owner, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper (landlord whose return
from the crop is fixed regardless of the amount of the crop
produced is excluded) on a farm on which such crop is planted in a
workmanlike manner for harvest:
Provided, That any failure
to harvest the crop because of conditions beyond the control of
such person shall not affect his status as a farmer engaged in the
production of the crop. In addition, the phrase 'farmers engaged in
the production of a commodity' also includes each person who it is
determined would have had an interest as a producer in the
commodity on a farm for which a farm allotment for the crop of the
commodity was established and no acreage of the crop was planted
but an acreage of the crop was regarded as planted for history
acreage purposes under the applicable commodity regulations."
7 CFR § 717.3(b).
[
Footnote 2/5]
Calif.Water Code § 39060.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District v.
Ohrt, 31 Cal. App. 2d
619, 623, 88 P.2d 763, 765.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Calif.Govt.Code § 811.2.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Section 43158.
See also id. § 39061.
[
Footnote 2/9]
In re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 322, 28
P. 272, 278.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Calif.Water Code § 43530.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Id. § 43508.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Calif.Govt.Code §§ 811.2, 815.
[
Footnote 2/13]
Calif.Water Code §§ 42200, 43000, 43025, 44001.
[
Footnote 2/14]
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith,
129 U. S. 26,
129 U. S.
28.
[
Footnote 2/15]
Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181,
125 U. S.
188-189;
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.
Co., 118 U. S. 394,
118 U. S.
397.
[
Footnote 2/16]
Calif.Water Code § 41004.