Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes a suit in equity to
redress the deprivation under color of state law "of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . ," is
within that exception of the federal anti-injunction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2283, that provides that a federal court may not enjoin
state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress." And in this § 1983 action, though the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court
when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding (
cf. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37, and
companion cases) are not questioned, the District Court is held to
have erred in holding that the anti-injunction statute absolutely
barred its enjoining a pending state court proceeding under any
circumstances whatsoever. Pp.
407 U. S.
228-243.
315 F.
Supp. 1387, reversed and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
members joined except POWELLL and REHNQUIST, JJ., who took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case. BURGER, C.J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,
post, p.
407 U. S.
243.
Page 407 U. S. 226
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal anti-injunction statute provides that a federal
court
"may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments. [
Footnote
1]"
An Act of Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, expressly authorizes a
"suit in equity" to redress "the deprivation," under color of state
law, "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution. . . ." [
Footnote
2] The question before us is whether this "Act of Congress"
comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of the
anti-injunction statute so as to permit a federal court in a § 1983
suit to grant an injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state
court. This question, which has divided the federal courts,
[
Footnote 3] has lurked in the
background of many of our recent cases, but we have not until today
explicitly decided it. [
Footnote
4]
Page 407 U. S. 227
I
The prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida, brought a
proceeding in a Florida court to close down the appellant's
bookstore as a public nuisance under the claimed authority of
Florida law. The state court entered a preliminary order
prohibiting continued operation of the bookstore. After further
inconclusive proceedings in the state courts, the appellant filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida, alleging that the actions of the state
judicial and law enforcement officials were depriving him of rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying upon 42
U.S.C. § 1983, [
Footnote 5] he
asked for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court
proceedings on the ground that Florida laws were being
unconstitutionally applied by the state court so as to cause him
great and irreparable harm. A single federal district judge issued
temporary restraining orders, and a three-judge court was convened
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. After a hearing, the
three-judge court dissolved the temporary restraining orders and
refused to enjoin the state court proceeding, holding that the
"injunctive relief sought here
Page 407 U. S. 228
as to the proceedings pending in the Florida courts does not
come under any of the exceptions set forth in Section 2283. It is
not expressly authorized by Act of Congress, it is not necessary in
the aid of this court's jurisdiction, and it is not sought in order
to protect or effectuate any judgment of this court."
315 F.
Supp. 1387, 1389. An appeal was brought directly here under 28
U.S.C. § 1253, [
Footnote 6] and
we noted probable jurisdiction. 402 U.S. 941.
II
In denying injunctive relief, the District Court relied on this
Court's decision in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281. The
Atlantic Coast Line case did not deal with the "expressly
authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, [
Footnote 7] but the Court's opinion in
that case does bring into sharp focus the critical importance of
the question now before us. For, in that case, we expressly
rejected the view that the anti-injunction statute merely states a
flexible doctrine of comity, [
Footnote 8] and made clear that the statute imposes an
absolute ban upon the issuance of a federal injunction against a
pending
Page 407 U. S. 229
state court proceeding, in the absence of one of the recognized
exceptions:
"On its face, the present Act is an absolute prohibition against
enjoining state court proceedings unless the injunction falls
within one of three specifically defined exceptions. The
respondents here have intimated that the Act only establishes a
'principle of comity,' not a binding rule on the power of the
federal courts. The argument implies that, in certain
circumstances, a federal court may enjoin state court proceedings
even if that action cannot be justified by any of the three
exceptions. We cannot accept any such contention. . . . [We] hold
that any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise
proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of
the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be upheld.
. . ."
398 U.S. at
398 U. S.
286-287.
It follows, in the present context, that, if 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
not within the "expressly authorized" exception of the
anti-injunction statute, then a federal equity court is wholly
without power to grant any relief in a § 1983 suit seeking to stay
a state court proceeding. In short, if a § 1983 action is not an
"expressly authorized" statutory exception, the anti-injunction law
absolutely prohibits, in such an action, all federal equitable
intervention in a pending state court proceeding, whether civil or
criminal and regardless of how extraordinary the particular
circumstances may be.
Last Term, in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
37, and its companion cases, [
Footnote 9] the Court dealt at length with the subject
of federal judicial intervention in pending
Page 407 U. S. 230
state criminal prosecutions. In
Younger, a three-judge
federal district court in a § 1983 action had enjoined a criminal
prosecution pending in a California court. In asking us to reverse
that judgment, the appellant argued that the injunction was in
violation of the federal anti-injunction statute. 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 40.
But the Court carefully eschewed any reliance on the statute in
reversing the judgment, basing its decision instead upon what the
Court called "Our Federalism" -- upon "the national policy
forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances." 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 41,
401 U. S.
44.
In
Younger, this Court emphatically reaffirmed "the
fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions." 401 U.S. at
401
U.S. 46. It made clear that even "the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute
on its face' does not, in
itself, justify an injunction against good faith attempts to
enforce it." 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 54. At
the same time, however, the Court clearly left room for federal
injunctive intervention in a pending state court prosecution in
certain exceptional circumstances -- where irreparable injury is
"both great and immediate," 401 U.S. at 401 U.S. 46, where the state law is
"`flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional
prohibitions,'" 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 53, or
where there is a showing of "bad faith, harassment, or . . . other
unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief." 401
U.S. at 401 U. S. 54. In
the companion case of Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S.
82, the Court said that
"[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken
by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid
conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where
irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief
against pending
Page 407 U. S. 231
state prosecutions appropriate."
401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 85.
See also Dyson v. Stein, 401 U. S. 200,
401 U. S.
203.
While the Court in
Younger and its companion cases
expressly disavowed deciding the question now before us -- whether
§ 1983 comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of the
anti-injunction statute, 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 5 it is
evident that our decisions in those cases cannot be disregarded in
deciding this question. In the first place, if § 1983 is not within
the statutory exception, then the anti-injunction statute would
have absolutely barred the injunction issued in
Younger,
as the appellant in that case argued, and there would have been no
occasion whatever for the Court to decide that case upon the
"policy" ground of "Our Federalism." Secondly, if § 1983 is not
within the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction
statute, then we must overrule
Younger and its companion
cases insofar as they recognized the permissibility of injunctive
relief against pending criminal prosecutions in certain limited and
exceptional circumstances. For, under the doctrine of
Atlantic
Coast Line, the anti-injunction statute would, in a § 1983
case, then be an "absolute prohibition" against federal equity
intervention in a pending state criminal or civil proceeding --
under any circumstances whatever.
The
Atlantic Coast Line and
Younger cases thus
serve to delineate both the importance and the finality of the
question now before us. And it is in the shadow of those cases that
the question must be decided.
III
The anti-injunction statute goes back almost to the beginnings
of our history as a Nation. In 1793, Congress enacted a law
providing that no "writ of injunction be granted [by any federal
court] to stay proceedings
Page 407 U. S. 232
in any court of a state. . . ." Act of March 2, 1793; 1 Stat.
335. The precise origins of the legislation are shrouded in
obscurity, [
Footnote 10] but
the consistent understanding
Page 407 U. S. 233
has been that its basic purpose is to prevent "needless friction
between state and federal courts."
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Gas
Co., 309 U. S. 4,
309 U. S. 9. The
law remained unchanged until 1874, when it was amended to permit a
federal court to stay state court proceedings that interfered with
the administration of a federal bankruptcy proceeding. [
Footnote 11] The present wording of
the legislation was adopted with the enactment of Title 28 of the
United States Code in 1948.
Despite the seemingly uncompromising language of the
anti-injunction statute prior to 1948, the Court soon
Page 407 U. S. 234
recognized that exceptions must be made to its blanket
prohibition if the import and purpose of other Acts of Congress
were to be given their intended scope. So it was that, in addition
to the bankruptcy law exception that Congress explicitly recognized
in 1874, the Court through the years found that federal courts were
empowered to enjoin state court proceedings, despite the
anti-injunction statute, in carrying out the will of Congress under
at least six other federal laws. These covered a broad spectrum of
congressional action: (1) legislation providing for removal of
litigation from state to federal courts, [
Footnote 12](2) legislation limiting the liability of
shipowners, [
Footnote 13]
(3) legislation providing for federal interpleader actions,
[
Footnote 14] (4)
legislation conferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages,
[
Footnote 15] (5)
legislation
Page 407 U. S. 235
governing federal habeas corpus proceedings, [
Footnote 16] and (6) legislation providing
for control of prices. [
Footnote
17]
In addition to the exceptions to the anti-injunction statute
found to be embodied in these various Acts of Congress, the Court
recognized other "implied" exceptions to the blanket prohibition of
the anti-injunction statute. One was an "
in rem"
exception, allowing a federal court to enjoin a state court
proceeding in order to protect its jurisdiction of a
res
over which it had first acquired jurisdiction. [
Footnote 18] Another was a "relitigation"
exception, permitting a federal court to enjoin relitigation in a
state court of issues already decided in federal litigation.
[
Footnote 19] Still a third
exception, more recently developed, permits a federal injunction of
state
Page 407 U. S. 236
court proceedings when the plaintiff in the federal court is the
United States itself, or a federal agency asserting "superior
federal interests." [
Footnote
20]
In
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.
S. 118, the Court in 1941 issued an opinion casting
considerable doubt upon the approach to the anti-injunction statute
reflected in its previous decisions. The Court's opinion expressly
disavowed the "relitigation" exception to the statute, and
emphasized generally the importance of recognizing the statute's
basic directive "of
hands off' by the federal courts in the use
of the injunction to stay litigation in a state court." 314 U.S. at
314 U. S. 132.
The congressional response to Toucey was the enactment in
1948 of the anti-injunction statute in its present form in 28
U.S.C. § 2283, which, as the Reviser's Note makes evident, served
not only to overrule the specific holding of Toucey,
[Footnote 21] but to restore
"the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the
Toucey decision." [Footnote 22]
We proceed, then, upon the understanding that, in determining
whether § 1983 comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of
the anti-injunction statute, the
Page 407 U. S. 237
criteria to be applied are those reflected in the Court's
decisions prior to
Toucey. [
Footnote 23] A review of those decisions makes reasonably
clear what the relevant criteria are. In the first place, it is
evident that, in order to qualify under the "expressly authorized"
exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law need not
contain an express reference to that statute. As the Court has
said, "no prescribed formula is required; an authorization need not
expressly refer to § 2283."
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Richman Bros. Co., 348 U. S. 511,
348 U. S. 516.
Indeed, none of the previously recognized statutory exceptions
contains any such reference. [
Footnote 24] Secondly, a federal law need not expressly
authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to
qualify as an exception. Three of the six previously recognized
statutory exceptions contain no such authorization. [
Footnote 25] Thirdly, it is clear that, in
order to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception to the
anti-injunction statute, an Act of Congress must have created a
specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a
federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal
court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding. This
is not
Page 407 U. S. 238
to say that, in order to come within the exception, an Act of
Congress must, on its face and in every one of its provisions, be
totally incompatible with the prohibition of the anti-injunction
statute. [
Footnote 26] The
test, rather, is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a
federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity,
could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court
proceeding.
See Toucey, supra, at
314 U. S.
132-134;
Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,
260 U. S. 226;
Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co.,
109 U. S. 578,
109 U. S. 599;
Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S.
66,
308 U. S. 78;
Kalb v. Fuerstein, 308 U. S. 433;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503.
With these criteria in view, we turn to consideration of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
IV
Section 1983 was originally § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
17 Stat. 13. It was "modeled" on § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 27, [
Footnote
27] and was enacted for the express purpose of "enforc[ing] the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 17 Stat. 13. The
predecessor of § 1983 was thus an important part of the basic
alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era
through federal legislation and constitutional amendment. [
Footnote 28] As a result of the
Page 407 U. S. 239
new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era --
and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was its
centerpiece -- the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of
basic federal rights against state power was clearly established.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167;
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.
S. 668;
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S.
1;
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.
S. 241,
389 U. S.
245-249; H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1908); J. tenBroek, The Anti-Slavery Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1951). [
Footnote 29] Section 1983 opened the federal courts to
private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against
incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation. [
Footnote 30]
Page 407 U. S. 240
It is clear from the legislative debates surrounding passage of
§ 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "against State action, . . .
whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial."
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.
S. 339,
100 U. S. 346
(emphasis supplied). Proponents of the legislation noted that state
courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, either
because the state courts were powerless to stop deprivations or
were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of
federally protected rights.
As Representative Lowe Stated, the
"records of the [state] tribunals are searched in vain for
evidence of effective redress [of federally secured rights]. . . .
What less than this [the Civil Rights Act of 1871] will afford an
adequate remedy? The Federal Government cannot serve a writ of
mandamus upon State Executives or upon State courts to compel them
to protect the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. . . .
The case has arisen . . . when the Federal Government must resort
to its own agencies to carry its own authority into execution.
Hence, this bill throws open the doors of the United States courts
to those whose rights under the Constitution are denied or
impaired."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374-376 (1871). This view was
echoed by Senator Osborn:
"If the State courts had proven themselves competent to suppress
the local disorders,
Page 407 U. S. 241
or to maintain law and order, we should not have been called
upon to legislate. . . . We are driven by existing facts to provide
for the several states in the South what they have been unable to
fully provide for themselves,
i.e., the full and complete
administration of justice in the courts. And the courts with
reference to which we legislate must be the United States
courts."
Id. at 653. And Representative Perry concluded:
"Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to
hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand
and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices. . . . [A]ll
the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes
of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes,
and feared detection. Among the most dangerous things an injured
party can do is to appeal to justice."
Id. at App. 78. [
Footnote 31]
Those who opposed the Act of 1871 clearly recognized that the
proponents were extending federal power in an attempt to remedy the
state courts' failure to secure federal rights. The debate was not
about whether the predecessor of § 1983 extended to actions of
state
Page 407 U. S. 242
courts, but whether this innovation was necessary or desirable.
[
Footnote 32]
This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly
conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States
and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created
rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not
protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, in
fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it
believed that these failings extended to the state courts.
V
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from
the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th
century, when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very
purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights
-- to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color
of state law, "whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial."
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at
100 U. S. 346.
In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the
federal courts to issue injunctions in § 1983 actions by expressly
authorizing a "suit in equity" as one of the means of redress. And
this Court long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief
against a state court proceeding can, in some circumstances, be
essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a
person's constitutional rights.
Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123;
cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33;
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479. For
these reasons, we conclude that, under the
Page 407 U. S. 243
criteria established in our previous decisions construing the
anti-injunction statute, § 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls
within the "expressly authorized" exception of that law.
In so concluding, we do not question or qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a
federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding. These
principles, in the context of state criminal prosecutions, were
canvassed at length last Term in
Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37, and
it companion case. They are principle that have been emphasized by
this Court many times in the past.
Fenner v. Boykin,
271 U. S. 240;
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S.
89;
Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U. S.
45;
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.
S. 387;
Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599;
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.
S. 157;
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.
S. 117;
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.
S. 611. Today we decide only that the District Court, in
this case, was in error in holding that, because of the
anti-injunction statute, it was absolutely without power in this §
1983 action to enjoin a proceeding pending in a state court under
any circumstances whatsoever.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
[
Footnote 2]
The statute provides in full:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[
Footnote 3]
Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (CA3) (§
1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception),
with Baines v.
City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (CA4) (1983 is not an
"expressly authorized" exception).
[
Footnote 4]
See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.
S. 479,
380 U. S. 484
n. 2;
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.
S. 611,
390 U. S. 613
n 3;
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 54.
See also Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.
S. 538,
405 U. S. 556;
Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U. S. 15.
In
Younger, supra, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS was the only
member of the Court who took a position on the question now before
us. We expressed the view that § 1983 is included in the "expressly
authorized exception to § 2283. . . ." 401 U.S. at
401 U. S. 62.
Cf. id. at
401 U. S. 54
(STEWART, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurring);
Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82,
401 U. S. 120
n. 14 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J., joined by WHITE and
MARSHALL, JJ.).
[
Footnote 5]
Federal jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). The
statute states in relevant part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:"
"
* * * *"
"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States. . . ."
[
Footnote 6]
The statute provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
[
Footnote 7]
At issue were the other two exceptions of the anti-injunction
statute: "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments."
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.
S. 281,
398 U. S.
288.
[
Footnote 8]
See First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of
Skokie, 173 F.2d 1;
Baines, 337 F.2d at 593.
See
also Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to
Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L.J. 1169, 1194
(1933).
[
Footnote 9]
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66;
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77;
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82;
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U. S. 200;
Byrne v. Karaleis, 401 U. S. 216.
[
Footnote 10]
"The history of this provision in the Judiciary Act of 1793 is
not fully known. We know that, on December 31, 1790, Attorney
General Edmund Randolph reported to the House of Representatives on
desirable changes in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Am.State Papers,
Misc., vol. 1, No. 17, pp. 21-36. The most serious question raised
by Randolph concerned the arduousness of the circuit duties imposed
on the Supreme Court justices. But the Report also suggested a
number of amendments dealing with procedural matters. A section of
the proposed bill submitted by him provided that 'no injunction in
equity shall be granted by a district court to a judgment at law of
a State court.'
Id. p. 26. Randolph explained that this
clause"
"will debar the district court from interfering with the
judgments at law in the State courts; for if the plaintiff and
defendant rely upon the State courts, as far as the judgment, they
ought to continue there as they have begun. It is enough to split
the same suit into one at law, and another in equity, without
adding a further separation, by throwing the common law side of the
question into the State courts, and the equity side into the
federal courts."
"
Id. p. 34. The Report was considered by the House
sitting as a Committee of the Whole, and then was referred to
successive special committees for further consideration. No action
was taken until after Chief Justice Jay and his associates wrote
the President that their circuit-riding duties were too burdensome.
American State Papers, Misc., vol. 1, No. 32, p. 51. In response to
this complaint, which was transmitted to Congress, the Act of March
2, 1793, was passed, containing, in § 5,
inter alia, the
prohibition against staying state court proceedings."
"Charles Warren, in his article Federal and State Court
Interference, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 345, 347, suggests that this provision
was the direct consequence of Randolph's report. This seems
doubtful in view of the very narrow purpose of Randolph's proposal,
namely, that federal courts of equity should not interfere with the
enforcement of judgments at law rendered in the state courts.
See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to
Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L.J. 1169, 1171, n.
14."
"There is no record of any debates over the statute.
See 3 Annals of Congress (1791-93). It has been suggested
that the provision reflected the then strong feeling against the
unwarranted intrusion of federal courts upon state sovereignty.
Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, was decided on February
18, 1793, less than two weeks before the provision was enacted into
law. The significance of this proximity is doubtful.
Compare Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43
Harv.L.Rev. 345, 347-348,
with Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 200 U. S. 273,
200 U. S.
291-292. Much more probable is the suggestion that the
provision reflected the prevailing prejudices against equity
jurisdiction. The Journal of William Maclay (1927 ed.), chronicling
the proceedings of the Senate while he was one of its members
(1789-1791), contains abundant evidence of a widespread hostility
to chancery practice.
See especially pp. 92-94, 101-06
(debate on the bill that became Judiciary Act of 1789). Moreover,
Senator Ellsworth (soon to become Chief Justice of the United
States), the principal draftsman of both the 1789 and 1793
Judiciary Acts, often indicated a dislike for equity jurisdiction.
See Brown, Life of Oliver Ellsworth (1905 ed.) 194;
Journal of William Maclay (1927 ed.) 103-04; Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv.L.Rev.
49, 96-100."
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.
S. 118,
314 U. S.
130-132.
See also Note, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 612 (1971); 1A J. Moore,
Federal Practice 2302 (1965); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1075-1078 (1953); Durfee
& Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 Mich.L.Rev. 1145
(1932).
[
Footnote 11]
As so amended, the statute provided that state court proceedings
could be enjoined "where such injunction may be authorized by any
law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Rev.Stat. § 720
(1874).
[
Footnote 12]
See French v. Hay,
22 Wall. 250;
Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,
260 U. S. 226. The
federal removal provisions, both civil and criminal, 28 U.S.C. §§
1441-1450, provide that, once a copy of the removal petition is
filed with the clerk of the state court, the "State court shall
proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." 28
U.S.C. § 1446(e).
[
Footnote 13]
See Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co.,
109 U. S. 578. The
Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 635, as amended, provides that, once a
shipowner has deposited with the court an amount equal to the value
of his interest in the ship, "all claims and proceedings against
the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease." 46
U.S.C. § 185.
[
Footnote 14]
See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S.
66. The Interpleader Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 416, as
currently written, provides that, in
"any civil action of interpleader . . . , a district court may .
. . enter its order restraining [all claimants] . . . from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United
States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation
involved in the interpleader action."
28 U.S.C. § 2361.
[
Footnote 15]
See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.
S. 433. The Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, as amended
in 1935, 49 Stat. 944, provides that, in situations to which it is
applicable, a federal court shall "stay all judicial or official
proceedings in any court." [
Footnote 18] 11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(2) (1940 ed.).
[
Footnote 16]
See Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241,
117 U. S.
248-249. The Federal Habeas Corpus Act provides that a
federal court before which a habeas corpus proceeding is pending
may "stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State
Court . . . for any matter involved in the habeas corpus
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2251.
[
Footnote 17]
Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56
Stat. 33, provided that the Price Administrator could request a
federal district court to enjoin acts that violated or threatened
to violate the Act. In
Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.
S. 252, we held that this authority was broad enough to
justify an injunction to restrain state court proceedings.
Id. at
328 U. S. 255.
The Emergency Price Control Act was thus considered a
congressionally authorized exception to the anti-injunction
statute.
Ibid.; see also Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U. S. 503.
Section 205(a) expired in 1947. Act of July 25, 1946, 60 Stat.
664.
[
Footnote 18]
See, e.g., Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S.
at
314 U. S.
135-136;
Freeman v.
Howe, 24 How. 450;
Kline v. Burke Construction
Co., 260 U. S. 226.
[
Footnote 19]
See, e.g., Toucey, supra, at
314 U. S.
137-141;
Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S.
340;
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U. S. 356.
See generally 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice 2302-2311
(1965).
[
Footnote 20]
Leiter Minerals Inc. v. United States, 352 U.
S. 220;
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.
S. 138.
[
Footnote 21]
The Reviser's Not states in part:
"The exceptions specifically include the words 'to protect or
effectuate its judgments,' for lack of which the Supreme Court held
that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of
cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (
See
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., . . .
314 U. S.
118. . . .) A vigorous dissenting opinion [314 U.S.
314 U. S. 141] notes that,
at the time of the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code, the power of
the courts . . . of the United States to protect their judgments
was unquestioned, and that the revisers of that code noted no
change and Congress intended no change."
H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A181-182 (1947).
[
Footnote 22]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 23]
Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.,
348 U. S. 511,
348 U. S. 521
(dissenting opinion).
[
Footnote 24]
See nn.
12
13 14 15 16 and
17 supra.
[
Footnote 25]
See nn.
12
13 and
17 supra. The federal courts have found
that other Acts of Congress that do not refer to § 2283 or to
injunctions against state court proceedings nonetheless come within
the "expressly authorized" language of the anti-injunction statute.
See, e.g., Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining
Co., 59 F. Supp.
348, 351 (WD Ky.) (the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Okin v.
SEC, 161 F.2d 978, 980 (CA2) (the Public Utility Holding
Company Act);
Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 230 (CA5)
(the 1964 Civil Rights Act);
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin,
360 F.2d 692 (CA2) (the Securities and Exchange Act).
[
Footnote 26]
Cf. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (CA4).
[
Footnote 27]
See remarks of Representative Shellabarger, chairman of
the House Select Committee which drafted the Civil Rights Act of
1871, Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,App. 68 (1871), and
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.
S. 538,
405 U. S. 545
n. 9.
[
Footnote 28]
In addition to proposing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, Congress, from 1866 to 1875 enacted the
following civil rights legislation: Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat.
27; Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 20, 1871, 17
Stat. 13; and Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335. In 1875, Congress
also passed the general federal question provision giving federal
courts the power to hear suits arising under Art. III, § 2, of the
Constitution. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470. This is the
predecessor of 28 U.S.C.§ 1331.
[
Footnote 29]
See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 Mich.L.Rev. 1323 (1952); Note, 75 Yale L.J.
1007 (1966); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court 65 (1928). As one commentator has put it:
"That statutory plan [of the Fourteenth Amendment and Acts of
Congress to enforce it] did supply the means of vindicating those
rights [of person and property] through the instrumentalities of
the federal government. . . . It did constitute the federal
government the protector of the civil rights. . . ."
TenBroek, at 185.
See also United States v. Price,
383 U. S. 787,
383 U. S. 801
n. 9; K. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction (1965).
[
Footnote 30]
As Representative Shellabarger stated, the Civil Rights Act of
1871
"not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former
condition may have been that of slaves, but also to all people
where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be
deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the
Constitution by reason and virtue of their national
citizenship."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871). And as
Representative Hoar stated:
"The principal danger that menaces us today is from the effort
within the States to deprive considerable numbers of persons of the
civil and equal rights which the General Government is endeavoring
to secure to them."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335.
Although, as originally drafted in 1871, § 1983's predecessor
protected rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution, the provision included by the Congress in the Revised
Statutes of 1874 was enlarged to provide protection for rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by federal law as well. Rev.Stat.
§ 1979.
[
Footnote 31]
Representative Coburn stated:
"The United States courts are further above mere local influence
than the county courts; their judges can act with more
independence, cannot be put under terror, as local judges can;
their sympathies are not so nearly identified with those of the
vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the
neighborhood; they will be able to rise above prejudices or bad
passions or terror more easily. . . ."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 460 (1871).
See also id. at App. 85 (Rep. Bingham); 321 (Rep.
Stoughton); 333-334 (Rep. Hoar); 389 (Rep. Elliot); 394 (Rep.
Rainey); 429 (Rep. Beatty); App. 68-69 (Rep. Shellabarger); App. 78
(Rep. Perry); 345 (Sen. Sherman); 505 (Sen. Pratt); 577 (Sen.
Carpenter); 651 (Sen. Sumner); 653 (Sen. Osborn); App. 255 (Sen.
Wilson).
Cf. id. at 697 (Sen. Edmunds).
[
Footnote 32]
See; e.g., Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 361 (Rep.
Swann); 385 (Rep. Lewis); 416 (Rep. Biggs); 429 (Rep. McHenry);
App. 179 (Rep. Voorhees); 599-600 (Sen. Saulsbury); App. 216 (Sen.
Thurman).
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the Court, and add a few words to
emphasize what the Court is and is not deciding today, as I read
the opinion. The Court holds
Page 407 U. S. 244
only that 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which is an absolute bar to
injunctions against state court proceedings in most suits, does not
apply to a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an
injunction of state proceedings. But, as the Court's opinion has
noted, it does nothing to
"question or qualify in any way the principles of equity,
comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding."
Ante at
407 U. S. 243.
In the context of pending state criminal proceedings, we held in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971), that these principles allow a federal court properly to
issue an injunction in only a narrow class of circumstances. We
have not yet reached or decided exactly how great a restraint is
imposed by these principles on a federal court asked to enjoin
state civil proceedings. Therefore, on remand in this case, it
seems to me the District Court, before reaching a decision on the
merits of appellant's claim, should properly consider whether
general notions of equity or principles of federalism, similar to
those invoked in
Younger, prevent the issuance of an
injunction against the state "nuisance abatement" proceedings in
the circumstances of this case.