Respondent was injured in December, 1965, while working on
petitioner's artificial island drilling rig, located on the Outer
Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast. Allegedly, not until
many months later were the injuries discovered to be serious. In
January, 1968, respondent brought suit for damages against
petitioner in federal district court. The District Court, relying
on
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
395 U. S. 352
(1969), held that Louisiana's one-year limitation on personal
injury actions applied, rather than the admiralty laches doctrine,
and granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
Rodrigue had held that state law, and not admiralty law,
applied to fixed structures on the Outer Continental Shelf under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (hereinafter Lands Act), and
extended to that area as federal laws the laws of the adjacent
State "to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent"
with federal laws. Respondent argued on appeal that, in view of
pre-
Rodrigue jurisprudence making admiralty law (including
the laches doctrine) applicable, it would be unfair to give that
decision retrospective effect. The Court of Appeals, not reaching
that argument, reversed, holding that Louisiana's "prescriptive"
time limitation, which barred the remedy but did not extinguish the
right to recovery, was not binding outside a Louisiana forum.
Consequently, the court concluded that the time limitation was not
"applicable" of its own force, and was "inconsistent" with the
admiralty laches doctrine, which, though not directly applicable by
virtue of
Rodrigue, was applicable as a matter of federal
common law.
Held:
1. The Lands Act, as interpreted in
Rodrigue, requires
that a State's statute of limitations be applied to actions for
personal injuries occurring on fixed structures on the Outer
Continental Shelf. The fact that the Louisiana law is
"prescriptive" does not make it inapplicable as federal law under
the Lands Act, and a
Page 404 U. S. 98
federal court may not apply a laches test to preclude
application of the State time limitation. Pp.
404 U. S.
100-105.
2. The Louisiana one-year statute of limitation. should not,
however, bar respondent's action here, since retroactive
application of that statute under
Rodrigue would deprive
respondent of any remedy at all on the basis of the unforeseeable
superseding legal doctrine of that decision. Pp.
404 U. S.
105-109.
430 F.2d 27, affirmed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a separate opinion,
post, p.
404 U. S.
109.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Gaines Ted Huson, suffered a back injury while
working on an artificial island drilling rig owned and operated by
the petitioner, Chevron Oil Co., and located on the Outer
Continental Shelf off the Gulf Coast of Louisiana. The injury
occurred in December, 1965. Allegedly, it was not until many months
later that the injury was discovered to be a serious one. In
January, 1968, the respondent brought suit for damages against the
petitioner in federal district court. The respondent's delay in
suing the petitioner ultimately brought his case to this Court.
The issue presented is whether the respondent's action is
time-barred and, more particularly, whether state or federal law
determines the timeliness of the action. That issue must be
resolved under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462,
43 U.S.C. § 1331
et seq. (hereinafter "Lands Act"), which
governs injuries occurring
Page 404 U. S. 99
on fixed structures on the Outer Continental Shelf. When this
lawsuit was initiated, there was a line of federal court decisions
interpreting the Lands Act to make general admiralty law, including
the equitable doctrine of laches, applicable to personal injury
suits such as the respondent's. [
Footnote 1] The petitioner did not question the timeliness
of the action as a matter of laches. While pretrial discovery
proceedings were still under way, however, this Court announced its
decision in
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
395 U. S. 352.
That decision entirely changed the complexion of this case. For it
established that the Lands Act does not make admiralty law
applicable to actions such as this one. Relying on
Rodrigue, the District Court held that Louisiana's
one-year limitation on personal injury actions, rather than the
admiralty doctrine of laches, must govern this case. It concluded
therefore, that the respondent's action was time-barred, and
granted summary judgment for the petitioner. [
Footnote 2]
On appeal, the respondent argued that
Rodrigue should
not be applied retroactively to bar actions filed before the date
of its announcement. [
Footnote
3] But the Court of Appeals declined to reach that question.
Instead, it held that the interpretation of the Lands Act in
Rodrigue does not compel application of the state statute
of limitations or prevent application of the admiralty doctrine of
laches. It concluded that the doctrine of laches should have been
applied by the District Court, and, therefore, reversed that
court's judgment and remanded the case for trial. 430 F.2d 27. We
granted certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals' construction
of the Lands
Page 404 U. S. 100
Act and of
Rodrigue. 402 U.S. 942. We hold that the
Lands Act, as interpreted in
Rodrigue, requires that the
state statute of limitations be applied to personal injury actions.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, on the
ground that
Rodrigue should not be invoked to require
application of the Louisiana time limitation retroactively to this
case.
I
The Lands Act makes the Outer Continental Shelf, including fixed
structures thereon, an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 43
U.S. C. §1333(a)(1). The Act extends the laws of the United States
to this area, 43 U.S. C. §1333(a)(1), and provides that the laws of
the adjacent State shall also apply "[t]o the extent that they are
applicable and not inconsistent" with applicable federal laws, 43
U.S.C. §1333(a)(2). [
Footnote
4] To the extent
Page 404 U. S. 101
that a comprehensive body of federal law is applicable under
§1333(a)(1), state law "inconsistent" with that law would be
inapplicable under §1333(a)(2).
In
Rodrigue, we clarified the scope of application of
federal law and state law under §1333(a)(1) and §1333(a)(2). By
rejecting the view that comprehensive admiralty law remedies apply
under §1333(a)(1), we recognized that there exists a substantial
"gap" in federal law. Thus, state law remedies are not
"inconsistent" with applicable federal law. Accordingly, we held
that, in order to provide a remedy for wrongful death, the "gap"
must be filled with the applicable body of state law under
§1333(a)(2).
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that
Rodrigue clearly
establishes that the remedy for personal injury, as for wrongful
death, cannot be derived from admiralty law, but must be governed
by the law of the adjacent State, Louisiana. But the court held
that Louisiana's time limitation on personal injury actions need
not be applied with the substantive remedy. It supported this
holding by reference to the terms of § 1333(a)(2) that limit the
application of state law under the Lands Act. The Louisiana time
limitation, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is not "applicable" of
its own force, and is "inconsistent" with the admiralty doctrine of
laches. The court held that, despite the holding in
Rodrigue, the laches doctrine is applicable as a matter of
federal common law. We must disagree.
The Court of Appeals did not suggest that state statutes of
limitations are
per se inapplicable under §1333(a)(2).
Rather, it focused on the peculiar nature of
Page 404 U. S. 102
the Louisiana time limitation on personal injury actions found
in Art. 3536, La.Civ.Code Ann. Article 3536 provides that personal
injury actions shall be "prescribed" by one year. The Court of
Appeals attached much significance to the fact that Art. 3536
"prescribes," rather than "perempts," such actions. Under Louisiana
law, "prescription," unlike "peremption," bars the remedy, but does
not formally extinguish the right to recovery.
See Page v.
Cameron Iron Works, 259 F.2d 420, 422-424;
Istre v.
Diamond M. Drilling Co., 226 So. 2d 779, 794-795 (La.App.);
Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 335,
65 So. 2d
783, 786. This characterization has importance under principles
of the conflict of laws. It has been held, as a matter of Louisiana
conflicts law, that mere "prescriptive" time limitations are not
binding outside their own forum.
See Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. C/B Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 50;
Kozan v.
Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 841;
Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling
Co., supra, at 795. Reasoning from this principle of conflicts
law, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "prescriptive"
limitation is not "applicable" in a federal court adjudicating a
claim under the Lands Act.
We hold, however, that the "prescriptive" nature of Art. 3536
does not undercut its applicability under the Lands Act. Under §
1333(a)(2) of the Act, "[s]tate law bec[omes] federal law federally
enforced."
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra, at
395 U. S. 365.
It was the intent of Congress, expressed in the Senate Committee
Report, in the Conference Report, and on the floor of the Senate,
that state laws be "adopted" or "enacted" as federal law.
See
id. at
395 U. S.
357-358. Thus, a federal court applying Louisiana law
under 1333(a)(2) of the Lands Act is applying it as
federal
law -- as the law of the federal forum. Since the federal
court is not, then, applying the law of
another forum
in
Page 404 U. S. 103
the usual sense, ordinary conflict of laws principles have no
relevance. Article 3536 is "applicable" in federal court under the
Lands Act just as it would be applicable in a Louisiana court.
[
Footnote 5]
The policies underlying the federal absorption of state law in
the Lands Act make this result particularly obvious. As we pointed
out in
Rodrigue, Congress recognized that "
the Federal
Code was never designed to be a complete body of law in and of
itself,'" and thus, that a comprehensive body of state law was
needed. Id. at 395 U. S. 358,
395 U. S. 361.
Congress also recognized that the "special relationship between the
men working on these artificial islands and the adjacent shore to
which they commute" favored application of state law with which
these men and their attorneys would be familiar. Id. at
395 U. S. 365;
see id. at 395 U. S. 363.
If Congress' goal was to provide a comprehensive and familiar body
of law, it would defeat that goal to apply only certain aspects of
a state personal injury remedy in federal court. A state time
limitation upon a remedy is coordinated with the substance of the
remedy, and is no less applicable under the Lands Act. [Footnote 6]
The application of Louisiana's Art. 3536 is, of course, subject
to the absence of "inconsistent" and applicable federal law. The
Court of Appeals acknowledged that
Rodrigue forecloses
direct applicability of the "inconsistent" laches doctrine through
admiralty law. But, by applying laches as a matter of federal
common law, it
Page 404 U. S. 104
sought to reintroduce the doctrine through a back door.
[
Footnote 7] This approach
subverts the congressional intent documented in
Rodrigue,
id. at
395 U. S.
359-366, that admiralty doctrines should not apply under
the Lands Act.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' approach amounts to an
inappropriate creation of federal common law. Even when a federal
statute creates a wholly federal right but specifies no particular
statute of limitations to govern actions under the right, the
general rule is to apply the state statute of limitations for
analogous types of actions.
See Auto Workers v. Hoosier
Corp., 383 U. S. 696;
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461;
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610;
Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53
Col.L.Rev. 68 (1953). A special federal statute of limitations is
created, as a matter of federal common law, only when the need for
uniformity is particularly great or when the nature of the federal
right demands a particular sort of statute of limitation.
See
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392;
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.
S. 221. But, under the Lands Act, there is not even such
limited freedom to create a federal statute of limitations, for
Congress specified that a comprehensive body of state law should be
adopted by the federal courts in the absence of existing federal
law. Congress specifically rejected national uniformity and
specifically provided for the application of state remedies which
demand state, not federal, statutes of limitation. Thus, Congress
made clear provision for filling in the "gaps" in federal law; it
did not intend that federal
Page 404 U. S. 105
courts fill in those "gaps" themselves by creating new federal
common law. [
Footnote 8]
II
Although we hold that Louisiana's one-year statute of
limitations must be applied under the Lands Act as interpreted in
Rodrigue, we do not blind ourselves to the fact that this is, in
relevant respect, a pre-
Rodrigue case. The respondent's
injury occurred more than three years before the announcement of
our decision in
Rodrigue. He instituted the present
lawsuit more than one year before
Rodrigue. Yet, if the
Louisiana statute of limitations controls in this case, his action
was time-barred more than two years before
Rodrigue. In
these circumstances, we must consider the respondent's argument
that the state statute of limitations should be given
nonretroactive application under
Rodrigue.
In recent years, the nonretroactive application of judicial
decisions has been most conspicuously considered
Page 404 U. S. 106
in the area of the criminal process.
E.g., Mackey v. United
States, 401 U. S. 667;
Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797;
Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244;
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618. But
the problem is by no means limited to that area. The earliest
instances of nonretroactivity in the decisions of this Court --
more than a century ago -- came in cases of nonconstitutional,
noncriminal state law.
E.g., 68 U. S. City of
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175;
Havemeyer v. Iowa
County, 3 Wall. 294;
Railroad
Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511. [
Footnote 9] It was in a noncriminal case that we
first held that a state court may apply its decisions
prospectively.
Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358.
And, in the last few decades, we have recognized the doctrine of
nonretroactivity outside the criminal area many times, in both
constitutional and nonconstitutional cases.
Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U. S. 701;
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.
S. 544;
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U. S. 481;
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S.
13;
England v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 375 U. S. 411;
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U. S. 371.
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have
generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to
be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law,
either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may
have relied,
see, e.g., Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., supra, at
392 U. S. 496,
or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was
not clearly foreshadowed,
see, e.g., Allen v. State Board of
Elections, supra, at
393 U. S. 572.
Second, it has been stressed that "we must . . . weigh the
merits
Page 404 U. S. 107
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the
rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective
operation will further or retard its operation."
Linkletter v.
Walker, supra, at
381 U. S. 629.
Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive
application, for
"[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial
inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis
in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding
of nonretroactivity."
Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at
395 U. S.
706.
Upon consideration of each of these factors, we conclude that
the Louisiana one-year statute of limitations should not be applied
retroactively in the present case.
Rodrigue was not only a
case of first impression in this Court under the Lands Act, but it
also effectively overruled a long line of decisions by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that admiralty law, including
the doctrine of laches, applies through the Lands Act.
See,
e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60;
Movible
Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870;
Loffland Bros. Co.
v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540. When the respondent was injured, for
the next two years until he instituted his lawsuit, and for the
ensuing year of pretrial proceedings, these Court of Appeals
decisions represented the law governing his case. It cannot be
assumed that he did or could foresee that this consistent
interpretation of the Lands Act would be overturned. The most he
could do was to rely on the law as it then was.
"We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced
has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not
avail themselves of it waived their rights."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12,
351 U. S. 26
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
To hold that the respondent's lawsuit is retroactively
time-barred would be anomalous indeed. A primary purpose underlying
the absorption of state law as federal
Page 404 U. S. 108
law in the Lands Act was to aid injured employees by affording
them comprehensive and familiar remedies.
Rodrigue v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., supra, at
395 U. S. 361,
395 U. S. 365.
Yet retroactive application of the Louisiana statute of limitations
to this case would deprive the respondent of any remedy whatsoever
on the basis of superseding legal doctrine that was quite
unforeseeable. To abruptly terminate this lawsuit that has
proceeded through lengthy and, no doubt, costly discovery stages
for a year would surely be inimical to the beneficent purpose of
the Congress.
It would also produce the most "substantial inequitable
results,"
Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at
395 U. S. 706,
to hold that the respondent "slept on his rights" at a time when he
could not have known the time limitation that the law imposed upon
him. In
Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, we invoked the
doctrine of nonretroactive application to protect property
interests of "cities, bondholders, and others connected with
municipal utilities"; and, in
Allen v. State Board of
Elections, supra, we invoked the doctrine to protect elections
held under possibly discriminatory voting laws. Certainly, the
respondent's potential redress for his allegedly serious injury --
an injury that may significantly undercut his future earning power
-- is entitled to similar protection. As in
England v. State
Board of Medical Examiners, supra, nonretroactive application
here simply preserves his right to a day in court. [
Footnote 10]
Page 404 U. S. 109
Both a devotion to the underlying purpose of the Lands Act's
absorption of state law and a weighing of the equities requires
nonretroactive application of the state statute of limitations
here. Accordingly, although holding that the opinion of the Court
of Appeals reflects a misapprehension of
Rodrigue, we
affirm its judgment remanding this case to the trial court.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See infra at
404 U. S.
107.
[
Footnote 2]
The decision of the District Court is unreported (ED La., Civil
Action No. 68-19D).
[
Footnote 3]
The respondent has made the same argument to this Court.
[
Footnote 4]
The full text of §1333(a)(1) and §1333(a)(2) reads:
"(a)(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands
and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose
of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources
therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State:
Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer
Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the
provisions of this subchapter."
"(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of
the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and
criminal laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953, are
declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial
islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within
the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to
the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President
shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such projected
lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such
applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the
appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State
taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf."
[
Footnote 5]
This is not to imply that a federal court adjudicating a claim
under state law as absorbed in the Lands Act must function as it
would in a diversity case.
See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64;
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S.
99;
Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.
S. 648,
345 U. S. 651.
We hold only that the state statute of limitations is part of the
law to be applied in federal court as it would be part of the law
to be applied in a state court.
[
Footnote 6]
Here we are not dealing with mere "housekeeping rules" embodied
in state law.
Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.
S. 460,
380 U. S.
473.
[
Footnote 7]
The Court of Appeals justified its creation of federal common
law in this instance by suggesting that personal injury actions
under the Lands Act are in a "
quasi-maritime area which is
traditionally imbued with the laches doctrine and which presents a
strong federal urge toward uniformity." 430 F.2d at 32.
[
Footnote 8]
Contrary to the suggestion by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, our holding
today is consonant with
Levinson v. Deupree, supra,
n 5. Since
Levinson
involved a federal court's obligation to adopt state procedural
rules in an admiralty action, it has very limited relevance to the
instant case, which involves an action under a statute which ousts
admiralty law and specifically directs that state law shall be
adopted as federal law. Moreover,
Levinson held only that
state "procedural niceties relating to amendments of pleadings"
need not be applied by federal admiralty courts, and the opinion
emphasized that it was not dealing with an important part of the
state action, such as a statute of limitations. 345 U.S. at
345 U. S.
651-652. As pointed out above, our holding today does
not extend to such state "housekeeping rules."
See
n 6,
supra.
Richards v. United States, 369 U. S.
1, also referred to by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, held that,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a federal court must apply "the
whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred."
Id. at
369 U. S. 11.
Insofar as
Richards bears on the present case, it supports
our holding that federal courts should not create interstitial
federal common law when the Congress ha directed that a whole body
of state law shall apply.
[
Footnote 9]
These cases were decided in the era before
Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, supra, n 5. The
first case involving nonretroactive application of state law
concerned interpretation of the Mississippi Constitution.
Rowan v.
Runnels, 5 How. 134.
[
Footnote 10]
We do
not hold here that
Rodrigue, in its
entirety, must be applied nonretroactively. Rather, we hold only
that state statutes of limitations, applicable under
Rodrigue's interpretation of the Lands Act, should not be
applied retroactively. Retroactive application of all state
substantive remedies under
Rodrigue would not work a
comparable hardship or be so inconsistent with the purpose of the
Lands Act.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS.
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
395 U. S. 352,
does not, with all respect, require reversal in this case.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
without reaching the question of the retroactivity of
Rodrigue.
Rodrigue, like the present case, arose under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331
et
seq. That Act created a federal cause of action for offshore
injuries enforceable in the federal courts, but made state laws
applicable. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2).
In
Rodrigue, La.Civ.Code Ann., Art. 2315 (1970) was
relevant, which provides in part:
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or
quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a
period of one year from the death of the deceased. . . ."
In the present case, Art. 3536 of the Code is applicable, and it
reads:
"The following actions are also prescribed by one year: "
"That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that
for damages caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi
offenses."
The latter limitation is "prescriptive" only,
i.e.,
that, while the Louisiana remedy is barred, the right is not. Under
Art. 3536, the limitation runs only to the
remedy
Page 404 U. S. 110
and would not be applicable in another forum applying the
substantive right.
Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 226
So. 2d 779, 794-799 (La.App. 1969). Respondent, therefore, argues
that the federal doctrine of laches is the only limitation upon his
right of recovery and that it is inapplicable where, as here, there
is no prejudice to the defendant and any delay in filing the
lawsuit was reasonably excusable.
See, e.g., Akers v. State
Marine Lines, 344 F.2d 217.
The Louisiana courts consider the distinction between
perermptive and prescriptive limitations important, [
Footnote 2/1] and, by reason of the federal
statute making Louisiana law applicable, federal courts are bound
by the distinction.
Richards v. United States,
369 U. S. 1. As
stated in
Rodrigue, the federal Act "supplemented gaps in
the federal law with state law through the
adoption of State
law as the law of the United States.'" 395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
357.
In
Rodrigue -- an action for wrongful death -- the
right is extinguished if the action for recovery is not brought
within a year of the death.
Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349
F.2d 832;
Mejia v. United States, 152 F.2d 686. Under Art.
3536 -- which governs here -- Louisiana law holds that it is merely
a "procedural restraint which bars the remedy, but does not
extinguish the right."
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. C/B Mr.
Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 50 (CA5 1965).
See also Page v. Cameron
Iron Works, 259 F.2d 420, 422 (CA5 1958);
Jackson v.
Continental
Page 404 U. S. 111
Southern Lines, 172 F.
Supp. 809 (WD Ark.1959);
Succession of Pizzillo, 223
La. 328, 6 So. 2d 783 (1953);
Devoe & Raynolds Co. v.
Robinson, 109 So. 2d 226 (La.App. 1959).
A district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction in Arkansas,
applied these principles of Louisiana law and held -- properly in
my mind -- that Art. 3536 did not bar an action filed more than one
year after the injury complained of
Jackson v. Continental
Southern Lines, supra. See also Page v. Cameron Iron
Works, supra. That decision is in perfect harmony with
long-established rules of conflict of laws. [
Footnote 2/2] A different result
Page 404 U. S. 112
should not obtain here where federal jurisdiction, 43 U.S.C. §
1333, flows from a head other than diversity.
Apart from traditional conflict of laws is the congressional
mandate to apply state laws to these federal causes of action. If
we are faithfully to apply the state law of Louisiana we would
apply here not the Louisiana
peremption rule applied in
Rodrigue, but the Louisiana
prescriptive rule
applicable to the instant personal injury case.
Today's decision conflicts with
Levinson v. Deupree,
345 U. S. 648,
where the District Court was enforcing in admiralty a state cause
of action for wrongful death. Although procedural irregularities in
the appointment of the administrator would have barred -- under the
State statute of limitations -- an action in state court, we held
that federal courts were free to formulate their own procedural
rules. If we were to follow
Levinson, we would not bind
federal courts to state rules of procedure designed to have no
application beyond the state forum for which they were created.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Cf. 356 U.
S. Blue Ridge
Page 404 U. S. 113
Electric Cooperative, 356 U. S. 525,
356 U. S.
533-539;
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.
S. 183,
330 U. S. 192;
Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co., 435 F.2d 527
(CA4;970); Note, 71 Col.L.Rev. 865 (1971).
Today's decision also conflicts with our decision in
Richards v. United States, supra. There, the Federal Tort
Claims Act referred us to the local law for a rule of decision,
just as
Rodrigue and the Lands Act do in the present case.
We concluded that the Act "require[d] application of the whole law
of the State where the act or omission occurred," 369 U.S. at
369 U. S. 11,
including its conflict of laws decision. [
Footnote 2/4] If we were to follow
Richards and
Rodrigue in the present case, we would apply
Louisiana's
Page 404 U. S. 114
prescriptive rule as it has been construed by Louisiana courts
and not use it to bar an action in a different forum.
For in that other forum -- here, the federal district court --
Louisiana law allows the federal court, consistently with conflict
of laws, to apply a different limitation than Louisiana would apply
in her own courts.
In
Rodrigue, we said:
"The purpose of the Lands Act was to define a body of law
applicable to the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed structures
such as those in question here on the outer Continental Shelf. That
this law was to be federal law of the United States, applying state
law only as federal law and then only when not inconsistent with
applicable federal law, is made clear by the language of the
Act."
395 U.S. at
395 U. S.
355-356.
We then concluded:
"It is evident from this that federal law is 'exclusive' in its
regulation of this area, and that state law is adopted only as
surrogate federal law."
Id. at
395 U. S.
357.
Since the federal court is not a Louisiana forum, [
Footnote 2/5] the Louisiana law of
prescription permits enforcement of this claim after
Louisiana's one-year statute has run. [
Footnote 2/6] Therefore, if we are to be faithful to the
federal scheme, we must apply Louisiana law, and Louisiana law
would
Page 404 U. S. 115
not apply
Rodrigue in a personal injury case where the
suit is not brought in a Louisiana forum.
The Court of Appeals, speaking through our leading admiralty
authority, Judge Brown, so held and went on to rule that in harmony
with Louisiana's
prescriptive rule this personal injury
suit was not barred under the laches doctrine familiar to maritime
law.
This is not a stale claim and its assertion after the one-year
period ran was not prejudicial; no prejudice was indeed pleaded.
Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392.
One who reads this record will be impressed with the grave
injustice of applying the Louisiana one-year statute as if it were
peremptive, rather than
prescriptive. Death comes
with a finality lacking in some personal injury cases; and the
rigid rule applied in
Rodrigue can do no injustice. But
personal injuries are often lingering and one may not know for
months whether he is partially or permanently crippled, whether he
must be retrained for wholly different work, and so on. In this
case, it took some months after the injury for respondent (1) to
realize that he could not return to his old work, and (2) to
discover the kind of work he could do.
If we followed Louisiana law, as Congress directed, we would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reflecting as it does
good law and a measure of justice not always allowable when the
rigidity of
Rodrigue governs a case.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Guillory v. Avoyelles R. Co., 104 La. 11, 15, 28 So.
899, 901 (1900).
"When a statute creates a right of action and stipulates the
delay within which that right is to be executed, the delay thus
fixed is not properly speaking one of prescription, but is one of
peremption."
"Statutes of prescription simply bar the remedy. Statutes of
peremption destroy the cause of action itself. That is to say,
after the limit of time expires, the cause of action no longer
exists; it is lost."
[
Footnote 2/2]
G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 146-147 (3d
ed.1963):
"The traditional reaction in Conflict of Laws . . . has been
that ordinarily, limitation is procedural. This view was taken by
the Dutch jurists, and, where the question arises out of a general
statute, it is the view generally accepted by Anglo-American
courts. The result is that, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary in most jurisdictions, when the claim is based upon
foreign facts, even though the foreign period of limitation has not
run, the plaintiff may not recover if the time allowed for suit at
the forum has expired. Conversely, if the foreign period has
expired, suit may nevertheless be brought at the forum if the time
specified there has not run."
(Footnotes omitted.)
Accord, Restatement of Conflict of
Laws §§ 603-604 (1934); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§
142, 143 (1971); 3 J. Beale, Conflict of Laws § 584.1 (1935); B.
Currie, Conflict of Laws 232-234, 255 (1963); A. Ehrenzweig,
Conflict of Laws 428-436 (1962); H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 267
(4th ed.1964); Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of
Laws, 31 Mich.L.Rev. 474 (1933); Comment, The Statute of
Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919).
While still sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Mr. Justice Harlan said:
"In actions where the rights of the parties are grounded upon
the law of jurisdictions other than the forum; it is a well settled
conflict of laws rule that the forum will apply the foreign
substantive law, but will follow its own rules of procedure."
Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154
(CA2 1955).
Mr. Justice Harlan went on to hold that a Panamanian statute of
limitations was not applicable where a Panamanian statutory right
was being enforced under the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal
District Court.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The majority supports it limitation on actions by saying
that
"we are not dealing with mere 'housekeeping rules' embodied in
state law.
Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S.
460,
380 U. S. 473."
Ante at
404 U. S. 103
n. 6. This conclusion, however, is directly contrary to the
characterization given the prescriptive limitation by Louisiana
courts:
". . . It is conceded by the five defendants appellees that had
plaintiff filed this suit in the federal court, the doctrine of
laches would apply. The cases cited by plaintiff . . . were filed
in the federal forum and are distinguished on this basis."
"But plaintiff chose the State forum. Plaintiff may have
preferred some procedural advantages afforded in the State court,
such as: agreement of only nine of twelve jurors needed; ability to
call under cross-examination any employee of a party as opposed to
the federal rule wherein the right to call witnesses under
cross-examination is limited to executive or top supervisory
personnel; no procedural vehicle provided for directed verdict or
judgment
n.o.v. in State court; or shorter delay in State
court between filing petition and trial. Having chosen the State
forum, he is bound by State procedural rules. The argument that
uniformity requires us to import the Federal procedural law of
laches rather, than use the Louisiana procedural law of
prescription, is unacceptable. If we adopt the federal procedural
rule in this instance, it would logically follow that more
Louisiana procedural rules will, for the same reason, be abandoned
in the future. We hold that our State courts are bound to apply
State procedural rules."
Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 226 So. 2d 779,
794.
The court then concluded, "The applicable Louisiana prescription
statute, LSA-C.C. Art. 3536, is procedural."
Id. at
794-795.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The majority would limit Richards' reasoning
"that federal courts should not create interstitial federal
common law when the Congress has directed that a whole body of
state law shall apply."
Ante at
404 U. S. 105
n. 8. It is precisely because we must apply the "whole body" of
state law, however, that we should apply the Louisiana
interpretation of that law and not use the prescriptive rule to bar
an action in a federal forum. H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 456-457 (1953).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The majority acknowledges that the federal court still retains
its identity as a federal forum when it indicates that it is not to
"function as it would in a diversity case,"
ante at
404 U. S. 103
n. 5, and that only certain state rules are adopted,
ante
at
404 U. S. 103
n. 6.
[
Footnote 2/6]
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318,
does not require a contrary result, because there, we considered
only whether Art. 3536 could be applied to a federal action in a
federal court, and not how it should be applied. Petitioner
conceded that his action was barred if Art. 3536 applied, and
"the sole question pressed by counsel and which we [were] called
upon to decide [was] the application of the state statute to the
conceded [federal] cause of action."
Id. at
233 U. S.
321.