A mandatory provision of the Idaho probate code that gives
preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement
class apply for appointment as administrator of a decedent' estate
is based solely on a discrimination prohibited by and therefore
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635, reversed and remanded.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Richard Lynn Reed, a minor, died intestate in Ada County, Idaho,
on March 29, 1967. His adoptive parents, who had separated sometime
prior to his death, are the parties to this appeal. Approximately
seven months after Richard's death, his mother, appellant Sally
Reed, filed a petition in the Probate Court of Ada County,
Page 404 U. S. 72
seeking appointment as administratrix of her son's estate.
[
Footnote 1] Prior to the date
set for a hearing on the mother's petition, appellee Cecil Reed,
the father of the decedent, filed a competing petition seeking to
have himself appointed administrator of the son's estate. The
probate court held a joint hearing on the two petitions and
thereafter ordered that letters of administration be issued to
appellee Cecil Reed upon his taking the oath and filing the bond
required by law. The court treated §§ 15-312 and 15-314 of the
Idaho Code as the controlling statutes, and read those sections as
compelling a preference for Cecil Reed because he was a male.
Section 15-312 [
Footnote 2]
designates the persons who are entitled to administer the estate of
one who dies intestate. In making these designations, that section
lists 11 classes of persons who are so entitled, and provides, in
substance,
Page 404 U. S. 73
that the order in which those classes are listed in the section
shall be determinative of the relative rights of competing
applicants for letters of administration. One of the 11 classes so
enumerated is "[t]he father or mother" of the person dying
intestate. Under this section, then, appellant and appellee, being
members of the same entitlement class, would seem to have been
equally entitled to administer their son's estate. Section 1314
provides, however, that
"[o]f several persons claiming and equally entitled [under §
1312] to administer, males must be preferred to females, and
relatives of the whole to those of the half blood."
In issuing its order, the probate court implicitly recognized
the equality of entitlement of the two applicants under § 15-312,
and noted that neither of the applicants was under any legal
disability; the court ruled, however, that appellee, being a male,
was to be preferred to the female appellant "by reason of Section
15-314 of the Idaho Code." In stating this conclusion, the probate
judge gave no indication that he had attempted to determine the
relative capabilities of the competing applicants to perform the
functions incident to the administration of an estate. It seems
clear the probate judge considered himself bound by statute to give
preference to the male candidate over the female, each being
otherwise "equally entitled."
Sally Reed appealed from the probate court order, and her appeal
was treated by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
of Idaho as a constitutional attack on § 15-314. In dealing with
the attack, that court held that the challenged section violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [
Footnote 3] and was, therefore,
Page 404 U. S. 74
void; the matter was ordered "returned to the Probate Court for
its determination of which of the two parties" was better qualified
to administer the estate.
This order was never carried out, however, for Cecil Reed took a
further appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed the
District Court and reinstated the original order naming the father
administrator of the estate. In reaching this result, the Idaho
Supreme Court first dealt with the governing statutory law and held
that, under § 15-312 "a father and mother are
equally entitled'
to letters of administration," but the preference given to males by
§ 15-314 is "mandatory" and leaves no room for the exercise of a
probate court's discretion in the appointment of administrators.
Having thus definitively and authoritatively interpreted the
statutory provisions involved, the Idaho Supreme Court then
proceeded to examine, and reject, Sally Reed's contention that §
15-314 violates the Equal Protection Clause by giving a mandatory
preference to males over females, without regard to their
individual qualifications as potential estate administrators. 93
Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635.
Sally Reed thereupon appealed for review by this Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 401
U.S. 934. Having examined the record and considered the briefs and
oral arguments of the parties, we have concluded that the arbitrary
preference established in favor of males by § 15-314 of the Idaho
Code cannot stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment's command
that no State deny the equal protection of the laws to any person
within its jurisdiction. [
Footnote
4]
Page 404 U. S. 75
Idaho does not, of course, deny letters of administration to
women altogether. Indeed, under § 15-312, a woman whose spouse dies
intestate has a preference over a son, father, brother, or any
other male relative of the decedent. Moreover, we can judicially
notice that, in this country, presumably due to the greater
longevity of women, a large proportion of estates, both intestate
and under wills of decedents, are administered by surviving
widows.
Section 15-314 is restricted in its operation to those
situations where competing applications for letters of
administration have been filed by both male and female members of
the same entitlement class established by § 15-312. In such
situations, § 15-314 provides that different treatment be accorded
to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a
classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to
treat different classes of persons in different ways.
Barbier
v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27
(1885);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61 (1911);
Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U. S. 106
(1949);
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners,
394 U. S. 802
(1969). The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does,
however, deny to States the power to legislate that different
treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
Page 404 U. S. 76
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to
the objective of that statute. A classification
"must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.
S. 412,
253 U. S. 415
(1920). The question presented by this case, then, is whether a
difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of
administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective
that is sought to be advanced by the operation of §§ 15-312 and
15-314.
In upholding the latter section, the Idaho Supreme Court
concluded that its objective was to eliminate one area of
controversy when two or more persons, equally entitled under §
15-312, seek letters of administration, and thereby present the
probate court "with the issue of which one should be named." The
court also concluded that, where such persons are not of the same
sex, the elimination of females from consideration
"is neither an illogical nor arbitrary method devised by the
legislature to resolve an issue that would otherwise require a
hearing as to the relative merits . . . of the two or more
petitioning relatives. . . ."
93 Idaho, at 514, 465 P.2d at 638.
Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate courts
by eliminating one class of contests is not without some
legitimacy. The crucial question, however, is whether § 15-314
advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command of
the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that it does not. To give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and whatever may be
Page 404 U. S. 77
said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily
controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be
mandated solely on the basis of sex.
We note finally that, if § 15-314 is viewed merely as a
modifying appendage to § 15-312 and as aimed at the same objective,
its constitutionality is not thereby saved. The objective of §
15-312 clearly is to establish degrees of entitlement of various
classes of persons in accordance with their varying degrees and
kinds of relationship to the intestate. Regardless of their sex,
persons within any one of the enumerated classes of that section
are similarly situated with respect to that objective. By providing
dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly
situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, supra.
The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
In her petition, Sally Reed alleged that her son's estate,
consisting of a few items of personal property and a small savings
account, had an aggregate value of less than $1,000.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 15-312 provides as follows:
"Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must
be granted to some one or more of the persons hereinafter
mentioned, and they are respectively entitled thereto in the
following order: "
"1. The surviving husband or wife or some competent person whom
he or she may request to have appointed."
"2. The children."
"3. The father or mother."
"4. The brothers."
"5. The sisters."
"6. The grandchildren."
"7. The next of kin entitled to share in the distribution of the
estate."
"8. Any of the kindred."
"9. The public administrator."
"10. The creditors of such person at the time of death."
"11. Any person legally competent."
"If the decedent was a member of a partnership at the time of
his decease, the surviving partner must in no case be appointed
administrator of his estate."
[
Footnote 3]
The court also held that the statute violated At. I, § 1, of the
Idaho Constitution.
[
Footnote 4]
We note that § 15-312, set out in
n 2,
supra, appears to give a superior
entitlement to brothers of an intestate (class 4) than is given to
sisters (class 5). The parties now before the Court are not
affected by the operation of § 15-312 in this respect, however, and
appellant has made no challenge to that section.
We further note that, on March 12, 1971 the Idaho Legislature
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, effective July 1, 1972. Idaho
Laws 1971, c. 111, p. 233. On that date, §§ 15-312 and 15-314 of
the present code will, then, be effectively repealed, and there is
in the new legislation no mandatory preference for males over
females as administrators of estates.