The requests of appellants in No. 322 for a jury trial were
denied, and they were adjudged juvenile delinquents under
Pennsylvania law. The State Supreme Court, while recognizing the
applicability to juveniles of certain due process procedural
safeguards, held that there is no constitutional right to a jury
trial in juvenile court. Appellants argue for a right to a jury
trial because they were tried in proceedings "substantially similar
to a criminal trial," and note that the press is generally present
at the trial, and that members of the public also enter the
courtroom. Petitioners in No. 128 were adjudged juvenile
delinquents in North Carolina, where their jury trial requests were
denied, and in proceedings where the general public was
excluded.
Held: A trial by jury is not constitutionally required
in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency
proceeding. Pp.
403 U. S.
540-551,
403 U. S.
553-556.
No. 322, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350, and No. 128, 275 N.C. 517,
169
S.E.2d 879, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concluded that:
1. The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings
is fundamental fairness, as developed by
In re Gault,
387 U. S. 1, and
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358,
which emphasized factfinding procedures, but, in our legal system,
the jury is not a necessary component of accurate factfinding. P.
403 U. S.
543.
2. Despite disappointments, failures, and shortcomings in the
juvenile court procedure, a jury trial is not constitutionally
required in a juvenile court's adjudicative stage. Pp.
403 U. S.
545-550.
(a) The Court has not heretofore ruled that all rights
constitutionally assured to an adult accused are to be imposed in a
juvenile proceeding. P.
403 U. S.
545.
(b) Compelling a jury trial might remake the proceeding into a
fully adversary process, and effectively end the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding. P.
403 U. S.
545.
(c) Imposing a jury trial on the juvenile court system would not
remedy the system's defects, and would not greatly strengthen the
factfinding function. P.
403 U. S.
547.
Page 403 U. S. 529
(d) The States should be free to experiment to achieve the high
promise of the juvenile court concept, and they may install a jury
system; or a juvenile court judge may use an advisory jury in a
particular case. P.
403 U. S.
547.
(e) Many States, by statute or judicial decision, deny a
juvenile a right to jury trial, and the great majority that have
faced that issue since
Gault, supra, and
Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145,
have concluded that the considerations involved in those cases do
not compel trial by jury in juvenile court. Pp.
403 U. S.
548-549.
(f) Jury trial would entail delay, formality, and clamor of the
adversary system, and possibly a public trial. P.
403 U. S.
550.
(g) Equating the adjudicative phase of the juvenile proceeding
with a criminal trial ignores the aspects of fairness, concern,
sympathy, and paternal attention inherent in the juvenile court
system. P.
403 U. S.
550.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concluded that:
Due process in juvenile delinquency proceedings, which are not
"criminal prosecutions," does not require the States to provide
jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process
adequately protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials
are intended to serve. In the juvenile context, those interests may
be adequately protected by allowing accused individuals to bring
the community's attention to bear upon their trials. Since
Pennsylvania has no statutory bar to public juvenile trials, and
since no claim is made that members of the public were excluded
over appellants' objections, the judgment in No. 322 should be
affirmed. Pp.
403 U. S.
553-556.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the judgments in these cases on
the ground that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally
required of the States, either by the Sixth Amendment or by due
process. P.
403 U. S.
557.
BLACKMUN, J., announced the Court's judgments and delivered an
opinion in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and WHITE, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p.
403 U. S. 551.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in No. 322
and dissenting in No. 128,
post, p.
403 U. S. 553.
HARLAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgments,
post, p.
403 U. S. 557.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACK and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
403 U. S.
557.
Page 403 U. S. 530
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgments of the Court and an
opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR.
JUSTICE WHITE join.
These cases present the narrow but precise issue whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right to
trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court
delinquency proceeding.
Page 403 U. S. 531
I
The issue arises understandably, for the Court, in a series of
cases, already has emphasized due process factors protective of the
juvenile:
1.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596
(1948), concerned the admissibility of a confession taken from a
15-year-old boy on trial for first-degree murder. It was held that,
upon the facts there developed, the Due Process Clause barred the
use of the confession. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in an opinion in which
three other Justices joined, said, "Neither man nor child can be
allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional
requirements of due process of law." 332 U.S. at
332 U. S.
601.
2.
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S.
49 (1962), where a 14-year-old was on trial, is to the
same effect.
3.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.
S. 541 (1966), concerned a 16-year-old charged with
housebreaking, robbery, and rape in the District of Columbia. The
issue was the propriety of the juvenile court's waiver of
jurisdiction "after full investigation," as permitted by the
applicable statute. It was emphasized that the latitude the court
possessed within which to determine whether it should retain or
waive jurisdiction
"assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular
circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and
fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a
'full investigation.'"
383 U.S. at
383 U. S.
553.
4.
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967),
concerned a 15-year-old, already on probation, committed in Arizona
as a delinquent after being apprehended upon a complaint of lewd
remarks by telephone. Mr. Justice Fortas, in writing for the Court,
reviewed the cases just cited and observed,
"Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted
aspects of the subject, they unmistakably
Page 403 U. S. 532
indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."
387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 13. The
Court focused on
"the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether
a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on
his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state
institution"
and, as to this, said that "there appears to be little current
dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role
to play."
Ibid. Kent was adhered to:
"We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile
court adjudication of 'delinquency,' as a requirement which is part
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our
Constitution."
Id. at
387 U. S. 30-31.
Due process, in that proceeding, was held to embrace adequate
written notice; advice as to the right to counsel, retained or
appointed; confrontation; and cross-examination. The privilege
against self-incrimination was also held available to the juvenile.
The Court refrained from deciding whether a State must provide
appellate review in juvenile cases or a transcript or recording of
the hearings.
5.
DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U. S.
28 (1969), presented, by state habeas corpus, a
challenge to a Nebraska statute providing that juvenile court
hearings "shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an
informal manner." However, because that appellant's hearing had
antedated the decisions in
Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U. S. 145
(1968), and
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.
S. 194 (1968), and because
Duncan and
Bloom had been given only prospective application by
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631
(1968), DeBacker's case was deemed an inappropriate one for
resolution of the jury trial issue. His appeal was therefore
dismissed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, in separate
dissents, took the position that a juvenile is entitled to a jury
trial at
Page 403 U. S. 533
the adjudicative stage. MR. JUSTICE BLACK described this as "a
right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal
justice in the English-speaking world," 396 U.S. at
396 U. S. 34,
and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS described it as a right required by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments "where the delinquency charged is
an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime
triable by jury." 396 U.S. at
396 U. S.
35.
6.
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358
(1970), concerned a 12-year-old charged with delinquency for having
taken money from a woman's purse. The Court held that
"the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged,"
397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 364,
and then went on to hold, at
397 U. S. 368,
that this standard was applicable, too, "during the adjudicatory
stage of a delinquency proceeding."
From these six cases --
Haley, Gallegos, Kent, Gault,
DeBacker, and
Winship -- it is apparent that:
1. Some of the constitutional requirements attendant upon the
state criminal trial have equal application to that part of the
state juvenile proceeding that is adjudicative in nature. Among
these are the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to
confrontation and to cross-examination, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. Included also is the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
2. The Court, however, has not yet said that all rights
constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to
be enforced or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency
proceeding. Indeed, the Court specifically has refrained from going
that far:
"We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, or
even of the usual administrative
Page 403 U. S. 534
hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."
Kent, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 562;
Gault, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 30.
3. The Court, although recognizing the high hopes and
aspirations of Judge Julian Mack, the leaders of the Jane Addams
School [
Footnote 1] and the
other supporters of the juvenile court concept, has also noted the
disappointments of the system's performance and experience and the
resulting widespread disaffection.
Kent, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S.
555-556;
Gault, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 17-19.
There have been, at one and the same time, both an appreciation for
the juvenile court judge who is devoted, sympathetic, and
conscientious, and a disturbed concern about the judge who is
untrained and less than fully imbued with an understanding approach
to the complex problems of childhood and adolescence. There has
been praise for the system and its purposes, and there has been
alarm over its defects.
4. The Court has insisted that these successive decisions do not
spell the doom of the juvenile court system, or even deprive it of
its "informality, flexibility, or speed."
Winship, 397
U.S. at
397 U. S. 366.
On the other hand, a concern precisely to the opposite effect was
expressed by two dissenters in
Winship. Id. at
397 U. S.
375-376.
II
With this substantial background already developed, we turn to
the facts of the present cases:
No. 322. Joseph McKeiver, then age 16, in May, 1968,
was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods
(felonies under Pennsylvania law, Pa.Stat.Ann., tit. 18, §§ 4704,
4807, and 4817 (1963)) as acts of juvenile
Page 403 U. S. 535
delinquency. At the time of the adjudication hearing, he was
represented by counsel. [
Footnote
2] His request for a jury trial was denied, and his case was
heard by Judge Theodore S. Gutowicz of the Court of Common Pleas,
Family Division, Juvenile Branch, of Philadelphia County,
Pennsylvania. McKeiver was adjudged a delinquent upon findings that
he had violated a law of the Commonwealth. Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 11, §
243(4)(a) (1965). He was placed on probation. On appeal, the
Superior Court affirmed without opinion.
In re McKeiver,
215 Pa.Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969).
Edward Terry, then age 15, in January, 1969, was charged with
assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy
(misdemeanors under Pennsylvania law, Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4708
and 4302 (1963)) as acts of juvenile delinquency. His counsel's
request for a jury trial was denied, and his case was heard by
Judge Joseph C. Bruno of the same Juvenile Branch of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Terry was adjudged a
delinquent on the charges. This followed an adjudication and
commitment in the preceding week for an assault on a teacher. He
was committed, as he had been on the earlier charge, to the Youth
Development Center at Cornwells Heights. On appeal, the Superior
Court affirmed without opinion.
In re Terry, 215 Pa.Super.
762, 255 A.2d 922 (1969).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted leave to appeal in
both cases, and consolidated them. The single question considered,
as phrased by the court, was "whether there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial in juvenile court." The answer, one justice
dissenting, was
Page 403 U. S. 536
in the negative.
In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350
(1970). We noted probable jurisdiction. 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
The details of the McKeiver and Terry offenses are set forth in
Justice Roberts' opinion for the Pennsylvania court, 438 Pa. at
341-342, nn. 1 and 2, 265 A.2d at 351 nn. 1 and 2, and need not be
repeated at any length here. It suffices to say that McKeiver's
offense was his participating with 20 or 30 youths who pursued
three young teenagers and took 25 cents from them; that McKeiver
never before had been arrested and had a record of gainful
employment; that the testimony of two of the victims was described
by the court as somewhat inconsistent and as "weak"; and that
Terry's offense consisted of hitting a police officer with his
fists and with a stick when the officer broke up a boys' fight
Terry and others were watching.
No. 128. Barbara Burrus and approximately 45 other
black children, ranging in age from 11 to 15 years, [
Footnote 3] were the subjects of juvenile
court summonses issued in Hyde County, North Carolina, in January,
1969.
The charges arose out of a series of demonstrations in the
county in late 1968 by black adults and children protesting school
assignments and a school consolidation plan. Petitions were filed
by North Carolina state highway patrolmen. Except for one relating
to James Lambert Howard, the petitions charged the respective
juveniles with willfully impeding traffic. The charge against
Howard was that he willfully made riotous noise and was disorderly
in the O. A. Peay School in Swan Quarter; interrupted and disturbed
the school during its regular sessions; and defaced school
furniture. The acts so
Page 403 U. S. 537
charged are misdemeanors under North Carolina law. N.C.Gen.Stat.
§§ 2174.1 (1965 and Supp. 1969), 14-132(a), 14-273 (1969).
The several cases were consolidated into groups for hearing
before District Judge Hallett S. Ward, sitting as a juvenile court.
The same lawyer appeared for all the juveniles. Over counsel's
objection, made in all except two of the cases, the general public
was excluded. A request for a jury trial in each case was
denied.
The evidence as to the juveniles other than Howard consisted
solely of testimony of highway patrolmen. No juvenile took the
stand or offered any witness. The testimony was to the effect that,
on various occasions, the juveniles and adults were observed
walking along Highway 64 singing, shouting, clapping, and playing
basketball. As a result, there was interference with traffic. The
marchers were asked to leave the paved portion of the highway, and
they were warned that they were committing a statutory offense.
They either refused or left the roadway and immediately returned.
The juveniles and participating adults were taken into custody.
Juvenile petitions were then filed with respect to those under the
age of 16.
The evidence as to Howard was that, on the morning of December
5, he was in the office of the principal of the O. A. Peay School
with 15 other persons while school was in session and was moving
furniture around; that the office was in disarray; that. as a
result. the school closed before noon; and that neither he nor any
of the others was a student at the school or authorized to enter
the principal's office.
In each case, the court found that the juvenile had committed
"an act for which an adult may be punished by law." A custody order
was entered declaring the juvenile a delinquent "in need of more
suitable guardianship" and committing him to the custody of the
County
Page 403 U. S. 538
Department of Public Welfare for placement in a suitable
institution
"until such time as the Board of Juvenile Correction or the
Superintendent of said institution may determine, not inconsistent
with the laws of this State."
The court, however, suspended these commitments and placed each
juvenile on probation for either one or two years conditioned upon
his violating none of the State's laws, upon his reporting monthly
to the County Department of Welfare, upon his being home by 11 p.m.
each evening, and upon his attending a school approved by the
Welfare Director. None of the juveniles has been confined on these
charges.
On appeal, the cases were consolidated into two groups. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.
In re Burrus, 4
N.C.App. 523,
167
S.E.2d 454 (1969);
In re Shelton, 5 N.C.App. 487,
168
S.E.2d 695 (1969). In its turn, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina deleted that portion of the order in each case relating to
commitment, but otherwise affirmed.
In re Burrus, 275 N.C.
517,
169 S.E.2d
879 (1969). Two justices dissented without opinion. We granted
certiorari. 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).
III
It is instructive to review, as an illustration, the substance
of Justice Roberts' opinion for the Pennsylvania court. He
observes, 438 Pa. at 343, 265 A.2d at 352, that, "[f]or over
sixty-five years, the Supreme Court gave no consideration at all to
the constitutional problems involved in the juvenile court area";
that
Gault "is somewhat of a paradox, being both broad and
narrow at the same time"; that it "is broad in that it evidences a
fundamental and far-reaching disillusionment with the anticipated
benefits of the juvenile court system"; that it is narrow because
the court enumerated four due process rights which it held
applicable in juvenile proceedings, but declined to rule on two
other claimed rights,
id. at
Page 403 U. S. 539
344-345, 265 A.2d at 353; that, as a consequence, the
Pennsylvania court was "confronted with a sweeping rationale and a
carefully tailored holding,"
id. at 345, 265 A.2d at 353;
that the procedural safeguards
"
Gault specifically made applicable to juvenile courts
have already caused a significant 'constitutional domestication' of
juvenile court proceedings,"
id. at 346, 265 A.2d at 354; that those safeguards and
other rights, including the reasonable doubt standard established
by
Winship,
"insure that the juvenile court will operate in an atmosphere
which is orderly enough to impress the juvenile with the gravity of
the situation and the impartiality of the tribunal and at the same
time informal enough to permit the benefits of the juvenile system
to operate"
(footnote omitted),
id. at 347, 265 A.2d at 354; that
the
"proper inquiry, then, is whether the right to a trial by jury
is 'fundamental' within the meaning of
Duncan, in the
context of a juvenile court which operates with all of the above
constitutional safeguards,"
id. at 348, 265 A.2d at 354; and that his court's
inquiry turned
"upon whether there are elements in the juvenile process which
render the right to a trial by jury less essential to the
protection of an accused's rights in the juvenile system than in
the normal criminal process."
Ibid.
Justice Roberts then concluded that such factors do inhere in
the Pennsylvania juvenile system: (1) Although realizing that
"faith in the quality of the juvenile bench is not an entirely
satisfactory substitute for due process,"
id. at 348, 265
A.2d at 355, the judges in the juvenile courts "do take a different
view of their role than that taken by their counterparts in the
criminal courts."
Id. at 348, 265 A.2d at 354-355. (2)
While one regrets its inadequacies, "the juvenile system has
available and utilizes much more fully various diagnostic and
rehabilitative services" that are "far superior to those available
in the regular criminal process."
Id. at 348-349,
Page 403 U. S. 540
265 A.2d at 355. (3) Although conceding that the
post-adjudication process "has in many respects fallen far short of
its goals, and its reality is far harsher than its theory," the end
result of a declaration of delinquency "is significantly different
from and less onerous than a finding of criminal guilt," and
"we are not yet convinced that the current practices do not
contain the seeds from which a truly appropriate system can be
brought forth."
(4) Finally,
"of all the possible due process rights which could be applied
in the juvenile courts, the right to trial by jury is the one which
would most likely be disruptive of the unique nature of the
juvenile process."
It is the jury trial that "would probably require substantial
alteration of the traditional practices." The other procedural
rights held applicable to the juvenile process "will give the
juveniles sufficient protection" and the addition of the trial by
jury "might well destroy the traditional character of juvenile
proceedings."
Id. at 349-350, 265 A.2d at 355.
The court concluded,
id. at 350, 265 A.2d at 356, that
it was confident
"that a properly structured and fairly administered juvenile
court system can serve our present societal needs without
infringing on individual freedoms."
IV
The right to an impartial jury "[i]n all criminal prosecutions"
under federal law is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, that requirement has now been imposed upon
the States "in all criminal cases which -- were they to be tried in
a federal court -- would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee." This is because the Court has said it believes "that
trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145,
391 U. S. 149
(1968);
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.
S. 194,
391 U. S.
210-211 (1968).
Page 403 U. S. 541
This, of course, does not automatically provide the answer to
the present jury trial issue, if for no other reason than that the
juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a "criminal
prosecution" within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment,
and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects
merely because it usually has been given the civil label.
Kent, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S. 554;
Gault, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 17,
387 U. S. 49-50;
Winship, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S.
365-366.
Little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to
call the juvenile court proceeding either "civil" or "criminal."
The Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach. Before
Gault was decided in 1967, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against self-incrimination had been imposed upon the state criminal
trial.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964).
So, too, had the Sixth Amendment's rights of confrontation and
cross-examination.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.
S. 400 (1965), and
Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U. S. 415
(1965). Yet the Court did not automatically and peremptorily apply
those rights to the juvenile proceeding. A reading of
Gault reveals the opposite. And the same separate approach
to the standard of proof issue is evident from the carefully
separated application of the standard, first to the criminal trial
and then to the juvenile proceeding, displayed in
Winship.
397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 361
and
397 U. S.
365.
Thus, accepting "the proposition that the Due Process Clause has
a role to play,"
Gault, 387 U.S. at
387 U. S. 13, our
task here with respect to trial by jury, as it was in
Gault with respect to other claimed rights, "is to
ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement."
Id. at
387 U. S.
13-14.
V
The Pennsylvania juveniles' basic argument is that they were
tried in proceedings "substantially similar to a criminal trial."
They say that a delinquency proceeding
Page 403 U. S. 542
in their State is initiated by a petition charging a penal code
violation in the conclusory language of an indictment; that a
juvenile detained prior to trial is held in a building
substantially similar to an adult prison; that, in Philadelphia,
juveniles over 16 are, in fact, held in the cells of a prison; that
counsel and the prosecution engage in plea bargaining; that motions
to suppress are routinely heard and decided; that the usual rules
of evidence are applied; that the customary common law defenses are
available; that the press is generally admitted in the Philadelphia
juvenile courtrooms; that members of the public enter the room;
that arrest and prior record may be reported by the press (from
police sources, however, rather than from the juvenile court
records); that, once adjudged delinquent, a juvenile may be
confined until his majority in what amounts to a prison (
see In
re Bethea, 215 Pa.Super. 75, 76, 257 A.2d 368, 369 (1969),
describing the state correctional institution at Camp Hill as a
"maximum security prison for adjudged delinquents and youthful
criminal offenders"); and that the stigma attached upon delinquency
adjudication approximates that resulting from conviction in an
adult criminal proceeding.
The North Carolina juveniles particularly urge that the
requirement of a jury trial would not operate to deny the supposed
benefits of the juvenile court system; that the system's primary
benefits are its discretionary intake procedure permitting
disposition short of adjudication, and its flexible sentencing
permitting emphasis on rehabilitation; that realization of these
benefits does not depend upon dispensing with the jury; that
adjudication of factual issues, on the one hand, and disposition of
the case, on the other, are very different matters, with very
different purposes; that the purpose of the former is
indistinguishable from that of the criminal trial; that the jury
trial provides an independent protective factor; that
Page 403 U. S. 543
experience has shown that jury trials in juvenile courts are
manageable; that no reason exists why protection traditionally
accorded in criminal proceedings should be denied young people
subject to involuntary incarceration for lengthy periods; and that
the juvenile courts deserve healthy public scrutiny.
VI
All the litigants here agree that the applicable due process
standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by
Gault
and
Winship, is fundamental fairness. As that standard was
applied in those two cases, we have an emphasis on factfinding
procedures. The requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation,
cross-examination, and standard of proof naturally flowed from this
emphasis. But one cannot say that, in our legal system, the jury is
a necessary component of accurate factfinding. There is much to be
said for it, to be sure, but we have been content to pursue other
ways for determining facts. Juries are not required, and have not
been, for example, in equity cases, in workmen's compensation, in
probate, or in deportation cases. Neither have they been generally
used in military trials. In
Duncan, the Court stated,
"We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial -- or
any particular trial -- held before a judge alone is unfair, or
that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he
would be by a jury."
391 U.S. at
391 U. S. 158.
In
DeStefano, for this reason and others, the Court
refrained from retrospective application of
Duncan, an
action it surely would have not taken had it felt that the
integrity of the result was seriously at issue. And in
Williams
v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78
(1970), the Court saw no particular magic in a 12-man jury for a
criminal case, thus revealing that even jury concepts themselves
are not inflexible.
We must recognize, as the Court has recognized before, that the
fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court
Page 403 U. S. 544
proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not
been realized. The devastating commentary upon the system's
failures as a whole, contained in the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 7-9 (1967), reveals the depth
of disappointment in what has been accomplished. Too often, the
juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart, protective,
and communicating figure the system envisaged. [
Footnote 4] The community's unwillingness to
provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the
insufficiency of time devoted, the scarcity of professional help,
the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives, and our general lack
of knowledge all contribute to dissatisfaction with the experiment.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 403 U. S. 545
The Task Force Report, however, also said,
id. at
7,
"To say that juvenile courts have failed to achieve their goals
is to say no more than what is true of criminal courts in the
United States. But failure is most striking when hopes are
highest."
Despite all these disappointments, all these failures, and all
these shortcomings, we conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile
court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement. We
so conclude for a number of reasons:
1. The Court has refrained, in the cases heretofore decided,
from taking the easy way with a flat holding that all rights
constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to be imposed
upon the state juvenile proceeding. What was done in
Gault
and in
Winship is aptly described in
Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 211 Pa.Super. 62, 74, 234 A.2d 9, 15 (1967):
"It is clear to us that the Supreme Court has properly attempted
to strike a judicious balance by injecting procedural orderliness
into the juvenile court system. It is seeking to reverse the trend
[pointed out in
Kent, 383 U.S. at
383 U. S.
556] whereby 'the child receives the worst of both
worlds. . . .'"
2. There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if
required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the
juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an
effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an
intimate, informal protective proceeding.
3. The Task Force Report, although concededly
pre-
Gault, is notable for its not making any
recommendation
Page 403 U. S. 546
that the jury trial be imposed upon the juvenile court system.
This is so despite its vivid description of the system's
deficiencies and disappointments. Had the Commission deemed this
vital to the integrity of the juvenile process, or to the handling
of juveniles, surely a recommendation or suggestion to this effect
would have appeared. The intimations, instead, are quite the other
way. Task Force Report 38. Further, it expressly recommends against
abandonment of the system and against the return of the juvenile to
the criminal courts. [
Footnote
6]
Page 403 U. S. 547
4. The Court specifically has recognized by dictum that a jury
is not a necessary part even of every criminal process that is fair
and equitable.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at
391 U. S.
149-150, n. 14, and
391 U. S.
158.
5. The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system
would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding function,
and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's
assumed ability to function in a unique manner. It would not remedy
the defects of the system. Meager as has been the hoped-for advance
in the juvenile field, the alternative would be regressive, would
lose what has been gained, and would tend once again to place the
juvenile squarely in the routine of the criminal process.
6. The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to
say that, despite disappointments of grave dimensions, it still
does not hold promise, and we are particularly reluctant to say, as
do the Pennsylvania appellants here, that the system cannot
accomplish its rehabilitative goals. So much depends on the
availability of resources, on the interest and commitment of the
public, on willingness to learn, and on understanding as to cause
and effect and cure. In this field, as in so many others, one
perhaps learns best by doing. We are reluctant to disallow the
States to experiment further and to seek in new and different ways
the elusive answers to the problems of the young, and we feel that
we would be impeding that experimentation by imposing the jury
trial. The States, indeed, must go forward. If, in its wisdom, any
State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain
kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system
embracing that feature. That, however, is the State's privilege,
and not its obligation.
7. Of course there have been abuses. The Task Force Report has
noted them. We refrain from saying at this
Page 403 U. S. 548
point that those abuses are of constitutional dimension. They
relate to the lack of resources and of dedication, rather than to
inherent unfairness.
8. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a juvenile court
judge, in a particular case where he feels the need, or when the
need is demonstrated, from using an advisory Jury.
9.
"The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of
states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice
accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in
determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'
Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U. S.
97,
291 U. S. 105 (1934)."
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790,
343 U. S. 798
(1952). It therefore is of more than passing interest that at least
29 States and the District of Columbia by statute deny the juvenile
a right to a jury trial in cases such as these. [
Footnote 7] The same result is achieved in
other
Page 403 U. S. 549
States by judicial decision. [
Footnote 8] In 10 States ,statutes provide for a jury
trial under certain circumstances. [
Footnote 9]
10. Since
Gault and since
Duncan, the great
majority of States, in addition to Pennsylvania and North Carolina,
that have faced the issue have concluded that the considerations
that led to the result in those two cases do not compel trial by
jury in the juvenile court.
In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d
305,
255 N.E.2d
380 (1970);
Bible v. State, ___ Ind. ___,
254 N.E.2d
319 (1970);
Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435
S.W.2d 457 (Ky.1968);
In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255
A.2d 419 (1969);
Hopkins v. Youth Court, 227 So. 2d
282 (Miss.1969);
In re J.W., 106 N.J.Super. 129,
254 A.2d 334 (1969);
In re D., 27
N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627 (1970);
In re Agler, 19 Ohio
St.2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969);
State v. Turner, 253 Ore.
235,
453 P.2d
910 (1969).
See In re Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d
263,
438 P.2d
205 (1968);
McMullen v. Geiger, 184 Neb. 581,
169 N.W.2d
431 (1969). To the contrary are
Peyton v. Nord, 78
N.M. 717,
437 P.2d 716
(1968), and,
semble, Nieves v. United
States, 280 F.
Supp. 994 (SDNY 1968).
11. Stopping short of proposing the jury trial for juvenile
proceedings are the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, § 24(a), approved
in July, 1968, by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws;
Page 403 U. S. 550
the Standard Juvenile Court Act, Art. V, § 19, proposed by the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency (
see W.
Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts 73, Dept. of
H.E.W., Children's Bureau Pub. No. 437-1966); and the Legislative
Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts § 29(a) (Dept. of
H.E.W., Children's Bureau Pub. No. 472-1969).
12. If the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile
court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that
system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial. It is of interest
that these very factors were stressed by the District Committee of
the Senate when, through Senator Tydings, it recommended, and
Congress then approved, as a provision in the District of Columbia
Crime Bill, the abolition of the jury trial in the juvenile court.
S.Rep. No. 91-620, pp. 114 (1969).
13. Finally, the arguments advanced by the juveniles here are,
of course, the identical arguments that underlie the demand for the
jury trial for criminal proceedings. The arguments necessarily
equate the juvenile proceeding -- or at least the adjudicative
phase of it -- with the criminal trial. Whether they should be so
equated is our issue. Concern about the inapplicability of
exclusionary and other rules of evidence, about the juvenile court
judge's possible awareness of the juvenile's prior record and of
the contents of the social file; about repeated appearances of the
same familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation
officers and social workers -- all to the effect that this will
create the likelihood of pre-judgment -- chooses to ignore, it
seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and
of paternal attention that the juvenile court system
contemplates.
Page 403 U. S. 551
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to
be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little
need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate
disillusionment will come one day, but, for the moment, we are
disinclined to give impetus to it.
Affirmed.
* Together with No. 128,
In re Burrus et al., on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, argued December
9-10, 1970.
[
Footnote 1]
See Mr. Justice Fortas' article, Equal Rights -- For
Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 401, 406 (1967).
[
Footnote 2]
At McKeiver's hearing, his counsel advised the court that he had
never seen McKeiver before, and "was just in the middle of
interviewing" him. The court allowed him five minutes for the
interview. Counsel's office, Community Legal Services, however, had
been appointed to represent McKeiver five months earlier. App.
2.
[
Footnote 3]
In North Carolina, juvenile court procedures are provided only
for persons under the age of 16. N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 7A-277 and
7A-278(1) (1969).
[
Footnote 4]
"A recent study of juvenile court judges . . . revealed that
half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had received
no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the
bar."
Task Force Report 7.
[
Footnote 5]
"What emerges, then, is this: in theory, the juvenile court was
to be helpful and rehabilitative rather than punitive. In fact, the
distinction often disappears not only because of the absence of
facilities and personnel, but also because of the limits of
knowledge and technique. In theory, the court's action was to affix
no stigmatizing label. In fact, a delinquent is generally viewed by
employers, schools, the armed services -- by society generally --
as a criminal. In theory, the court was to treat children guilty of
criminal acts in noncriminal ways. In fact, it labels truants and
runaways as junior criminals."
"In theory, the court's operations could justifiably be
informal, its findings and decisions made without observing
ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the
best interest of the child. In fact, it frequently does nothing
more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process
of law -- knowing not what else to do and needing, whether
admittedly or not, to act in the community's interest even more
imperatively than the child's. In theory, it was to exercise its
protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold. In
fact, there is increasing reason to believe that its intervention
reinforces the juvenile's unlawful impulses. In theory, it was to
concentrate on each case the best of current social science
learning. In fact, it has often become a vested interest in its
turn, loathe to cooperate with innovative programs or avail itself
of forward-looking methods."
Task Force Report 9.
[
Footnote 6]
"Nevertheless, study of the juvenile courts does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the time has come to jettison the
experiment and remand the disposition of children charged with
crime to the criminal courts of the country. As trying as are the
problems of the juvenile courts, the problems of the criminal
courts, particularly those of the lower courts, which would fall
heir to much of the juvenile court jurisdiction are even graver;
and the ideal of separate treatment of children is still worth
pursuing. What is required is, rather, a revised philosophy of the
juvenile court based on the recognition that, in the past, our
reach exceeded our grasp. The spirit that animated the juvenile
court movement was fed in part by a humanitarian compassion for
offenders who were children. That willingness to understand and
treat people who threaten public safety and security should be
nurtured, not turned aside as hopeless sentimentality, both because
it is civilized and because social protection itself demands
constant search for alternatives to the crude and limited expedient
of condemnation and punishment. But neither should it be allowed to
outrun reality. The juvenile court is a court of law, charged like
other agencies of criminal justice with protecting the community
against threatening conduct. Rehabilitating offenders through
individualized handling is one way of providing protection, and
appropriately the primary way in dealing with children. But the
guiding consideration for a court of law that deals with
threatening conduct is nonetheless protection of the community. The
juvenile court, like other courts, is therefore obliged to employ
all the means at hand, not excluding incapacitation, for achieving
that protection. What should distinguish the juvenile from the
criminal courts is greater emphasis on rehabilitation, not
exclusive preoccupation with it."
Task Force Report 9.
[
Footnote 7]
Ala.Code, Tit. 13, § 369 (1958); Alaska Stat. § 47.10.070 (Supp.
1970); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 8-229 (1956),
see Ariz.Law, c.
223 (May 19, 1970); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 45-206 (1964); Del.Code Ann.,
Tit. 10, § 1175 (Supp. 1970); Fla.Stat. § 39.09(2) (1965); Ga.Code
Ann. § 24-2420 (Supp. 1970); Hawaii Rev.Stat. § 571-41 (1968);
Idaho Code § 16-1813 (Supp. 1969); Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9-3215 (Supp.
1970); Iowa Code § 232.27 (1971); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 208.060 (1962);
La.Rev.Stat. § 13: 1579 (Supp. 1962); Minn.Stat. § 260.155 subd. 1
(1969); Miss.Code Ann. § 7185-08 (1942); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 211.171(6)
(1969) (equity practice control); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-206.03(2)
(1968); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 62.190(3) (1968); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A: 435
(1952); N.Y.Family Court Act §§ 164 and 165 and Civ.Prac.Law and
Rules § 4101; N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7A-285 (1969); N.D.Cent.Code §
27-16-18 (1960); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2151.35 (Supp. 1970);
Ore.Rev.Stat. § 419.498(1) (1968); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 11, § 247
(1965); S.C.Code Ann. § 15-1095.19 (Supp. 1970); Utah Code Ann. §
55-10-94 (Supp. 1969); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 33, § 651(a) (Supp.
1970); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 13.04.030; D.C.Code § 16-2316(a) (Supp.
1971).
[
Footnote 8]
In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924);
Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923);
In re
Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968);
Commonwealth
v. Pale, 339 Mass. 313, 316,
159
N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959);
In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184
A.2d 449 (1962).
[
Footnote 9]
Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 37-19-24 (Supp. 1965); Kan.Stat.Ann. §
38-808 (Supp. 1969); Mich.Comp.Laws § 712 A. 17 (1948);
Mont.Rev.Codes Ann. § 10-604.1 (Supp. 1969); Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit.
10, § 1110 (Supp. 1970); S.D.Comp.Laws § 26-8-31 (1967);
Tex.Civ.Stat., Art. 2338-1, § 13(b) (Supp. 1970); W.Va.Code Ann. §
49-5-6 (1966); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 48.25(2) (Supp. 1971); Wyo.Stat.Ann.
§ 14-115.24 (Supp. 1971).
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
Although the function of the jury is to find facts, that body is
not necessarily, or even probably, better at the job than the
conscientious judge. Nevertheless, the consequences of criminal
guilt are so severe that the Constitution mandates a jury to
prevent abuses of official power by insuring, where demanded,
community participation in imposing serious deprivations of
liberty, and to provide a hedge against corrupt, biased, or
political justice. We have not, however, considered the juvenile
case a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment, and hence automatically subject to all of the
restrictions normally applicable in criminal cases. The question
here is one of due process of law, and I join the plurality opinion
concluding that the States are not required by that clause to
afford jury trials in juvenile courts where juveniles are charged
with improper acts.
The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have a
will, and are responsible for their actions. A finding of guilt
establishes that they have chosen to engage in conduct so
reprehensible and injurious to others that they must be punished to
deter them and others from crime. Guilty defendants are considered
blameworthy; they are branded and treated as such, however much the
State also pursues rehabilitative ends in the criminal justice
system.
For the most part, the juvenile justice system rests on more
deterministic assumptions. Reprehensible acts by
Page 403 U. S. 552
juveniles are not deemed the consequence of mature and
malevolent choice, but of environmental pressures (or lack of
them), or of other forces beyond their control. Hence, the state
legislative judgment not to stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by
branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy
that punishment is required to deter him or others. Coercive
measures, where employed, are considered neither retribution nor
punishment. Supervision or confinement is aimed at rehabilitation,
not at convincing the juvenile of his error simply by imposing
pains and penalties. Nor is the purpose to make the juvenile
delinquent an object lesson for others, whatever his own merits or
demerits may be. A typical disposition in the juvenile court where
delinquency is established may authorize confinement until age 21,
but it will last no longer, and, within that period, will last only
so long as his behavior demonstrates that he remains an
unacceptable risk if returned to his family. Nor is the
authorization for custody until 21 any measure of the seriousness
of the particular act that the juvenile has performed.
Against this background, and in light of the distinctive purpose
of requiring juries in criminal cases, I am satisfied with the
Court's holding. To the extent that the jury is a buffer to the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor in the criminal law system, the
distinctive intake policies and procedures of the juvenile court
system to a great extent obviate this important function of the
jury . As for the necessity to guard against judicial bias, a
system eschewing blameworthiness and punishment for evil choice is
itself an operative force against prejudice and short-tempered
justice. Nor, where juveniles are involved, is there the same
opportunity for corruption to the juvenile's detriment, or the same
temptation to use the courts for political ends.
Page 403 U. S. 553
Not only are those risks that mandate juries in criminal cases
of lesser magnitude in juvenile court adjudications, but the
consequences of adjudication are less severe than those flowing
from verdicts of criminal guilt. This is plainly so in theory, and,
in practice, there remains a substantial gulf between criminal
guilt and delinquency, whatever the failings of the juvenile court
in practice may be. Moreover, to the extent that current
unhappiness with juvenile court performance rests on
dissatisfaction with the vague and overbroad grounds for
delinquency adjudications, with faulty judicial choice as to
disposition after adjudication, or with the record of
rehabilitative custody, whether institutional or probationary,
these shortcomings are in no way mitigated by providing a jury at
the adjudicative stage.
For me, there remain differences of substance between criminal
and juvenile courts. They are quite enough for me to hold that a
jury is not required in the latter. Of course, there are strong
arguments that juries are desirable when dealing with the young,
and States are free to use juries if they choose. They are also
free, if they extend criminal court safeguards to juvenile court
adjudications, frankly to embrace condemnation, punishment, and
deterrence as permissible and desirable attributes of the juvenile
justice system. But the Due Process Clause neither compels nor
invites them to do so.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment in No. 322 and
dissenting in No. 128.
I agree with the plurality opinion's conclusion that the
proceedings below in these cases were not "criminal prosecutions"
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. For me, therefore, the
question in these cases is whether jury trial is among the
"essentials of due process and fair treatment,"
In re
Gault, 387 U. S. 1,
387 U. S. 30
(1967), required during the adjudication of a charge of delinquency
based
Page 403 U. S. 554
upon acts that would constitute a crime if engaged in by an
adult.
See In re Winship, 397 U.
S. 358,
397 U. S. 359
and n. 1 (1970). This does not, however, mean that the interests
protected by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of jury trial in all
"criminal prosecutions" are of no importance in the context of
these cases. The Sixth Amendment, where applicable, commands that
these interests be protected by a particular procedure, that is,
trial by jury. The Due Process Clause commands not a particular
procedure, but only a result: in my Brother BLACKMUN's words,
"fundamental fairness . . . [in] factfinding." In the context of
these and similar juvenile delinquency proceedings, what this means
is that the States are not bound to provide jury trials on demand
so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the
interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve.
[
Footnote 2/1]
In my view, therefore, the due process question cannot be
decided upon the basis of general characteristics of juvenile
proceedings, but only in terms of the adequacy of a particular
state procedure to "protect the [juvenile] from oppression by the
Government,"
Singer v. United States, 380 U. S.
24,
380 U. S. 31
(1965), and to protect him against "the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145,
391 U. S. 156
(1968).
Examined in this light, I find no defect in the Pennsylvania
cases before us. The availability of trial by jury allows an
accused to protect himself against possible oppression by what is,
in essence, an appeal to the community conscience, as embodied in
the jury that hears
Page 403 U. S. 555
his case. To some extent, however, a similar protection may be
obtained when an accused may, in essence, appeal to the community
at large, by focusing public attention upon the facts of his trial,
exposing improper judicial behavior to public view, and obtaining,
if necessary, executive redress through the medium of public
indignation. Of course, the Constitution, in the context of adult
criminal trials, has rejected the notion that public trial is an
adequate substitute for trial by jury in serious cases. But, in the
context of juvenile delinquency proceedings, I cannot say that it
is beyond the competence of a State to conclude that juveniles who
fear that delinquency proceedings will mask judicial oppression may
obtain adequate protection by focusing community attention upon the
trial of their cases. For, however much the juvenile system may
have failed in practice, its very existence as an ostensibly
beneficent and noncriminal process for the care and guidance of
young persons demonstrates the existence of the community's
sympathy and concern for the young. Juveniles able to bring the
community's attention to bear upon their trials may therefore draw
upon a reservoir of public concern unavailable to the adult
criminal defendant. In the Pennsylvania cases before us, there
appears to be no statutory ban upon admission of the public to
juvenile trials. [
Footnote 2/2]
Appellants themselves, without contradiction, assert that "the
press is generally admitted" to juvenile delinquency proceedings in
Philadelphia. [
Footnote 2/3] Most
important, the record in these
Page 403 U. S. 556
cases is bare of any indication that any person whom appellants
sought to have admitted to the courtroom was excluded. In these
circumstances, I agree that the judgment in No. 322 must be
affirmed.
The North Carolina cases, however, present a different
situation. North Carolina law either permits or requires exclusion
of the general public from juvenile trials. [
Footnote 2/4] In the cases before us, the trial
judge
"ordered the general public excluded from the hearing room and
stated that only officers of the court, the juveniles, their
parents or guardians, their attorney and witnesses would be present
for the hearing,"
In re Burrus, 4 N.C.App. 523, 525,
167
S.E.2d 454, 456 (1969), notwithstanding petitioners' repeated
demand for a public hearing. The cases themselves, which arise out
of a series of demonstrations by black adults and juveniles who
believed that the Hyde County, North Carolina, school system
unlawfully discriminated against black school children, present a
paradigm of the circumstances in which there may be a substantial
"temptation to use the courts for political ends." Opinion of MR.
JUSTICE WHITE,
ante at
403 U. S. 552.
And finally, neither the opinions supporting the judgment nor the
respondent in No. 128 has pointed to any feature of North
Carolina's juvenile proceedings that could substitute for public or
jury trial in protecting the petitioners against misuse of the
judicial process.
Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145,
391 U. S. 188,
391 U. S. 193
(1968) (HARLAN, J., dissenting) (availability of resort to "the
political process"
Page 403 U. S. 557
is an alternative permitting States to dispense with jury
trials). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment in No. 128.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no
juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative
guarantees and protections which would serve the purposes that the
jury serves in the English and American systems."
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145,
391 U. S. 150
n. 14 (1968). This conclusion is, of course, inescapable in light
of our decisions that petty criminal offenses may be tried without
a jury notwithstanding the defendant's request.
E.g., District
of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617
(1937).
[
Footnote 2/2]
The generally applicable statute, Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 11, § 245
(1965), merely provides that juvenile proceedings shall be
"separate" from regular court business. Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 11, §
269 402 (1965), requiring exclusion of the general public from
juvenile hearings, applies only to Allegheny County. Both of the
instant cases were tried in Philadelphia County.
[
Footnote 2/3]
"The judges of the Philadelphia Juvenile Court exercise varying
degrees of control over admission to the courtroom, but the press
is generally admitted. . . ."
Brief for Appellants 9 n. 9.
[
Footnote 2/4]
N.C.Gen.Stat. § 110-24 (1966), in force at the time of these
trials, appears on its face to permit, but not require, such
exclusion, as does identical language in the present statute,
N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7A-285 (1969). The North Carolina Supreme Court, in
the present cases, has read these statutes as a legislative
determination "that a public hearing is [not] in the best interest
of the youthful offender."
In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517,
530,
169
S.E.2d 879, 887 (1969).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the judgments.
If I felt myself constrained to follow
Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145
(1968), which extended the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial to
the States, I would have great difficulty, upon the premise
seemingly accepted in my Brother BLACKMUN's opinion, in holding
that the jury trial right does not extend to state juvenile
proceedings. That premise is that juvenile delinquency proceedings
have, in practice, actually become, in many, if not all, respects,
criminal trials.
But see my concurring and dissenting
opinion in
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1,
387 U. S. 65
(1967). If that premise be correct, then I do not see why, given
Duncan, juveniles as well as adults would not be
constitutionally entitled to jury trials, so long as juvenile
delinquency systems are not restructured to fit their original
purpose. When that time comes, I would have no difficulty in
agreeing with my Brother BLACKMUN, and indeed with my Brother
WHITE, the author of
Duncan, that juvenile delinquency
proceedings are beyond the pale of
Duncan.
I concur in the judgments in these cases, however, on the ground
that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of the
States, either as a matter of Sixth Amendment law or due process.
See my concurring and dissenting opinion in
Duncan and my separate opinion in
Williams v.
Florida, 399 U. S. 78,
399 U.S. 118-119
(1970).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL concur, dissenting.
These cases from Pennsylvania and North Carolina present the
issue of the right to a jury trial for offenders charged in
juvenile court and facing a possible incarceration
Page 403 U. S. 558
until they reach their majority. I believe the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, require a jury trial.
In the Pennsylvania cases, one of the appellants was charged
with robbery (Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4704 (1963)), larceny
(Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4807), and receiving stolen goods
(Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4817) as acts of juvenile delinquency.
Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 11, § 246 (1965). He was found a delinquent, and
placed on probation. The other appellant was charged with assault
and battery on a police officer (Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4708) and
conspiracy (Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4302) as acts of juvenile
delinquency. On a finding of delinquency, he was committed to a
youth center. Despite the fact that the two appellants, aged 15 and
16, would face potential incarceration until their majority,
Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 11, § 250, they were denied a jury trial.
In the North Carolina cases, petitioners are students, from 11
to 15 years of age, who were charged under one of three criminal
statutes: (1) "disorderly conduct" in a public building,
N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-132 (1969); (2) "willful" interruption or
disturbance of a public or private school, N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-273;
or (3) obstructing the flow of traffic on a highway or street,
N.C.Gen.Stat. § 20-174.1 (1965 and Supp. 1969).
Conviction of each of these crimes would subject a person,
whether juvenile or adult, to imprisonment in a state institution.
In the case of these students, the possible term was six to 10
years; it would be computed for the period until an individual
reached the age of 21. Each asked for a jury trial, which was
denied. The trial judge stated that the hearings were juvenile
hearings, not criminal trials. But the issue in each case was
whether
Page 403 U. S. 559
they had violated a state criminal law. The trial judge found in
each case that the juvenile had committed "an act for which an
adult may be punished by law," and held in each case that the acts
of the juvenile violated one of the criminal statutes cited above.
The trial judge thereupon ordered each juvenile to be committed to
the state institution for the care of delinquents and then placed
each on probation for terms from 12 to 24 months.
We held in
In re Gault, 387 U. S.
1,
387 U. S. 13,
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone." As we noted in that case, the Juvenile Court
movement was designed to avoid procedures to ascertain whether the
child was "guilty" or "innocent," but to bring to bear on these
problems a "clinical" approach.
Id. at
387 U. S. 15,
387 U. S. 16. It
is, of course, not our task to determine as a matter of policy
whether a "clinical" or "punitive" approach to these problems
should be taken by the States. But where a State uses its juvenile
court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and to
order "confinement" until the child reaches 21 years of age, or,
where the child, at the threshold of the proceedings, faces that
prospect, then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as
an adult. As MR. JUSTICE BLACK said in
In re Gault, supra,
at
387 U. S. 61
(concurring):
"Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State,
charged, and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and then
ordered by the State to be confined for six years, I think the
Constitution requires that he be tried in accordance with the
guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly
this would be true of an adult defendant, and it would be a plain
denial of equal protection of the laws -- an invidious
discrimination
Page 403 U. S. 560
-- to hold that others subject to heavier punishments could,
because they are children, be denied these same constitutional
safeguards."
Just as courts have sometimes confused delinquency with crime,
so have law enforcement officials treated juveniles not as
delinquents, but as criminals. As noted in the President's Crime
Commission Report:
"In 1965, over 100,000 juveniles were confined in adult
institutions. Presumably most of them were there because no
separate juvenile detention facilities existed. Nonetheless, it is
clearly undesirable that juveniles be confined with adults."
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 179 (1967). Even when
juveniles are not incarcerated with adults, the situation may be no
better. One Pennsylvania correctional institution for juveniles is
a brick building with barred windows, locked steel doors, a cyclone
fence topped with barbed wire, and guard towers. A former juvenile
judge described it as "a maximum security prison for adjudged
delinquents."
In re Bethea, 215 Pa.Super. 75, 76, 257 A.2d
368, 369.
In the present cases, imprisonment or confinement up to 10 years
was possible for one child, and each faced at least a possible
five-year incarceration. No adult could be denied a jury trial in
those circumstances.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145,
391 U. S. 162.
The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes trial by jury provided in the
Sixth Amendment applicable to the States, speaks of denial of
rights to "any person," not denial of rights to "any adult person,"
and we have held, indeed, that, where a juvenile is charged with an
act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, he is
entitled to be tried under a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358.
Page 403 U. S. 561
In
DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U. S.
28,
396 U. S. 33,
396 U. S. 35,
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and I dissented from a refusal to grant a
juvenile, who was charged with forgery, a jury trial merely because
the case was tried before
Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U. S. 145, was
decided. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, after noting that a juvenile being
charged with a criminal act was entitled to certain constitutional
safeguards,
viz., notice of the issues, benefit of
counsel, protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and
confrontation of the witnesses against him, added:
"I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the
Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of
those rights and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is
surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the
English-speaking world."
396 U.S. at
396 U. S.
34.
I added that, by reason of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the juvenile is entitled to a jury trial
"as a matter of right where the delinquency charged is an
offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable
by jury. Such is this case, for behind the facade of delinquency is
the crime of forgery."
Id. at
396 U. S.
35.
Practical aspects of these problems are urged against allowing a
jury trial in these cases.* They have been
Page 403 U. S. 562
answered by Judge De Ciantis of the Family Court of Providence,
Rhode Island, in a case entitled
In the Matter of McCloud,
decided January 15, 1971. A juvenile was charged with the rape of a
17-year-old female, and Judge De Ciantis granted a motion for a
jury trial in an opinion, a part of which I have attached as an
403
U.S. 528app|>appendix to this dissent. He there concludes
that "the real traumatic" experience of incarceration without due
process is "the feeling of being deprived of basic rights." He
adds:
"The child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly, and not
merely expediently or as speedily as possible, will be a better
prospect for rehabilitation. Many of the children who come before
the court come from broken homes, from the ghettos; they often
suffer from low self-esteem; and their behavior is frequently a
symptom of their own feelings of inadequacy. Traumatic experiences
of denial of basic rights only accentuate the past deprivation and
contribute to the problem. Thus, a general societal attitude of
acceptance of the juvenile as a person entitled to the same
protection as an adult may be the true beginning of the
rehabilitative process. "
Page 403 U. S. 563
Judge De Ciantis goes on to say that "[t]rial by jury will
provide the child with a safeguard against being prejudged" by a
judge who may well be prejudiced by reports already submitted to
him by the police or caseworkers in the case. Indeed, the child,
the same as the adult, is in the category of those described in the
Magna Carta:
"No freeman may be . . . imprisoned . . . except by the lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."
These cases should be remanded for trial by jury on the criminal
charges filed against these youngsters.
* The Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia and
the Neighborhood Legal Services Program of Washington, D.C., have
filed a brief
amici in which the results of a survey of
jury trials in delinquency cases in the 10 States requiring jury
trials plus the District of Columbia are set forth. The cities
selected were mostly large metropolitan areas. Thirty juvenile
courts processing about 75,000 juvenile cases a year were
canvassed:
"[W]e discovered that, during the past five and a half years, in
22 out of 26 courts surveyed, cumulative requests for jury trials
totaled 15 or less. In the remaining five courts in our sample,
statistics were unavailable. During the same period, in 26 out of
29 courts the cumulative number of jury trials actually held
numbered 15 or less, with statistics unavailable for two courts in
our sample. For example, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, counsel is present in
100% of delinquency cases, but only one jury trial has been
requested and held during the past five and one-half years. In the
Juvenile Court of Fort Worth, Texas, counsel is also present in
100% of the cases, and only two jury trials have been requested
since 1967. The Juvenile Court in Detroit, Michigan, reports that
counsel is appointed in 70-80% of its delinquency cases, but, thus
far in 1970, it has had only four requests for a jury. Between 1965
and 1969, requests for juries were reported as 'very few.'"
"In only four juvenile courts in our sample has there clearly
been a total during the past five and one-half years of more than
15 jury trial requests and/or more than 15 such trials held."
The four courts showing more than 15 requests for jury trials
were Denver, Houston, Milwaukee, and Washington, D.C.
|
403
U.S. 528app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING
De Ciantis, J.: The defendant, who will hereinafter be referred
to as a juvenile, on the sixth day of September, 1969, was charged
with Rape upon a female child, seventeen years old, in violation of
Title 11, Chapter 37, Section 1, of the General Laws of 1956.
* * * *
TRAUMA
The fact is that the procedures which are now followed in
juvenile cases are far more traumatic than the potential experience
of a jury trial. Who can say that a boy who is arrested and
handcuffed, placed in a lineup, transported in vehicles designed to
convey dangerous criminals, placed in the same kind of a cell as an
adult, deprived of his freedom by lodging him in an institution
where he is subject to be transferred to the state's prison and in
the "hole" has not undergone a traumatic experience?
The experience of a trial with or without a jury is meant to be
impressive and meaningful. The fact that a juvenile realizes that
his case will be decided by twelve
Page 403 U. S. 564
objective citizens would allow the court to retain its
meaningfulness without causing any more trauma than a trial before
a judge who perhaps has heard other cases involving the same
juvenile in the past, and may be influenced by those prior
contacts. To agree that a jury trial would expose a juvenile to a
traumatic experience is to lose sight of the real traumatic
experience of incarceration without due process. The real traumatic
experience is the feeling of being deprived of basic rights. [In]
In the matter of Reis, [Footnote
3/1] this Court indicated the inadequacies of the
procedure under which our court operates. A judge who receives
facts of a case from the police and approves the filing of a
petition based upon those facts may be placed in the untenable
position of hearing a charge which he has approved. His duty is to
adjudicate on the evidence introduced at the hearing and not be
involved in any pre-adjudicatory investigation.
It is contrary to the fundamental principles of due process for
the court to be compelled, as it is in this state, to act as a
one-man grand jury, then sit in judgment on its own determination
arising out of the facts and proceedings which he conducted. This
responsibility belongs with a jury.
BACKLOG
An argument has been made that to allow jury trials would cause
a great backlog of cases, and, ultimately, would impair the
functioning of the juvenile court. The fact, however, is that there
is no meaningful evidence that granting the right to jury trials
will impair the function of the court. Some states permit jury
trials in all juvenile court cases; few juries have been demanded,
and there is no suggestion from these courts that jury trials have
impeded the system of juvenile justice.
Page 403 U. S. 565
In Colorado, where jury trials have been permitted by statute,
Judge Theodore Rubin of the Denver Juvenile Court has indicated
that jury trials are an important safeguard, and that they have not
impaired the functioning of the Denver Juvenile Courts. For
example, during the first seven months of 1970, the two divisions
of the Denver Juvenile Court have had fewer than two dozen jury
trials, in both delinquency and dependency-neglect cases. In
Michigan, where juveniles are also entitled to a jury trial, Judge
Lincoln of the Detroit Juvenile Court indicates that his court has
had less than five jury trials in the year 1969 to 1970.
The recent Supreme Court decision of
Williams
vs Florida, [
399 U.S.
78] (June 22, 1970), which held that the constitutional right
to trial by jury in criminal cases does not require a twelve-member
jury, could be implemented to facilitate the transition to jury
trials. A jury of less than twelve members would be less
cumbersome, less "formal," and less expensive than the regular
twelve-member jury, and yet would provide the accused with
objective factfinders.
In fact, the very argument of expediency, suggesting
"supermarket" or "assembly line" justice is one of the most
forceful arguments in favor of granting jury trials. By granting
the juvenile the right to a jury trial, we would, in fact, be
protecting the accused from the judge who is under pressure to move
the cases, the judge with too many cases and not enough time. It
will provide a safeguard against the judge who may be prejudiced
against a minority group or who may be prejudiced against the
juvenile brought before him because of some past occurrence which
was heard by the same judge.
There have been criticisms that juvenile court judges, because
of their hearing caseload, do not carefully weigh the evidence in
the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings.
Page 403 U. S. 566
It is during this phase that the judge must determine whether,
in fact, the evidence has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused committed the acts alleged in the petition.
Regardless of the merit of these criticisms, they have impaired the
belief of the juveniles, of the bar, and of the public as to the
opportunity for justice in the juvenile court. Granting the
juvenile the right to demand that the facts be determined by a jury
will strengthen the faith of all concerned parties in the juvenile
system.
* * * *
It is important to note at this time a definite side benefit of
granting jury trials,
i.e., an aid to rehabilitation. The
child who feels that he has been dealt with fairly, and not merely
expediently or as speedily as possible, will be a better prospect
for rehabilitation. Many of the children who come before the court
come from broken homes, from the ghettos; they often suffer from
low self-esteem; and their behavior is frequently a symptom of
their own feelings of inadequacy. Traumatic experiences of denial
of basic rights only accentuate the past deprivation and contribute
to the problem. Thus, a general societal attitude of acceptance of
the juvenile as a person entitled to the same protection as an
adult may be the true beginning of the rehabilitative process.
PUBLIC TRIAL
Public trial, in the judgment of this Court, does not affect the
juvenile court philosophy.
[In]
In re Oliver,
[
Footnote 3/2] Mr. Justice Black
reviews the history of the public trial. Its origins are obscure,
but it seems to have evolved along with the jury trial guarantee in
English common law, and was then adopted as a provision
Page 403 U. S. 567
of the Federal Constitution, as well as by most state
constitutions. Among the benefits of a public trial are the
following:
"1. Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown
to the parties. These witnesses may then voluntarily come forward
and give important testimony."
"2. The spectators learn about their government and acquire
confidence in their judicial remedies."
"3. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the [forum] of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."
(P.
333 U. S.
270.)
Justice Black has nothing to say on the question of whether a
public trial acts as a deterrent to crime, but it is clear that he
believes publicity to improve the quality of criminal justice, both
theoretically and practically.
As for the juvenile trial issue he writes:
"Whatever may be the classification of juvenile court
proceedings, they are often conducted without admitting all the
public. But it has never been the practice to wholly exclude
parents, relatives, and friends, or to refuse juveniles the benefit
of counsel."
(P.
333 U. S.
266.)
In fact, the juvenile proceedings as presently conducted are far
from secret. Witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense,
social workers, court reporters, students, police trainees,
probation counselors, and sheriffs are present in the courtroom.
Police, the Armed Forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
obtain information, and have access to the police files. There
seems no more reason to believe that a jury trial would destroy
confidentiality than would witnesses summoned to testify.
Page 403 U. S. 568
The Court also notes the report of the PRESIDENT's COMMISSION
O[N] LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967), wherein it is stated:
"A juvenile's adjudication record is required by the law of most
jurisdictions to be private and confidential; in practice, the
confidentiality of those reports is often violated."
Furthermore,
"[s]tatutory restrictions almost invariably apply only to court
records, and even as to those the evidence is that many courts
routinely furnish information to the FBI and the military, and on
request to government agencies and even to private employers."
JUDGE'S EXPERTISE
The Court is also aware of the argument that the juvenile court
was created to develop judges who were experts in sifting out the
real problems behind a juvenile's breaking the law; therefore, to
place the child's fate in the hands of a jury would defeat that
purpose. This will, however, continue to leave the final decision
of disposition solely with the judge. The role of the jury will be
only to ascertain whether the facts, which give the court
jurisdiction, have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jury will not be concerned with social and psychological factors.
These factors, along with prior record, family and educational
background, will be considered by the judge during the
dispositional phase.
Taking into consideration the social background and other facts,
the judge, during the dispositional phase, will determine what
disposition is in the best interests of the child and society. It
is at this stage that a judge's expertise is most important, and
the granting of a jury trial
Page 403 U. S. 569
will not prevent the judge from carrying out the basic
philosophy of the juvenile court.
Trial by jury will provide the child with a safeguard against
being prejudged. The jury clearly will have no business in learning
of the social report or any of the other extraneous matter unless
properly introduced under the rules of evidence. Due process
demands that the trier of facts should not be acquainted with any
of the facts of the case or have knowledge of any of the
circumstances, whether through officials in his own department or
records in his possession. If the accused believes that the judge
has read an account of the facts submitted by the police or any
other report prior to the adjudicatory hearing, and that this may
prove prejudicial, he can demand a jury and insure against such
knowledge on the part of the trier of the facts.
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
Counsel also questions whether a child can waive his right to a
jury trial or, in fact, whether a parent or counsel may waive.
When the waiver comes up for hearing, the Court could, at its
discretion, either grant or refuse the juvenile's waiver of a jury
trial, and/or appoint a guardian or legal counsel to advise the
child.
My experience has shown that the greatest percentage of
juveniles who appear before the court in felony cases have lived
appalling lives due to parental neglect and brutality, lack of
normal living conditions, and poverty. This has produced in them a
maturity which is normally acquired much later in life. They are
generally well aware of their rights in a court of law. However, in
those cases where a child clearly needs guidance, the
court-appointed guardian or attorney could explain to him the
implications of a waiver. The juvenile's rights and interests would
thus be protected every bit as stringently
Page 403 U. S. 570
as they are today before he is allowed to plead guilty or not
guilty to a complaint. A guilty plea is, after all, a waiver of the
right to trial altogether.
Counsel is placed with the responsibility of explaining to the
juvenile the significance of guilty and
nolo contendere
pleas, of instructing the juvenile on the prerogative to take the
witness stand, and is expected to advise his client in the same
manner as he would an adult about to stand trial. And now counsel
suggests to the Court that counsel is not capable of explaining and
waiving the right to a jury trial. The Court fails to see the
distinction between this waiver and the absolute waiver, to-wit, a
guilty plea. Counsel should act in the best interest of his client,
even if this may be in conflict with the parents. On a number of
occasions, this Court has appointed counsel for a juvenile whose
parents could not afford to retain private counsel, and where the
parents' interests were in conflict with those of the child. This
procedure will be continued, and the Court will continue to rely on
the good judgment of the bar.
The Court could easily require that a waiver of a jury trial be
made in person by the juvenile in writing, in open court, with the
consent and approval of the Court and the attorney representing
both the juvenile and the state. The judge could ascertain as to
whether the juvenile can intelligently waive his right and, if
necessary, appoint counsel to advise the youth as to the
implications connected with the waiver. This could be accomplished
without any difficulty through means presently available to the
Court.
JURY OF PEERS
One of the most interesting questions raised is that concerning
the right of a juvenile to a trial by his peers. Counsel has
suggested that a jury of a juvenile's peers
Page 403 U. S. 571
would be composed of other juveniles, that is, a "teenage jury."
Webster's Dictionary, Second Edition, 1966, defines a peer as an
equal, one of the same rank, quality, value. The word "peers" means
nothing more than citizens,
In re Grilli, 179 N.Y.S. 795,
797. The phrase "judgment of his peers" means at common law, a
trial by a jury of twelve men,
State vs. Simmons, 61 Kan.
752. "Judgment of his peers" is a term expressly borrowed from the
Magna Charta, and it means a trial by jury,
Ex parte
Wagner, 58 Okl. Cr. 161. The Declaration of Independence also
speaks of the equality of all men. Are we now to say that a
juvenile is a second-class citizen, not equal to an adult? The
Constitution has never been construed to say women must be tried by
their peers, to-wit, by all-female juries, or Negroes by all-Negro
juries.
The only restriction on the makeup of the jury is that there can
be no systematic exclusion of those who meet local and federal
requirements, in particular, voting qualifications.
The Court notes that, presently in some states, 18-year-olds can
vote. Presumably, if they can vote, they may also serve on juries.
Our own legislature has given first passage to an amendment to the
Constitution to permit 18-year-olds to vote. Thus, it is quite
possible that we will have teenage jurors sitting in judgment of
their so-called "peers."
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
The argument that the adjudication of delinquency is not the
equivalent of criminal process is spurious. This Court has
discussed the futility of making distinctions on the basis of
labels in prior decisions. Because the legislature dictates that a
child who commits a felony shall be called a delinquent does not
change the nature of the crime. Murder is murder; robbery is
robbery -- they are
Page 403 U. S. 572
both criminal offenses, not civil, regardless and independent of
the age of the doer.
* * * *
It is noteworthy that, in our statute, there is not an express
statutory provision indicating that the proceedings are civil.
Trial by jury in Rhode Island is guaranteed to all persons,
whether, in criminal cases or in civil cases. That right existed
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and certainly, whether
one is involved in a civil or criminal proceeding of the Family
Court in which his "liberty" is to be "taken" "imprisoned"
"outlawed" and "banished," he is entitled to a trial by jury.
(
Henry vs Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, at 30).
This Court believes that, although the juvenile court was
initially created as a social experiment, it has not ceased to be
part of the judicial system. In view of the potential loss of
liberty at stake in the proceeding, this Court is compelled to
accord due process to all the litigants who come before it; and,
therefore, all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, including
trial by jury, must prevail.
The Court concludes that the framers of our Constitution never
intended to place the power in any one man or official, and take
away the "protection of the law from the rights of an individual."
I t meant "to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and
posterity." The Constitution was written with the philosophy based
upon a composite of all of the most liberal ideas which came down
through the centuries: The Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights,
the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Common Law; and the keystone is
the preservation of individual liberty. All these ideas were
carefully inserted in our Constitution.
The juvenile is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.
[
Footnote 3/1]
Reis, 7 CrL 2151 (1970).
[
Footnote 3/2]
333 U. S. 257.