Petitioner company and respondent union were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement containing a provision that all
controversies concerning its interpretation or application should
be resolved by arbitration and that there should be no work
stoppage, lockout, picketing, or boycotts during the life of the
contract. A dispute arose and, when petitioner did not accede to
respondent's demand, a strike was called and the union began to
picket petitioner's establishment. Petitioner's effort to invoke
the contract's arbitration procedures being unsuccessful, it sought
injunctive relief in the state court, which issued a temporary
restraining order. The union removed the case to the Federal
District Court, which ordered arbitration and enjoined the strike
and the picketing. The Court of Appeals reversed, considering
itself bound by
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U. S. 195
(1962), which held that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars a
federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, even though
that agreement contains binding arbitration provisions enforceable
under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Held: In the circumstances of this case -- where the
grievance was subject to arbitration under the collective
bargaining agreement, petitioner was ready for arbitration when the
strike was enjoined, and the District Court concluded that
respondent's violations of the no-strike clause were causing
petitioner irreparable injury -- the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
bar the granting of injunctive relief.
Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, supra, overruled. Pp.
398 U. S.
240-255.
(a) The doctrine of
stare decisis, "a principle of
policy, and not a mechanical formula," does not bar reexamination
of
Sinclair. Pp.
398 U. S.
240-241.
(b) The mere silence of Congress after Sinclair was decided does
not foreclose reconsideration of that decision. Pp.
398 U. S.
241-242.
(c) Arbitration is an important instrument of federal policy for
resolving labor disputes, and a refusal to arbitrate is not an
Page 398 U. S. 236
abuse against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.
S. 448 (1957). Pp.
398 U. S.
242-243.
(d) This Court's holding in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
75, 390 U. S. 557
(1968), that § 301(a) suits initially brought in state courts are
removable to federal courts (a decision which, in conjunction with
Sinclair, had the effect of ousting state courts of
jurisdiction in such cases where injunctive relief is sought for
breach of a no-strike obligation), contravenes the congressional
purpose embodied in § 301(a) to supplement, and not encroach upon,
the preexisting jurisdiction of state courts.
Avco has
created an anomalous situation urgently necessitating
reconsideration of
Sinclair. Pp.
398 U. S.
244-245.
(e) Congress did not intend that the removal procedure be used
to foreclose completely injunctive and other remedies otherwise
available in the state courts. P.
398 U. S.
246.
(f) Extending
Sinclair to the States would be an
unacceptable resolution of the dilemma created by
Sinclair
and
Avco because it would substantially lessen the
employers' incentive to agree to submit grievances to arbitration
in exchange for the unions' undertakings to refrain from striking
and would totally eliminate, contrary to congressional intent, the
injunction as the most effective device to enforce no-strike
obligations. Pp.
398 U. S.
247-249.
(g) The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must he
accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration,
equitable remedies to enforce which are essential to further
congressional policy for peacefully resolving labor disputes. Pp.
398 U. S.
249-253.
(h) The narrow holding in this case comports with the principles
of the dissent in
Sinclair, supra at
370 U. S. 228,
which the Court adopts as guidelines for the district courts in
determining whether to grant injunctive relief. Pp.
398 U. S.
253-254.
416 F.2d 368, reversed and remanded.
Page 398 U. S. 237
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we reexamine the holding of
Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195
(1962), that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act [
Footnote 1] preclude a
federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a
no-strike obligation under a collective
Page 398 U. S. 238
bargaining agreement, even though that agreement contains
provisions, enforceable under § 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, [
Footnote
2] for binding arbitration of the grievance dispute concerning
which the strike was called. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, considering itself bound by
Sinclair, reversed
the grant by the District Court for the Central District of
California of petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief. 416 F.2d
368 (1969). We granted certiorari. 396 U.S. 1000 (1970). Having
concluded that
Sinclair was erroneously decided and that
subsequent events have undermined its continuing validity, we
overrule that decision and reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
I
In February, 1969, at the time of the incidents that produced
this litigation, petitioner and respondent were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement which provided,
inter
alia, that all controversies concerning its interpretation or
application should be resolved by adjustment and arbitration
procedures set forth therein [
Footnote 3] and that, during the life of the contract,
there should
Page 398 U. S. 239
be "no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or
boycotts. . . ." [
Footnote 4]
The dispute arose when petitioner's frozen foods supervisor and
certain members of his crew who were not members of the bargaining
unit began to rearrange merchandise in the frozen food cases of one
of petitioner's supermarkets. A union representative insisted that
the food cases be stripped of all merchandise and be restocked by
union personnel. When petitioner did not accede to the union's
demand, a strike was called and the union began to picket
petitioner's establishment. Thereupon petitioner demanded that the
union cease the work stoppage and picketing and sought to invoke
the grievance and arbitration procedures specified in the
contract.
The following day, since the strike had not been terminated,
petitioner filed a complaint in California
Page 398 U. S. 240
Superior Court seeking a temporary restraining order, a
preliminary and permanent injunction, and specific performance of
the contractual arbitration provision. The state court issued a
temporary restraining order forbidding continuation of the strike
and also an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should
not be granted. Shortly thereafter, the union removed the case to
the Federal District Court, and there made a motion to quash the
state court's temporary restraining order. In opposition,
petitioner moved for an order compelling arbitration and enjoining
continuation of the strike. Concluding that the dispute was subject
to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement and that
the strike was in violation of the contract, the District Court
ordered the parties to arbitrate the underlying dispute, and
simultaneously enjoined the strike, all picketing in the vicinity
of petitioner's supermarket, and any attempts by the union to
induce the employees to strike or to refuse to perform their
services.
II
At the outset, we are met with respondent's contention that
Sinclair ought not to be disturbed, because the decision
turned on a question of statutory construction which Congress can
alter at any time. Since Congress has not modified our conclusions
in
Sinclair, even though it has been urged to do so,
[
Footnote 5] respondent argues
that principles of
stare decisis should govern the present
case.
We do not agree that the doctrine of
stare decisis bars
a reexamination of
Sinclair in the circumstances of this
case. We fully recognize that important policy considerations
militate in favor of continuity and predictability in the law.
Nevertheless, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Page 398 U. S. 241
wrote for the Court,
"
[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy, and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however
recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision
with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience."
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106,
309 U. S. 119
(1940).
See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.
S. 111,
382 U. S. 116
(1965). It is precisely because
Sinclair stands as a
significant departure from our otherwise consistent emphasis upon
the congressional policy to promote the peaceful settlement of
labor disputes through arbitration [
Footnote 6] and our efforts to accommodate and harmonize
this policy with those underlying the anti-injunction provisions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act [
Footnote
7] that we believe
Sinclair should be reconsidered.
Furthermore, in light of developments subsequent to
Sinclair, in particular, our decision in
Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557
(1968), it has become clear that the
Sinclair decision
does not further, but rather frustrates, realization of an
important goal of our national labor policy.
Nor can we agree that conclusive weight should be accorded to
the failure of Congress to respond to
Sinclair on the
theory that congressional silence should be interpreted as
acceptance of the decision. The Court has cautioned that "[i]t is,
at best, treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the
adoption of a controlling rule of law."
Girouard v. United
States, 328 U. S. 61,
328 U. S. 69
Page 398 U. S. 242
(1946). Therefore, in the absence of any persuasive
circumstances evidencing a clear design that congressional inaction
be taken as acceptance of
Sinclair, the mere silence of
Congress is not a sufficient reason for refusing to reconsider the
decision.
Helvering v. Hallock, supra, at
309 U. S.
119-120.
III
From the time
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U. S. 448
(1957), was decided, we have frequently found it necessary to
consider various substantive and procedural aspects of federal
labor contract law and questions concerning its application in both
state and federal courts.
Lincoln Mills held generally
that
"the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws,"
353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 456,
and, more specifically, that a union can obtain specific
performance of an employer's promise to arbitrate grievances. We
rejected the contention that the anti-injunction proscriptions of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited this type of relief, noting
that a refusal to arbitrate was not "part and parcel of the abuses
against which the Act was aimed,"
id. at
353 U. S. 458,
and that the Act itself manifests a policy determination that
arbitration should be encouraged.
See 29 U.S.C. § 108.
[
Footnote 8] Subsequently, in
the
Steelworkers
Page 398 U. S. 243
Trilogy, [
Footnote
9] we emphasized the importance of arbitration as an instrument
of federal policy for resolving disputes between labor and
management, and cautioned the lower courts against usurping the
functions of the arbitrator.
Serious questions remained, however, concerning the role that
state courts were to play in suits involving collective bargaining
agreements. Confronted with some of these problems in
Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502
(1962), we held that Congress clearly intended
not to
disturb the preexisting jurisdiction of the state courts over suits
for violations of collective bargaining agreements. We noted that
the
"clear implication of the entire record of the congressional
debates in both 1946 and 1947 is that the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction upon the federal district courts was not to displace,
but to supplement, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the
courts of the various States over contracts made by labor
organizations."
Id. at
368 U. S.
511.
Shortly after the decision in
Dowd Box, we sustained,
in
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S.
95 (1962), an award of damages by a state court to an
employer for a breach by the union of a no-strike provision in its
contract. While emphasizing that, "in enacting § 301, Congress
intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over
inconsistent local rules,"
id. at
369 U. S. 104,
we did not consider the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to state court proceedings because the employer's prayer for relief
sought only
Page 398 U. S. 244
damages and not specific performance of a no-strike
obligation.
Subsequent to the decision in
Sinclair, we held in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 7, supra, that § 301(a) suits
initially brought in state courts may be removed to the designated
federal forum under the federal question removal jurisdiction
delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In so holding, however, the Court
expressly left open the questions whether state courts are bound by
the anti-injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
whether federal courts, after removal of a § 301(a) action, are
required to dissolve any injunctive relief previously granted by
the state courts.
See generally General Electric Co. v. Local
Union 191, 413 F.2d 964 (C.A. 5th Cir.1969) (dissolution of
state injunction required). Three Justices who concurred expressed
the view that
Sinclair should be reconsidered "upon an
appropriate future occasion." 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 562
(STEWART, J., concurring). [
Footnote 10]
The decision in
Avco, viewed in the context of
Lincoln Mills and its progeny, has produced an anomalous
situation which, in our view, makes urgent the reconsideration of
Sinclair. The principal practical effect of
Avco
and
Sinclair, taken together, is nothing less than to oust
state courts of jurisdiction in § 301(a) suits where injunctive
Page 398 U. S. 245
relief is sought for breach of a no-strike obligation. Union
defendants can, as a matter of course, obtain removal to a federal
court, [
Footnote 11] and
there is obviously a compelling incentive for them to do so in
order to gain the advantage of the strictures upon injunctive
relief which
Sinclair imposes on federal courts. The
sanctioning of this practice, however, is wholly inconsistent with
our conclusion in
Dowd Box that the congressional purpose
embodied in § 301(a) was to supplement, and not to encroach upon,
the preexisting jurisdiction of the state courts. [
Footnote 12] It is ironic indeed that the
very provision that Congress clearly intended to provide additional
remedies for breach of collective bargaining agreements has been
employed to displace previously existing state remedies. We are not
at liberty thus to depart from the clearly expressed congressional
policy to the contrary.
On the other hand, to the extent that widely disparate remedies
theoretically remain available in state, as opposed to federal,
courts, the federal policy of labor law
Page 398 U. S. 246
uniformity elaborated in
Lucas Flour Co., is seriously
offended. This policy, of course, could hardly require, as a
practical matter, that labor law be administered identically in all
courts, for undoubtedly a certain diversity exists among the state
and federal systems in matters of procedural and remedial detail, a
fact that Congress evidently took into account in deciding not to
disturb the traditional jurisdiction of the States. The injunction,
however, is so important a remedial device, particularly in the
arbitration context, that its availability or nonavailability in
various courts will not only produce rampant forum shopping and
maneuvering from one court to another, but will also greatly
frustrate any relative uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. Furthermore, the existing scheme, with the injunction
remedy technically available in the state courts but rendered
inefficacious by the removal device, assigns to removal proceedings
a totally unintended function. While the underlying purposes of
Congress in providing for federal question removal jurisdiction
remain somewhat obscure, [
Footnote 13] there has never been a serious contention
that Congress intended that the removal mechanism be utilized to
foreclose completely remedies otherwise available in the state
courts. Although federal question removal jurisdiction may well
have been intended to provide a forum for the protection of federal
rights where such protection was deemed necessary or to encourage
the development of expertise by the federal courts in the
Page 398 U. S. 247
interpretation of federal law, there is no indication that
Congress intended by the removal mechanism to effect a wholesale
dislocation in the allocation of judicial business between the
state and federal courts.
Cf. City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U. S. 808
(1966).
It is undoubtedly true that each of the foregoing objections to
Sinclair-Avco could be remedied either by overruling
Sinclair or by extending that decision to the States.
While some commentators have suggested that the solution to the
present unsatisfactory situation does lie in the extension of the
Sinclair prohibition to state court proceedings, [
Footnote 14] we agree with Chief
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court that
"whether or not Congress could deprive state courts of the power
to give such [injunctive] remedies when enforcing collective
bargaining agreements, it has not attempted to do so either in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act or section 301."
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932
(1958).
See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Marine Local
25, 338 F.2d 837 (C.A.3d Cir.1964),
cert. denied, 380
U.S. 935 (1965);
Shaw Electric Co. v. I.B.E.W., 418 Pa. 1,
208 A.2d 769 (1965).
An additional reason for not resolving the existing dilemma by
extending
Sinclair to the States is the devastating
implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and
their accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were
not available. [
Footnote 15]
As we have
Page 398 U. S. 248
previously indicated, a no-strike obligation, express or
implied, is the
quid pro quo for an undertaking by the
employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of
arbitration.
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
supra, at
353 U. S. 455.
[
Footnote 16] Any incentive
for employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily
dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which
the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it
is, of course, true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of
redress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an
aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a dispute has been
settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal
strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or
after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial
strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between
employer and union. [
Footnote
17]
Page 398 U. S. 249
Even if management is not encouraged by the unavailability of
the injunction remedy to resist arbitration agreements, the fact
remains that the effectiveness of such agreements would be greatly
reduced if injunctive relief were withheld. Indeed, the very
purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to
strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. This basic purpose
is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate, effective
remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed to
obviate. Thus, because
Sinclair, in the aftermath of
Avco, casts serious doubt upon the effective enforcement
of a vital element of stable labor-management relations --
arbitration agreements with their attendant no-strike obligations
-- we conclude that
Sinclair does not make a viable
contribution to federal labor policy.
IV
We have also determined that the dissenting opinion in
Sinclair states the correct principles concerning the
accommodation necessary between the seemingly absolute terms of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the policy considerations underlying §
301(a). [
Footnote 18] 370
U.S. at
370 U. S.
215.
Page 398 U. S. 250
Although we need not repeat all that was there said, a few
points should be emphasized at this time.
The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be
accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration.
Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon
isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total
corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly
inconsistent provisions.
See Richards v. United States,
369 U. S. 1,
369 U. S. 11
(1962);
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.
S. 270,
350 U. S. 285
(1956);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.
S. 219,
312 U. S. 235
(1941).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive to a situation totally
different from that which exists today. In the early part of this
century, the federal courts generally were regarded as allies of
management in its attempt to prevent the organization and
strengthening of labor unions, and, in this industrial struggle,
the injunction became a potent weapon that was wielded against the
activities of labor groups. [
Footnote 19] The result was a large number of sweeping
decrees, often issued
ex parte, drawn on an
ad
hoc basis without regard to any systematic elaboration of
national labor policy.
See Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley
Co., 311 U. S. 91,
311 U. S. 102
(1940).
Page 398 U. S. 251
In 1932, Congress attempted to bring some order out of the
industrial chaos that had developed and to correct the abuses that
had resulted from the interjection of the federal judiciary into
union-management disputes on the behalf of management.
See
declaration of public policy, Norris-LaGuardia Act, 2, 47 Stat. 70.
Congress, therefore, determined initially to limit severely the
power of the federal courts to issue injunctions "in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute. . . ." § 4, 47 Stat.
70. Even as initially enacted, however, the prohibition against
federal injunctions was by no means absolute.
See
Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 7, 8, 9, 47 Stat. 71, 72. Shortly
thereafter, Congress passed the Wagner Act, [
Footnote 20] designed to curb various management
activities that tended to discourage employee participation in
collective action.
As labor organizations grew in strength and developed toward
maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the
nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective
bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful
resolution of industrial disputes. This shift in emphasis was
accomplished, however, without extensive revision of many of the
older enactments, including the anti-injunction section of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, it became the task of the courts to
accommodate, to reconcile the older statutes with the more recent
ones.
A leading example of this accommodation process is
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.
Co., 353 U. S. 30
(1957). There, we were confronted with a peaceful strike which
violated the statutory duty to arbitrate imposed by the Railway
Labor Act. The Court concluded that a strike in violation of a
statutory arbitration duty was not the type of situation
Page 398 U. S. 252
to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive, that an
important federal policy was involved in the peaceful settlement of
disputes through the statutorily mandated arbitration procedure,
that this important policy was imperiled if equitable remedies were
not available to implement it, and, hence, that Norris-LaGuardia's
policy of nonintervention by the federal courts should yield to the
overriding interest in the successful implementation of the
arbitration process.
The principles elaborated in
Chicago River are equally
applicable to the present case. To be sure,
Chicago River
involved arbitration procedures established by statute. However, we
have frequently noted, in such cases as
Lincoln Mills, the
Steelworkers Trilogy, and
Lucas Flour, the
importance that Congress has attached generally to the voluntary
settlement of labor disputes without resort to self-help, and more
particularly to arbitration as a means to this end. Indeed, it has
been stated that
Lincoln Mills, in its exposition of §
301(a), "went a long way towards making arbitration the central
institution in the administration of collective bargaining
contracts." [
Footnote
21]
The
Sinclair decision, however, seriously undermined
the effectiveness of the arbitration technique as a method
peacefully to resolve industrial disputes without resort to
strikes, lockouts, and similar devices. Clearly, employers will be
wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically enforceable
against them when no similarly efficacious remedy is available to
enforce the concomitant undertaking of the union to refrain from
striking. On the other hand, the central purpose of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster the growth and viability of labor
organizations is hardly retarded -- if anything, this goal is
advanced -- by a remedial device that merely enforces the
obligation that the union freely undertook under
Page 398 U. S. 253
a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration. [
Footnote 22]
We conclude, therefore, that the unavailability of equitable relief
in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the
congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes, that the
core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not sacrificed by the
limited use of equitable remedies to further this important policy,
and consequently that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the
granting of injunctive relief in the circumstances of the instant
case.
V
Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not
undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only
with the situation in which a collective bargaining contract
contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure.
Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is
appropriate
Page 398 U. S. 254
as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an
arbitrable grievance. The dissenting opinion in
Sinclair
suggested the following principles for the guidance of the district
courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief --
principles that we now adopt:
"A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not
grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until
it decides that the case is one in which an injunction would be
appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is
sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court
may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the
contract
does have that effect, and the employer should be
ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction
against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of
course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be
warranted under ordinary principles of equity -- whether breaches
are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will
be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable
injury to the employer, and whether the employer will suffer more
from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its
issuance."
370 U.S. at
370 U. S. 228.
(Emphasis in original.)
In the present case, there is no dispute that the grievance in
question was subject to adjustment and arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement, and that the petitioner was ready
to proceed with arbitration at the time an injunction against the
strike was sought and obtained. The District Court also concluded
that, by reason of respondent's violations of its no-strike
obligation, petitioner "has suffered irreparable injury and will
continue to suffer irreparable injury." Since we now
Page 398 U. S. 255
overrule
Sinclair, the holding of the Court of Appeals
in reliance on
Sinclair must be reversed. Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case
with directions to enter a judgment affirming the order of the
District Court.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the decision of this
case.
[
Footnote 1]
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any
person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as
these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts: "
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;"
"
* * * *"
"(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence;"
"
* * * *"
"(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in
promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;"
"
* * * *"
"(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified. . . ."
§ 4, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 104.
[
Footnote 2]
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
[
Footnote 3]
"
ARTICLE XIV"
"
ADJUSTMENT AND ARBITRATION"
"A. CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT."
"Any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of
any kind or character existing between the parties and arising out
of or in any way involving the interpretation or application of the
terms of this Agreement . . . [with certain exceptions not relevant
to the instant case] shall be settled and resolved by the
procedures and in the manner hereinafter set forth."
"B. ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE."
"
* * * *"
"C. ARBITRATION."
"1. Any matter not satisfactorily settled or resolved in
Paragraph B hereinabove shall be submitted to arbitration for final
determination upon written demand of either party. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"4. The arbitrator or board of arbitration shall be empowered to
hear and determine the matter in question and the determination
shall be final and binding upon the parties, subject only to their
rights under law. . . ."
[
Footnote 4]
"D. POWERS, LIMITATIONS AND RESERVATIONS."
"
* * * *"
"2.
Work Stoppages. Matters subject to the procedures
of this Article shall be settled and resolved in the manner
provided herein. During the term of this Agreement, there shall be
no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts,
except that this limitation shall not be binding upon either party
hereto if the other party refuses to perform any obligation under
this Article or refuses or fails to abide by, accept or perform a
decision or award of an arbitrator or board."
[
Footnote 5]
See e.g., Report of Special
Atkinson-Sinclair
Committee, A.B.A. Labor Relations Law Section -- Proceedings 226
(1963) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A.
Sinclair Report].
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U. S. 564
(1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574
(1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593
(1960);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U. S. 448
(1957).
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River
& Ind. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30
(1957);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra; cf.
Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.
S. 232 (1949).
See also United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219
(1941).
[
Footnote 8]
Section 108 provides:
"No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to
any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation
imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question,
or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available
governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration."
See generally Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo,
Peoria & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50
(1944).
[
Footnote 9]
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., supra;
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co.,
supra; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., supra.
[
Footnote 10]
Shortly after
Sinclair was decided, an erosive process
began to weaken its underpinnings. Various authorities suggested
methods of mitigating the absolute rigor of the
Sinclair
rule. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that
Sinclair does not prevent a federal district court
from enforcing an arbitrator's order directing a union to terminate
work stoppages in violation of a no-strike clause.
New Orleans
Steamship Assn. v. General Longshore Workers, 389 F.2d 369,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968);
see Pacific
Maritime Assn. v. International Longshoremen, 304 F. Supp 1315
(D.C.N.D. Cal.1969).
See generally Keene, The Supreme
Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From
Lincoln
Mills to
Avco and Beyond, 15 Vill.L.Rev. 32
(1969).
[
Footnote 11]
Section 301(a) suits require neither the existence of diversity
of citizenship nor a minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy.
All § 301(a) suits may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
[
Footnote 12]
The view that state court jurisdiction would not be disturbed by
§ 301(a) was perhaps most clearly articulated by Senator Ferguson,
a spokesman for that provision, in a Senate debate in 1946:
"Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, there is nothing whatever in the
now-being-considered amendment which takes away from the State
courts all the present rights of the State courts to adjudicate the
rights between parties in relation to labor agreements. The
amendment merely says that the Federal courts shall have
jurisdiction. It does not attempt to take away the jurisdiction of
the State courts, and the mere fact that the Senator and I disagree
does not change the effect of the amendment."
"Mr. MURRAY. But it authorizes the employers to bring suit in
the Federal courts, if they so desire."
"Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct. That is all it does. It takes
away no jurisdiction of the State courts."
92 Cong.Rec. 5708.
[
Footnote 13]
The legislative history of the federal question removal
provision is meager, but it has been suggested that its purpose was
the same as original federal question jurisdiction, enacted at the
same time in the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, namely, to
protect federal rights,
see H. Hart H. Wechsler, The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 727-733 (1953), and to
provide a forum that could more accurately interpret federal law,
see Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 Col.L.Rev. 157, 159 (1953). 113 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1096, 1098
and n. 17 (1965).
[
Footnote 14]
See, e.g., Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The
Patchwork of
Avco and
Philadelphia Marine on the
Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 Col.L.Rev. 980 (1969); Dunau,
Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 Va.L.Rev. 427 (1969).
[
Footnote 15]
It is true that about one-half of the States have enacted
so-called "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" that place various
restrictions upon the granting of injunctions by state courts in
labor disputes. However, because many States do not bar injunctive
relief for violations of collective bargaining agreements in only
about 14 jurisdictions is there a significant Norris-LaGuardia-type
prohibition against equitable remedies for breach of no-strike
obligations.
See Bartosic,
supra, n 14, at 1001-1006; Keene,
supra,
n 10, at 49 and nn. 79,
80.
[
Footnote 16]
We held in
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,
supra, that, even in the absence of an express no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining contract, an agreement that
certain disputes "will be exclusively covered by compulsory
terminal arbitration" (369 U.S. at
369 U. S. 106)
gives rise to an implied promise by the union not to strike during
the term of the contract in response to these arbitrable disputes.
Id. at 104-106. In the present case, there was an express
no-strike clause in the union-management contract.
See
n 4,
supra.
[
Footnote 17]
As the neutral members of the A.B.A. committee on the problems
raised by
Sinclair noted in their report:
"Under existing laws, employers may maintain an action for
damages resulting from a strike in breach of contract and may
discipline the employees involved. In many cases, however, neither
of these alternatives will be feasible. Discharge of the strikers
is often inexpedient because of a lack of qualified replacements or
because of the adverse effect on relationships within the plant.
The damage remedy may also be unsatisfactory because the employer's
losses are often hard to calculate and because the employer may
hesitate to exacerbate relations with the union by bringing a
damage action. Hence, injunctive relief will often be the only
effective means by which to remedy the breach of the no-strike
pledge, and thus effectuate federal labor policy."
A.B.A.
Sinclair Report 242.
[
Footnote 18]
Scholarly criticism of
Sinclair has been sharp, and it
appears to be almost universally recognized that
Sinclair,
particularly after
Avco, has produced an untenable
situation. The commentators are divided, however, with respect to
proposed solutions, some favoring reconsideration of
Sinclair, others suggesting extension of
Sinclair
to the States, and still others recommending that any action in
this area be left to Congress.
See generally Aaron,
Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 Col.L.Rev. 1027 (1963); Aaron, The Labor Injunction
Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 292 (1963); Bartosic
supra,
n 14; Dunau,
supra,
n 14; Keene,
supra,
n 10; Kiernan Availability
of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor
Contracts, 32 Albany L.Rev. 303 (1968); Wellington, The No-Strike
Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-examination, 30
U.Pitt.L.Rev. 293 (1968); Wellington Albert, Statutory
Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on
Sinclair
v. Atkinson, 72 Yale L.J. 1547 (1963).
[
Footnote 19]
See generally F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor
Injunction (1930).
[
Footnote 20]
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 151
et seq.
[
Footnote 21]
Wellington & Albert,
supra, n 18, at 1557.
[
Footnote 22]
As well stated by the neutral members of the A.B.A.
Sinclair committee:
"Any proposal which would subject unions to injunctive relief
must take account of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the opposition
expressed in that Act to the issuing of injunctions in labor
disputes. Nevertheless, the reasons behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act
seem scarcely applicable to the situation . . . [in which a strike
in violation of a collective bargaining agreement is enjoined]. The
Act was passed primarily because of widespread dissatisfaction with
the tendency of judges to enjoin concerted activities in accordance
with 'doctrines of tort law which made the lawfulness of a strike
depend upon judicial views of social and economic policy.'
[Citation omitted.] Where an injunction is used against a strike in
breach of contract, the union is not subjected in this fashion to
judicially created limitations on its freedom of action, but is
simply compelled to comply with limitations to which it has
previously agreed. Moreover, where the underlying dispute is
arbitrable, the union is not deprived of any practicable means of
pressing its claim, but is only required to submit the dispute to
the impartial tribunal that it has agreed to establish for this
purpose."
A.B.A.
Sinclair Report 242.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
When
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.
S. 195, was decided in 1962, I subscribed to the opinion
of the Court. Before six years had passed, I had reached the
conclusion that the
Sinclair holding should be
reconsidered, and said so in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735,
390 U. S. 557,
390 U. S. 562
(concurring opinion). Today I join the Court in concluding "that
Sinclair was erroneously decided, and that subsequent
events have undermined its continuing validity. . . ."
In these circumstances, the temptation is strong to embark upon
a lengthy personal apologia. But since MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN has so
clearly stated my present views in his opinion for the Court today,
I simply join in that opinion and in the Court's judgment. An
aphorism of Mr. Justice Frankfurter provides me refuge: "Wisdom too
often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because
it comes late."
Henslee v. Union Planters Bank,
335 U. S. 595,
335 U. S. 600
(dissenting opinion).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
Congress, in 1932, enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 4 of
which, 29 U.S.C. § 104, with exceptions not here relevant,
specifically prohibited federal courts in the broadest and most
comprehensive language from
Page 398 U. S. 256
issuing any injunctions, temporary or permanent, against
participation in a labor dispute. Subsequently, in 1947, Congress
gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in "[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization."
Although this subsection, § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a), explicitly waives the diversity and amount in
controversy requirements for federal jurisdiction, it says nothing
at all about granting injunctions. Eight years ago, this Court
considered the relation of these two statutes: after full briefing
and argument, relying on the language and history of the Acts, the
Court decided that Congress did not wish this later statute to
impair in any way Norris-LaGuardia's explicit prohibition against
injunctions in labor disputes.
Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195
(1962).
Although Congress has been urged to overrule our holding in
Sinclair, it has steadfastly refused to do so. Nothing in
the language or history of the two Acts has changed. Nothing at all
has changed, in fact, except the membership of the Court and the
personal views of one Justice. I remain of the opinion that
Sinclair was correctly decided, and, moreover, that the
prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is close to the heart of
the entire federal system of labor regulation. In my view,
Sinclair should control the disposition of this case.
Even if the majority were correct, however, in saying that
Sinclair misinterpreted the Taft-Hartley and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts, I should be compelled to dissent. I believe
that both the making and the changing of laws which affect the
substantial rights of the people are primarily for Congress, not
this Court. Most especially is this so when the laws involved are
the focus of strongly held views of powerful but antagonistic
political and economic interests. The Court's function in the
application and interpretation of such laws must be carefully
limited to avoid encroaching on the power of
Page 398 U. S. 257
Congress to determine policies and make laws to carry them
out.
When the Court implies that the doctrine called
stare
decisis rests solely on "important policy considerations . . .
in favor of continuity and predictability in the law," it does not
tell the whole story. Such considerations are present and, in a
field as delicate as labor relations, extremely important. Justice
Brandeis said, dissenting in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U. S. 393,
285 U. S. 406
(1932):
"
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because, in
most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right."
In the ordinary case, considerations of certainty and the equal
treatment of similarly situated litigants will provide a strong
incentive to adhere to precedent.
When this Court is interpreting a statute, however, an
additional factor must be weighed in the balance. It is the
deference that this Court owes to the primary responsibility of the
legislature in the making of laws. Of course, when this Court first
interprets a statute, then the statute becomes what this Court has
said it is.
See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moser,
275 U. S. 133,
275 U. S. 136
(1927). Such an initial interpretation is proper, and unavoidable,
in any system in which courts have the task of applying general
statutes in a multitude of situations. B. Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process 112-115 (1921). The Court undertakes the task
of interpretation, however, not because the Court has any special
ability to fathom the intent of Congress, but rather because
interpretation is unavoidable in the decision of the case before
it. When the law has been settled by an earlier case, then any
subsequent "reinterpretation" of the statute is gratuitous, and
neither more nor less than
Page 398 U. S. 258
an amendment: it is no different in effect from a judicial
alteration of language that Congress itself placed in the
statute.
Altering the important provisions of a statute is a legislative
function. And the Constitution states simply and unequivocally:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . . ." U.S.Const. Art. I. It is the
Congress, not this Court, that responds to the pressures of
political groups, pressures entirely proper in a free society. It
is Congress, not this Court, that has the capacity to investigate
the divergent considerations involved in the management of a
complex national labor policy. And it is Congress, not this Court,
that is elected by the people. This Court should, therefore,
interject itself as little as possible into the law-making and
law-changing process. Having given our view on the meaning of a
statute, our task is concluded, absent extraordinary circumstances.
When the Court changes its mind years later, simply because the
judges have changed, in my judgment, it takes upon itself the
function of the legislature.
The legislative effect of the Court's reversal is especially
clear here. In
Sinclair, the Court invited Congress to act
if it should be displeased with the judicial interpretation of the
statute. We said, 370 U.S. at
370 U. S.
214-215:
"Strong arguments are made to us that it is highly desirable
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act be changed in the public interest. If
that is so, Congress itself might see fit to change that law and
repeal the anti-injunction provisions of the Act insofar as suits
for violation of collective agreements are concerned, as the House
bill under consideration originally provided. It might, on the
other hand, decide that, if injunctions are necessary, the whole
idea of enforcement of these agreements by private suits should
Page 398 U. S. 259
be discarded in favor of enforcement through the administrative
machinery of the Labor Board, as Senator Taft provided in his
Senate bill. Or it might decide that neither of these methods is
entirely satisfactory, and turn instead to a completely new
approach. The question of what change, if any, should be made in
the existing law is one of legislative policy properly within the
exclusive domain of Congress -- it is a question for lawmakers, not
law interpreters."
Commentators on our holding found this invitation to legislative
action clear, and judicial self-restraint proper.
See
Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 Va.L.Rev. 427,
464-465 (1969); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation
and the Political Process: A Comment on
Sinclair v.
Atkinson, 72 Yale L.J. 1547, 1565-1566 (1963). Bills were
introduced in Congress seeking to effect a legislative change. S.
2132, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 9059, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965). Congress, however, did not act, thus indicating at
least a willingness to leave the law as
Sinclair had
construed it. It seems to me highly inappropriate for this Court
now, eight years later, in effect to enact the amendment that
Congress has refused to adopt.
Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U. S. 356
(1953);
see also United States v. International Boxing Club of
New York, Inc., 348 U. S. 236,
348 U. S.
242-244 (1955).
I do not believe that the principle of
stare decisis
forecloses all reconsiderations of earlier decisions. In the area
of constitutional law, for example, where the only alternative to
action by this Court is the laborious process of constitutional
amendment and where the ultimate responsibility rests with this
Court, I believe reconsideration is always proper.
See James v.
United States, 366 U. S. 213,
366 U. S.
233-234 (1961) (separate opinion
Page 398 U. S. 260
of BLACK, J.).
* Even on
statutory questions, the appearance of new facts or changes in
circumstances might warrant reexamination of past decisions in
exceptional cases under exceptional circumstances. In the present
situation, there are no such circumstances. Congress has taken no
action inconsistent with our decision in
Sinclair.
Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S.
61,
328 U. S. 70
(1946). And, although bills have been introduced,
cf. Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106,
309 U. S.
119-120 (1940), Congress has declined the invitation to
act.
The only "subsequent event" to which the Court can point is our
decision in
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.
S. 557 (1968). The Court must recognize that the holding
of
Avco is in no way inconsistent with
Sinclair.
As we said in
Avco, supra, at
390 U. S.
561:
"The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches
is, of course, different from the question whether there is
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy."
The Court contends, however, that the result of the two cases,
taken together, is the "anomalous situation" that no-strike clauses
become unenforceable in state courts, and this is inconsistent with
"an important goal of our national labor policy."
Page 398 U. S. 261
Avco does make any effort to enforce a no-strike clause
in a state court removable to a federal court, but it does not
follow that the no-strike clause is unenforceable. Damages may be
awarded; the union may be forced to arbitrate. And the employer may
engage in self-help. The Court would have it that these techniques
are less effective than an injunction. That is doubtless true. But
the harshness and effectiveness of injunctive relief -- and
opposition to "government by injunction" -- were the precise
reasons for the congressional prohibition in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The effect of the
Avco decision is, indeed, to
highlight the limited remedial powers of federal courts. But if the
Congress is unhappy with these powers as this Court defined them,
then the Congress may act; this Court should not. The members of
the majority have simply decided that they are more sensitive to
the "realization of an important goal of our national labor policy"
than the Congress or their predecessors on this Court.
The correct interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act, and even the
goals of "our national labor policy," are less important than the
proper division of functions between the branches of our Federal
Government. The Court would do well to remember the words of John
Adams, written in the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
"The judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative
and executive powers, or either of them, to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men."
I dissent.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissents for the reasons stated in the
majority opinion in
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U. S. 195
(1962).
* Other members of the Court have drawn the distinction between
constitutional and statutory matters, and indicated that the
correction of this Court's errors in statutory interpretation is
best left to Congress. For example, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS noted in
dissent in
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.
S. 111,
382 U. S.
133-134 (1965):
"An error in interpreting a federal statute may be easily
remedied. If this Court has failed to perceive the intention of
Congress, or has interpreted a statute in such a manner as to
thwart the legislative purpose, Congress may change it. The lessons
of experience are not learned by judges alone."
See also United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 381 U. S. 392,
381 U. S. 406
(1965) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). Apparently, however, some members
of the Court are willing to give greater weight to
stare
decisis in constitutional than in statutory matters.
See,
e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324,
394 U. S.
327-328 (1969) (HARLAN, J., concurring).