Section 2012 of the New York Education Law provides that, in
certain school districts residents who are otherwise eligible to
vote in state and federal elections may vote in the school district
elections only if they own or lease taxable realty in the district
or are parents or custodians of children enrolled in the local
public schools. Appellant, a bachelor who neither owns nor leases
taxable real property, challenged the constitutionality of the
section. A three-judge district court ruled § 2012
constitutional.
Held: Section 2012 violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
395 U. S.
625-633.
(a) Where a state statute grants the right to vote to some
bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and
denies the franchise to others, it must be determined whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Pp.
395 U. S.
625-630.
(b) Assuming,
arguendo, that New York legitimately
might limit the franchise in these school district elections to
those "primarily interested in school affairs," the § 2012
classifications do not accomplish this purpose with sufficient
precision to justify denying the franchise to appellant and members
of his class, since the classifications include many persons at
best only remotely interested in school affairs, and exclude others
directly interested. Pp.
395 U. S.
630-633.
282 F.
Supp. 70, reversed and remanded.
Page 395 U. S. 622
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are called on to determine whether § 2012 of
the New York Education Law is constitutional. The legislation
provides that, in certain New York school districts, residents who
are otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections may
vote in the school district election only if they (1) own (or
lease) taxable real property within the district, or (2) are
parents (or have custody of) children enrolled in the local public
schools. Appellant, a bachelor who neither owns nor leases taxable
real property, filed suit in federal court claiming that § 2012
denied him equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. With one judge dissenting, a three-judge
District Court dismissed appellant's complaint. Finding that § 2012
does violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we reverse.
I
New York law provides basically three methods of school board
selection. In some large city districts, the school board is
appointed by the mayor or city council. N.Y.Educ.Law § 2553, subds.
2, 4 (1953), as amended (Supp. 196&). On the other hand, in
some cities, primarily those with less than 125,000 residents, the
school board is elected at general or municipal elections in which
all qualified city voters may participate. N.Y.Educ.Law §§ 2502,
subd. 2, 2553, subd. 3 (1953).
Cf. N.Y.Educ.Law § 2531
(1953). Finally, in other districts such as the one involved in
this case, which are primarily rural
Page 395 U. S. 623
and suburban, the school board is elected at an annual meeting
of qualified school district voters. [
Footnote 1]
The challenged statute is applicable only in the districts which
hold annual meetings. To be eligible to vote at an annual district
meeting, an otherwise qualified [
Footnote 2] district resident must either (1) be the owner
or lessee of taxable real property located in the district, (2) be
the spouse of one who owns or leases qualifying property, or (3) be
the parent or guardian of a child enrolled for a specified time
during the preceding year in a local district school.
Although the New York State Department of Education has
substantial responsibility for education in the State, the local
school districts maintain significant control over the
administration of local school district affairs. [
Footnote 3] Generally, the board of education
has the basic responsibility for local school operation, including
prescribing the courses of study, determining the textbooks
Page 395 U. S. 624
to be used, and even altering and equipping a former schoolhouse
for use as a public library. N.Y.Educ.Law § 1709 (1953).
Additionally, in districts selecting members of the board of
education at annual meetings, the local voters also pass directly
on other district matters. For example, they must approve the
school budget submitted by the school board. N.Y.Educ.Law §§ 2021,
2022 (1953). [
Footnote 4]
Moreover, once the budget is approved, the governing body of the
villages within the school district must raise the money which has
been declared "necessary for teachers' salaries and the ordinary
contingent expenses [of the schools]." N.Y.Educ.Law § 1717 (1953).
[
Footnote 5] The voters also
may
"authorize such acts and vote such taxes as they shall deem
expedient . . . for . . . equipping for library use any former
schoolhouse . . . [and] for the purchase of land and buildings for
agricultural, athletic, playground or social center purposes. . .
."
N.Y.Educ.Law § 416 (1953).
Appellant is a 31-year-old college-educated stockbroker who
lives in his parents' home in the Union Free School District No.
15, a district to which § 2012 applies. He is a citizen of the
United States, and has voted in federal and state elections since
1959. However, since
Page 395 U. S. 625
he has no children and neither owns nor leases taxable real
property, appellant's attempts to register for and vote in the
local school district elections have been unsuccessful. After the
school district rejected his 1965 application, appellant instituted
the present class action challenging the constitutionality of the
voter eligibility requirements.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York denied appellant's request (made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281)
that a three-judge district court be convened, and granted
appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's complaint.
Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15, 259 F. Supp. 164
(D.C.E.D.N.Y.1966). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, ruling appellant's complaint warranted convening
a three-judge court.
Kramer v. Union Free School District No.
16, 379 F.2d 491 (C.A.2d Cir.1967). On remand, the three-judge
court ruled that § 2012 is constitutional, and dismissed
appellant's complaint.
282 F. Supp.
70. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253, appellant filed a direct
appeal with this Court; we noted probable jurisdiction. 393 U.S.
818 (1968).
II
At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in
this case. The requirements of § 2012 that school district voters
must (1) be citizens of the United States, (2) be
bona
fide residents of the school district, and (3) be at least 21
years of age are not challenged. Appellant agrees that the States
have the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency
requirements on the availability of the ballot.
Cf. Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89,
380 U. S. 91
(1965);
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.
S. 621 (1904). The sole issue in this case is whether
the additional requirements of § 2012 -- requirements which
prohibit some district residents who are otherwise
Page 395 U. S. 626
qualified by age and citizenship from participating in district
meetings and school board elections -- violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's command that no State shall deny persons equal
protection of the laws.
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the
classification."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23,
393 U. S. 30
(1968). And, in this case, we must give the statute a close and
exacting examination.
"[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens
to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
377 U. S. 562
(1964).
See Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at
393 U. S. 31;
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1,
376 U. S. 17
(1964). This careful examination is necessary because statutes
distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our
representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in
determining who may participate in political affairs or in the
selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government.
Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the
effectiveness of some citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from
this Court.
Reynolds v. Sims, supra. See Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U. S. 474
(1968). No less rigid an examination is applicable to statutes
denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by
residence and age. [
Footnote 6]
Statutes granting the franchise to
Page 395 U. S. 627
residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying
some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which
substantially affect their lives. [
Footnote 7] Therefore, if a challenged state statute
grants the right to vote to some
bona fide residents of
requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others,
the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to
promote a compelling state interest.
See Carrington v. Rash,
supra at
380 U. S.
96.
And, for these reasons, the deference usually given to the
judgment of legislators does not extend to decisions concerning
which resident citizens may participate in the election of
legislators and other public officials. Those decisions must be
carefully scrutinized by the Court to determine whether each
resident citizen has, as far as is possible, an equal voice in the
selections. Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny
some residents the right to vote, the general presumption of
constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional
approval given state classifications if the Court
Page 395 U. S. 628
can conceive of a "rational basis" for the distinctions made
[
Footnote 8] are not
applicable.
See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U. S. 663,
383 U. S. 670
(1966). The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given
"rational" classifications in other types of enactments [
Footnote 9] are based on an assumption
that the institutions of state government are structured so as to
represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the
statute is, in effect, a challenge of this basic assumption, the
assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming
constitutionality. And the assumption is no less under attack
because the legislature which decides who may participate at the
various levels of political choice is fairly elected. Legislation
which delegates decisionmaking to bodies elected by only a portion
of those eligible to vote for the legislature can cause unfair
representation. Such legislation can exclude a minority of voters
from any voice in the decisions just as effectively as if the
decisions were made by legislators the minority had no voice in
selecting. [
Footnote 10]
The need for exacting judicial scrutiny of statutes distributing
the franchise is undiminished simply because, under a different
statutory scheme, the offices subject
Page 395 U. S. 629
to election might have been filled through appointment.
[
Footnote 11] States do have
latitude in determining whether certain public officials shall be
selected by election or chosen by appointment and whether various
questions shall be submitted to the voters. In fact, we have held
that, where a county school board is an administrative, not
legislative, body, its members need not be elected.
Sailors v.
Kent Bd. of Education, 387 U. S. 105,
387 U. S. 108
(1967). However,
"once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not
be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, at
383 U. S. 665.
[
Footnote 12]
Nor is the need for close judicial examination affected because
the district meetings and the school board do not have "general"
legislative powers. Our exacting examination is not necessitated by
the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some
resident citizens are permitted to participate and some are not.
For example, a city charter might well provide that the elected
city council appoint a mayor who would have broad administrative
powers. Assuming the council were elected consistent with the
commands of the Equal Protection Clause, the delegation of power to
the mayor would not call for this Court's exacting review. On the
other hand, if the city charter made the office of mayor subject to
an
Page 395 U. S. 630
election in which only some resident citizens were entitled to
vote, there would be presented a situation calling for our close
review.
III
Besides appellant and others who similarly live in their
parents' homes, the statute also disenfranchises the following
persons (unless they are parents or guardians of children enrolled
in the district public school): senior citizens and others living
with children or relatives; clergy, military personnel, and others
who live on tax exempt property; boarders and lodgers; parents who
neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose children are
too young to attend school; parents who neither own nor lease
qualifying property and whose children attend private schools.
Appellant asserts that excluding him from participation in the
district elections denies him equal protection of the laws. He
contends that he and others of his class are substantially
interested in and significantly affected by the school meeting
decisions. All members of the community have an interest in the
quality and structure of public education, appellant says, and he
urges that "the decisions taken by local boards . . . may have
grave consequences to the entire population." Appellant also argues
that the level of property taxation affects him, even though he
does not own property, as property tax levels affect the price of
goods and services in the community.
We turn therefore to question whether the exclusion is necessary
to promote a compelling state interest. First, appellees [
Footnote 13] argue that the State
has a legitimate interest in limiting the franchise in school
district elections
Page 395 U. S. 631
to "members of the community of interest" -- those "primarily
interested in such elections." Second, appellees urge that the
State may reasonably and permissibly conclude that "property
taxpayers" (including lessees of taxable property who share the tax
burden through rent payments) and parents of the children enrolled
in the district's schools are those "primarily interested" in
school affairs.
We do not understand appellees to argue that the State is
attempting to limit the franchise to those "subjectively concerned"
about school matters. Rather, they appear to argue that the State's
legitimate interest is in restricting a voice in school matters to
those "directly affected" by such decisions. The State apparently
reasons that, since the schools are financed in part by local
property taxes, persons whose out-of-pocket expenses are "directly"
affected by property tax changes should be allowed to vote.
Similarly, parents of children in school are thought to have a
"direct" stake in school affairs, and are given a vote.
Appellees argue that it is necessary to limit the franchise to
those "primarily interested" in school affairs because
"the ever-increasing complexity of the many interacting phases
of the school system and structure make it extremely difficult for
the electorate fully to understand the whys and wherefores of the
detailed operations of the school system."
Appellees say that many communications of school boards and
school administrations are sent home to the parents through the
district pupils, and are "not broadcast to the general public";
thus, nonparents will be less informed than parents. Further,
appellees argue, those who are assessed for local property taxes
(either directly or indirectly through rent) will have enough of an
interest "through the burden on their pocketbooks, to acquire such
information as they may need."
Page 395 U. S. 632
We need express no opinion as to whether the State in some
circumstances might limit the exercise of the franchise to those
"primarily interested" or "primarily affected." Of course, we
therefore do not reach the issue of whether these particular
elections are of the type in which the franchise may be so limited.
For, assuming,
arguendo, that New York legitimately might
limit the franchise in these school district elections to those
"primarily interested in school affairs," close scrutiny of the §
2012 classifications demonstrates that they do not accomplish this
purpose with sufficient precision to justify denying appellant the
franchise.
Whether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to
those resident citizens "primarily interested" deny those excluded
equal protection of the laws depends,
inter alia, on
whether all those excluded are, in fact, substantially less
interested or affected than those the statute includes. In other
words, the classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion
of appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the
articulated state goal. [
Footnote 14] Section 2012 does not meet the exacting
standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively
distribute the franchise. The classifications in § 2012 permit
inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect
interest in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others
who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting
decisions. [
Footnote 15]
Page 395 U. S. 633
Nor do appellees offer any justification for the exclusion of
seemingly interested and informed residents -- other than to argue
that the § 2012 classifications include those "whom the State could
understandably deem to be the most intimately interested in actions
taken by the school board," and urge that
"the task of . . . balancing the interest of the community in
the maintenance of orderly school district elections against the
interest of any individual in voting in such elections should
clearly remain with the Legislature. [
Footnote 16]"
But the issue is not whether the legislative judgments are
rational. A more exacting standard obtains. The issue is whether
the § 2012 requirements do, in fact, sufficiently further a
compelling state interest to justify denying the franchise to
appellant and members of his class. The requirements of § 2012 are
not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to those
"primarily interested" in school affairs to justify the denial of
the franchise to appellant and members of his class.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York is therefore reversed. The case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
|
395
U.S. 621app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
Section 2012, New York Education Law:
"A person shall be entitled to vote at any school meeting for
the election of school district officers, and upon all other
matters which may be brought before such meeting, who is:"
"1. A citizen of the United States."
"2. Twenty-one years of age. "
Page 395 U. S. 634
"3. A resident within the district for a period of thirty days
next preceding the meeting at which he offers to vote, and who in
addition thereto possesses one of the following three
qualifications: "
"a. Owns or is the spouse of an owner, leases, hires, or is in
the possession under a contract of purchase or is the spouse of one
who leases, hires or is in possession under a contract of purchase
of, real property in such district liable to taxation for school
purposes, but the occupation of real property by a person as lodger
or boarder shall not entitle such person to vote, or"
"b. Is the parent of a child of school age, provided such a
child shall have attended the district school in the district in
which the meeting is held for a period of at least eight weeks
during the year preceding such school meeting, or"
"c. Not being the parent, has permanently residing with him a
child of school age who shall have attended the district school for
a period of at least eight weeks during the year preceding such
meeting."
"No person shall be deemed to be ineligible to vote at any such
meeting, by reason of sex, who has the other qualifications
required by this section."
[
Footnote 1]
In some districts, the election takes place on the Wednesday
following the district meeting. N.Y.Educ.Law § 2013 (Supp.
1968).
[
Footnote 2]
The statute also requires that a voter be a citizen of the
United States and at least 21 years of age. Appellant meets these
requirements, and does not challenge the citizenship, age, or
residency requirements of § 2012.
See infra at
395 U. S. 625.
The statute is set out in the
395
U.S. 621app|>Appendix,
infra.
[
Footnote 3]
"But while the administration of schools and the formulation of
general policies have been centralized in the State Education
Department . . . , the immediate control and operation of the
schools in New York have, to a large extent, been vested in the
localities. The thousands of districts . . . possess a high degree
of authority in education. They decide matters of local taxation
for school purposes, elect trustees and other school officials,
purchase buildings and sites, employ teachers, and . . . maintain
discipline. . . ."
Graves, Development of the Education Law in New York, 16
Consolidated Laws of New York (Education Law) xxiii (McKinney
1953).
See R. Pyle, Some Aspects of Education in New York
9-13 (1967).
[
Footnote 4]
In districts which do not have annual meetings, the budget is
not submitted to district voters. Thus, in city districts where the
board of education is elected by all the voters, the board has the
power to set the budget and assess taxes to meet expenditures. In
large city districts, where the board is appointed, the board must
submit requests to the city government, much as would any other
city department. R. Pyle, Some Aspects of Education in New York 11
(1967).
[
Footnote 5]
The legislation provides that the money shall be raised through
a "tax, to be levied upon all the real property in [the] village. .
. ." And the "corporate authorities shall have no power to withhold
the sums so declared to be necessary. . . ." N.Y.Educ.Law § 1717
(1953).
[
Footnote 6]
This case presents an issue different from the one we faced in
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago,
394 U. S. 802
(1969). The present appeal involves an absolute denial of the
franchise. In
McDonald, on the other hand, we were
reviewing a statute which made casting a ballot easier for some who
were unable to come to the polls. As we noted, there was no
evidence that the statute absolutely prohibited anyone from
exercising the franchise; at issue was not a claimed right to vote,
but a claimed right to an absentee ballot.
Id. at
394 U. S.
807-808.
[
Footnote 7]
Of course, the effectiveness of any citizen's voice in
governmental affairs can be determined only in relationship to the
power of other citizens' votes. For example, if school board
members are appointed by the mayor, the district residents may
effect a change in the board's membership or policies through their
votes for the mayor.
Cf. N.Y.Educ.Law § 2553, subds. 2, 4
(1953), as amended (Supp. 1968). Each resident's formal influence
is perhaps indirect, but it is equal to that of other residents.
However, when the school board positions are filled by election and
some otherwise qualified city electors are precluded from voting,
the excluded residents, when compared to the franchised residents,
no longer have an effective voice in school affairs. This is
precisely the situation with regard to the size of the school
budget in districts where § 2012 applies.
See n 4,
supra.
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420,
366 U. S.
425-428 (1961);
Allied Stores v. Bowers,
358 U. S. 522,
358 U. S. 527
(1959);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U. S. 552,
330 U. S. 556
(1947).
[
Footnote 9]
Of course, we have long held that, if the basis of
classification is inherently suspect, such as race, the statute
must be subjected to an exacting scrutiny regardless of the subject
matter of the legislation.
See, e.g., McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U. S. 184,
379 U. S. 192
(1964);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.
S. 410,
334 U. S. 420
(1948);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633,
332 U. S. 640
(1948).
[
Footnote 10]
Thus, statutes structuring local government units receive no
less exacting an examination merely because the state legislature
is fairly elected.
See Avery v. Midland County,
390 U. S. 474,
390 U. S. 481,
n. 6 (1968).
[
Footnote 11]
Similarly, no less a showing of a compelling justification for
disenfranchising residents is required merely because the questions
scheduled for the election need not have been submitted to the
voters.
[
Footnote 12]
In
Sailors v. Kent Bd. of Education, 387 U.
S. 105 (1967), each local school board sent one delegate
to a biennial meeting at which the members of the county board of
education were selected. We noted that "the choice of members of
the county school board did not involve an election."
Id.
at
387 U. S. 111.
However, we also pointed out that the members of the local school
boards, who, in effect, made the county board appointments, were
elected, but that "no constitutional complaint [was] raised
respecting that election."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 13]
The Union Free School District No. 15 and each member of it
board of education were named as defendants. The Attorney General
of New York intervened as an appellee.
[
Footnote 14]
Of course, if the exclusions are necessary to promote the
articulated state interest, we must then determine whether the
interest promoted by limiting the franchise constitutes a
compelling state interest. We do not reach that issue in this
case.
[
Footnote 15]
For example, appellant resides with his parents in the school
district, pays state and federal taxes, and is interested in and
affected by school board decisions; however, he has no vote. On the
other hand, an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state
or federal taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district, can
participate in the election.
[
Footnote 16]
We were informed at oral argument, however, that a very small
proportion of the eligible voters attend the meetings.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN join, dissenting.
In
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U. S.
45, this Court upheld against constitutional attack a
literacy requirement, applicable to voters in all state and federal
elections, imposed by the State of North Carolina. Writing for a
unanimous Court, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS said:
"The States have long been held to have broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised,
Pope v. Williams,
193 U. S.
621,
193 U. S. 633;
Mason v.
Missouri, 179 U. S. 328,
179 U. S.
335, absent, of course, the discrimination which the
Constitution condemns."
360 U.S. at
360 U. S. 551.
Believing that the appellant in this case is not the victim of any
"discrimination which the Constitution condemns," I would affirm
the judgment of the District Court.
The issue before us may be briefly summarized. New York has
provided that, in certain areas of the State, local authority over
public schools shall reside in "Union Free School Districts," such
as the District involved here. In such areas, the qualified voters
of the District annually elect members of a Board of Education and
determine by vote the basic fiscal policy of the school system:
they adopt a budget and, in effect, decide the amount of school
taxes that shall be imposed upon the taxable real property of the
District. State and federal grants provide some additional funds
for the operation of the school system, but the only method by
which the District itself may raise its own revenue is through such
property taxes. [
Footnote 2/1]
Three classes of persons are qualified under New York law to
vote in these school elections: (1) parents or guardians of
children attending public schools within the District; (2) persons
who own taxable real property within the District, and their
spouses, and (3) persons who lease taxable real property within the
District, and their spouses. [
Footnote
2/2] The appellant, a bachelor who lives with
Page 395 U. S. 636
his parents and who neither owns nor leases any real property
within the District, falls within none of those classes, and
consequently is disqualified from voting despite the fact that he
meets the general age and residence requirements imposed by state
law. The question presented is whether, by virtue of that
disqualification, the appellant is denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Although at times variously phrased, the traditional test of a
statute's validity under the Equal Protection Clause is a familiar
one: a legislative classification is invalid only "if it rest[s] on
grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's
objectives."
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U. S. 552,
330 U. S. 556.
[
Footnote 2/3] It was under just
such a test that the literacy requirement involved in
Lassiter was upheld. The premise of our decision in that
case was that a State may constitutionally impose upon its citizens
voting requirements reasonably "designed to promote intelligent use
of the ballot." 360 U.S. at
360 U. S. 51. A
similar premise underlies the proposition, consistently endorsed by
this Court, [
Footnote 2/4] that a
State may exclude nonresidents from participation in its elections.
Such residence requirements, designed to help ensure that voters
have a substantial stake in the outcome of elections and an
opportunity to become familiar with the candidates and issues voted
upon, are entirely permissible
Page 395 U. S. 637
exercises of state authority. Indeed, the appellant explicitly
concedes, as he must, the validity of voting requirements relating
to residence, literacy, and age. Yet he argues -- and the Court
accepts the argument -- that the voting qualifications involved
here somehow have a different constitutional status. I am unable to
see the distinction.
Clearly a State may reasonably assume that its residents have a
greater stake in the outcome of elections held within its
boundaries than do other persons. Likewise, it is entirely rational
for a state legislature to suppose that residents, being generally
better informed regarding state affairs than are nonresidents, will
be more likely than nonresidents to vote responsibly. And the same
may be said of legislative assumptions regarding the electoral
competence of adults and literate persons on the one hand, and of
minors and illiterates, on the other. It is clear, of course, that
lines thus drawn cannot infallibly perform their intended
legislative function. Just as "[i]lliterate people may be
intelligent voters," [
Footnote 2/5]
nonresidents or minors might also, in some instances, be
interested, informed, and intelligent participants in the electoral
process. Persons who commute across a state line to work may well
have a great stake in the affairs of the State in which they are
employed; some college students under 21 may be both better
informed and more passionately interested in political affairs than
many adults. But such discrepancies are the inevitable concomitant
of the line-drawing that is essential to law making. So long as the
classification is rationally related to a permissible legislative
end, therefore -- as are residence, literacy, and age requirements
imposed with respect to voting -- there is no denial of equal
protection.
Page 395 U. S. 638
Thus judged, the statutory classification involved here seems to
me clearly to be valid. New York has made the judgment that local
educational policy is best left to those persons who have certain
direct and definable interests in that policy: those who are either
immediately involved as parents of school children or who, as
owners or lessees of taxable property, are burdened with the local
cost of funding school district operations. [
Footnote 2/6] True, persons outside those classes may be
genuinely interested in the conduct of a school district's business
-- just as commuters from New Jersey may be genuinely interested in
the outcome of a New York City election. But unless this Court is
to claim a monopoly of wisdom regarding the sound operation of
school systems in the 50 States, I see no way to justify the
conclusion that the legislative classification involved here is not
rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.
"There is no group more interested in the operation and
management of the public schools than the taxpayers who support
them and the parents whose children attend them."
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.
S. 429,
342 U. S. 435
(DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). With good reason, the Court does not
really argue the contrary. Instead, it strikes down New York's
statute by asserting that the traditional equal protection standard
is inapt in this case, and that a considerably stricter standard --
under which classifications relating to "the franchise" are to be
subjected to "exacting judicial scrutiny" -- should be applied. But
the asserted justification for applying such a standard cannot
withstand analysis.
Page 395 U. S. 639
The Court is quite explicit in explaining why it believes this
statute should be given "close scrutiny":
"The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given
'rational' classifications in other types of enactments are based
on an assumption that the institutions of state government are
structured so as to represent fairly all the people. However, when
the challenge to the statute is, in effect, a challenge of this
basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis
for presuming constitutionality."
(Footnote omitted.) I am at a loss to understand how such
reasoning is at all relevant to the present case. The voting
qualifications at issue have been promulgated not by Union Free
School District No. 15, but by the New York State Legislature, and
the appellant is, of course, fully able to participate in the
election of representatives in that body. There is simply no claim
whatever here that the state government is not "structured so as to
represent fairly all the people," including the appellant.
Nor is there any other justification for imposing the Court's
"exacting" equal protection test. This case does not involve racial
classifications, which, in light of the genesis of the Fourteenth
Amendment, have traditionally been viewed as inherently "suspect."
[
Footnote 2/7] And this statute is
not one that impinges upon a constitutionally protected right, and
that consequently can be justified only by a "compelling" state
interest. [
Footnote 2/8] For "the
Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of
suffrage
Page 395 U. S. 640
upon anyone. . . . ;"
Minor v.
Happersett, 21 Wall. 162,
88 U. S. 178.
In any event, it seems to me that, under any equal protection
standard short of a doctrinaire insistence that universal suffrage
is somehow mandated by the Constitution, the appellant's claim must
be rejected. First of all, it must be emphasized -- despite the
Court's undifferentiated references to what it terms "the
franchise" -- that we are dealing here not with a general election,
but with a limited, special purpose election. [
Footnote 2/9] The appellant is eligible to vote in
all state, local, and federal elections in which general
governmental policy is determined. He is fully able, therefore, to
participate not only in the processes by which the requirements for
school district voting may be changed, but also in those by which
the levels of state and federal financial assistance to the
District are determined. He clearly is not locked into any
self-perpetuating status of exclusion from the electoral process.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Secondly, the appellant is, of course, limited to asserting his
own rights, not the purported rights of hypothetical childless
clergymen or parents of preschool children who neither own nor rent
taxable property. The appellant's
Page 395 U. S. 641
status is merely that of a citizen who says he is interested in
the affairs of his local public schools. If the Constitution
requires that he must be given a decisionmaking role in the
governance of those affairs, then it seems to me that any
individual who seeks such a role must be given it. For, as I have
suggested, there is no persuasive reason for distinguishing
constitutionally between the voter qualifications New York has
required for its Union Free School District elections and
qualifications based on factors such as age, residence, or
literacy. [
Footnote 2/11]
Today's decision can only be viewed as irreconcilable with the
established principle that "[t]he States have . . . broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised. . . ." Since I think that principle is entirely sound, I
respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment and opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The District Court's statement to this effect has been
explicitly reiterated and emphasized by the appellees, and the
proposition is apparently conceded by the appellant.
See
N.Y.Educ.Law §§ 416, 1717, 2021; N.Y.Real Prop.Tax Law §§ 1302,
1306, 1308.
[
Footnote 2/2]
New York's general age and residence requirements must also be
met.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420,
366 U. S.
425-426:
"The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
[
Footnote 2/4]
Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621;
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U. S.
45,
360 U. S. 51;
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89,
380 U. S. 93-94,
380 U. S. 96;
see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663,
383 U. S.
666.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. at
360 U. S.
52.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Presumably, the rationale for including lessees and their
spouses in the electoral process is that the cost of property
taxes, is in many instances, passed on from owner to lessee.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.
S. 214,
323 U. S. 216;
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184,
379 U. S.
192.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618,
394 U. S. 634;
cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449,
357 U. S.
463.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Special-purpose governmental authorities such as water,
lighting, and sewer districts exist in various sections of the
country, and participation in such districts is undoubtedly limited
in many instances to those who partake of the agency's services and
are assessed for its expenses. The constitutional validity of such
a policy is, it seems to me, unquestionable. And while it is true,
as the appellant argues, that a school system has a more pervasive
influence in the community than do most other such special purpose
authorities, I cannot agree that that difference in degree presents
anything approaching a distinction of constitutional dimension.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Compare Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly,
377 U. S. 713,
with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533.
Since
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S.
89, and
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U. S. 663,
dealt with requirements for voting in general elections, those
decisions do not control the result here.
[
Footnote 2/11]
A comparison of the classification made by New York with one
based on literacy, for instance, presumably would attempt to weigh
the interest of the person excluded from voting against the
reasonableness of the legislative assumption regarding his
competence as a voter or his connection with the subject matter of
the election. In such a speculative analysis, precision is not
attainable; for that very reason, it seems to me, the standard of
adjudication should be a reasonably tolerant one. But even assuming
such an analysis were attempted, it could not, in my view, justify
drawing a constitutional line between the classification involved
here and a literacy requirement. True, the appellant and persons in
his class might be thought to have generally more ability to vote
intelligently than do illiterates. On the other hand, illiterate
citizens clearly have considerably more of a stake in the outcome
of general elections than do the members of the appellant's class
in the result of school district elections.