Petitioner pleaded guilty to murder at a probable cause hearing
when he had no counsel. He testified at his trial (when he had
counsel), and denied guilt. On cross-examination, his prior plea
was introduced. Petitioner was convicted and the State's highest
court affirmed over his contention that admission of the prior plea
was error. Based on
White v. Maryland, 373 U. S.
59, decided after petitioner's trial, petitioner sought
post-conviction relief, which that court denied on the ground that
White was not retroactive.
Held: White v. Maryland, which is indistinguishable in
principle from the present case, applies retroactively.
Certiorari granted; 353 Mass. 575,
233
N.E.2d 730, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
In February, 1955 petitioner was arrested in connection with a
recent homicide and attempted robbery. The next morning, at a
probable cause hearing, but unassisted by counsel, he pleaded
guilty to counts of murder and assault with intent to rob. Six days
later, at his arraignment, and again unaided by counsel, he pleaded
not guilty to an indictment charging him with first-degree murder.
After being assigned counsel for trial, he took the stand in his
own defense and again pleaded not guilty to the indictment,
asserting instead that he lacked the premeditation necessary for
first-degree murder. On cross-examination, the district attorney
questioned him about his prior statements at the preliminary
hearing and introduced his plea of guilty for the purpose of
refreshing
Page 393 U. S. 6
his memory. The jury then returned a verdict of guilty and
imposed a sentence of death, since commuted to life imprisonment.
On direct review by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, he
assigned as error the admission at trial of his prior plea. The
court rejected his claim by affirming the conviction.
In 1966, petitioner sought post-conviction relief from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on the ground that our
supervening decision in
White v. Maryland, 373 U. S.
59, rendered his conviction void. While recognizing a
"close similarity" between his case and
White, that court
nonetheless reaffirmed the judgment below on the ground that
White was not retroactive. Petitioner comes here by
petition for a writ of certiorari. The motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of
certiorari are granted.
In
White v. Maryland, an accused pleaded guilty when
arraigned at a preliminary hearing, and at that time had no counsel
to represent him. We held that
Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U. S. 52, was
applicable, as only the aid of counsel could have enabled the
accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead
intelligently.
White v. Maryland is indistinguishable in
principle from the present case, and we hold that it is applicable
here although it was not decided until after the arraignment and
trial in the instant case.
The right to counsel at the trial (
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335); on
appeal (
Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353), and at the other "critical" stages of the
criminal proceedings (
Hamilton v. Alabama, supra) have all
been made retroactive, since the "denial of the right must almost
invariably deny a fair trial."
* See Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U. S. 293,
388 U. S.
297.
Reversed.
* For the distinction drawn between the right to counsel cases
and those arising under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
see
also Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406,
382 U. S.
416.