Bruton v. United States, 391 U.
S. 123, which overruled
Delli Paoli v. United
States, 352 U. S. 232, and
held that, despite instructions to the jury to disregard
implicating statements in determining a codefendant's guilt or
innocence, admission at a joint trial of a defendant's
extrajudicial confession implicating a codefendant violates the
codefendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination is to be
applied retroactively, both to state and federal prosecutions.
Certiorari granted; judgment vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.
S. 123, decided May 20, 1968, we overruled
Delli
Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232, and
held that, despite instructions to the jury to disregard the
implicating statements in determining the codefendant's guilt or
innocence, admission at a joint trial of a defendant's
extrajudicial confession implicating a codefendant violated the
codefendant's right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This case presents the
question whether
Bruton is to be applied retroactively. We
hold that it is.
The facts parallel the facts in
Bruton. The petitioner
was convicted by a jury of armed robbery at a joint trial with one
Rappe in Davidson County, Tennessee. A police officer testified
that Rappe orally confessed to him that petitioner and Rappe
committed the crime.
Page 392 U. S. 294
The trial judge instructed the jury that Rappe's confession was
admissible against her, but that her statements implicating
petitioner were not to be considered in determining petitioner's
guilt or innocence. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed
petitioner's conviction. Petitioner filed a proceeding in federal
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee. That court relied on
Delli Paoli,
and denied relief. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.
Although
Bruton involved a federal prosecution, and
this is a state prosecution, the right of cross-examination secured
by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400;
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415.
"We have . . . retroactively applied rules of criminal procedure
fashioned to correct serious flaws in the factfinding process at
trial."
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.
S. 293,
388 U. S. 298.
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368;
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335;
Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433;
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618,
381 U. S. 639,
n. 20;
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.
S. 719,
384 U. S.
727-728;
cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S.
1. Despite the cautionary instruction, the admission of
a defendant's confession which implicates a codefendant results in
such a "serious flaw." The retroactivity of the holding in
Bruton is therefore required; the error "went to the basis
of fair hearing and trial because the procedural apparatus never
assured the [petitioner] a fair determination" of his guilt or
innocence.
Linkletter v. Walker, supra, at
381 U. S. 639,
n. 20. As we said in
Bruton:
"[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will
not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations
Page 392 U. S. 295
of the jury system cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is
presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a codefendant . . . are deliberately spread before
the jury in a joint trial."
391 U.S. at
391 U. S.
135-136.
Due regard for countervailing considerations -- reliance on the
old standard of
Delli Paoli and the impact of
retroactivity upon the administration of justice,
Stovall v.
Denno, supra, at
388 U. S. 298
-- does not counsel against retroactivity of
Bruton. The
element of reliance is not persuasive, for
Delli Paoli has
been under attack from its inception, and many courts have, in
fact, rejected it.
See Bruton v. United States, supra, at
391 U. S.
128-135 and nn. 4, 8, 10. And even if the impact of
retroactivity may be significant, the constitutional error presents
a serious risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have
been reliably determined.
The motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and
the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
District Court for further consideration in light of
Bruton v.
United States, supra.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the Court's holding as to
retroactivity for the reasons given in his dissent in
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618,
381 U. S. 640,
and not for the reasons given in the Court's opinion today.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissent for the reasons
stated in MR. JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion in
Bruton v.
United States, 391 U. S. 123,
391 U. S. 138
(1968).