Appellant, on behalf of five illegitimate children, brought this
action under a Louisiana statute (La.Civ.Code Art. 2315) for the
wrongful death of their mother. The trial court dismissed the suit
and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a surviving "child"
under the statute did not include an illegitimate child, denial of
whose right of recovery was "based on morals and general welfare
because it discourages bringing children into the world out of
wedlock." The State Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Held: The statute as construed to deny a right of
recovery under Art. 2315 by illegitimate children creates an
invidious discrimination contravening the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, since legitimacy or illegitimacy of
birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly
inflicted on the mother. Pp.
391 U. S.
70-72.
250 La. 25, 193 So. 2d 530, reversed.
Page 391 U. S. 69
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant sued on behalf of five illegitimate children to
recover, under a Louisiana statute [
Footnote 1] (La.Civ.Code Ann. Art. 2315 (Supp. 1967)) for
two kinds of damages as a result of the wrongful death of their
mother: (1) the damages to them for the loss of their mother;
Page 391 U. S. 70
and (2) those based on the survival of a cause of action which
the mother had at the time of her death for pain and suffering.
Appellees [
Footnote 2] are the
doctor who treated her and the insurance company.
We assume in the present state of the pleadings that the mother,
Louise Levy, gave birth to these five illegitimate children and
that they lived with her; that she treated them as a parent would
treat any other child; that she worked as a domestic servant to
support them, taking them to church every Sunday and enrolling
them, at her own expense, in a parochial school. The Louisiana
District Court dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that "child" in Article 2315 means "legitimate child," the
denial to illegitimate children of "the right to recover" being
"based on morals and general welfare because it discourages
bringing children into the world out of wedlock." 192 So. 2d 193,
195. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied certiorari. 250 La. 25,
193 So. 2d 530.
The case is here on appeal (28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)), and we noted
probable jurisdiction, 389 U.S. 925, the statute as construed
having been sustained against challenge under both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not
"nonpersons." They are humans, live, and have their being.
[
Footnote 3] They are clearly
"persons" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote
4]
Page 391 U. S. 71
While a State has broad power when it comes to making
classifications (
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.
S. 726,
372 U. S.
732), it may not draw a line which constitutes an
invidious discrimination against a particular class.
See
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535,
316 U. S.
541-542. Though the test has been variously stated, the
end result is whether the line drawn is a rational one.
See
Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457,
354 U. S.
465-466.
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and economic
legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature in making
classifications.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U. S. 483,
348 U. S. 489;
Morey v. Doud, supra at
354 U. S.
465-466. Even so, would a corporation, which is a
"person," for certain purposes, within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause (
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania,
125 U. S. 181,
125 U. S. 188)
be required to forgo recovery for wrongs done its interests because
its incorporators were all bastards? However that might be, we have
been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights
(
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at
316 U. S. 541;
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663,
383 U. S.
669-670), and have not hesitated to strike down an
invidious classification even though it had history and tradition
on its side. (
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483;
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
supra, at
383 U. S.
669). The rights asserted here involve the intimate,
familial relationship between a child and his own mother. When the
child's claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in
terms of "equal protection," should the tortfeasors go free merely
because the child is illegitimate? Why should the illegitimate
child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of wedlock?
He certainly is subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen,
including the payment of taxes and conscription under the Selective
Service Act. How, under our constitutional regime, can he be denied
correlative rights which other citizens enjoy?
Page 391 U. S. 72
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These
children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for
them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and
in the spiritual sense; in her death, they suffered wrong in the
sense that any dependent would. [
Footnote 5]
We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against them
when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs [
Footnote 6] is possibly relevant to the harm that
was done the mother. [
Footnote
7]
Reversed.
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
see
post, p.
391 U. S.
76.]
[
Footnote 1]
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges
him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense
or quasi offense is a property right which, on the death of the
obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs,
subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse."
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or
quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a
period of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of: (1)
the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or
either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving
father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no
spouse or child surviving, and (3) the surviving brothers and
sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse,
child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose favor this right
of action survives may also recover the damages which they
sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to
recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a
property right which, on the death of the survivor in whose favor
the right of action survived, is inherited by his legal,
instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted
thereon by the survivor or not."
"As used in this article, the words 'child,' 'brother,'
'sister,' 'father,' and 'mother' include a child, brother, sister,
father, and mother, by adoption, respectively."
[
Footnote 2]
The State of Louisiana was dismissed from the action and
exceptions relating to the Charity Hospital, at which the mother
was treated, were continued indefinitely. No appeal was taken with
respect to either of those defendants.
[
Footnote 3]
See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal
Statutes, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 337 (1962).
[
Footnote 4]
No State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
[
Footnote 5]
Under Louisiana law, both parents are under a duty to support
their illegitimate children. La.Civ.Code Ann. Arts. 239, 240
(1952).
[
Footnote 6]
We can say with Shakespeare:
"Why bastard, wherefore base?"
"When my dimensions are as well compact,"
"My mind as generous, and my shape as true,"
"As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us"
"With base? with basenes? bastardy? base, base?"
King Lear, Act I, Scene 2.
[
Footnote 7]
Under Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Act (La.Rev.Stat.Ann.
§§ 23:1231, 23:1252, 23:1253 (1964)), an illegitimate child, who is
a dependent member of the deceased parent's family, may recover
compensation for his death.
See Thompson v. Vestal Lumber &
Mfg. Co, 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945). Employers are
entitled to recover from a wrongdoer workmen's compensation
payments they make to the deceased's dependent illegitimate
children.
See Board of Commissioners v. City of New
Orleans, 223 La.199,
65 So. 2d
313 (1953);
Thomas v. Matthews Lumber Co., 201 So. 2d
357 (Ct.App. La.1967).