Respondents, who are incarcerated under consecutive state prison
sentences, have attacked as unconstitutional sentences which they
have not begun to serve, in petitions for writs of habeas corpus
which they have respectively filed in District Courts under 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That provision specifies that federal district
courts may issue habeas corpus writs on behalf of prisoners who are
"in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United
States." The District Courts, relying on
McNally v. Hill,
293 U. S. 131
(1934), denied relief, holding that the petitions were premature,
since respondents were not "in custody" within the statute's
meaning under the sentences which they were challenging, and that
respondents would not be able to attack those sentences until they
started to serve them, which would not be until after 1990. The
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that, in light of more recent
decisions, this Court would no longer follow
McNally.
Held: A prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in
custody" under any one of them for purposes of § 2241(c)(3), and
may in a federal habeas corpus proceeding thereunder challenge the
constitutionality of a sentence scheduled for future service. The
decision in
McNally v. Hill, supra, which was compelled
neither by statute nor history and which constitutes an
indefensible barrier to prompt adjudication of constitutional
claims in the federal courts, is overruled. Pp.
391 U. S.
58-67.
383 F.2d 709, affirmed.
Page 391 U. S. 55
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), which
specifies that the United States District Courts may issue writs of
habeas corpus on behalf of prisoners who are "in custody in
violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States." The
question presented is whether a district court may entertain a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a prisoner incarcerated
under consecutive sentences who claims that a sentence that he is
scheduled to serve in the future is invalid because of a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court
considered this issue in
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.
S. 131 (1934), and held that the habeas corpus statute
does not authorize attacks upon future consecutive sentences. We
granted certiorari in this case to reexamine
McNally. 389
U.S. 1035 (1968). We conclude that the decision in that case was
compelled neither by statute nor by history and that today it
represents an indefensible barrier to prompt adjudication of
constitutional claims in the federal courts.
Respondents, Robert Rowe and Clyde Thacker, are serving prison
terms in the Virginia State Penitentiary. In June, 1963, Rowe was
sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment after a jury found him guilty
of rape. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to an indictment charging
him with felonious abduction with intent to defile arising from the
same events which had led to the rape conviction. [
Footnote 1] He
Page 391 U. S. 56
was sentenced to a 20-year term on this conviction to run
consecutively to the 30-year sentence. After exhausting state
remedies, [
Footnote 2] Rowe
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He did not
attack the rape conviction, but alleged that the conviction for
felonious abduction was constitutionally defective because he had
been subjected to double jeopardy, because his plea of guilty had
been involuntary, because the indictment had failed to state an
offense and because he had been inadequately represented by trial
counsel. Without reaching the merits of Rowe's claims, the District
Court denied relief. Applying
McNally, the court found
Rowe was then detained under the 30-year sentence for rape. Since
he did not claim that sentence was invalid, it was held that he was
not then "in custody" under an unconstitutionally imposed sentence
within the meaning of § 2241. The court concluded that it could not
entertain Rowe's challenge to the conviction for felonious
abduction until he was confined under the sentence imposed for that
conviction. That time would not arrive until 1993. [
Footnote 3]
Thacker's § 2241 petition in the Eastern District of Virginia
met a similar fate. He is imprisoned under a number of sentences
totaling more than 60 years. He asserted that three consecutive
five-year sentences imposed for housebreaking in 1953 were invalid
because of
Page 391 U. S. 57
inadequate representation by counsel at the time he entered
pleas of guilty. [
Footnote 4]
Finding that Thacker's attack on these sentences was premature
because he and not begun to serve them, the District Court
dismissed the petition "without prejudice to Thacker's
reapplication at the proper time." Under
McNally, the
"proper time" will be in 1994 when Thacker commences service of the
first of the three sentences he challenges. [
Footnote 5]
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consolidated the two
cases. After a hearing en banc, it reversed and remanded them to
the District Courts. 383 F.2d 709 (1967). Recognizing that the
District Courts had correctly applied
McNally, the Court
of Appeals declined to adhere to that decision. Writing for a
unanimous court, Chief Judge Haynsworth reasoned that this Court
would no longer follow
McNally, which in his view
represented a "doctrinaire approach" based on an "old
jurisdictional concept" which had been "thoroughly rejected by the
Supreme Court in recent cases." [
Footnote 6]
Id.
Page 391 U. S. 58
at 714. We are in complete agreement with this conclusion and
the considerations underlying it.
The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device for subjecting
executive, [
Footnote 7]
judicial, [
Footnote 8] or
private [
Footnote 9] restraints
on liberty to judicial scrutiny. Where it is available, it assures,
among other things, that a prisoner may require his jailer to
justify the detention under the law. [
Footnote 10] In England where it originated and in the
United States, this high purpose has made the writ both the symbol
and guardian of individual liberty. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries
*131-138;
See Ex parte
Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807);
Ex parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874);
Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86
(1923);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.
S. 458 (1938);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.
S. 443 (1953);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.
S. 391 (1963).
The habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts is
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Like the predecessor statute which
controlled in
McNally, [
Footnote 11] § 2241 provides for
Page 391 U. S. 59
the issuance of writs on behalf of persons "in custody." But the
statute does not attempt to define the terms "habeas corpus" or
"custody." Confronted with this fact, the Court in
McNally
reasoned that
"[t]o ascertain its meaning and the appropriate use of the writ
in the federal courts, recourse must be had to the common law . . .
and to the decisions of this Court interpreting and applying the
common law principles. . . ."
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. at
293 U. S. 136.
We need not look very far to discover three principal
characteristics of the writ as it had developed in the federal
courts even before the decision in
McNally. First, though
the writ in England had been utilized largely to secure the
admission to bail and discharge of prisoners, [
Footnote 12] its major office in the federal
courts since the Civil War has been to provide post-conviction
relief. [
Footnote 13]
Second, the partial codifications of the common law writ in England
and more recent legislation in this country have contained specific
and detailed provisions requiring
prompt adjudication of
the validity of the challenged restraint.
See and compare
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2; Act of February 5,
1867, c. 28, 14 Stat. 385, and 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Third, at least
tentatively in
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.
S. 309
Page 391 U. S. 60
(1915), and more clearly in
Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U. S. 86
(1923), this Court had recognized that a district court was
authorized to look behind the bare record of a trial proceeding and
conduct a factual hearing to determine the merits of alleged
deprivations of constitutional rights [
Footnote 14] -- a procedure that reached full
flowering in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.
S. 458 (1938). Thus, by the time
McNally was
decided, the federal writ of habeas corpus was substantially a
post-conviction device which could afford prompt adjudication of
factual as well as legal issues. Keeping these purposes of the writ
in mind, we turn to consideration of the
McNally holding
and the reasons which compel us to overrule it.
A federal jury had found McNally guilty of three counts of an
indictment charging offenses under the Motor Vehicle Theft Act (now
18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2313). [
Footnote 15] He had been sentenced to two years on the
first count and four years each on the second and third counts, the
sentences on the first and second counts to run concurrently
Page 391 U. S. 61
and the sentence on the third consecutively. In his application
in a district court for a writ of habeas corpus,
McNally
claimed that the indictment failed to state an offense as to the
third count. He did not attack the convictions under the first and
second counts. When he filed his petition, he was serving under the
second count. The lower courts denied relief on the merits. But
this Court affirmed on a jurisdictional ground, holding that,
because
McNally had not begun to serve the sentence on the
third count -- and therefore was not "in custody" under that
sentence -- his petition for relief was premature:
"[W]ithout restraint which is unlawful, the writ may not be
used. A sentence which the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot
be the cause of restraint which the statute makes the subject of
inquiry."
293 U.S. at
293 U. S. 138.
The effect of this disposition was ameliorated somewhat by the
Court's suggestion that McNally might seek relief by another route.
Id. at
293 U. S. 140.
See also Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.
S. 342,
313 U. S. 349
(1941).
But cf. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.
S. 546 (1941). Moreover, McNally's challenge was
directed at the face of the indictment. Therefore, postponement of
adjudication of his claims probably would not have resulted in the
loss of crucial evidence. But the harshness of a rule which may
delay determination of federal claims for decades becomes obvious
when applied to the cases of Rowe and Thacker. Their cases also
exemplify the manner in which the decision in
McNally cuts
against the prior and subsequent development of the writ in the
federal courts.
Both Rowe and Thacker allege that they were so inadequately
represented at trial that they were denied the assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Petitioner concedes that, but for
Page 391 U. S. 62
McNally, respondents' allegations would entitle them to
plenary hearings in the District Courts. Brief for Petitioner 6.
Yet, under the current schedules of confinement, it is argued,
neither Rowe nor Thacker may obtain adjudication of his claims
until after 1990. By that time, dimmed memories or the death of
witnesses is bound to render it difficult or impossible to secure
crucial testimony on disputed issues of fact. Of course, prejudice
to meritorious claims resulting from the kind of delay which
McNally imposes is not limited to situations involving
ineffective assistance of counsel. To name but a few examples,
factual determinations are often dispositive of claims of coerced
confession,
e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.
S. 433 (1961),
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.
S. 556 (1954); lack of competency to stand trial,
e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375
(1966), and denial of a fair trial,
e.g., Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333
(1966). Postponement of the adjudication of such issues for years
can harm both the prisoner and the State and lessens the
probability that final disposition of the case will do substantial
justice. [
Footnote 16] As
the Court of Appeals observed:
"Years hence, the prisoner, at least, may be expected to give
testimonial support to the allegations of his petition, but, if
they are false in fact, the Commonwealth of Virginia may be unable
to refute them because of the unavailability of records and of the
testimony of responsible officials and participants in the trial.
The greater the lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that
the state could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary.
It
Page 391 U. S. 63
is to the great interest of the Commonwealth and to the prisoner
to have these matters determined as soon as possible when there is
the greatest likelihood the truth of the matter may be established.
[
Footnote 17]"
383 F.2d at 715. Clearly, to the extent that the rule of
McNally postpones plenary consideration of issues by the
district courts, it undermines the character of the writ of habeas
corpus as the instrument for resolving fact issues not adequately
developed in the original proceedings. To that extent, it also
undermines
Moore v. Dempsey, supra, and is inconsistent
with subsequent decisions of this Court which have reaffirmed
Moore. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.
S. 458 (1938);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.
S. 443 (1953);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.
S. 391 (1963).
McNally is also at odds with the purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus in another respect. As noted above, a principal aim
of the writ is to provide for swift judicial review of alleged
unlawful restraints on liberty. Calendar congestion, considerations
of federalism,
see, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at
372 U. S.
415-420;
Ex parte
Royall,
Page 391 U. S. 64
117 U. S. 241
(1886), and the exigencies of appellate review account for largely
unavoidable delays in the processing of criminal cases. But the
prematurity rule of
McNally in many instances extends
without practical justification the time a prisoner entitled to
release must remain in confinement. Rowe and Thacker eventually may
establish that the convictions they challenge were obtained in
violation of the Constitution. If they do, each day they are
incarcerated under those convictions while their cases are in the
courts will be time that they might properly have enjoyed as free
men. Common sense dictates that prisoners seeking habeas corpus
relief after exhausting state remedies should be able to do so at
the earliest practicable time.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that
McNally is
inconsistent with the purposes underlying the federal writ of
habeas corpus. Moreover, in arriving at its decision, the Court in
McNally relied in part upon an unnecessarily narrow
interpretation of the habeas corpus statute. Standing alone, the
limitation of § 2241(c)(3) -- that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus
shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in
violation of the Constitution" -- is not free of ambiguity.
However, in common understanding "custody" comprehends respondents'
status for the entire duration of their imprisonment. Practically
speaking, Rowe is in custody for 50 years, or for the aggregate of
his 30- and 20-year sentences. For purposes of parole eligibility,
under Virginia law, he is incarcerated for 50 years. Va.Code Ann. §
53-251 (1967);
see n
3,
supra. Nothing on the face of § 2241 militates against
an interpretation which views Rowe and Thacker as being "in
custody" under the aggregate of the consecutive sentences imposed
on them. Under that interpretation, they are "in custody in
violation of the Constitution" if any consecutive sentence they are
scheduled to serve was imposed as the result
Page 391 U. S. 65
of a deprivation of constitutional rights. This approach to the
statute is consistent with the canon of construction that remedial
statutes should be liberally construed. It also eliminates the
inconsistencies between purpose and practice which flow from the
McNally holding. Meaningful factual hearings on alleged
constitutional deprivations can be conducted before memories and
records grow stale, and at least one class of prisoners will have
the opportunity to challenge defective convictions and obtain
relief without having to spend unwarranted months or years in
prison.
We find unpersuasive the arguments made in
McNally to
support the narrower interpretation of the custody requirement. No
prior decision of the Court was cited as clear authority for the
prematurity doctrine. [
Footnote
18] To fill the gap, the Court relied on the history of the
writ in England prior to 1789 and a line of reasoning whose
unexamined premise was doubtful before
McNally and was
subsequently rejected. Both the historical and conceptual bases of
the opinion are revealed in the Court's observation that
"[d]iligent search of the English authorities and the digests
before 1789 has failed to disclose any case where the writ was
sought or used . . . as a means of securing the judicial decision
of any question which, even if determined in the prisoner's favor,
could
Page 391 U. S. 66
not have resulted in his immediate release."
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. at
293 U. S.
137-138. To the extent that the Court thought that the
absence of eighteenth century English precedent demonstrated that
McNally was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, the
Court's reliance seems to have been misplaced. In light of the fact
that English judges had no power to impose cumulative punishment in
felony cases, [
Footnote 19]
and apparently did not assume such power in misdemeanor cases until
1769, [
Footnote 20] it is
not at all surprising that research failed to uncover a pre-1789
common law analogy for McNally's petition for relief. In any event,
the development of the writ of habeas corpus did not end in 1789.
What we said of the writ in a similar context in
Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236
(1963), is equally applicable here.
"[The writ] is not now and never has been a static, narrow,
formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand
purpose -- the protection of individuals against erosion of their
right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty."
Id. at
371 U. S.
243.
Of course, the excursion in
McNally into history to
determine that the writ of habeas corpus issued only to adjudicate
entitlement to "immediate release" was not unnecessary. Though
McNally held only that the petitioner did not meet the
custody requirements of the statute,
see Walker v.
Wainwright, 390 U. S. 335
(1968), that holding rested in part on the premise that physical
discharge from custody is the only relief available in a habeas
corpus proceeding. But the statute does not deny the federal courts
power to fashion appropriate relief other than immediate release.
Since 1874, the habeas
Page 391 U. S. 67
corpus statute has directed the courts to determine the facts
and dispose of the case summarily, "as law and justice require."
Rev.Stat. § 761 (1874), superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
Consistently with this command, this Court has held that a prisoner
whose first sentence parole was revoked upon a second conviction
could challenge the second conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding
though he would not be released if he prevailed,
Ex parte
Hull, 312 U. S. 546
(1941); that a person who was paroled after he filed his habeas
corpus petition could still obtain relief from the restraints
imposed by the parole conditions,
Jones v. Cunningham,
supra, and that a prisoner could attack the first of two
consecutive sentences in a federal habeas corpus proceeding even
though he would still be confined under the second sentence if he
succeeded,
Walker v. Wainwright, supra. See also
United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48,
153 U. S. 63-64
(1894). Thus, to the extent that
McNally relied on the
notion that immediate physical release was the only remedy under
the federal writ of habeas corpus, it finds no support in the
statute and has been rejected by this Court in subsequent
decisions.
We overrule
McNally, and hold that a prisoner serving
consecutive sentences is "in custody" under any one of them for
purposes of § 2241(c)(3). [
Footnote 21] This interpretation is consistent with the
statutory language and with the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus in the federal courts.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Rowe's initial plea of double jeopardy had been overruled by the
trial court.
[
Footnote 2]
Rowe had filed an application for state habeas corpus relief in
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. This petition was denied
under Virginia's version of the
McNally rule.
See
Peyton v. Williams, 206 Va. 595, 145 S.E.2d 147 (1965).
Subsequent to the decision below, the Virginia Legislature enacted
a statute, effective June 28, 1968, which will abolish the rule of
prematurity in the State.
See n 17,
infra.
[
Footnote 3]
If Rowe receives full credit for "good time," the 30-year
sentence will expire in 1982. Under the two sentences, he will be
eligible for parole in 1974. If he were relieved of the 20-year
term, he would be eligible for parole in 1970.
See Va.Code
Ann. § 53-251 (1967).
[
Footnote 4]
These sentences were originally suspended, but the suspension
was revoked in 1956.
[
Footnote 5]
If Thacker does not receive good time credit, he will commence
service of the three sentences in 2009. He will be eligible for
parole in 1976.
[
Footnote 6]
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case was
preceded by two cases in which it held that § 2241(c)(3) permits
attack upon a future consecutive sentence which affects or may
affect a prisoner's current parole eligibility.
Williams v.
Peyton, 372 F.2d 216 (C.A.4th Cir.1967);
Martin v.
Virginia, 349 F.2d 781 (C.A.4th Cir.1965). In
McNally, the Court rejected the prisoner's argument that
he was entitled to habeas corpus relief because he would be
eligible for parole if the challenged sentence were invalidated.
293 U.S. at
293 U. S. 134,
293 U. S. 140. In
Williams and
Martin, the Court of Appeals
concluded that this Court's decision in
Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236
(1963), represented a departure from this narrow reading of the
habeas corpus statute.
[
Footnote 7]
E.g., Darnel's Case ["Five Knights' Case"] 3 How.St.Tr.
1-59 (K.B. 1627);
Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866). The proceedings in
Darnel's Case are summarized in D. Meador, Habeas Corpus
and Magna Carta 13-16 (1966).
[
Footnote 8]
E.g., Bushel's Case, Jones, T. 13, 84 Eng.Rep. 1123
(K.B.);
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.
S. 335 (1968).
[
Footnote 9]
E.g., Rex v. Clarkson, 1 Strange 444, 93 Eng.Rep. 625
(K.B. 1721);
see Ford v. Ford, 371 U.
S. 187 (1962).
[
Footnote 10]
The indignation aroused by the decision in
Darnel's Case,
supra, n 7, led to
enactment in 1627 of the Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1, c. 1, which
condemned a return reciting that imprisonment was by "speciale
mandatum Domini Regis" as insufficient under "the law of the land."
See W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus 8-9
(2d ed. 1893). In the
United States, the Act of February
5, 1867, c. 28, 14 Stat. 385, made the writ available to "any
person . . . restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."
[
Footnote 11]
Rev.Stat. § 753 (1874). For a collection and discussion of the
federal habeas corpus statutes from the original Judiciary Act of
1789 to 1953,
see G. Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus
Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407 (1953).
[
Footnote 12]
The celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, was
concerned exclusively with providing an efficacious remedy for
pretrial imprisonment.
See W. Church, A Treatise on the
Writ of Habeas Corpus 21-32, 48-58 (2d ed. 1893).
[
Footnote 13]
This development is explained in part by this Court's
recognition that certain trial or sentencing defects could
invalidate the proceedings in a court which had jurisdiction over
the crime and the defendant,
e.g., 85 U.
S. 18 Wall. 163 (1874), by the Court's decisions
holding that some of the safeguards of criminal procedure embodied
in the Bill of Rights are applicable to state criminal proceedings
by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and by the requirement that a state prisoner exhaust state remedies
before applying for federal habeas corpus.
Ex parte
Royall, 117 U. S. 241
(1886); 28 U.S.C. § 2254;
see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.
S. 391,
372 U. S.
415-420 (1963).
[
Footnote 14]
The Court in
Frank recognized that the Act of February
5, 1867, c. 28, 14 Stat. 385, substituted
"for the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of
judicial authority under the common law practice . . . a more
searching investigation, in which the applicant is put upon his
oath to set forth the truth of the matter respecting the causes of
his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is
to 'dispose of the party as law and justice require.'"
237 U.S. at
237 U. S.
330-331. In
Moore, the Court remanded the case
to the District Court for determination of the truth of allegations
that the pervading influence of a mob had denied the appellants a
fair trial in the state court. 261 U.S. at
261 U. S.
92.
[
Footnote 15]
Because
McNally was imprisoned by federal authorities,
his application for habeas corpus relief could have rested on the
clause of Rev.Stat. § 753 (1874) which authorized federal courts to
entertain petitions from prisoners in the custody of the United
States. However, the Court's interpretation of the custody
requirement in
McNally was equally applicable to state
prisoners claiming their incarceration violated the Constitution.
E.g., Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200,
339 U. S. 203
(1950).
[
Footnote 16]
Even where resolution of constitutional claims turns on record
evidence, loss or destruction of a relevant document or failure to
transcribe the record over a period of years,
cf. Norvell v.
Illinois, 373 U. S. 420
(1963), could mean that a claim relegated to the limbo of
prematurity might never be adequately determined.
[
Footnote 17]
This consideration has led at least two States which previously
followed the prematurity doctrine to reject it in recent years.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213
A.2d 613 (1965); Ore.Rev.Stat. § 138.510 (1961).
See also
Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Ore. 205,
324 P.2d
475 (1958). California does not follow the
McNally
rule.
In re Chapman, 43 Cal. 2d
385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954). Finally, while this case was under
consideration in this Court, Virginia repudiated the prematurity
doctrine by statute.
See Va.S. No. 44, 1968 Sess.,
amending Va.Code Ann. § 8-596 (effective June 28, 1968). A
committee of the American Bar Association which is inquiring into
post-conviction remedies has recommended abandonment of the
prematurity doctrine which it calls "one of the most frustrating
elements of present post-conviction practice." Advisory Committee
on Sentencing and Review, A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies 43
(Tent.Draft 1967).
[
Footnote 18]
Of the prior decisions of this Court cited in
McNally,
only
In re Swan, 150 U. S. 637
(1893), suggested a rule of prematurity. Even in
Swan, the
Court held no more than that the prisoner was not entitled to
immediate discharge from confinement merely because the sentencing
judge had imposed an allegedly unauthorized fine in addition to a
valid prison term. 150 U.S. at
150 U. S. 653. In
at least two cases,
Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.
S. 632 (1915), and
Ex parte Spencer,
228 U. S. 652
(1913), the Court had reached the merits of habeas corpus
applications by prisoners who had not served the valid portions of
their sentences. Though relief was ultimately denied in
Morgan and
Spencer, they illustrate that the
prior decisions of the Court by no means compelled the
McNally result.
[
Footnote 19]
See Regina v. Albury, [1951] 1 All E.R. 491
(Crim.App.); 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England
291-292 (1883).
[
Footnote 20]
Wilkes v. Rex, 4 Bro.P.C. 360, 2 Eng.Rep. 244 (H.L.
1769).
[
Footnote 21]
We intimate no views on the merits of respondents' underlying
claims.