Petitioner, who was in a state prison, was questioned by an
Internal Revenue Service investigator about certain tax returns in
a "routine tax investigation," without any warnings that any
evidence he gave could be used against him, that he had a right to
remain silent, and a right to counsel, or that one would be
appointed for him if he was unable to afford counsel. Documents and
oral statements obtained from petitioner were introduced in his
criminal trial for filing false claims for tax refunds. He was
convicted, and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Held: Pursuant to
Miranda v. United States,
384 U. S. 436
(1966), petitioner was entitled to warnings of his right to be
silent and right to counsel. Tax investigations, which frequently
lead to criminal prosecution, are not immune from the
Miranda warning requirement to be given to a person in
custody, whether or not such custody is in connection with the case
under investigation. Pp.
391 U. S. 3-5.
376 F.2d 595, reversed and remanded.
Page 391 U. S. 2
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted by a jury in a United States District
Court on two counts charging that he knowingly filed false claims
against the Government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, [
Footnote 1] and sentenced to 30 months'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The
frauds charged were claims for tax refunds growing out of
petitioner's individual income taxes for 1960 and 1961. Both income
tax returns for these two years asserted receipts of income from
two different companies which the government agents were unable to
locate and which evidence offered tended to show were nonexistent.
The amount of income claimed in each tax return was calculated in
such a way as to show that these two nonexistent employers had
withheld taxes sufficient to justify substantial refunds to
petitioner. The Government paid the 1960 tax refund to petitioner
of $85.60 as claimed, but the record fails to show whether the 1961
claimed refund was paid. A part of the evidence on which the
conviction rested consisted of documents and oral statements
obtained from petitioner by a government agent while petitioner was
in prison serving a state sentence. Before eliciting this
information, the government agent did not not warn petitioner that
any evidence
Page 391 U. S. 3
he gave the Government could be used against him, and that he
had a right to remain silent if he desired as well as a right to
the presence of counsel, and that, if he was unable to afford
counsel, one would be appointed for him. At trial, petitioner
sought several times without success to have the judge hold
hearings out of the presence of the jury to prove that his
statements to the revenue agent were given without these warnings,
and should therefore not be used as evidence against him. For this
contention, he relied exclusively on our case of
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966). The District Court rejected this contention, as did the
Court of Appeals in affirming. 376 F.2d 595. We granted certiorari
to decide whether the
Miranda case calls for reversal. We
hold that it does.
There can be no doubt that the documents and oral statements
given by petitioner to the government agent and used against him
were strongly incriminating. [
Footnote 2] In the
Miranda case, this Court's
opinion stated at some length the constitutional reasons why one in
custody who is interrogated by officers about matters that might
tend to incriminate him is entitled to be warned
"that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for him
Page 391 U. S. 4
prior to any questioning if he so desires."
384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 479.
The Government here seeks to escape application of the
Miranda warnings on two arguments: (1) that these
questions were asked as a part of a routine tax investigation,
where no criminal proceedings might even be brought, and (2) that
the petitioner had not been put in jail by the officers questioning
him, but was there for an entirely separate offense. These
differences are too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from
the well considered conclusions of
Miranda with reference
to warnings to be given to a person held in custody.
It is true that a "routine tax investigation" may be initiated
for the purpose of a civil action, rather than criminal
prosecution. To this extent, tax investigations differ from
investigations of murder, robbery, and other crimes. But tax
investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, just as
the one here did. In fact, the last visit of the revenue agent to
the jail to question petitioner took place only eight days before
the full-fledged criminal investigation concededly began. And, as
the investigating revenue agent was compelled to admit, there was
always the possibility during his investigation that his work would
end up in a criminal prosecution. We reject the contention that tax
investigations are immune from the
Miranda requirements
for warnings to be given a person in custody.
The Government also seeks to narrow the scope of the
Miranda holding by making it applicable only to
questioning one who is "in custody" in connection with the very
case under investigation. There is no substance to such a
distinction, and, in effect, it goes against the whole purpose of
the
Miranda decision, which was designed to give
meaningful protection to Fifth Amendment rights. We find nothing in
the
Miranda opinion which calls for a curtailment of the
warnings to be given persons
Page 391 U. S. 5
under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the
person is in custody. In speaking of "custody," the language of the
Miranda opinion is clear and unequivocal:
"To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized."
384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 478.
And the opinion goes on to say that the person so held must be
given the warnings about his right to be silent and his right to
have a lawyer.
Thus, the courts below were wrong in permitting the introduction
of petitioner's self-incriminating evidence given without warning
of his right to be silent and right to counsel. The cause is
reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
18 U.S.C. § 287 provides:
"Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the
civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any
department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United
States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to
be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
[
Footnote 2]
Internal Revenue Agent Lawless testified that, on October 30,
1964, he interviewed petitioner in the Florida State Penitentiary
to determine if the 1960 return had been prepared by petitioner and
to obtain petitioner's consent in writing to extend the statute of
limitations on the 1960 return. At this interview, petitioner
identified the 1960 tax return and the signature thereon as his; he
also signed the extension form. Again, on March 2, 1965, Agent
Lawless interviewed petitioner at the penitentiary, and this time
petitioner identified the 1961 tax return and signature thereon as
his and signed an extension form for this return.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE
STEWART join, dissenting.
I dissented from the Court's decision in
Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966), because I thought that the Court had accepted an
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment having "no significant
support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the
Fifth Amendment," 384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 526,
and because I disagreed with the Court's "assessment of the [new]
rule's consequences measured against community values," 384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 537.
I continue to believe that the decision in
Miranda was an
extravagant and unwise interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, and I
would prefer that
Miranda be abandoned,
Page 391 U. S. 6
thus avoiding the reversal of this criminal conviction because
of introduction at trial of statements by the petitioner that were
unquestionably voluntary by traditional standards but were made
without the petitioner's having received the so-called
Miranda warnings. However, even were I to agree that
Miranda was correctly decided, I would not join the
unexplained extension which the Court gives
Miranda in
this case. At issue are two questions [
Footnote 2/1] asked of petitioner by an Internal Revenue
agent in the course of a civil investigation. The interview was
indistinguishable from the thousands of inquiries into tax
liability made annually as a necessary adjunct to operation of our
tax system. The Court said in
Miranda that "proper
safeguards" were needed for "in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime," 384 U.S. at
384 U. S. 467.
In this case, the majority states that criminal investigation of
Mathis began soon after the second of the visits to him of Revenue
Agent Lawless. This suggests a view, unsupported by the record
before us, that the civil investigation had raised suspicions of
criminal conduct by Mathis at the time of this visit. [
Footnote 2/2] However, the majority also
says that "tax investigations frequently lead to criminal
prosecutions,"
Page 391 U. S. 7
a hint that any in-custody questioning by an employee of the
Government must be preceded by warnings if it is within the
immensely broad area of investigations which "frequently lead" to
criminal inquiries. Fortunately, voluntary compliance with civil
regulation is widespread in this country. Nevertheless, compliance
must be supplemented and encouraged by constant and widespread
investigations, during which questions are asked and data are
requested by employees of the Government whose goal is only to
settle fairly the civil accounts between the United States and its
citizens. Sometimes, of course, the possibility of a criminal
violation is discovered through such inquiries. I had not thought
that
Miranda extended its checklist of warnings to these
civil investigations. Certainly the explanation of the need for
warnings given in the
Miranda opinion does not cover civil
investigations, and the Court's opinion in this case furnishes no
additional support.
The Court is equally cavalier in concluding that petitioner was
"in custody" in the sense in which that phrase was used in
Miranda. The State of Florida was confining petitioner at
the time he answered Agent Lawless' questions. But
Miranda
rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction, but on a
conclusion that coercion -- pressure to answer questions -- usually
flows from a certain type of custody, police station interrogation
of someone charged with or suspected of a crime. Although
petitioner was confined, he was at the time of interrogation in
familiar surroundings. Neither the record nor the Court suggests
reasons why petitioner was "coerced" into answering Lawless'
questions any more than is the citizen interviewed at home by a
revenue agent or interviewed in a Revenue Service office to which
citizens are requested to come for interviews. The
Page 391 U. S. 8
rationale of
Miranda has no relevance to inquiries
conducted outside the allegedly hostile and forbidding atmosphere
surrounding police station interrogation of a criminal suspect. The
Court's willingness to reverse without explaining why the reasons
given for the
Miranda decision have any relevance to the
facts of this case is deeply troubling.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Petitioner was asked whether tax returns received by the
Government bearing his name had, in fact, been prepared by him and
whether he would consent to an extension of the statute of
limitations for causes of action arising from those returns.
[
Footnote 2/2]
A civil investigator is required, whenever and as soon as he
finds "definite indications of fraud or criminal potential," to
refer a case to the Intelligence Division for investigation by a
different agent who works regularly on criminal matters. In the
case before us, such a reference was made eight days after the
second visit to petitioner by Agent Lawless. The criminal agent
visited petitioner, gave him the full set of "
Miranda
warnings," and was told petitioner did not wish to discuss the case
with him. No further questions were asked.