Petitioners claim that respondents, Chairman of the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and
the Subcommittee's chief counsel, tortiously entered into and
participated in a conspiracy with Louisiana officials to seize
petitioners' property and records in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Louisiana courts held the arrests and searches illegal.
Here, the court below, while recognizing difficulty in concluding
that there were no disputed issues of fact respecting petitioners'
claim, upheld summary dismissal of the action on the ground of
respondents' legislative immunity.
Held: Since there is no evidence of the respondent
Chairman's "involvement in any activity that could result in
liability," the complaint as to him was properly dismissed. The
doctrine of legislative immunity protects
"legislators engaged 'in the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity,' . . . not only from the consequences of litigation's
results, but also from the burden of defending themselves."
However, the doctrine of legislative immunity is less absolute
when applied to officers or employees of legislative bodies. There
is a sufficient factual dispute with respect to the alleged
participation in the conspiracy of the subcommittee's chief counsel
to require that a trial be had. The legal consequences of such
participation, if it occurred, cannot be determined prior to the
factual refinement of trial. The judgment below is therefore
reversed as to the subcommittee's chief counsel. 123
U.S.App.D.C.190, 358 F.2d 821, affirmed in part and reversed and
remanded in part.
PER CURIAM.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
sustained the order granting summary judgment
Page 387 U. S. 83
to the respondents who are, respectively, the Chairman and
counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee of the United States Senate. Petitioners' claim is
essentially that respondents tortiously entered into and
participated in a conspiracy and concert of action with Louisiana
officials to seize property and records of petitioners by unlawful
means in violation of petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. The
circumstances of the searches and arrests involved are set forth in
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479
(1965), and in Judge Wisdom's dissenting opinion in the District
Court in that case,
227 F.
Supp. 556, 573 (D.C.E.D.La.1964). Louisiana courts held the
arrests and searches illegal because the warrants secured by the
police had not been supported by a showing of probable cause. In a
civil suit by these same petitioners against the Louisiana
officials allegedly involved in the conspiracy, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversing a summary judgment in favor
of third-party defendants, held that plaintiffs had raised a
genuine issue of material fact whether the Chairman
"and the other members of the [State] Committee were 'acting in
the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,' which would entitle
them to immunity."
Pfister v. Arceneaux, 376 F.2d 821.
In the present case, the court below recognized "considerable
difficulty" in reaching the conclusion that, on the basis of the
affidavits of the parties, there were no disputed issues of fact
with respect to petitioners' claim. It nevertheless upheld summary
dismissal of the action on the ground that
"the record before the District Court contained unchallenged
facts of a nature and scope sufficient to give [respondents] an
immunity against answerability in damages. . . ."
In support of this conclusion, the court addressed itself to
only that part of petitioners' claims which related to the
take-over of the records by
Page 387 U. S. 84
respondents after the "raids." As to this, it held that the
subject matter of the seized records was within the jurisdiction of
the Senate Subcommittee, and that the issuance of subpoenas to the
Louisiana committee to obtain the records held by it was validated
by subsequent Subcommittee ratification. On this basis, the court
held that the acts for which petitioners seek relief were
privileged, citing
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367 (1951).
The court did not specifically comment upon petitioners'
contention that the record shows a material dispute of fact as to
their claim that respondent Sourwine actively collaborated with
counsel to the Louisiana committee in making the plans for the
allegedly illegal "raids" pursuant to the claimed authority of the
Louisiana committee and on its behalf, in which petitioners claim
that their property and records were seized in violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights. In the absence of the factual refinement
which can occur only as a result of trial, we need not and, indeed,
could not, express judgment as to the legal consequences of such
collaboration, if it occurred.
There is controverted evidence in the record, such as the date
appearing on certain documents which respondents' evidence disputes
as a typographical error, which affords more than merely colorable
substance to petitioners' assertions as to respondent Sourwine. We
make no comment as to whether this evidence, standing alone, would
be sufficient to support a verdict in petitioners' favor against
respondent Sourwine, or would require a verdict in his favor. But
we believe that, as against an employee of the committee, this
showing is sufficient to entitle petitioners to go to trial. In
respect of respondent Eastland, we agree with the lower courts that
petitioners' complaint must be dismissed. The record does not
contain evidence of his involvement in any activity that could
result in liability. It is the purpose and office of
Page 387 U. S. 85
the doctrine of legislative immunity, having its roots as it
does in the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution,
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168,
103 U. S. 204
(1881), that legislators engaged "in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity,"
Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341
U.S. at
341 U. S. 376,
should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's
results, but also from the burden of defending themselves. This
Court has held, however, that this doctrine is less absolute,
although applicable, when applied to officers or employees of a
legislative body, rather than to legislators themselves. As the
Court said in
Tenney v. Brrandhove, supra, the doctrine,
in respect of a legislator, "deserves greater respect than where an
official acting on behalf of the legislature is sued. . . ."
* 341 U.S. at
341 U. S. 378.
Cf. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647
(1963). In light of this principle, we are compelled to hold that
there is a sufficient factual dispute with respect to respondent
Sourwine to require reversal of the judgment below as to him.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Court of Appeals as to
respondent Eastland and reverse and remand to the District Court as
to respondent Sourwine for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
* As the Court pointed out in
Tenney, supra (per
Frankfurter, J.), in
Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, this
Court "allowed a judgment against the Sergeant-at-Arms, but found
that one could not be entered against the defendant members of the
House." 341 U.S. at
341 U. S.
378.