In December 1957 Ringold and Rosenkranz applied for a patent on
an allegedly novel process for making certain steroids, claiming
priority as of December, 1956. A patent issued thereon in 1959. In
January, 1960, respondent filed an application to patent the same
process, asserting that he had discovered it prior to December,
1956, and requesting that an "interference" be declared to test the
issue of priority. Respondent's application was denied by a Patent
Office examiner, the Board of Appeals affirming, for failure "to
disclose any utility for" the compound produced by the process. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed, holding that,
"where a claimed process produces a known product, it is not
necessary to show utility for the product" as long as it is not
detrimental to the public interest.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1256 to review
upon petition of the Commissioner of Patents patent decisions of
the CCPA. Pp.
383 U. S.
523-528.
2. The Patent Office properly may refuse to declare an
"interference" on the ground that the application therefor fails to
disclose a
prima facie case of patentability. P.
383 U. S. 528,
n 12.
3. The practical utility of the compound produced by a chemical
process is an essential element in establishing a
prima
facie case for the patentability of the process. Pp.
383 U. S.
528-536.
(a) One may patent only that which is useful. Pp.
383 U. S.
528-529,
383 U. S.
535.
(b) Respondent has not provided any basis for overturning the
determination of the Patent Office that the utility requirement was
not satisfied in this case by reference to the alleged utility of
an adjacent homologue. Pp.
383 U. S. 531-532.
(c) The requirement that a chemical process be useful is not
satisfied by a showing that the compound yielded belongs to a class
of compounds which scientists are screening for possible uses. Pp.
383 U. S.
532-536.
Page 383 U. S. 520
(d) Nor is the utility requirement for chemical processes
satisfied by a showing that the process works,
i.e.,
yields the intended product. Pp.
383 U. S.
532-536.
52 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 739, 333 F.2d 234, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two questions of importance to the
administration of the patent laws: first, whether this Court has
certiorari jurisdiction, upon petition of the Commissioner of
Patents, to review decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals; and second, whether the practical utility of the compound
produced by a chemical process is an essential element in
establishing a
prima facie case for the patentability of
the process. The facts are as follows:
In December, 1957, Howard Ringold and George Rosenkranz applied
for a patent on an allegedly novel process for making certain known
steroids. [
Footnote 1] They
claimed
Page 383 U. S. 521
priority as of December 17, 1956, the date on which they had
filed for a Mexican patent. United States Patent No. 2,908,693
issued late in 1959.
In January, 1960, respondent Manson, a chemist engaged in
steroid research, filed an application to patent precisely the same
process described by Ringold and Rosenkranz. He asserted that it
was he who had discovered the process, and that he had done so
before December 17, 1956. Accordingly, he requested that an
"interference" be declared in order to try out the issue of
priority between his claim and that of Ringold and Rosenkranz.
[
Footnote 2]
A Patent Office examiner denied Manson's application, and the
denial was affirmed by the Board of Appeals within the Patent
Office. The ground for rejection was the failure "to disclose any
utility for" the chemical compound produced by the process. Letter
of Examiner, dated May 24, 1960. This omission was not
Page 383 U. S. 522
cured, in the opinion of the Patent Office, by Manson's
reference to an article in the November, 1956, issue of the Journal
of Organic Chemistry, 21 J.Org.Chem. 1333-1335, which revealed that
steroids of a class which included the compound in question were
undergoing screening for possible tumor-inhibiting effects in mice,
and that a homologue [
Footnote
3] adjacent to Manson's steroid had proven effective in that
role. Said the Board of Appeals,
"It is our view that the statutory requirement of usefulness of
a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens to be
closely related to another compound which is known to be
useful."
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (hereinafter CCPA)
reversed, Chief Judge Worley dissenting. 52 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 739,
745, 333 F.2d 234, 237-238. The court held that Manson was entitled
to a declaration of interference, since, "where a claimed process
produces a known product, it is not necessary to show utility for
the product" so long as the product "is not alleged to be
detrimental to the public interest." Certiorari was granted, 380
U.S. 971, to resolve this running dispute over what constitutes
"utility" in chemical process claims, [
Footnote 4] as well as to answer the question concerning
our certiorari jurisdiction.
Page 383 U. S. 523
I
Section 1256 of Title 28 U.S.C. (1964 ed.), enacted in 1948,
provides that "Cases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari." This
unqualified language would seem to foreclose any challenge to our
jurisdiction in the present case. Both the Government [
Footnote 5] and the respondent urge
that we have certiorari jurisdiction over patent decisions of the
CCPA, although the latter would confine our jurisdiction to those
petitions filed by dissatisfied applicants, and would deny the
Commissioner of Patents the right to seek certiorari. [
Footnote 6] This concert of opinion
does not settle the basic question, because jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by consent of the parties. The doubt that does exist
stems from a decision of this
Page 383 U. S. 524
Court, rendered in January, 1927, in
Postum Cereal Co. v.
California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693,
which has been widely interpreted as precluding certiorari
jurisdiction over patent and trademark decisions of the CCPA.
Postum, however, was based upon a statutory scheme
materially different from the present one.
Postum involved
a proceeding in the Patent Office to cancel a trademark. The
Commissioner of Patents rejected the application. An appeal was
taken to the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
which, in 1927, exercised the jurisdiction later transferred to the
CCPA. Under the statutory arrangement in effect at the time, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals was not definitive, because it was
not an order to the Patent Office determinative of the controversy.
A subsequent bill in equity could be brought in the District Court,
and it was possible that a conflicting adjudication could thus be
obtained. On this basis, the Court held that it could not review
the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals was an "administrative decision," rather
than a "judicial judgment":
"merely an instruction to the Commissioner of Patents by a court
which is made part of the machinery of the Patent Office for
administrative purposes."
272 U.S. at
272 U. S.
698-699. Therefore, this Court concluded, the proceeding
in the Court of Appeals -- essentially administrative in nature --
was neither case nor controversy within the meaning of Article III
of the Constitution. Congress might confer such "administrative"
tasks upon the courts of the District of Columbia, wrote Chief
Justice Taft, but it could not empower this Court to participate
therein.
Congress soon amended the statutory scheme. In March of 1927, it
provided that an action in the District Court was to be
alternative, and not cumulative, to appellate review, that it could
not be maintained to overcome
Page 383 U. S. 525
an adjudication in the Court of Appeals. [
Footnote 7] In 1929, Congress transferred
appellate jurisdiction over the Commissioner's decisions from the
Court of Appeals to what had been the Court of Customs Appeals and
was now styled the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. [
Footnote 8] Whereas the Court of
Appeals had been empowered to take additional evidence and to
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, the CCPA was
confined to the record made in the Patent Office. [
Footnote 9]
Compare Federal
Communications Comm'n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U. S. 134,
309 U. S.
144-145. Despite these changes, however,
Postum
had acquired a life of its own. It continued to stand in the way of
attempts to secure review here of CCPA decisions respecting the
Commissioner of Patents.
See, e.g., McBride v. Teeple, 311
U.S. 649, denying certiorari for "want of jurisdiction" on the
authority of Postum. [
Footnote
10]
This was the background against which Congress, in its 1948
codification of statutes pertaining to the judiciary, enacted §
1256, blandly providing in unqualified language for review on
certiorari of "[c]ases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals."
Nothing in the legislative materials relating to the statute,
except its language, is of assistance to us in the resolution of
the present problem: did the statutory changes which followed
Page 383 U. S. 526
Postum mean that a patent decision by the CCPA was a
"judicial" determination reviewable by this Court under Article
III? And, if so, was § 1256 intended to create such
jurisdiction?
Assistance came with the 1958 revision of the Judicial Code.
Congress there declared the CCPA "a court established under article
III . . . ," that is, a constitutional court exercising judicial,
rather than administrative, power. 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964 ed.). In
1962, this Court addressed itself to the nature and status of the
CCPA.
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.
S. 530, raised the question whether a judge of the CCPA
was an Article III judge, capable of exercising federal judicial
power. In answering that question in the affirmative, MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN's opinion, for three of the seven Justices participating,
expressly left open the question whether § 1256 conferred
certiorari jurisdiction over patent and trademark cases decided in
the CCPA, 370 U.S. at
370 U. S. 578
n. 49. It suggested, however, that
Postum might be nothing
more than a museum piece. The opinion noted that
Postum
"must be taken to be limited to the statutory scheme in existence
before" 1929. 370 U.S. at
370 U. S. 579.
The concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, in which THE CHIEF
JUSTICE joined, did not reflect any difference on this point.
Thus, the decision sought to be reviewed is that of an Article
III court. It is "judicial" in character. It is not merely an
instruction to the Commissioner or part of the "administrative
machinery" of the Patent Office. It is final and binding in the
usual sense. [
Footnote 11]
In sum,
Postum
Page 383 U. S. 527
has no vitality in the present setting, and there remains no
constitutional bar to our jurisdiction.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we have no difficulty in
giving full force and effect to the generality of the language in §
1256. It would be entirely arbitrary for us to assume, despite the
statutory language, that Congress, in 1948, intended to enshrine
Postum -- dependent as it was upon a statutory scheme
fundamentally altered in 1927 and 1929 -- as a hidden exception to
the sweep of § 1256. The contrary is more plausible: that, by using
broad and unqualified language, Congress intended our certiorari
jurisdiction over CCPA cases to be as broad as the Constitution
permits.
This conclusion is reinforced by reference to the anomalous
consequences which would result were we to adopt a contrary view of
§ 1256. Determinations of the Patent Office may be challenged
either by appeal to the CCPA or by suit instituted in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C. §
145, 28 U.S.C. § 1542 (1964 ed.). Where the latter route is
elected, the decision obtained may be reviewed in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and ultimately in
this Court upon writ of certiorari.
Hoover Co. v. Coe,
325 U. S. 79. It
would be strange indeed if corresponding certiorari jurisdiction
did not exist where the alternative route was elected. Were that
so, in the event of conflict between the CCPA and the courts of the
District of Columbia, resolution by this Court would be achievable
only if the litigants chose to proceed through the latter.
Obviously, the orderly administration both of our certiorari
jurisdiction and of the patent laws requires that ultimate review
be available in this Court, regardless of the route chosen by the
litigants.
Page 383 U. S. 528
We therefore conclude that § 1256 authorizes the grant of
certiorari in the present case. We now turn to the merits.
[
Footnote 12]
II
Our starting point is the proposition, neither disputed nor
disputable, that one may patent only that which is
Page 383 U. S. 529
"useful." In
Graham v. John Deere Co., ante, p.
383 U. S. 1 at
383 U. S. 5-10, we
have reviewed the history of the requisites of patentability, and
it need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the concept of
utility has maintained a central place in all of our patent
legislation, beginning with the first patent law in 1790 [
Footnote 13] and culminating in the
present law's provision that
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title. [
Footnote 14]"
As is so often the case, however, a simple, everyday word can be
pregnant with ambiguity when applied to the facts of life. That
this is so is demonstrated by the present conflict between the
Patent Office and the CCPA over how the test is to be applied to a
chemical process which yields an already known product whose
utility -- other than as a possible object of scientific inquiry --
has not yet been evidenced. It was not long ago that agency and
court seemed of one mind on the question. In
Application of
Bremner, 37 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1032, 1034, 182 F.2d 216, 217, the
court affirmed rejection by the Patent Office of both process and
product claims. It noted that "no use for the products claimed to
be developed by the processes had been shown in the specification."
It held that "It was never intended that a patent be granted upon a
product, or a process producing a product, unless such product be
useful." Nor was this new doctrine in the court.
See Thomas v.
Michael, 35 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1036, 1038-1039, 166 F.2d 944,
946-947.
Page 383 U. S. 530
The Patent Office has remained steadfast in this view. The CCPA,
however, has moved sharply away from
Bremner. The trend
began in
Application of Nelson, 47 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1031,
280 F.2d 172. There, the court reversed the Patent Office's
rejection of a claim on a process yielding chemical intermediates
"useful to chemists doing research on steroids," despite the
absence of evidence that any of the steroids thus ultimately
produced were themselves "useful." The trend has accelerated,
[
Footnote 15] culminating in
the present case, where the court held it sufficient that a process
produces the result intended and is not "detrimental to the public
interest." 52 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) at 745, 333 F.2d at 238.
It is not remarkable that differences arise as to how the test
of usefulness is to be applied to chemical processes. Even if we
knew precisely what Congress meant in 1790 when it devised the "new
and useful" phraseology and in subsequent reenactments of the test,
we should have difficulty in applying it in the context of
contemporary chemistry, where research is as comprehensive as man's
grasp and where little or nothing is wholly beyond the pale of
"utility" -- if that word is given its broadest reach.
Respondent does not -- at least in the first instance -- rest
upon the extreme proposition, advanced by the court below, that a
novel chemical process is patentable so long
Page 383 U. S. 531
as it yields the intended product [
Footnote 16] and so long as the product is not itself
"detrimental." Nor does he commit the outcome of his claim to the
slightly more conventional proposition that any process is "useful"
within the meaning of § 101 if it produces a compound whose
potential usefulness is under investigation by serious scientific
researchers, although he urges this position, too, as an
alternative basis for affirming the decision of the CCPA. Rather,
he begins with the much more orthodox argument that his process has
a specific utility which would entitle him to a declaration of
interference even under the Patent Office's reading of § 101. The
claim is that the supporting affidavits filed pursuant to Rule
204(b), by reference to Ringold's 1956 article, reveal that an
adjacent homologue of the steroid yielded by his process has been
demonstrated to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice, and that
this discloses the requisite utility. We do not accept any of these
theories as an adequate basis for overriding the determination of
the Patent Office that the "utility" requirement has not been
met.
Even on the assumption that the process would be patentable were
respondent to show that the steroid produced had a tumor-inhibiting
effect in mice, [
Footnote
17] we would
Page 383 U. S. 532
not overrule the Patent Office finding that respondent has not
made such a showing. The Patent Office held that, despite the
reference to the adjacent homologue, respondent's papers did not
disclose a sufficient likelihood that the steroid yielded by his
process would have similar tumor-inhibiting characteristics.
Indeed, respondent himself recognized that the presumption that
adjacent homologues have the same utility [
Footnote 18] has been challenged in the steroid
field because of "a greater known unpredictability of compounds in
that field." [
Footnote 19]
In these circumstances and in this technical area, we would not
overturn the finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board
of Appeals and not challenged by the CCPA.
The second and third points of respondent's argument present
issues of much importance. Is a chemical process "useful" within
the meaning of § 101 either (1) because it works --
i.e.,
produces the intended product? or (2) because the compound yielded
belongs to a class of compounds now the subject of serious
scientific investigation? These contentions present the basic
problem for our adjudication. Since we find no specific assistance
in the legislative materials underlying § 101, we are remitted to
an analysis of the problem in light of the general intent of
Congress, the purposes of the patent system, and the implications
of a decision one way or the other.
In support of his plea that we attenuate the requirement of
"utility," respondent relies upon Justice Story's
Page 383 U. S. 533
well known statement that a "useful" invention is one
"which may be applied to a beneficial use in society, in
contradistinction to an invention injurious to the morals, health,
or good order of society, or frivolous and insignificant [
Footnote 20]"
-- and upon the assertion that to do so would encourage
inventors of new processes to publicize the event for the benefit
of the entire scientific community, thus widening the search for
uses and increasing the fund of scientific knowledge. Justice
Story's language sheds little light on our subject. Narrowly read,
it does no more than compel us to decide whether the invention in
question is "frivolous and insignificant" -- a query no easier of
application than the one built into the statute. Read more broadly,
so as to allow the patenting of any invention not positively
harmful to society, it places such a special meaning on the word
"useful" that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that
Congress so intended. There are, after all, many things in this
world which may not be considered "useful" but which, nevertheless
are totally without a capacity for harm.
It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent
system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning
discoveries and inventions. [
Footnote 21] And it may be that inability to patent a
process to some extent discourages disclosure and leads to greater
secrecy than would otherwise be the case. The inventor of the
process, or the corporate organization by which he is employed, has
some incentive to keep the invention
Page 383 U. S. 534
secret while uses for the product are searched out. However, in
light of the highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that
they disclose as little useful information as possible -- while
broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible -- the
argument based upon the virtue of disclosure must be warily
evaluated. Moreover, the pressure for secrecy is easily
exaggerated, for if the inventor of a process cannot himself
ascertain a "use" for that which his process yields, he has every
incentive to make his invention known to those able to do so.
Finally, how likely is disclosure of a patented process to spur
research by others into the uses to which the product may be put?
To the extent that the patentee has power to enforce his patent,
there is little incentive for others to undertake a search for
uses.
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging
disclosure and of inhibiting secrecy, we believe a more compelling
consideration is that a process patent in the chemical field, which
has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific
utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted
only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until the process claim
has been reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the
metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise
delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable
area. Such a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, [
Footnote 22] without compensating benefit to the public.
The basic
quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution
and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit
derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.
Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point
-- where specific benefit
Page 383 U. S. 535
exists in currently available form -- there is insufficient
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove
to be a broad field.
These arguments for and against the patentability of a process
which either has no known use or is useful only in the sense that
it may be an object of scientific research would apply equally to
the patenting of the product produced by the process. Respondent
appears to concede that, with respect to a product, as opposed to a
process, Congress has struck the balance on the side of
nonpatentability unless "utility" is shown. Indeed, the decisions
of the CCPA are in accord with the view that a product may not be
patented absent a showing of utility greater than any adduced in
the present case. [
Footnote
23] We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that,
although Congress intended that no patent be granted on a chemical
compound whose sole "utility" consists of its potential role as an
object of use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to apply
to the process which yielded the unpatentable product. [
Footnote 24] That proposition seems
to us little more than an attempt to evade the impact of the rules
which concededly govern patentability of the product itself.
This is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of
contributions to the fund of scientific information
Page 383 U. S. 536
short of the invention of something "useful," or that we are
blind to the prospect that what now seems without "use" may
tomorrow command the grateful attention of the public. But a patent
is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion. "[A] patent system must
be related to the world of commerce, rather than to the realm of
philosophy. . . ." [
Footnote
25]
The judgment of the CCPA is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, while acquiescing in Part I of the Court's
opinion, dissents on the merits of the controversy for
substantially the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.
[
Footnote 1]
The applicants described the products of their process as
"2-methyl dihydrotestosterone derivatives and esters thereof, as
well as 2-methyl dihydrotestosterone derivatives having a C-17
lower alkyl group. The products of the process of the present
invention have a useful high anabolic-androgenic ratio, and are
especially valuable for treatment of those ailments where an
anabolic or anti-estrogenic effect, together with a lesser
androgenic effect, is desired."
[
Footnote 2]
35 U.S.C. § 135 (1964 ed.) provides:
"Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the
opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending
application, or with any unexpired patent, he shall give notice
thereof. . . . The question of priority of invention shall be
determined by a board of patent interferences . . . whose decision,
if adverse to the claim of an applicant, shall constitute the final
refusal by the Patent Office of the claims involved, and the
Commissioner may issue a patent to the applicant who is adjudged
the prior inventor. . . ."
Patent Office Rule 204(b), 37 CFR § 1.204(b), provides:
"When the filing date or effective filing date of an applicant
is subsequent to the filing date of a patentee, the applicant,
before an interference will be declared, shall file an affidavit
that he made the invention in controversy in this country, before
the filing date of the patentee . . . and, when required, the
applicant shall file an affidavit . . . setting forth facts which
would
prima facie entitle him to an award of priority
relative to the filing date of the patentee."
Judge Thurman Arnold has provided an irreverent description of
the way patent claims, including "interferences," are presented to
the Patent Office.
See Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe, 79
U.S.App.D.C. 155, 145 F.2d 18.
[
Footnote 3]
"A homologous series is a family of chemically related
compounds, the composition of which varies from member to member by
CH(2) (one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen). . . .
Chemists knowing the properties of one member of a series would, in
general, know what to expect in adjacent members."
Application of Henze, 37 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1009, 1014, 181
F.2d 196, 200-201.
See also In re Hass, 31 C.C.P.A.(Pat.)
895, 901, 141 F.2d 122, 125;
Application of Norris, 37
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 876, 179 F.2d 970;
Application of Jones, 32
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1020, 149 F.2d 501. With respect to the inferior
predictability of steroid homologues,
see infra, p.
383 U. S.
532.
[
Footnote 4]
In addition to the clear conflict between the Patent Office and
the CCPA, there arguably exists one between the CCPA and the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
See Petrocarbon
Limited v. Watson, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 247 F.2d 800,
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 955.
But see Application of
Szwarc, 50 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1571, 1576-1583, 319 F.2d 277,
281-286.
[
Footnote 5]
The present case is the first in which the Government has taken
the position that § 1256 confers jurisdiction upon this Court to
review patent decisions in the CCPA. Prior to
Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, the
Government was of the view that the Court lacked jurisdiction.
See, e.g., the Brief in Opposition in
Dalton v.
Marzall, No. 87, O.T. 1951,
cert. denied, 342 U.S.
818. After the decision in
Glidden, discussed
infra at
383 U. S. 526,
the Government conceded the issue was a close one.
See,
e.g., Brief in Opposition in
In re Gruschwitz, No.
579, O.T. 1963,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 967.
[
Footnote 6]
We find no warrant for this curious limitation either in the
statutory language or in the legislative history of § 1256. Nor do
we find persuasive the circumstance that the Commissioner may not
appeal adverse decisions of the Board of Appeals. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141,
142, and 145 (1964 ed.). As a member of the Board and the official
responsible for selecting the membership of its panels, 35 U.S.C. §
7 (1964 ed.), the Commissioner may be appropriately considered as
bound by Board determinations. No such consideration operates to
prevent his seeking review of adverse decisions rendered by the
CCPA.
[
Footnote 7]
Act of March 2, 1927, c. 273, § 11, 44 Stat. 1335, 1336.
See
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra, at
370 U. S.
572-579; Kurland & Wolfson, Supreme Court Review of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 18 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 192
(1950). This remains the law. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145.
[
Footnote 8]
Act of March 2, 1929, c. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.
[
Footnote 9]
See Kurland & Wolfson,
op. cit. supra,
n 7 at 196.
[
Footnote 10]
Apart from
Postum, until enactment of § 1256 in 1948,
there existed no statutory basis for jurisdiction in these cases.
See Robertson & Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States, § 251 (Wolfson & Kurland ed.
1951).
[
Footnote 11]
This is not to say that a CCPA determination that an applicant
is entitled to a patent precludes a contrary result in a subsequent
infringement suit, any more than issuance of a patent by the Patent
Office or the decision in an earlier infringement action against a
different "infringer" has that effect.
See, e.g., Graham v.
John Deere Co., ante, p.
383 U. S. 1 at
383 U. S. 4. We
review decisions of the District Court under 35 U.S.C. § 145
although these are subject to the same measure of readjudication in
infringement suits.
See Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U. S.
79.
[
Footnote 12]
Respondent and the
amicus curiae take a different view
than does the Government of precisely what the issue on the merits
is. They argue that the issue of "patentability" is not properly
before us, that the issue actually presented is whether the Primary
Examiner in the Patent Office has authority under Rule 204(b)
himself to evaluate the sufficiency of affidavits submitted under
that Rule.
Both the Board of Appeals and the CCPA rejected this view and
focused instead on the question of what averments satisfy the
statutory requirement that a claimed chemical process be "useful."
We agree. First, the issue of "patentability" cannot be foreclosed
by the circumstance that the Patent Office -- which, according to
counsel for respondent, processes some 1,800 claims and issues 700
patents each week -- has already issued a patent to Ringold and
Rosenkranz, who asserted in their claim that their process yielded
useful products.
See note
1 supra. Second, there is no basis for the proposition
that, even where an applicant for an interference presents a claim
which, on its face, is unpatentable, a complicated and frequently
lengthy factual inquiry into priority of invention must inexorably
take place. On the contrary, Rule 201(a), 37 CFR § 1.201(a),
defines an interference proceeding as one involving
"two or more parties claiming substantially the same
patentable invention, and may be instituted as soon as it
is determined that common
patentable subject matter is
claimed. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
See Application of Rogoff, 46
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 733, 739, 261 F.2d 601, 606:
"The question as to patentability of claims to an applicant must
be determined before any question of interference arises and claims
otherwise unpatentable to an applicant cannot be allowed merely in
order to set up an interference."
See also Wirkler v. Perkins, 44 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1005,
1008, 245 F.2d 502, 504.
Cf. Glass v. De Roo, 44
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 723, 239 F.2d 402.
The current version of Rule 203(a), 37 CFR § 1.203(a), makes it
explicit that the examiner, "[b]efore the declaration of
interference," must determine the patentability of the claim as to
each party.
See also Rule 237, 37 CFR § 1.237.
[
Footnote 13]
See Act of April 10, 1790, c. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Act of
Feb. 21, 1793, c. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Act of July 4, 1836, c. 357, 5
Stat. 117; Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198; Rev.Stat. §
4886 (1874).
[
Footnote 14]
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964 ed.).
[
Footnote 15]
Thus, in
Application of Wilke, 50 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 964,
314 F.2d 558, the court reversed a Patent Office denial of a
process claim, holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964 ed.) was
satisfied even though the specification recited only the manner in
which the process was to be used and not any use for the products
thereby yielded.
See also Application of Adams, 50
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1185, 316 F.2d 476.
In
Application of Szwarc, 50 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1571, 319
F.2d 277, the court acknowledged that its view of the law
respecting utility of chemical processes had changed since
Bremner. See generally Note, The Utility
Requirement in the Patent Law, 53 Geo.L.J. 154, 175-181 (1964).
[
Footnote 16]
Respondent couches the issue in terms of whether the process
yields a "known" product. We fail to see the relevance of the fact
that the product is "known," save to the extent that references to
a compound in scientific literature suggest that it might be a
subject of interest and possible investigation.
[
Footnote 17]
In light of our disposition of the case, we express no view as
to the patentability of a process whose sole demonstrated utility
is to yield a product shown to inhibit the growth of tumors in
laboratory animals.
See Application of Hitchings, 52
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1141, 342 F.2d 80;
Application of Bergel,
48 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1102, 292 F.2d 955;
cf. Application of
Dodson, 48 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1125, 292 F.2d 943;
Application
of Krimmel, 48 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1116, 292 F.2d 948. For a Patent
Office view,
see Marcus, The Patent Office and
Pharmaceutical Invention, 47 J.Pat.Off.Soc. 669, 673-676
(1965).
[
Footnote 18]
See n 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 19]
See respondent's letter requesting amendment, dated
July 21, 1960, Record, pp. 20-23.
See also Application of
Adams, 50 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1185, 1190, 316 F.2d 476, 479-480
(concurring-dissenting opinion). In the present case, the Board of
Appeals found support in the Ringold article itself for the view
that "minor changes in the structure of a steroid may produce
profound changes in its biological activity." Record, p. 52.
[
Footnote 20]
Note on the Patent Laws, 3 Wheat.App. 13, 24.
See also
Justice Story's decisions on circuit in
Lowell v. Lewis,
15 Fed.Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C.C.D.Mass.), and
Bedford v.
Hunt, 3 Fed.Cas. 37 (No. 1217) (C.C.D.Mass.).
[
Footnote 21]
"As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure,
the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor
who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret."
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co.,
322 U. S. 471,
322 U. S.
484.
[
Footnote 22]
See Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 155,
158-161, 145 F.2d 18, 21-24.
[
Footnote 23]
See, e.g., the decision below, 52 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) at
744, 333 F.2d at 237.
See also Application of Bergel, 48
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) at 1105, 292 F.2d at 958.
Cf. Application of
Nelson, 47 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) at 1043-1044, 280 F.2d at 180-181;
Application of Folkers, 52 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1269, 344 F.2d
970.
[
Footnote 24]
The committee reports which preceded enactment of the 1952
revision of the patent laws disclose no intention to create such a
dichotomy, and in fact provide some evidence that the contrary was
assumed. Sen.Rep.No.1979, Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 5, 17; H.R.Rep.No.1923, Committee on the Judiciary, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 17.
Cf. Hoxie, A Patent Attorney's
View, 47 J.Pat.Off.Soc. 630, 636 (1965).
[
Footnote 25]
Application of Ruschig, 52 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1238, 1245,
343 F.2d 965, 970 (Rich, J.).
See also Katz v. Horni Signal
Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961 (C.A.2d Cir.).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
While I join the Court's opinion on the issue of certiorari
jurisdiction, I cannot agree with its resolution of the important
question of patentability.
Respondent has contended that a workable chemical process, which
is both new and sufficiently nonobvious to satisfy the patent
statute, is, by its existence alone, a contribution to chemistry
and "useful" as the statute employs that term. [
Footnote 2/1] Certainly this reading of "useful" in
the statute is within the scope of the constitutional grant, which
states only that, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts," the exclusive right to "Writings and Discoveries" may be
secured for limited times to those who produce them. Art. I, § 8.
Yet the patent statute is somewhat differently worded, and is,
on
Page 383 U. S. 537
its face, open both to respondent's construction and to the
contrary reading given it by the Court. In the absence of
legislative history on this issue, we are thrown back on policy and
practice. Because I believe that the Court's policy arguments are
not convincing, and that past practice favors the respondent, I
would reject the narrow definition of "useful" and uphold the
judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (hereafter
CCPA).
The Court's opinion sets out about half a dozen reasons in
support of its interpretation. Several of these arguments seem to
me to have almost no force. For instance, it is suggested that,
"[u]ntil the process claim has been reduced to production of a
product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly
are not capable of precise delineation"
(p.
383 U. S. 534,
ante) and "[i]t may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps
unknowable area" (p.
383 U. S. 534,
ante). I fail to see the relevance of these assertions;
process claims are not disallowed because the products they produce
may be of "vast" importance nor, in any event, does advance
knowledge of a specific product use provide much safeguard on this
score or fix "metes and bounds" precisely since a hundred more uses
may be found after a patent is granted and greatly enhance its
value.
The further argument that an established product use is part of
"[t]he basic
quid pro quo" (p.
383 U. S. 534,
ante) for the patent or is the requisite "successful
conclusion" (p.
383 U. S. 536,
ante) of the inventor's search appears to beg the very
question whether the process is "useful" simply because it
facilitates further research into possible product uses. The same
infirmity seems to inhere in the Court's argument that chemical
products lacking immediate utility cannot be distinguished for
present purposes from the processes which create them, that
respondent appears to concede and the CCPA holds that
Page 383 U. S. 538
the products are nonpatentable, and that, therefore, the
processes are nonpatentable. Assuming that the two classes cannot
be distinguished, a point not adequately considered in the briefs,
and assuming further that the CCPA has firmly held such products
nonpatentable, [
Footnote 2/2] this
permits us to conclude only that the CCPA is wrong either as to the
products or as to the processes, and affords no basis for deciding
whether both or neither should be patentable absent a specific
product use.
More to the point, I think, are the Court's remaining,
prudential arguments against patentability: namely, that disclosure
induced by allowing a patent is partly undercut by patent
application drafting techniques, that disclosure may occur without
granting a patent, and that a patent will discourage others from
inventing uses for the product. How far opaque drafting may lessen
the public benefits resulting from the issuance of a patent is not
shown by any evidence in this case, but, more important, the
argument operates against all patents, and gives no reason for
singling out the class involved here. The thought that these
inventions may be more likely than most to be disclosed even if
patents are not allowed may have more force; but, while empirical
study of the industry might reveal that chemical researchers would
behave in this fashion, the abstractly logical choice for them
seems to me to maintain secrecy until a product use can be
discovered. As to discouraging the search by
Page 383 U. S. 539
others for product uses, there is no doubt this risk exists, but
the price paid for any patent is that research on other uses or
improvements may be hampered because the original patentee will
reap much of the reward. From the standpoint of the public
interest, the Constitution seems to have resolved that choice in
favor of patentability.
What I find most troubling about the result reached by the Court
is the impact it may have on chemical research. Chemistry is a
highly interrelated field, and a tangible benefit for society may
be the outcome of a number of different discoveries, one discovery
building upon the next. To encourage one chemist or research
facility to invent and disseminate new processes and products may
be vital to progress, although the product or process be without
"utility" as the Court defines the term, because that discovery
permits someone else to take a further but perhaps less difficult
step leading to a commercially useful item. In my view, our
awareness in this age of the importance of achieving and
publicizing basic research should lead this Court to resolve
uncertainties in its favor, and uphold the respondent's position in
this case.
This position is strengthened, I think, by what appears to have
been the practice of the Patent Office during most of this century.
While available proof is not conclusive, the commentators seem to
be in agreement that, until
Application of Bremner, 37
C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1032, 182 F.2d 216, in 1950, chemical patent
applications were commonly granted although no resulting end use
was stated or the statement was in extremely broad terms. [
Footnote 2/3] Taking this to be true,
Bremner represented
Page 383 U. S. 540
a deviation from established practice which the CCPA has now
sought to remedy in part only to find that the Patent Office does
not want to return to the beaten track. If usefulness was typically
regarded as inherent during a long and prolific period of chemical
research and development in this country, surely this is added
reason why the Court's result should not be adopted until Congress
expressly mandates it, presumably on the basis of empirical data
which this Court does not possess.
Fully recognizing that there is ample room for disagreement on
this problem when, as here, it is reviewed in the abstract, I
believe the decision below should be affirmed.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The statute in pertinent part is set out in the Court's opinion,
p.
383 U. S. 529,
ante.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Any concession by respondent would hardly be controlling on an
issue of this general importance, but I am less clear than the
Court that such a concession exists.
See, e.g., Brief for
Respondent, p. 53. As to the CCPA, it is quite true that that court
purports in the very case under review and in others to distinguish
product patents, although its actual practice may be somewhat less
firm.
See Application of Adams, 50 C.C.PA.(Pat.) 1185, 316
F.2d 476.
Application of Nelson, 47 C.C.P.A.(Pat.) 1031,
280 F.2d 172.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See, e.g., the statement of a Patent Office
Examiner-in-Chief:
"Until recently, it was also rather common to get patents on
chemical compounds in cases where no use was indicated for the
claimed compounds or in which a very broad indication or suggestion
as to use was included in the application. (
Bremner and
another later ruling) . . . have put an end to this practice."
Wolffe, Adequacy of Disclosure as Regards Specific Embodiment
and Use of Invention, 41 J.Pat.Off.Soc. (1959). The Government's
brief in this case is in accord:
"[I]t was apparently assumed by the Patent Office [prior to
1950] . . . that chemical compounds were necessarily useful . . . ,
and that specific inquiry beyond the success of the process was
therefore unnecessary. . . ."
Brief for the Commissioner, p. 25.
See also Cohen &
Schwartz, Do Chemical Intermediates Have Patentable Utility? 29
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 87, 91 (1960); Note, 53 Geo.L.J. 154, 183 (1964);
14 Am.U.L.Rev. 78 (1964).