For the purpose of peaceably protesting the denial of their
constitutional right to equal treatment in a public facility,
petitioners, five Negroes, entered the public room of a regional
library operated on a segregated basis by the Louisiana parishes
where they lived and another parish. No one was in the library room
except petitioners and the library assistant. Petitioner Brown
requested a book. The library assistant, after checking, advised
that the library did not have the book, but that she would request
it from the State Library and that Brown would be notified upon its
receipt. (The book was mailed to him at a later date, with
instructions to mail it back or deliver it to the library's "Blue"
bookmobile, a facility reserved for Negroes only.) Thereafter the
library assistant asked petitioners to leave. But, for the purpose
of manifesting silent protest against the library's segregation
policy, Brown sat down and the others stood near him. There was no
noise or boisterous talking. The branch librarian also asked
petitioners to leave, but they remained. In about 10 or 15 minutes
from the time petitioners entered the library, the sheriff and
deputies arrived, having been forewarned, asked petitioners to
leave, and were told that they would not. The sheriff then arrested
them. Subsequently, petitioners were convicted for violating the
Louisiana breach of the peace statute, which makes it a crime "with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby" to crowd
or congregate in a public building and fail or refuse to disperse
or move on when ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer or
other authorized person.
Held: The decision below is reversed. Pp.
383 U. S.
133-151.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, concluded that:
1. There is not the slightest evidence to sustain application of
the breach of the peace statute to petitioners, since there was
nothing to indicate an intent by them to provoke a breach of the
peace and there were no circumstances to indicate that such a
breach might be occasioned, the demonstration having been peaceful,
orderly, and unprovocative, and no patrons having been
Page 383 U. S. 132
present in the library. Petitioners' conduct was considerably
less disruptive than in any of the preceding three situations in
which this Court invalidated convictions under the same Louisiana
statute or its predecessor,
Garner v. Louisiana,
36 U. S. 157;
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154; and
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536. Pp.
383 U. S.
133-135,
383 U. S.
139-140.
2. The rights of peaceable and orderly protest which petitioners
were exercising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are not
confined to verbal expression, but embrace other types of
expression, including appropriate silent and reproachful presence,
such as petitioners used here. Therefore, even if such action came
within the statute, it would have to be held that the statute could
not constitutionally reach petitioners' actions in the
circumstances of this case. Pp.
383 U. S.
141-142.
3. Regulation of libraries and other public facilities must be
reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and may not be used as a pretext
for punishing those who exercise their constitutional rights. P.
383 U. S.
143.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concluded that:
The Louisiana breach of the peace statute is unconstitutional
for overbreadth, as this Court held in
Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U. S. 536. No
intervening limiting construction or legislative revision of the
statute, and no circumstance of this case, make that declaration of
invalidity any less controlling here. Pp.
383 U. S.
143-150.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concluded that:
Petitioners' convictions must be reversed, since, on this
record, it is shown that they were making only normal and
authorized use of the public library by remaining 10 minutes after
ordering a book. Pp.
383 U. S.
150-151.
Reversed.
Page 383 U. S. 133
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS announced the judgment of the Court and an
opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS
join.
This is the fourth time in little more than four years that this
Court has reviewed convictions by the Louisiana courts for alleged
violations, in a civil rights context, of that State's breach of
the peace statute. In the three preceding cases, the convictions
were reversed.
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.
S. 157, decided in December, 1961, involved sit-ins by
Negroes at lunch counters catering only to whites.
Taylor v.
Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154,
decided in June, 1962, concerned a sit-in by Negroes in a waiting
room at a bus depot, reserved "for whites only."
Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536,
decided in January, 1965, involved the leader of some 2,000 Negroes
who demonstrated in the vicinity of a courthouse and jail to
protest the arrest of fellow demonstrators. In each of these cases,
the demonstration was orderly. In each, the purpose of the
participants was to protest the denial to Negroes of rights
guaranteed them by state and federal constitutions and to petition
their governments for redress of grievances. In none was there
evidence that the participants planned or intended disorder. In
none were there circumstances which might have led to a breach of
the peace chargeable to the protesting participants. [
Footnote 1]
Page 383 U. S. 134
In
Garner, the Court found the record utterly barren of
evidence to support convictions under Title 14, Article 103(7) of
the Louisiana Criminal Code, which then defined the crime of
"disturbing the peace" in specific detail. [
Footnote 2] The record contained no evidence of
boisterous or disorderly actions or of "passive conduct likely to
cause a public disturbance." 368 U.S. at
368 U. S.
173-174. In
Taylor, which arose under the
Louisiana statute as amended to read in its present form,
see p.
383 U. S. 138,
infra, the Court, in a per curiam opinion, set aside the
convictions despite evidence of "restlessness" among the white
onlookers. Finally, in
Cox, the Court held that the fact
would not permit application of Louisiana's breach of the peace
statute despite the large scale of the demonstrations and the fact
that petitioner's speech occasioned "grumbling" on the part of
white onlookers. Petitioner and the demonstrators as a group,
though "well behaved," were far from silent, 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 543,
379 U. S. 546.
[
Footnote 3] As an
"additional
Page 383 U. S. 135
reason" why the conviction could not be sustained, the Court,
citing
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S.
1, and
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.
S. 229, held that, were the statute to be defined and
applied as the Louisiana Supreme Court had done, it would be
unconstitutional because the vagueness and breadth of the
definition "would allow persons to be punished merely for
peacefully expressing unpopular views." 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 551.
See Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at
372 U. S.
237.
Since the present case was decided under precisely the statute
involved in
Cox, but before our decision in that case was
announced, it might well be supposed that, without further ado, we
would vacate and remand in light of
Cox. But because the
incident leading to the present convictions occurred in a public
library, and might be thought to raise materially different
questions, we have heard argument and have considered the case
in extenso.
The locus of the events was the Audubon Regional Library in the
town of Clinton, Louisiana, Parish of East Feliciana. The front
room of the building was used as a public library facility, where
patrons might obtain library services. It was a small room,
containing two tables and one chair (apart from the branch
assistant's desk and chairs), a stove, a card catalogue, and open
book shelves. The room was referred to by the regional librarian,
Mrs. Perkins, as "the adult reading room, the adult service room."
The library permitted "registered borrowers" to "browse" among the
books in the room or to borrow books. A "registered borrower" was
one who could produce an identification card showing that he was
registered by the Audubon Regional Library. Other space in the
building included the headquarters of the regional library.
The Audubon Regional Library is operated jointly by the Parishes
of East Feliciana, West Feliciana, and St. Helena. It has three
branches and two bookmobiles.
Page 383 U. S. 136
The bookmobiles served 33 schools, both white and Negro, as well
as "individuals." One of the bookmobiles was red, the other blue.
The red bookmobile served only white persons. The blue bookmobile
served only Negroes. It is a permissible inference that no Negroes
used the branch libraries. [
Footnote 4]
The registration cards issued to Negroes were stamped with the
word "Negro." A Negro in possession of such a card was entitled to
borrow books, but only from the blue bookmobile. A white person
could not receive service from the blue bookmobile. He would have
to wait until the red bookmobile came around, or would have to go
to a branch library.
This tidy plan was challenged on Saturday, March 7, 1964, at
about 11:30 a.m. Five young Negro males, all residents of East or
West Feliciana Parishes, went into the adult reading or service
room of the Audubon Regional Library at Clinton. The branch
assistant, Mrs. Katie Reeves, was alone in the room. She met the
men "between the tables" and asked if she "could help." Petitioner
Brown requested a book, "The Story of the Negro" by Arna Bontemps.
Mrs. Reeves checked the card catalogue, ascertained that the Branch
did not have the book, so advised Mr. Brown, and told him that she
would request the book from the State Library, that he would be
notified upon its receipt, and that "he could either pick it up or
it would be mailed to him." She told him that "his point of service
was a bookmobile, or it could be mailed to him." Mrs. Reeves
testified that she expected that the men would then leave; they did
not, and she asked them to leave. They did not. Petitioner Brown
sat down, and the others stood near him. They said nothing; there
was no noise or boisterous talking.
Page 383 U. S. 137
Mrs. Reeves called Mrs. Perkins, the regional librarian, who was
in another room. Mrs. Perkins asked the men to leave. They
remained.
Neither Mrs. Reeves nor Mrs. Perkins had called the sheriff, but
in 10 to 15 minutes from the time of the arrival of the men at the
library, the sheriff and deputies arrived. The sheriff asked the
Negroes to leave. They said they would not. The sheriff then
arrested them. The sheriff had been notified that morning that
members of the Congress of Racial Equality "were going to sit-in"
at the library. Ordinarily, the sheriff testified, CORE tells him
when they are going to demonstrate or picket. The sheriff was
standing at his "place of business" when he saw "these 5 colored
males coming down the street." He saw them enter the library. He
called the jail to notify his deputies, and he reached the library
immediately after the deputies got there. When the sheriff arrived,
there was no noise, no disturbance. He testified that he arrested
them "for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an
officer."
The library obtained the requested book and mailed it to Mr.
Brown on March 28, 1964. An accompanying card said, "You may return
the book either by mail or to the Blue Bookmobile." The reference
to the color of the vehicle was obviously not designed to
facilitate identification of the library vehicle. The blue
bookmobile is for Negroes, and for Negroes only.
In the course of argument before this Court, counsel for both
the State and petitioners stated that the Clinton Branch was closed
after the incident of March 7. Counsel for the State also advised
the court that the use of cards stamped "Negro" continues to be the
practice of the regional library.
On March 25, 1964, Mr. Brown and his four companions were tried
and found guilty. Brown was sentenced to pay $150 and costs, and,
in default thereof, to spend
Page 383 U. S. 138
90 days in the parish jail. His companions were sentenced to $35
and costs, or 15 days in jail. The charge was that they had
congregated together in the public library of Clinton, Louisiana,
"with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace and under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace might be occasioned
thereby," and had failed and refused "to leave said premises when
ordered to do so" by the librarian and by the sheriff.
The Louisiana breach of peace statute under which they were
accused reads as follows:
"Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned
thereby: (1) crowds or congregates with others . . . in . . . a . .
. public place or building . . . and who fails or refuses to
disperse and move on, or disperse or move on, when ordered so to do
by any law enforcement officer . . . or any other authorized person
. . . shall be guilty of disturbing the peace. [
Footnote 5]"
Under Louisiana law, these convictions were not appealable.
See Garner v. Louisiana, supra, at
368 U. S.
161-162. Petitioners sought discretionary review by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which denied their application, finding no
error. This Court granted certiorari, 381 U.S. 901, and we
reverse.
We may briefly dispose of certain threshold problems.
Petitioners cannot constitutionally be convicted merely because
they did not comply with an order to leave the library.
See
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87,
382 U. S. 90-91;
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284,
373 U. S.
291-293;
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U. S.
61;
cf. Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at
379 U. S. 579
(separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK). The statute itself reads
in the conjunctive; it requires both the defined breach of peace
and an order to move on. Without reference to the statute, it
Page 383 U. S. 139
must be noted that petitioners' presence in the library was
unquestionably lawful. It was a public facility, open to the
public. Negroes could not be denied access, since white persons
were welcome.
Wright v. Georgia, supra, at
373 U. S. 292;
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526;
Johnson v. Virginia, supra. Petitioners' deportment while
in the library was unexceptionable. They were neither loud,
boisterous, obstreperous, indecorous nor impolite. There is no
claim that, apart from the continuation -- for ten or fifteen
minutes -- of their presence itself, their conduct provided a basis
for the order to leave, or for a charge of breach of the peace.
We come, then, to the bare bones of the problem. Petitioners,
five adult Negro men, remained in the library room for a total of
ten or fifteen minutes. The first few moments were occupied by a
ritualistic request for service and a response. We may assume that
the response constituted service, and we need not consider whether
it was merely a gambit in the ritual. This ceremony being out of
the way, the Negroes proceeded to the business in hand. They sat
and stood in the room, quietly, as monuments of protest against the
segregation of the library. They were arrested and charged and
convicted of breach of the peace under a specific statute.
If we compare this situation with that in
Garner, we
must inevitably conclude that here, too, there is not the slightest
evidence which would or could sustain the application of the
statute to petitioners. The statute requires a showing either of
"intent to provoke a breach of the peace," or of "circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned" by the acts in
question. There is not in this case the slightest hint of either.
We need not be beguiled by the ritual of the request for a copy of
"The Story of the Negro." We need not assume that petitioner Brown
and his friends were in search of a book for night reading. We
instead rest upon the
Page 383 U. S. 140
manifest fact that they intended to and did stage a peaceful and
orderly protest demonstration, with no "intent to provoke a breach
of the peace."
See Garner v. Louisiana, supra,at
368 U. S.
174.
Nor were the circumstances such that a breach of the peace might
be "occasioned" by their actions, as the statute alternatively
provides. The library room was empty, except for the librarians.
There were no other patrons. There were no onlookers except for the
vigilant and forewarned sheriff and his deputies. Petitioners did
nothing and said nothing even remotely provocative. The danger, if
any existed, was surely less than in the course of the sit-in at
the "white" lunch counters in
Garner. And surely there was
less danger that a breach of the peace might occur from Mrs. Katie
Reeves and Mrs. Perkins in the adult reading room of the Clinton
Branch Library than that disorder might result from the "restless"
white people in the bus depot waiting room in
Taylor, or
from the 100 to 300 "grumbling" white onlookers in
Cox.
But, in each of these cases, this Court refused to countenance
convictions under Louisiana's breach of the peace statute.
The argument of the State of Louisiana, however, is that the
issue presented by this case is much simpler than our statement
would indicate. The issue, asserts the State, is simply that
petitioners were using the library room "as a place in which to
loaf or make a nuisance of themselves." The State argues that the
"test" -- the permissible civil rights demonstration -- was
concluded when petitioners entered the library, asked for service,
and were served. Having satisfied themselves, the argument runs,
that they could get service, they should have departed. Instead,
they simply sat there, "staring vacantly," and this was "enough to
unnerve a woman in the situation Mrs. Reeves was in."
Page 383 U. S. 141
This is a piquant version of the affair, but the matter is
hardly to be decided on points. It was not a game. It could not be
won so handily by the gesture of service to this particular
request. There is no dispute that the library system was
segregated, and no possible doubt that these petitioners were there
to protest this fact. But even if we were to agree with the State's
ingenuous characterization of the events, we would have to reverse.
There was no violation of the statute which petitioners are accused
of breaching; no disorder, no intent to provoke a breach of the
peace, and no circumstances indicating that a breach might be
occasioned by petitioners' actions. The sole statutory provision
invoked by the State contains not a word about occupying the
reading room of a public library for more than 15 minutes, any more
than it purports to punish the bare refusal to obey an unexplained
command to withdraw from a public street,
see Garner,
supra, or public building. We can find nothing in the language
of the statute, in fact, which would elevate the giving of cause
for Mrs. Reeves' discomfort, however we may sympathize with her, to
a crime against the State of Louisiana.
Cf. Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87,
382 U. S. 101
(concurring opinion).
But there is another and sharper answer which is called for. We
are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right --
the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing
freedom of speech and of assembly, and freedom to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. The Constitution of the
State of Louisiana reiterates these guaranties.
See Art.
I, §§ 3, 5. As this Court has repeatedly stated, [
Footnote 6] these
Page 383 U. S. 142
rights are no confined to verbal expression. They embrace
appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a
peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful
presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be,
the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities. [
Footnote 7] Accordingly, even if the
accused action were within the scope of the statutory instrument,
we would be required to assess the constitutional impact of its
application, and we would have to hold that the statute cannot
constitutionally be applied to punish petitioners' actions in the
circumstances of this case.
See Edwards v. South Carolina,
supra, at
372 U. S. 235
. The statute was deliberately and purposefully applied solely to
terminate the reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the
right to protest the unconstitutional segregation of a public
facility. Interference with this right, so exercised, by state
action is intolerable under our Constitution.
Wright v.
Georgia, supra, at
373 U. S.
292.
It is an unhappy circumstance that the locus of these events was
a public library -- a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and
to beauty. It is a sad commentary that this hallowed place in the
Parish of East Feliciana bore the ugly stamp of racism. It is sad,
too, that it was a public library which, reasonably enough in the
circumstances, was the stage for a confrontation between those
discriminated against and the representatives of the offending
parishes. Fortunately, the circumstances here were such that no
claim can be made that use of the library by others was disturbed
by the demonstration. Perhaps the time and method were carefully
chosen with this in mind. Were it otherwise, a factor not present
in this case would have to be considered. Here, there was no
disturbance of others, no disruption of library activities, and no
violation of any library regulations.
Page 383 U. S. 143
A State or its instrumentality may, of course, regulate the use
of its libraries or other public facilities. But it must do so in a
reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, equally applicable to all
and administered with equality to all. It may not do so as to some
and not as to all. It may not provide certain facilities for whites
and others for Negroes. And it may not invoke regulations as to use
-- whether they are
ad hoc or general -- as a pretext for
pursuing those engaged in lawful, constitutionally protected
exercise of their fundamental rights.
Cf. Wright v. Georgia,
supra, at
373 U. S.
293.
The decision below is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Participants in an orderly demonstration in a public place are
not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of
the constitutionally protected demonstration itself, that their
critics might react with disorder or violence.
See Cox v.
Louisiana, supra, at
379 U. S.
551-552;
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.
S. 284;
cf. Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U. S. 1.
Compare Feiner v. New York, 340 U.
S. 315, where one speaker was haranguing 75 or 80
"restless" listeners;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U. S. 568
("fighting words");
cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268,
340 U. S. 289
(concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
See generally, on
the problem of the "heckler's veto," Kalven, The Negro and the
First Amendment, pp. 140-160 (1965).
[
Footnote 2]
The statute then read:
"Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in
such a manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the
public:"
"(1) Engaging in a fistic encounter; or"
"(2) Using of any unnecessarily loud, offensive, or insulting
language; or"
"(3) Appearing in an intoxicated condition; or"
"(4) Engaging in any act in a violent and tumultuous manner by
any three or more persons; or"
"(5) Holding of an unlawful assembly; or"
"(6) Interruption of any lawful assembly of people; or"
"(7) Commission of any other act in such a manner as to
unreasonably disturb or alarm the public."
[
Footnote 3]
While it was not disputed that the demonstration was "orderly
and well controlled," the demonstrators clapped and sang, and
petitioner spoke in protest of arrests of certain other civil
rights demonstrators. In addition to the breach of the peace
charge, Cox was charged with obstructing public passageways and
with demonstrating near a courthouse. Convictions on these grounds
were also reversed.
See 379 U. S. 379 U.S.
536,
379 U. S. 559.
[
Footnote 4]
The inference finds support in testimony both of the sheriff and
of Mrs. Laura Spears, a witness for the defense who was employed as
the assistant in charge of the blue bookmobile.
[
Footnote 5]
La.Rev.Stat. § 14:103.1 (Cum.Supp.1962).
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.
S. 415,
371 U. S.
428-431;
Garner v. Louisiana, supra, at
368 U. S. 201
(separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN);
NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449,
357 U. S.
460-463;
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.
S. 359,
283 U. S. 369.
See Kalven,
op. cit. supra, n 1 at 129-138.
[
Footnote 7]
Cf. Wright v. Georgia, supra.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
Petitioners were charged with and convicted of violating the
Louisiana statute, § 14:103.1, which provides:
"Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned
thereby . . . crowds or congregates with others . . . in or upon .
. . a public street or public highway, or upon a public sidewalk,
or any other public place or building . . . and who fails or
refuses to disperse and move on . . . when ordered so to do by any
law enforcement officer of any municipality, or parish, in which
such act or acts are committed, or by any law enforcement officer
of the state of Louisiana, or any other authorized person . . .
shall be guilty of disturbing the peace."
La.Rev.Stat. § 14:103.1 (Cum.Supp.1962).
In
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536,
379 U. S.
551-552, the Court declared this statute as construed
unconstitutional for overbreadth: it "is unconstitutional in that
it sweeps within its broad scope activities that are
constitutionally protected free speech and assembly." This holding
was
Page 383 U. S. 144
concurred in by my Brothers BLACK,
379 U. S. 379 U.S.
559 at
379 U. S.
576-580, HARLAN and WHITE,
id. at
379 U. S. 591.
No limiting construction [
Footnote
2/1] or legislative revision [
Footnote 2/2] has intervened, and no circumstance of
this case makes that declaration of invalidity less controlling
here. The overbreadth of the statute recognized in
Cox
therefore requires the reversal of these convictions.
The appellants in
Cox were convicted for their conduct
on public streets and sidewalks, while petitioners here were
convicted for their conduct in a public library. Because of this,
it is contended in dissent,
post, p.
383 U. S. 157,
that
Cox and this case involve different "phases" of §
14:103.1 -- a "public street and sidewalk phase," in contrast to a
"public building phase." Insofar as this dissection of the statute
is meaningful, it does not make the holding of
Cox
inapplicable; [
Footnote 2/3] both
phases are overbroad, and the overbreadth of each poses a serious
threat to the exercise of constitutional rights.
First. The overbreadth of § 14:103.1 discerned in
Cox did not inhere in the terms "public street" or "public
sidewalk"; it inhered in the phrase "breach of the peace," as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to mean "to agitate,
to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to
hinder, to disquiet." 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 551.
Nothing in the Louisiana courts' decisions in this case rejects
this interpretation of the phrase "breach of the peace" for the
public building phase of
Page 383 U. S. 145
§ 14:103.1; nor is there anything about a public building that
would make this definition of the proscribed conduct
inapplicable.
The public building phase of § 14:103.1, especially when read in
context of the other phases, is not, contrary to the dissent's
suggestion,
post, p.
383 U. S. 162,
restricted to, nor even aimed at, "trespassers on government
property"; Louisiana has a separate criminal statute, not at all
involved in this prosecution, which explicitly deals with
trespassing in public buildings. [
Footnote 2/4] Moreover, I reject the suggestion that
this breach of the peace statute, making refusal to obey an order
"to disperse and move on" an element of the crime, is as narrow as
a sufficiently specific trespass statute explicitly concerned with
trespassing on government property that also makes refusal to obey
an order to keep off or leave the property an element of the crime.
Because this statute seeks to curb breaches of the peace and risks
of such breaches occurring through crowding, it apparently permits
a wide range of persons to issue the requisite order, no formal or
customary procedures need be followed in issuing the order, and
instantaneous and unquestioning compliance with the order is
required. For example, the trial court below, in applying §
14:103.1, assumed that, as a matter of state law, any employee of
the library would have the authority to issue the order "to
disperse and move on"
Page 383 U. S. 146
simply as the occasion arose and that petitioners were expected
to immediately comply with the order even though they might have
reasonably thought they were being ejected simply to preserve the
segregated character of the library.
Cf. Wright v.
Georgia, 373 U. S. 284,
373 U. S.
291-292.
Second. The danger posed by the Louisiana courts'
definition of "breach of the peace" -- that it might sweep within
its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected --
is no less present when read in conjunction with "public building"
than when read with "public street" and "public sidewalk." The
constitutional protection for conduct in a public building
undertaken to desegregate governmental services provided therein
derives from both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech, petition and assembly, [
Footnote 2/5] and
Page 383 U. S. 147
the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against racial
segregation of governmental services and facilities. Overbreadth in
the public building phase might inhibit the exercise of these
constitutional rights by threatening punishment of the initial
efforts to secure such desegregation. For example, the public
building phase of § 14:103.1 might be read as reaching the conduct
of two Negroes who did nothing more than enter a library restricted
to whites, request a book and refuse to leave when ordered to do so
before service was rendered. The conduct of the two Negroes would
be as constitutionally protected as the conduct of the Negro who
refused to leave the white section of a segregated courtroom,
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U. S. 61, and
yet their conduct would be punishable under § 14:103.1 because
their purpose could be deemed "to agitate, to arouse from a state
of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet."
In light of these possible clearly unconstitutional applications
of the statute, we need not decide whether petitioners' actual
conduct is constitutionally protected; for,
"in appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon such rights,
this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible
applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that
at bar."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
371 U. S. 432.
It suffices that petitioners' conduct was arguably constitutionally
protected, and was "not the sort
Page 383 U. S. 148
of "hard-core" conduct that would obviously be prohibited under
any construction" [
Footnote 2/6] of
§ 14:103.1. It was engaged in to achieve desegregation of the
library through a request for service and a protest, expressed by
petitioners' continued presence. Petitioners were orderly and
quiet. Their continued presence, for a relatively short period of
time, did not interfere with the functioning of the library. Their
presence might have embarrassed and unnerved the librarians, who
had in the past faithfully observed the policy of segregation; but
such "vague disquietudes" [
Footnote
2/7] do not take petitioners' conduct outside the appropriate
limits. The sheriff gave petitioners no reason for the order to
leave, [
Footnote 2/8] and thus
petitioners might
Page 383 U. S. 149
have reasonably believed that they were being ejected only
because they were Negroes seeking to exercise their constitutional
rights; [
Footnote 2/9] as my
Brother Black observed in
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.
S. 315,
340 U. S. 327,
"at least where time allows, courtesy and explanation of commands
are basic elements of good official conduct in a democratic
society."
Since the overbreadth of § 14:103.1 as construed clearly
requires the reversal of these convictions, [
Footnote 2/10] it is wholly unnecessary to reach, let
alone rest reversal, as
Page 383 U. S. 150
the prevailing opinion seems to do, on the proposition that even
a narrowly drawn "statute cannot constitutionally be applied to
punish petitioners' actions in the circumstances of this case."
[
Footnote 2/1]
See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S.
87,
382 U. S. 99
(concurring opinion);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.
S. 479,
380 U. S. 491,
n. 7.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Compare Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.
S. 495,
and Commercial Pictures Corp. v.
Regents, 346 U. S. 587,
with Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U. S. 684.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In declaring the statute unconstitutional for overbreadth, the
Court in
Cox relied heavily on
Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, a case
involving the application of a breach of the peace ordinance to an
individual purporting to exercise First Amendment rights in an
auditorium, not on the streets or sidewalks.
[
Footnote 2/4]
La.Acts 1963, No. 91, amending and reenacting La.Rev.Stat. §
14:63.3 (Cum.Supp.1962). The dissent refers to subdivision (4) of §
14:103.1 to support its view that subdivision (1), the basis for
the charges and the convictions, "is to all intents and purposes
aimed at trespassers on government property."
Post, p.
383 U. S. 162.
However, subdivision (4) is also modified by the introductory
clause "Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or
under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be
occasioned thereby"; and thus to establish a violation of that
subdivision more than the refusal to leave the "premises of
another" after an order to do so would have to be proved.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
371 U. S.
428-431;
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.
S. 157,
368 U. S.
201-202 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN):
"There was more to the conduct of those petitioners than a bare
desire to remain at the 'white' lunch counter and their refusal of
a police request to move from the counter. We would surely have to
be blind not to recognize that petitioners were sitting at these
counters, where they knew they would not be served, in order to
demonstrate that their race was being segregated in dining
facilities in this part of the country."
"Such a demonstration, in the circumstances of these two cases,
is as much a part of the 'free trade in ideas,'
Abrams v.
United States, 250 U. S. 616,
250 U. S.
630 (Holmes, J., dissenting), as is verbal expression,
more commonly thought of as 'speech.' It, like speech, appeals to
good sense and to 'the power of reason as applied through public
discussion,'
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357,
274 U. S. 375 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), just as much as, if not more than, a public oration
delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This Court has never
limited the right to speak, a protected 'liberty' under the
Fourteenth Amendment,
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S.
652,
268 U. S. 666, to mere
verbal expression.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S.
359;
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88;
West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624,
319 U. S.
633-634.
See also NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U. S.
449,
357 U. S. 460. If the act of
displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized
government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,
Stromberg v. California,
supra, the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter
with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to
enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of
protections."
Public buildings often provide a forum for more traditional
forms of First Amendment activity, such as verbal expression.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516 (city hall);
Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U. S. 1
(auditorium open to public in privately owned building).
[
Footnote 2/6]
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at
380 U. S.
491-492.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526,
373 U. S.
535-536.
See generally Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U. S. 60,
245 U. S. 81;
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1,
358 U. S. 16;
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154,
370 U. S. 156;
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. at
373 U. S. 293;
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at
379 U. S.
551.
[
Footnote 2/8]
On cross-examination the sheriff testified as follows:
"Q. Sheriff, did you arrest these people, these defendants,
because you considered their action going into the Library as a
demonstration?"
"A. I arrested them because the occupants of the building had
asked them to leave, and so had I; it was a public building, and
they refused to leave."
"Q. What did you tell them when you went in, Sheriff, did you
have any conversations with these people?"
"A. Not with them, I talked to Mrs. Perkins, and she told me
that she had taken their application and had asked them to leave,
and they wouldn't, and I asked them to leave. Henry Brown told me
it was a public library, the rest of them didn't say anything."
"Q. Did Brown mention anything to you about wanting a book on
the Constitution of the United States?"
"A. He did not."
"Q. After Brown told you that it was a public library, what did
you say then?"
"A. I don't know of anything that I said. I was assured that
Mrs. Perkins had asked them to leave, since they didn't have the
book they wanted."
"Q. Did you at that point, ask them to leave?"
"A. I did."
"Q. When you --"
"A. -- And I also told them that they had the choice of leaving,
or be arrested for not leaving a public building when asked to do
so by an officer."
"Q. When you got there, Sheriff, was anybody making any
noise?"
"A. No noise."
"Q. Prior to your asking these defendants to leave, did you ask
each of them, all of them, whether or not they intended to use the
reference books at the Library?"
"A. I didn't ask them what they intended to do, and they didn't
state at that time what they were doing there."
[
Footnote 2/9]
See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. at
373 U. S.
291-292: "Obviously . . . one cannot be punished for
failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself
violative of the Constitution."
[
Footnote 2/10]
This ground of reversal makes it unnecessary to decide whether
subdivision (1) of § 14:103.1 embodies an invidious discrimination
because it contains the following exemption:
"[N]othing herein contained shall apply to a bona fide
legitimate labor organization or to any of its legal activities
such as picketing, lawful assembly or concerted activity in the
interest of its members for the purpose of accomplishing or
securing more favorable wage standards, hours of employment and
working conditions. . . ."
My Brother BLACK, in his opinion in
Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 581,
found the obstructing public passages statute (La.Rev.Stat. §
14.100.1 (Cum.Supp.1962)) to embody "an invidious discrimination
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" because it contained the same exemption from its
coverage for labor union activities.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the result.
Were it clear from this record that lingering in a public
library for 10 minutes after ordering a wanted book contravened
some explicit statute, ordinance, or library regulation of general
application, or even if it were reasonably clear that a 10-minute
interlude between receiving service and departure exceeded what is
generally contemplated as a normal use of a public library, I would
have difficulty joining in a reversal of this case, for, in either
of these events, I would consider a refusal to leave the library
and an insistence upon violating a generally applicable condition
concerning the use of the library evidence of an intent to breach
the peace constitutionally sufficient to sustain a conviction. Nor
would I deem the First Amendment to forbid a municipal regulation
limiting loafing in library reading rooms.
But nothing of the kind comes through to me in this record.
There is no such ordinance or regulation, and it can hardly be said
that the brief sojourn in this parish library departed so far from
the common practice of library users. The petitioners were there
but a very brief period before being asked to leave, they were
quiet and orderly, they interfered with no other library users,
and, for all this record reveals, they might have been considering
among themselves what to do with the rest of their day. I think
that the petitioners were entitled to be where they were for the
time that they remained, and it is difficult to believe that, if
this group had been white, its members would have been asked to
leave on such
Page 383 U. S. 151
short notice, much less asked to leave by the sheriff and
arrested, rather than merely escorted from the building, when
reluctance to leave was demonstrated. That the library was a
segregated institution and was not in the habit of allowing Negroes
in the building only underlines this situation. In my view, the
behavior of these petitioners and their use of the library
building, even though it was for the purposes of a demonstration,
did not depart significantly from what normal library use would
contemplate.
The conclusion that petitioners were making only a normal and
authorized use of this public library requires the reversal of
their convictions. Petitioners' entering the library and refusing
to forgo a use of the library normally permitted members of the
public is no evidence, in the circumstances of this case, of any
intent to breach the peace. Moreover, if the petitioners were
making a use of the library normally permitted whites, why were
they asked to leave the library? They were quiet, orderly, and
exhibited no threatening or provocative behavior. The library had
been a segregated institution, has been closed since the incident
involved in this case, and the petitioners were advised they could
pick up the desired book at the blue bookmobile. The State arrested
petitioners because they refused to leave the library, but offers
no convincing explanation for why they were asked to leave. On this
record, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that petitioners
were asked to leave the library because they were Negroes. If they
were, their convictions deny them equal protection of the laws.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join dissenting.
I do not believe that any provision of the United States
Constitution forbids any one of the 50 States of the
Page 383 U. S. 152
Union, including Louisiana, to make it unlawful to stage
"sit-ins" or "stand-up" in their public libraries for the purpose
of advertising objections to the State's public policies. That,
however, is precisely what the Court, or at least a majority of the
Court majority, [
Footnote 3/1] here
holds that all the States are forbidden to do by our Constitution.
I dissent. The three opinions written for the majority of five who
reverse these convictions make it necessary for me to state the
relevant facts, circumstances, and issues in this case as I view
them.
Representatives of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)
claimed that Negroes had been "locked out" of libraries operated
jointly by three Louisiana parishes. A "demonstration was planned"
by the organization "to integrate the Library," and accordingly
these five petitioners, all Negroes, went to the Audubon Regional
Library located at Clinton, Louisiana, on a Saturday morning about
11:30 "to sit-in at the Library." The county sheriff, whose office
was in the courthouse within sight of the library building, had
received information that "they (referring to CORE) were going to
sit-in, or that something was going to take place at the Library
that morning," and noticed the petitioners when they went by his
office on their way to the library. Upon arrival at the library,
petitioners were met inside the building by Mrs. Reeves, who was
the assistant librarian. She courteously asked them if she could
help them in any way. One of the group, petitioner Brown, handed
her a slip of paper on which was written the title of a book which
he said he wanted. Mrs. Reeves went to her
Page 383 U. S. 153
shelves and her catalogues, and after making a search, came back
and told Mr. Brown that the library did not have the book, but that
she could request it from the state library and probably get it for
him. She told him she would do this. Mr. Brown then sat down in the
only chair in the library room other than the chair at Mrs. Reeves'
desk, and the other four petitioners stood around him. When
petitioners did not leave, Mrs. Reeves told the group again that
she would send for the book, and when Mr. Brown continued to sit
and the others continued to stand, she asked them to leave. They
did not leave, so Mrs. Reeves then called Mrs. Perkins, the
regional librarian and told Mrs. Perkins about the situation. Mrs.
Perkins went to Mr. Brown and told him she did not know whether he
understood that a request for the book he had asked for would be
sent to the state library. Along about that time, Mr. Brown said to
Mrs. Perkins, "what about the Constitution?", but did not request
that any copy of the Constitution be given to him. Mrs. Perkins
then repeated the request of Mrs. Reeves that petitioners leave the
library, telling them "that the one who seemed to want something
had been served." About 10 or 15 minutes after the petitioners came
to the library, when, according to Mrs. Perkins' testimony, she was
just about to call the sheriff over the phone, the sheriff came
into the library. Mrs. Perkins explained to him that Mrs. Reeves
had taken petitioners' application for the book they wanted, that
the book was not available, that she and Mrs. Reeves had both
requested the petitioners to leave, and that they would not do so.
After learning these facts, the sheriff also asked petitioners to
leave the library building, and stated that he would have to arrest
them if they did not. The petitioners refused to leave, and,
speaking for the group, petitioner Brown told the sheriff
Page 383 U. S. 154
"that he was not going to leave the Library." Thereupon the
sheriff immediately arrested all of them. Petitioners, while in the
library, never talked in unusually loud voices, and used no bad
language. Beyond Mr. Brown's request for the book which the library
did not have, none of the petitioners at any time prior to his
arrest requested any further service of either of the librarians,
nor did any petitioner in any other way seek to read in the library
or otherwise use any of the library's facilities except for sitting
and standing purposes.
The Clinton branch of the Audubon Regional Library is not a
large one. It appears to be used almost entirely as a circulating,
and not a reading, library. The duty of Mrs. Reeves, assistant
librarian, according to her testimony, which was not disputed,
was
"To assist people who come into the Library to select their
books; check out the books to them; to keep the shelves in order,
and to keep a record of the circulation of the day."
In the library's "lobby," where the events of this case took
place, there were book shelves and one table on each side; also in
the room were a desk and chair for the librarian, and one other
chair. The two tables were used mainly for book display and
magazines. It was not against the policy of the library to allow
citizens with library registration cards to read if they cared to.
But, according to Mrs. Reeves' testimony at trial, "very few people
read; if a book is there and they want it, they take it and go."
Mrs. Perkins testified that "We do not maintain a reading room, as
such, we do not have the space for it." Mrs. Perkins later referred
to the "lobby" as the "adult reading room, the adult service
room."
The particular part of the Louisiana statute [
Footnote 3/2] under which petitioners were
convicted, contrary to implications
Page 383 U. S. 155
in the other opinions, has never been before this Court previous
to this time. It provides as follows:
"Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned
thereby . . . congregates with others . . . in any . . . public
building . . . , and who fails or refuses to . . . move on, when
ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer of any municipality
. . . or any other authorized person . . . shall be guilty of
disturbing the peace."
The information against these petitioners charged, substantially
in the language of the statute, that petitioners failed and refused
to leave the library when ordered to do so by Mrs. Perkins, who was
in lawful charge of the library, and also failed to leave the
premises when ordered to do so by the sheriff.
Because I think that the crucial issues to be decided here are
much narrower and far less complicated than the prevailing opinion
implies, I find it necessary first to point out that several
matters discussed in that opinion are, in my judgment, either
irrelevant or do not justify the inferences drawn from them.
I
In concluding to reverse these convictions, the prevailing
opinion relies almost entirely on three prior breach of the peace
cases which have come to this Court from the State of Louisiana,
and
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.
S. 229. I think that none of these four cases has any
appreciable bearing on what the Court should hold in this case.
(a) The first of these cases is
Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U. S. 157,
decided in December, 1961. That case, involving
Page 383 U. S. 156
"sit-in" demonstrations at several lunch counters, was decided
under an old Louisiana breach of the peace statute. The section
involved here was added to the old law after the events described
in that case took place, but before the Court's opinion. The old
law considered in
Garner did not contain any phrase
similar to the one under consideration here which makes it an
offense to disturb the peace by congregating in a public building
over the protest of a person rightfully in charge of the building.
Moreover, the majority of the Court in
Garner, in
construing the old law, noted the presence of the new section and
expressly contrasted its reach with that of the older statute. 368
U.S. at
368 U. S.
168-169. There are other significant differences between
Garner and this case, but the fact that
Garner
involved an almost entirely different statute, which was expressly
distinguished from the present one by the Court's opinion, makes it
hard for me to see how the Court's
Garner holding can
provide any meaningful support for the reversal of these
convictions.
(b) The second Louisiana breach of the peace case upon which the
prevailing opinion relies for reversal is
Taylor v.
Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154.
That case, as described today in the prevailing opinion, "concerned
a sit-in by Negroes in a waiting room at a bus depot, reserved
for whites only.'" In Taylor, the Court, in a short
per curiam opinion, held merely that the breach of the peace
convictions could not be supported where
"the only evidence to support the charge was that petitioners
were violating a custom that segregated people in waiting rooms
according to their race"
contrary to federal law. 370 U.S. at
370 U. S. 156.
There was no indication in that case that persons, having no
business whatever in a bus depot except in stage a public protest
against some state policy, have a constitutional
Page 383 U. S. 157
right to occupy the depot's space after having been requested by
competent authorities to leave.
(c) The case relied on most heavily by the prevailing opinion
and my Brother Brennan is
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.
S. 536. That case, unlike this one, involved picketing
and patrolling in the streets, and correspondingly that part of the
Louisiana breach of the peace statute which prohibited certain
kinds of street activity. The language of the phase of the statute
under consideration here, relating to congregating in public
buildings and refusing to move on when ordered to do so by an
authorized person, was in no way involved or discussed in
Cox. The problems of state regulation of the streets, on
the one hand, and public buildings, on the other, are quite
obviously separate and distinct. Public buildings such as
libraries, schoolhouses, fire departments, courthouses, and
executive mansions are maintained to perform certain specific and
vital functions. Order and tranquility of a sort entirely unknown
to the public streets are essential to their normal operation.
Contrary to the implications in the prevailing opinion, it is
incomprehensible to me that a State must measure disturbances in
its libraries and on the streets with identical standards.
Furthermore, the vice of discriminatory enforcement, which
contaminates the "public street" phase of this statute [
Footnote 3/3] does not beset the statute's
application to activity in public buildings. In the public
building, unlike the street, peace and quiet is a fast and
necessary rule, and, as a result, there is much less room for peace
officers to abuse their authority in enforcing the "public
building" part of the statute.
In my Brother BRENNAN's separate concurring opinion, the
contention seems to be made that, in
Cox, this
Page 383 U. S. 158
Court declared as unconstitutionally vague not only the part of
the Louisiana statute under which Cox was convicted relating to
picketing in the streets, but also the part creating the offense
under which petitioners here were convicted. If this is true, it
means that, in
Cox, the Court declared unconstitutional
both the parts of the statute creating the offenses involved in the
Cox case and this one and also all of the some 30-odd
separate and diverse offenses enumerated in the statute, ranging
from the making of obscene remarks and gestures to causing a
disturbance on a public bus, to refusing to leave the private
premises of another when asked to do so by the owner. If the
Court's holding was that broad, it has placed in great jeopardy
every breach of the peace statute in this country. I do not think
the Court intended to do any such thing. I can see nothing in the
Court's opinion in
Cox or in any of the concurring
opinions, one of which I wrote, which indicates an intention to
make such a sweeping condemnation of breach of the peace statutes.
In
Cox, this Court held unconstitutional the part of the
statute under which Cox was convicted because, as construed by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, it authorized "persons to be punished
merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views." 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 551.
The part of the statute involved here which makes it an offense to
congregate in a public building and refuse to leave it when asked
to do so by an authorized person does not affect or threaten in any
way an exercise of the rights of free speech, and the Louisiana
courts did not so construe this phase of the statute as they had
construed the part under which Cox was convicted. The phase of the
statute under scrutiny in this case clearly and precisely regulates
certain particular conduct in language which, taken as a whole, has
no ambiguity whatever. Persons of ordinary intelligence would have
no difficulty whatever in knowing that this part of the statute
requires them to
Page 383 U. S. 159
move on from a public building when an authorized person asks
them to do so.
See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S.
1,
332 U. S. 5-8. The
only conduct reached by this part of the statute is a refusal to
move on when requested to do so by an authorized person, and this
conduct is described in words declared in
Cox to be
"narrow and specific." [
Footnote
3/4] 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 551.
Since petitioners here had no library business whatever, the
Constitution of the United States does not require that they be
permitted to remain in the library despite state law to the
contrary.
(d) The fourth case which the prevailing opinion cites as
indicating that the "public building" phase of the Louisiana
statute is unconstitutional is
Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U. S. 229.
This Court's holding in the
Edwards case, however, was
based on the fact that the statute construed there was not narrowly
drawn to assure its nondiscriminatory application. Here, the part
of the Louisiana statute relating to public buildings, as construed
and applied by the Louisiana courts, does clearly describe the
offense. Nothing in
Edwards, as I read it, states any
principle of constitutional law under which a State must permit its
public libraries, dedicated to reading and learning and studying,
to be used for the purpose of conducting protests against public or
private policies. And that is the constitutional issue in the
present case.
I find nothing in these four cases, nor in any other case
decided by this Court that I can recall, which restricts
Page 383 U. S. 160
Louisiana's power to enforce that part of its statute on which
these convictions rest in order to maintain peace and order in its
public libraries so as to further the extremely necessary purposes
underlying their existence.
II
The prevailing opinion, and, to some extent, the two separate
concurring opinions, treat this case as though Louisiana was here
attempting to enforce a policy of denying Louisiana citizens the
right to use the State's libraries on account of race. Whatever may
have been the policy of the State of Louisiana in the past or may
be the policy of that State at the present at other places or in
other circumstances, there simply was no racial discrimination
practiced in this case. These petitioners were treated with every
courtesy, and granted every consideration to which they were
entitled in the Audubon Regional Library. They asked for a book,
perhaps, as the prevailing opinion suggests, more as a ritualistic
ceremonial than anything else. The lady in charge nevertheless
hunted for the book, found she did not have it, sent for it, and
later obtained it from the state library for petitioners' use.
[
Footnote 3/5] No petitioner asked
for any other book, none indicated that he wanted to read any other
book, and none attempted to read any other book or any other
printed matter. As a matter of fact, the record shows, and the
prevailing opinion admits, that the five petitioners stayed in the
library not to use it for learning, but as "monuments of protest"
to voice their disapproval of what they
Page 383 U. S. 161
thought was a policy of the State. Although Mrs. Perkins, the
branch's librarian, testified unambiguously that there was no
racial discrimination practiced at her library, and although the
record shows without the slightest dispute that there was no
discrimination of any kind or character practiced against these
petitioners, in at least the prevailing opinion and that of my
Brother White, it is nevertheless implied at several places that
the equal treatment given these petitioners was some kind of
subterfuge or sham. These aspersions are, I think, wholly without
justification. The prevailing opinion refers to the "tidy plan" of
the State; with reference to the service given petitioners, it says
that "We may assume that the response constituted service, and we
need not consider whether it was merely a gambit in the ritual"; it
insinuates that Louisiana was playing a "game" with petitioners'
rights, and the courteous treatment given petitioners by the
librarian is degraded by calling it a "gesture of service"; it,
moreover, refers to the State's argument in this case as giving a
"piquant version of the affair." I see no basis or reason for these
innuendos against the State's defense of its convictions in this
case. The State's District Attorney, who argued the case before us,
stated frankly and forthrightly that there would be no defense had
Louisiana denied these petitioners equal service at its public
libraries on account of their race. There was no such denial. We
must now consider the Court's reversal on its merits.
III
As best I can tell, one ground upon which both the prevailing
opinion and that of my Brother WHITE rely to reverse these
convictions is that the State failed to prove its case. This
conclusion appears to be based on the assumption that, under the
Louisiana statute, properly
Page 383 U. S. 162
construed, there can be no conviction unless persons who do not
want library service stay there an unusually long time after being
ordered to leave, make a big noise, use some bad language, engage
in fighting, try to provoke a fight, or in some other way become
boisterous. The argument seems to be that, without a blatant, loud
manifestation of aggressive hostility or an exceedingly long
"sit-in" or "sojourn" in a public library, there are no
circumstances which could foreseeably occasion a breach of the
peace. Louisiana has not so construed its statute, nor should we.
Doing so goes against common sense and common understanding. While
soft words can undoubtedly turn away wrath, they may also provoke
it. Disturbers of the peace do not always rattle swords or shout
invectives. It is high time to challenge the assumption, in which
too many people have too long acquiesced, that groups that think
they have been mistreated or that have actually been mistreated
have a constitutional right to use the public's streets, buildings,
and property to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want,
without regard to whom such conduct may disturb.
The phase of the Louisiana statute that we are considering here
is, to all intents and purposes, aimed at trespassers on government
property. In addition, subdivision (4) of the same Louisiana law
makes it an offense for one to refuse to leave the premises of
another when requested to do so by the owner. Both of these
provisions of the state statute, however, provide that, before an
offense is committed, the conduct must be engaged in "with intent
to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that
a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby." There is a long
history behind trespass laws in the United States. Invasion of
another man's property over his protest is one of the surest ways
any person can pick out to disturb the peace.
Page 383 U. S. 163
Louisiana, just like any other State in this Union, has a right
to pass and use laws based on knowledge of this fact, a knowledge
so widespread and prevalent that it would probably be difficult to
find a hermit ignorant of its existence.
I think that the evidence in this case established every element
in the offense charged against petitioners. No one disputes the
fact that petitioners congregated in a public building and refused
to move on when ordered to do so by authorized persons. The only
factual question which can possibly arise regarding the application
of the statute here is whether, under Louisiana law, petitioners
either intended to breach the peace or created circumstances under
which a breach might have been occasioned. The record shows that
petitioners, as part of a plan, entered the library and, once
there, stayed despite the librarians' protests until its normal
activity was completely disrupted. To be sure, there were not "100
to 300
grumbling' white onlookers," as there were in Cox v.
Louisiana, supra, but surely, in the prevailing opinion's
futile effort to rely on Cox, it is not meant that 300 or
100 grumbling onlookers must be crowded into a library before
Louisiana can maintain an action under this statute. A tiny parish
branch library, staffed by two women, is not a department store, as
in Garner v. Louisiana, supra, nor a bus terminal, as in
Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, nor a public thoroughfare, as
in Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, and Cox.
Short of physical violence, petitioners could not have more
completely upset the normal, quiet functioning of the Clinton
branch of the Audubon Regional Library. The state courts below
thought the disturbance created by petitioners constituted a
violation of the statute. So far as the reversal here rests on a
holding that the Louisiana statute was not violated, the Court
simply substitutes its judgment
Page 383 U. S. 164
for that of the Louisiana courts as to what conduct satisfies
the requirements of that state statute. We are a long way off from
what happened there to substitute our judgment for theirs. To do so
not only upsets settled doctrine concerning the interpretation of
state statutes by federal courts,
see, e.g., Garner v.
Louisiana, supra, at
368 U. S. 166;
Kingsley Intern. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.
S. 684,
360 U. S. 688,
but also builds on shifting sands that ignore the realities of life
in our country.
IV
Having already attempted to hold, wrongfully I think, that these
convictions should be set aside as unconstitutional because of a
complete lack of evidence to prove the charge, the prevailing
opinion ventures out in an attempt to decide other constitutional
questions. It says:
"Accordingly, even if the accused action were within the scope
of the statutory instrument, we would be required to assess the
constitutional impact of its application, and we would have to hold
that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to punish
petitioners' actions in the circumstances of this case."
I have sometimes thought that this Court has gone entirely too
far in refusing to decide constitutional questions on the ground
that they should be avoided where possible. The journey here,
however, goes entirely too far in the opposite direction.
Apparently unsatisfied with or unsure of the "no evidence" ground
for reversing the convictions, the prevailing opinion goes on to
state that the statute was used unconstitutionally in the
circumstances of this case because it was
"deliberately and purposefully applied solely to terminate the
reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest
the unconstitutional segregation of a public facility."
First, I am
Page 383 U. S. 165
constrained to say that this statement is wholly unsupported by
the record in this case. There is simply no evidence in the record
at all that petitioners were arrested because they were exercising
the "right to protest." It is nevertheless said that this was the
sole reason for the arrests. Moreover, the conclusion that the
statute was unconstitutionally applied because it interfered with
the petitioners' so-called protest establishes a completely new
constitutional doctrine. In this case, this new constitutional
principle means that, even though these petitioners did not want to
use the Louisiana public library for library purposes, they had a
constitutional right nevertheless to stay there over the protest of
the librarians who had lawful authority to keep the library orderly
for the use of people who wanted to use its books, its magazines,
and its papers. But the principle espoused also has a far broader
meaning. It means that the Constitution (the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments) requires the custodians and supervisors of
the public libraries in this country to stand helplessly by while
protesting groups advocating one cause or another, stage "sit-ins"
or "stand-ups" to dramatize their particular views on particular
issues. And it should be remembered that, if one group can take
over libraries for one cause, other groups will assert the right to
do so for causes which, while wholly legal, may not be so appealing
to this Court. The States are thus paralyzed with reference to
control of their libraries for library purposes, and I suppose that
inevitably the next step will be to paralyze the schools. Efforts
to this effect have already been made all over the country.
Furthermore, here it seems to have made no difference whatever that
the Audubon Regional Library, at least in this instance, satisfied
its constitutional duty by giving these petitioners its services in
full measure without regard to their race.
Page 383 U. S. 166
The constitutional doctrine that actually prevails in this Court
today for the first time in its history rests, at least in great
part, on the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment as
carried into the States by the Fourteenth. This is the First
Amendment which, as I have said in the past, is to me the very
heart of our free government, without which liberty and equality
cannot exist. [
Footnote 3/6] But I
have never thought, and do not now think, that the First Amendment
can sustain the startling doctrine the prevailing opinion here
creates. The First Amendment, I think protects speech, writings,
and expression of views in any manner in which they can be
legitimately and validly communicated. But I have never believed
that it gives any person or group of persons the constitutional
right to go wherever they want, whenever they please, without
regard to the rights of private or public property or to state law.
Indeed, a majority of this Court said as much in
Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559,
379 U. S. 574.
Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly and the
right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and
religion, it does not guarantee to any person the right to use
someone else's property, even that owned by government and
dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.
The novel constitutional doctrine of the prevailing opinion
nevertheless exalts the power of private nongovernmental groups to
determine what use shall be made of governmental property over the
power of the elected governmental officials of the States and the
Nation.
The prevailing opinion seems to find some comfort in its very
questionable assumption that, in this case,
"no claim can be made that use of the library by others was
Page 383 U. S. 167
disturbed by the demonstration. Perhaps the time and method were
carefully chosen with this in mind."
If this was the reason Saturday morning was selected, the only
representative of CORE who testified was not aware of it. [
Footnote 3/7] No one of the petitioners has
suggested such a thing. The lawyers for the petitioners have not.
In fact at the trial responses of the sheriff to questions asked
him by petitioners' lawyer indicate that there was another patron
in the library at the time the petitioners "sat in" or "stood up"
there. But even if there were no other patrons there in this
instance, with this new constitutional doctrine rather shakily
established, it is pretty clear that organized protesters will not
overlook the chance to go into the libraries and disturb those in
there to learn at a time when their "demonstration" activities will
obtain the most publicity.
The prevailing opinion laments the fact that the place where
these events took place was "a public library -- a place dedicated
to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty." I too lament this fact, and
for this reason I am deeply troubled with the fear that powerful
private groups throughout the Nation will read the Court's action
as I do -- that is, as granting them a license to invade the
tranquillity and beauty of our libraries whenever they have quarrel
with some state policy which may or may not exist. It is an unhappy
circumstance, in my judgment, that the group which, more than any
other, has needed a government of equal laws and equal justice is
now encouraged to believe that the best way for it to
Page 383 U. S. 168
advance its cause, which is a worthy one, is by taking the law
into its own hands from place to place and from time to time.
Governments like ours were formed to substitute the rule of law for
the rule of force. Illustrations may be given where crowds have
gathered together peaceably by reason of extraordinarily good
discipline reinforced by vigilant officers. "Demonstrations" have
taken place without any manifestations of force at the time. But I
say once more that the crowd moved by noble ideals today can become
the mob ruled by hate and passion and greed and violence tomorrow.
If we ever doubted that, we know it now. The peaceful songs of love
can become as stirring and provocative as the Marseillaise did in
the days when a noble revolution gave way to rule by successive
mobs until chaos set in. The holding in this case today makes it
more necessary than ever that we stop and look more closely at
where we are going.
I would affirm.
[
Footnote 3/1]
There are three separate opinions which support reversal of the
decision below. The opinion of my Brother FORTAS, which for
convenience I will call the majority's "prevailing" opinion, is
joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and my Brother DOUGLAS. My Brothers
BRENNAN and WHITE each concur in the result of the prevailing
opinion, but reach that result on different grounds.
[
Footnote 3/2]
La.Rev.Stat. § 14:103.1 (Cum.Supp.1962).
[
Footnote 3/3]
See my concurring opinion in
Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U. S. 559,
379 U. S.
578-580.
[
Footnote 3/4]
A condition under which this conduct is punishable is that it be
entered into "with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or
under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be
occasioned thereby." In the context of the
Cox case
relating to activity on the public streets, this Court held this
language unconstitutionally vague. But, as I have pointed out
above, the Court could not have meant that every disturbing the
peace statute which contains this language is unconstitutional.
[
Footnote 3/5]
The note describing the book he wanted which petitioner Brown
gave Mrs. Reeves read, "Wendall Arna, the Story of the Negro:
Bontems." This information apparently described no printed book.
The book which was obtained from the state library for petitioners'
use was The Story of the Negro, by Arna Bontemps.
[
Footnote 3/6]
See my dissenting opinion in
Milk Wagon Drivers
Union, etc. v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.
S. 287,
312 U. S.
301-302.
[
Footnote 3/7]
Miss Feingold, task force worker for CORE and the State's first
witness, testified on direct examination as follows:
"Q. Was there any particular reason for these defendants' going
to the Library on a Saturday morning?"
"A. You mean on a Saturday as opposed to any other day?"
"Q. Yes?"
"A. No, I don't."