Petitioner, while a prisoner, was certified as insane by a
prison physician and transferred to Dannemora State Hospital, an
institution under the jurisdiction of the New York Department of
Correction and used for prisoners declared mentally ill while
serving sentence. Dannemora's director filed a petition in the
Surrogate's Court stating that petitioner's sentence was expiring
and requesting that he be civilly committed under § 384 of the N.Y.
Correction Law. At the proceeding, the State submitted medical
evidence that petitioner was still mentally ill and in need of
hospital care. The Surrogate stated that he had no objection to
petitioner's transfer to a civil hospital under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Mental Hygiene, but that, under § 384, that
decision was up to the latter Department. That Department had
determined
ex parte that petitioner was not suitable for
care in a civil hospital. When petitioner's sentence expired, his
custody shifted to the Department of Mental Hygiene, but he has
since remained at Dannemora. Writs of habeas corpus in state courts
were dismissed, and petitioner's request that he be transferred to
a civil hospital was denied as beyond the court's power.
Held: Petitioner was denied equal protection of the
laws by the statutory procedure whereby a person may be civilly
committed at the expiration of a prison sentence without the jury
review available to all others civilly committed in New York, and
by his commitment to an institution maintained by the Department of
Correction beyond the expiration of his prison term without the
judicial determination that he is dangerously mentally ill such as
that afforded to all those so committed except those nearing the
end of a penal sentence. Pp.
383 U. S.
110-115.
Judgment of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York,
Third Judicial Department, 21 App.Div. 2d 754, reversed and
remanded to that court.
Page 383 U. S. 108
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider the
constitutional validity of the statutory procedure under which
petitioner was committed to a mental institution at the expiration
of his criminal sentence in a state prison.
Petitioner, Johnnie K. Baxstrom, was convicted of second degree
assault in April, 1959, and was sentenced to a term of two and
one-half to three years in a New York prison. On June 1, 1961, he
was certified as insane by a prison physician. He was then
transferred from prison to Dannemora State Hospital, an institution
under the jurisdiction and control of the New York Department of
Correction and used for the purpose of confining and caring for
male prisoners declared mentally ill while serving a criminal
sentence. In November, 1961, the director of Dannemora filed a
petition in the Surrogate's Court of Clinton County stating that
Baxstrom's penal sentence was about to terminate and requesting
that he be civilly committed pursuant to § 384 of the New York
Correction Law.
On December 6, 1961, a proceeding was held in the Surrogate's
chambers. Medical certificates were submitted by the State which
stated that, in the opinion of two of its examining physicians,
Baxstrom was still mentally ill and in need of hospital and
institutional care. Respondent, then assistant director at
Dannemora, testified that, in his opinion. Baxstrom was still
mentally ill. Baxstrom, appearing alone, was accorded
Page 383 U. S. 109
a brief opportunity to ask questions. [
Footnote 1] Respondent and the Surrogate both stated
that they had no objection to his being transferred from Dannemora
to a civil hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Mental Hygiene. But the Surrogate pointed out that he had no
jurisdiction to determine that question -- that under § 384, the
decision was entirely up to the Department of Mental Hygiene. The
Surrogate then signed a certificate which indicated he was
satisfied that Baxstrom "may require mental care and treatment" in
an institution for the mentally ill. The Department of Mental
Hygiene had already determined
ex parte that Baxstrom was
not suitable for care in a civil hospital. Thus, on December 18,
1961, the date upon which Baxstrom's penal sentence expired,
custody over him shifted from the Department of Correction to the
Department of Mental Hygiene, but he was retained at Dannemora, and
has remained there to this date.
Thereafter, Baxstrom sought a writ of habeas corpus in a state
court. An examination by an independent psychiatrist was ordered,
and a hearing was held at which the examining psychiatrist
testified that, in his opinion, Baxstrom was still mentally ill.
The writ was dismissed. In 1963, Baxstrom applied again for a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that his constitutional rights had been
violated and that he was then sane, or, if insane, he should be
transferred to a civil mental hospital. Due to his indigence and
his incarceration in Dannemora, Baxstrom could not produce
psychiatric testimony to disprove the testimony adduced at the
prior hearing. The writ was therefore dismissed. Baxstrom's
alternative request for
Page 383 U. S. 110
transfer to a civil mental hospital was again denied as being
beyond the power of the court despite a statement by the State's
attorney that he wished that Baxstrom would be transferred to a
civil mental hospital. On appeal to the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the dismissal of the writ was affirmed without opinion.
21 A.D.2d 754, 251 N.Y.S.2d 938. A motion for leave to appeal to
the Court of Appeals was denied. 14 N.Y.2d 490, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1028,
202 N.E.2d 159. We granted certiorari. 381 U.S. 949.
We hold that petitioner was denied equal protection of the laws
by the statutory procedure under which a person may be civilly
committed at the expiration of his penal sentence without the jury
review available to all other persons civilly committed in New
York. Petitioner was further denied equal protection of the laws by
his civil commitment to an institution maintained by the Department
of Correction beyond the expiration of his prison term without a
judicial determination that he is dangerously mentally ill such as
that afforded to all so committed except those, like Baxstrom,
nearing the expiration of a penal sentence.
Section 384 of the New York Correction Law prescribes the
procedure for civil commitment upon the expiration of the prison
term of a mentally ill person confined in Dannemora. [
Footnote 2] Similar procedures are prescribed
for civil
Page 383 U. S. 111
commitment of all other allegedly mentally ill persons.
N.Y.Mental Hygiene Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 27, §§ 70, 72.
All persons civilly committed, however, other than those committed
at the expiration of a penal term, are expressly granted the right
to
de novo review by jury trial of the question of their
sanity under § 74 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Under this procedure,
any person dissatisfied with an order certifying him as mentally
ill may demand full review by a jury of the prior determination as
to his competency. If the jury returns a verdict that the person is
sane, he must be immediately discharged. It follows that the State,
having made this substantial review proceeding generally available
on this issue, may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from some.
The director contends that the State has created a reasonable
classification differentiating the civilly insane from the
"criminally insane," which he defines as those with dangerous or
criminal propensities. Equal protection does not require that all
persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a
distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made.
Walters v. City of St. Louis,
347 U. S. 231,
347 U. S. 237.
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or
dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for
purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be
given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the
opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all. For
purposes of granting judicial review before a jury of the question
whether a person is mentally ill and in need of
institutionalization, there is no conceivable basis for
distinguishing the commitment
Page 383 U. S. 112
of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all
other civil commitments.
The statutory procedure provided in § 384 of the New York
Correction Law denied Baxstrom the equal protection of the laws in
another respect, as well. Under § 384, the judge need only satisfy
himself that the person "may require care and treatment in an
institution for the mentally ill." Having made such a finding, the
decision whether to commit that person to a hospital maintained by
the Department of Correction or to a civil hospital is completely
in the hands of administrative officials. [
Footnote 3] Except for persons committed to Dannemora
upon expiration of sentence under § 384, all others civilly
committed to hospitals maintained by the Department of
Page 383 U. S. 113
Correction are committed only after judicial proceedings have
been held in which it is determined that the person is so
dangerously mentally ill that his presence in a civil hospital is
dangerous to the safety of other patients or employees, or to the
community. [
Footnote 4]
This statutory classification cannot be justified by the
contention that Dannemora is substantially similar to other mental
hospitals in the State and that commitment to one hospital or
another is simply an administrative matter affecting no fundamental
rights. The parties have described various characteristics of
Dannemora to show its similarities and dissimilarities to civil
hospitals in New York. As striking as the dissimilarities are, we
need not make any factual determination as to the nature of
Dannemora; the New York State Legislature has already made that
determination. By statute, the hospital is under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Correction, and is used for the purpose of
confining and caring for insane prisoners and persons, like
Baxstrom, committed at the expiration of a penal term. N.Y.
Correction Law § 375. Civil mental hospitals in New York, on the
other hand, are under the jurisdiction and control of the
Department of Mental Hygiene. Certain privileges of patients at
Dannemora are restricted by statute. N.Y. Correction Law § 388.
Moreover, as has
Page 383 U. S. 114
been noted, specialized statutory procedures are prescribed for
commitment to hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Correction. While we may assume that transfer among like mental
hospitals is a purely administrative function, where, as here, the
State has created functionally distinct institutions,
classification of patients for involuntary commitment to one of
these institutions may not be wholly arbitrary.
The director argues that it is reasonable to classify persons in
Baxstrom's class together with those found to be dangerously
insane, since such persons are not only insane, but have proven
criminal tendencies, as shown by their past criminal records. He
points to decisions of the New York Court of Appeals supporting
this view.
People ex rel. Kamisaroff v. Johnston, 13
N.Y.2d 66, 242 N.Y.S.2d 38, 192 N.E.2d 11;
People ex rel.
Brunson v. Johnston, 15 N.Y.2d 647, 255 N.Y.S.2d 867, 204
N.E.2d 200.
We find this contention untenable. Where the State has provided
for a judicial proceeding to determine the dangerous propensities
of all others civilly committed to an institution of the Department
of Correction, it may not deny this right to a person in Baxstrom's
position solely on the ground that he was nearing the expiration of
a prison term. [
Footnote 5] It
may or may not be that Baxstrom
Page 383 U. S. 115
is presently mentally ill and such a danger to others that the
strict security of a Department of Correction hospital is
warranted. All others receive a judicial hearing on this issue.
Equal protection demands that Baxstrom receive the same.
The capriciousness of the classification employed by the State
is thrown sharply into focus by the fact that the full benefit of a
judicial hearing to determine dangerous tendencies is withheld only
in the case of civil commitment of one awaiting expiration of penal
sentence. A person with a past criminal record is presently
entitled to a hearing on the question whether he is dangerously
mentally ill so long as he is not in prison at the time civil
commitment proceedings are instituted. Given this distinction, all
semblance of rationality of the classification, purportedly based
upon criminal propensities, disappears.
In order to accord to petitioner the equal protection of the
laws, he was and is entitled to a review of the determination as to
his sanity in conformity with proceedings granted all others
civilly committed under § 74 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law. He
is also entitled to a hearing under the procedure granted all
others by § 85 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law to determine
whether he is so dangerously mentally ill that he must remain in a
hospital maintained by the Department of Correction. The judgment
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in the Third
Judicial Department of New York is reversed, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
The State apparently permits counsel to be retained in such
proceedings where the person can afford to hire his own attorney,
despite the fact that § 384 makes no provision for counsel to be
present.
See 1961 Op.N.Y.Atty.Gen. 180, 181. Baxstrom is
indigent, however, and had no counsel at this hearing.
[
Footnote 2]
As it appeared when applied to petitioner in 1961, N.Y.
Correction Law § 384 provided in part:
"1. Within thirty days prior to the expiration of the term of a
prisoner confined in the Dannemora state hospital, when in the
opinion of the director such prisoner continues insane, the
director shall apply to a judge of a court of record for the
certification of such person as provided in the mental hygiene law
for the certification of a person not in confinement on a criminal
charge. The court in which such proceedings are instituted shall if
satisfied that such person may require care and treatment in an
institution for the mentally ill, issue an order directing that
such person be committed to the custody of the commissioner of
mental hygiene to be placed in an appropriate state institution of
the department of mental hygiene or of the department of correction
as may be designated for the custody of such person by agreement
between the heads of the two departments."
[
Footnote 3]
In this case, the administrative decision to retain Baxstrom in
Dannemora was made before any hearing was afforded to Baxstrom, and
was made despite the otherwise unanimous conclusion by testifying
psychiatrists, including an independent examining psychiatrist and
respondent himself, that there was no reason why Baxstrom could not
be transferred to a civil institution. The following is a portion
of the transcript of the hearing before the Surrogate:
"The COURT: (Addressing Dr. Herold) Have you any objection if
this man is transferred to a civil hospital if the Department of
Mental Hygiene so decrees?"
"Dr. HEROLD: None whatever."
"The COURT: And I, Sir, agree with you. I have no objection to
his transfer if the Department of Mental Hygiene so finds."
"I hope that you will be transferred to a civil hospital."
"Good luck."
And at the first habeas corpus hearing:
"Q. Do you feel, Doctor, from your examination and examining the
records of this man, he needs additional care? Is that
correct?"
"A. [Dr. Kerr] Yes, sir. May I say something at this point,
sir?"
"Q. Surely."
"A. Since Mr. Baxstrom's sentence has actually expired, sir, I
would like to say that, in my opinion, there is no reason why he
could not be treated in a civil mental hospital. I would simply
like to say that for the record, sir."
"The COURT: All right."
[
Footnote 4]
N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 85, 135.
See also N.Y.Code
Crim.Proc. §§ 662-b(3)(b), 872(1)(b), as amended, N.Y.Laws 1965, c.
540, §§ 1, 2. Former § 412 of Correction Law, permitting commitment
to Matteawan State Hospital of any patient who had previously been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, without the benefit of the
proceeding accorded others under § 85 of the Mental Hygiene Law,
was held unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection in
United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117
(C.A.2d Cir. 1961),
probable jurisdiction noted, 368 U.S.
951,
vacated and dismissed as moot, 369 U.
S. 149, and was repealed by N.Y.Laws 1965, c. 524. Even
that provision required a showing that the person still manifested
criminal tendencies.
[
Footnote 5]
In oral argument, counsel for respondent suggested that the
determination by the Department of Mental Hygiene to retain a
person in Dannemora must be based not only on his past criminal
record, but also on evidence that he is currently dangerous. Far
from supporting the validity of the procedure, this only serves to
further accent the arbitrary nature of the classification. Under
this procedure, all civil commitments to an institution under the
control of the Department of Correction require a determination
that the person is presently dangerous; all persons so committed
are entitled to a judicial proceeding to determine this fact except
those awaiting expiration of sentence. Their fate is decided by
unreviewable determinations of the Department of Mental
Hygiene.