The United States brought this suit in 1945 against California
to determine dominion over the submerged lands and mineral rights
under the three-mile belt of sea off the California coast. In 1947,
this Court held (
332 U. S. 332 U.S.
19) that the United States possessed paramount rights in such lands
and minerals underlying the Pacific Ocean seaward of the low water
mark on the California coast and outside of inland waters.
Thereafter, the Court appointed a Special Master to determine for
specific coastal segments the line of ordinary low water and the
outer limit of inland waters. In his Report, filed in 1952, the
Master based his definition of inland waters on that applied by the
United States in its foreign relations as of the date of the 1947
decree. Both parties noted exceptions to the Report, but, before
any further action, the Submerged Lands Act was enacted in 1953.
This Act gave the States ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within their boundaries, including the seaward boundaries
"as they existed at the time such State became a member of the
Union," but in no event to be interpreted as extending from the
"coastline" more than three geographical miles into the Pacific
Ocean. "Coast line" was derivatively defined in terms of the
seaward limit of "inland waters," a term not defined by the Act. No
action was taken on the Master's Report until 1963, when the United
States filed an amended complaint reviving the Report and
redescribing the issues as modified by the Submerged Lands Act. The
United States contends that the Act simply moved the line out three
miles from the line established by the 1947 decree, while
California asserts that "inland waters," as used in the Act, means
not what the United States would claim as such in international
relations, but what the States historically considered to be inland
when they joined the Union.
Held:
1. The Act's legislative history shows that "inland waters" was
to be defined by the courts. Pp.
381 U. S.
150-160.
Page 381 U. S. 140
(a) By eliminating the definition of inland waters from the
bill, Congress intended to leave the meaning of the term to the
courts, independently of the Act. Pp.
381 U. S.
150-154.
(b) The addition of the three-mile limitation provision to the
bill shows that Congress must have intended that some criterion be
used by the courts other than one dependent upon a State's
subjective concept of its inland waters. Pp.
381 U. S.
154-160.
(c) The Act does not restrict the Court to the time of enactment
in determining the best and most workable definition of inland
waters, which is found in the Convention. Pp.
381 U. S.
164-165.
(d) Adopting the meaning of inland waters in terms of the
Convention definition, with a 24-mile maximum closing line for bays
and a "semicircle" test for the sufficiency of the water area
enclosed, will provide definiteness and stability to the rights
granted in the Act. Pp.
381 U. S.
165-167.
3. Although the Convention permits the use of the straight
baseline method for ascertaining inland waters claimed against
other nations, the choice is one that rests with the United States,
which is responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, and not
with the individual States. Pp.
381 U. S.
167-169.
4. Applying the Convention's 24-mile closing rule and the
"semicircle" test for classifying bays, Monterey Bay is inland
water, but none of the other coastal segments in dispute meets the
requirements. Pp.
381 U. S.
169-170.
5. California's assertion that Santa Barbara Channel may be
considered a "fictitious bay" under international law cannot force
the United States, which disagrees, to take such a position to
extend our international boundaries. Pp.
381 U. S.
170-172.
Page 381 U. S. 141
6. The exception to the Convention's 24-mile closing rule for
"historic" bays, those over which a nation has traditionally
asserted and maintained dominion, cannot benefit California unless
the United States endorses its claims or there is clear historic
evidence supporting such claims. None of the disputed water areas
(not considering Monterey Bay, which is covered by the 24-mile
rule) is an historic inland water of the United States. Pp.
381 U. S.
172-175.
7. Open roadsteads used for loading, unloading, and anchoring
ships are, pursuant to the Convention, areas of the territorial
sea, and are therefore not to be considered inland waters. P.
381 U. S.
175.
Special Master's Report approved as modified.
Page 381 U. S. 142
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The present case requires us to determine the extent of
submerged lands granted to the State of California by the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, [
Footnote 1]
and in particular to declare whether specified bodies of water on
the California coast are "inland waters" within the meaning of that
Act. A substantial amount of background is necessary to place the
issues in perspective.
I
THE SETTING OF THE CASE.
This is a suit begun in 1945, brought by the United States
against California to determine dominion over the submerged lands
and mineral rights under the three-mile belt of sea off the coast
of California. In 1947, the Court decreed:
"The United States of America is now, and has been at all times
pertinent hereto, possessed of paramount rights in, and full
dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things
underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low
water mark on the coast of California, and outside of the inland
waters, extending seaward three nautical miles. . . . The State of
California has no title thereto or property interest therein."
United States v. California, 332 U.
S. 804,
332 U. S. 805,
Order and Decree.
After the entry of this decree, the United States asked that the
lands awarded to it be defined in greater detail in certain areas
where there was substantial oil well activity, and which California
asserted lay within inland waters. The Court appointed a Special
Master, [
Footnote 2] and
directed him to consider seven specified segments of the
Page 381 U. S. 143
California coast [
Footnote
3] to determine the line of ordinary low water and the outer
limit of inland waters. These segments included various bays, and,
as the problem evolved, the so-called "overall unit area"
consisting of the waters inside a line encompassing the islands off
the shore of southern California, some as far as 50 miles out.
[
Footnote 4] The Special
Master's Report, generally favoring the position of the United
States, was filed with this Court in November, 1952, 344 U.S. 872.
He adopted as his criteria for defining inland waters those applied
by the United States
Page 381 U. S. 144
in the conduct of its foreign affairs as of the date of the
California decree, October 27, 1947 -- in particular, a rule that
only a bay having a closing line across its mouth no more than 10
miles in length and enclosing a sufficient water area to satisfy
the so-called Boggs formula [
Footnote 5] would be inland water, with the qualification
that a bay which had been historically considered inland water
would so continue. [
Footnote 6]
Both parties noted their exceptions to the
Page 381 U. S. 145
Report, but before any further action was taken, Congress
enacted the Submerged Lands Act.
The Submerged Lands Act [
Footnote 7] grants to the States "title to and ownership
of the lands beneath navigable waters
Page 381 U. S. 146
within the boundaries of the respective States." § 3(a).
"Boundaries" includes the seaward boundaries of a State "as they
existed at the time such State became a member of the Union, or as
heretofore approved by the Congress," but subject to the limitation
that
"in no event shall the term 'boundaries' . . . be interpreted as
extending from the coastline more than three geographical miles
into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three
marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico."
§ 2(b).
Page 381 U. S. 147
"Coast line" is then defined as the composite
"line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast
which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters."
§ 2(c). For States
Page 381 U. S. 148
having no previously approved seaward boundaries, the Act
provides that
"[a]ny State admitted subsequent to the formation of the Union
which has not already done so may extend its seaward boundaries to
a line three geographical miles distant from its coastline. . .
."
§ 4.
Thus, the Act effectively grants each State on the Pacific coast
all submerged lands shoreward of a line three geographical miles
[
Footnote 8] from its
"coastline", derivatively defined in terms of "the seaward limit of
inland waters." "Inland waters" is not defined by the Act.
In a later measure related to the Submerged Lands Act, Congress
declared that the United States owned all submerged land in the
continental shelf seaward of the lands granted to the States. Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331
et
seq.
The passage of the Submerged Lands Act marked the beginning of a
long halt in the proceedings in this case. Depth of California's
coastal waters increases very rapidly, and, as of May 22, 1953, the
date of enactment, it was impractical to drill for oil except close
to the shore. By granting to California the mineral rights in the
three-mile belt, the Act vested in California all the interests
that were then thought to be important, and no further action was
taken on the Special Master's Report. That Report was neither
adopted, modified, nor rejected
Page 381 U. S. 149
by this Court, but was simply allowed to lie dormant. By 1963,
however, drilling techniques had improved sufficiently to
revitalize the importance of the demarcation line between state and
federal submerged lands. The United States filed an amended
complaint reviving the Special Master's Report and redescribing the
issues as modified by the Submerged Lands Act; both the United
States and California filed new exceptions to the Report, and the
case is now ready for decision.
The basic contention of the United States is that the Act simply
moved the line of demarcation out three miles from the line
established by the
California decree. Therefore, contends
the United States, the Special Master's Report on the line of
ordinary low water and the outer limit of inland waters as used in
the California decree is just as relevant now as it was before
Congress acted, and, with slight modifications, the line drawn by
the Special Master should be taken as the "coastline" for purposes
of the Submerged Lands Act. California asserts that, whereas the
Special Master determined inland waters to be those which the
United States would have claimed as such for purposes of
international relations, the Submerged Lands Act used the term in
an entirely different sense to mean those waters which the States
historically considered to be inland -- in California's case, those
waters which the State considered to be inland at the time it
entered the Union. Therefore, according to California, the line
drawn in the Special Master's Report was determined under standards
wholly foreign to the Submerged Lands Act.
The focal point of this case is the interpretation to be placed
on "inland waters" as used in the Act. Since the Act does not
define the term, we look to the legislative history.
Page 381 U. S. 150
II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REVEALS THAT CONGRESS MEANT TO
LEAVE THE DEFINITION OF INLAND WATERS TO THE COURTS
Two changes relevant for our purposes were made in the bill
which became the Submerged Lands Act between the time it was sent
to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the
time of its passage.
(1) As first written, the bill defined inland waters to
include
"all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits,
historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water which join
the open sea."
This definition was removed by the Senate Committee. [
Footnote 9]
(2) The bill originally contained no limitation on the extent of
historic boundaries that could be claimed. The provision limiting
the extent of boundary claims to no more than three geographical
miles from the coastline on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and
three marine leagues on the Gulf of Mexico was added to the bill on
the floor of the Senate in the late stages of the debates.
[
Footnote 10]
Removal of the definition for inland waters and the addition of
the three-mile limitation in the Pacific, when taken together,
unmistakably show that California cannot prevail in its contention
that, "as used in the Act, Congress intended inland waters to
identify those areas which the states always thought were inland
waters." [
Footnote 11] By
deleting the original definition of "inland waters,"
Page 381 U. S. 151
Congress made plain its intent to leave the meaning of the term
to be elaborated by the courts, independently of the Submerged
Lands Act.
In response to substantial objections made in the hearings to
the original bill's broad definition of inland waters on grounds
that it would prejudice and limit the position which the United
States could take in its future conduct of foreign affairs,
[
Footnote 12] Senator
Cordon, the manager of the bill, recommended and obtained
elimination of the definition. The Committee Report which he
authored explained:
"The words 'which include all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays,
channels, straits, historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies
of water which join the open sea' have been deleted from the
reported bill because of the committee's belief that the question
of what constitutes inland waters should be left where Congress
finds it. The committee is convinced that the definition neither
adds nor takes away anything a State may have now in the way of a
coast and the lands underneath waters behind it."
S.Rep.No.133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 18, U.S.Code Cong. and
Adm.News 1953, p. 1493. [
Footnote 13] The committee's understanding that the
measure "neither adds nor takes away anything a State may have now
in the way of a coast and the lands underneath waters behind it,"
appears to be an acceptance of "inland waters" as used in the
California and prior Court opinions, whatever that usage
might have been. Various different concepts of inland waters were
asserted during the Senate Hearings, based on such elements as the
depth of the water, [
Footnote
14] the width of opening of a coastal indentation, [
Footnote 15] the Boggs formula, and
the common designation
Page 381 U. S. 152
of bodies of water as bays, sounds, straits, etc. [
Footnote 16] When it became clear
that the question had highly technical aspects (
see, e.g.,
n 5,
supra) and was
one on which differences would arise, the Senate Committee adopted
the expedient solution of leaving the matter just as it had found
it, neither accepting nor rejecting any particular rule or formula.
[
Footnote 17] It intended to
leave unaffected the judicial view of inland waters and the
judicial responsibility for particularizing it.
Reference to Senator Cordon's request to the Senate Committee
for deletion of the objectionable clause confirms that
understanding. He said:
"The matter of inland waters is one that has been defined time
and time again by the courts, not, I believe, in any one
all-inclusive definition, but it was felt [by those who objected to
the definition during the hearings] that the use of these words
were [
sic] an attempted legislative definition of the term
'inland waters,' and it was inadvisable for us in this bill, which
is a transfer of title, to attempt to make law in the other field
of what is or is not inland water."
"The use of the language, it was felt, would probably raise
questions that have not been raised, whereas the present
definitions are in the decisions and available to the court."
"Senator MALONE. The inland waters had a special master for that
particular job, did they not, and that is now under consideration,
that is, his report is under consideration by the Supreme
Court?"
"Senator CORDON. With respect to California, and a portion of
California coast; yes."
Senate Hearings 1304-1305.
Page 381 U. S. 153
Shortly thereafter, there follows a virtually conclusive
statement:
"Senator CORDON. It was not the chairman's view that we were
attempting to draw a line delimiting inland waters, but that
we
were using a term that is well known in the law and is defined by
the Court in the California case, for instance, and in the
Louisiana case, I assume. That line might still be defined,
even though the area may not now have the same legal status as it
had before. [
Footnote
18]"
Id. at 1376. (Emphasis added.)
California fastens on a statement made in the Committee Report
with regard to the eliminated definition:
"The elimination of the language, in the committee's opinion, is
consistent with the philosophy of the Holland bill to place the
States in the position in which both they and the Federal
Government thought they were for more than a century and a half,
and not to create any situations with respect thereto."
S.Rep.No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 18. From this, California
reasons that "inland waters" must have been intended to encompass
all waters which the States "thought" were inland waters, for that
is the only way in which the Act can now be interpreted to
effectuate fully its supposed "philosophy" of granting to the
States all submerged lands within their historic boundaries.
If such a view of the bill's purpose is accepted as of the time
that the Committee Report was written, there is, nonetheless, no
inconsistency whatsoever between that
Page 381 U. S. 154
purpose and a legislative intent to leave the definition of
inland waters to the courts without restriction; at that time, the
limitation on boundary claims had not yet been incorporated into
the Act; thus, as the Act was then written, States could have
claimed all submerged lands within their historic boundaries, no
matter how "inland waters" was defined. The definition would have
affected only those States which, not having adequate preexisting
seaward boundaries, chose to extend their boundaries three miles
from the coastline pursuant to § 4 of the Act. As stated by Senator
Cordon during the Hearings,
"this bill has two approaches to a determination of the area of
its application. The first approach is that of the boundaries of
the States when they came into the Union; second, an election to
any State that has not done so to extend its boundary 3
geographical miles from its present coastline, as that term is
described in the present tense in the bill."
Senate Hearings 1374.
Only with the adoption of the three-mile limitation on the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the three-league limitation in the
Gulf of Mexico did the interpretations of historic boundaries and
inland waters become operationally related, and any inconsistency
thus created between the limitation and the prior philosophy of the
Act shows only that, to the extent the limitation would come into
play, the philosophy was modified. [
Footnote 19] This amendment was one of very few made to
the bill as reported by the Senate Committee, and came as the
result of continuous criticism throughout the course of the debates
that the extent of the grant was indefinite, [
Footnote 20] and that coastal States could
engage in a "claiming race" [
Footnote 21] for submerged lands.
Page 381 U. S. 155
California points to language stating that adoption of the
limitation worked no significant change in the bill. 99 Cong.Rec.
4114-4116 (remarks of Senator Holland). But such statements simply
reflect the understanding of the major supporters of the bill that
no States other than Texas and Florida (on its Gulf side) had
provable claims beyond three miles, and that the claims of those
two States did not go beyond three leagues. [
Footnote 22] If such were the case, the
limitation could indeed be thought to have no effect, for no state
boundaries would run afoul of it, and the vast grant of submerged
lands up to three miles along the length of the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts, and three leagues, subject to historical proof, in
the Gulf of Mexico, would not be impaired. Senator Holland, the
author of the bill, proposed the limiting boundary amendment to
meet the fears of those Senators who had criticized the
indefiniteness of the bill. He explained:
". . . I think the amendment has very little effect. But I am
perfectly willing to meet the suggestions of my friends, some of
whom have been opponents, and some of whom have been supporters of
the joint resolution, to the effect that they would like to have
the language more clearly spelled out than it was in the original
measure, to the effect that there is no intention whatsoever to
grant boundaries beyond 3 geographical miles in either the Atlantic
or the Pacific, and that this Congress knows of no possible
situation under which greater boundaries are claimed or could be
granted in the Gulf of Mexico than 3 leagues; and, in that case,
this Congress knows, although this amendment does not indicate it,
that
Page 381 U. S. 156
there are but 2 States affected by that particular
situation."
99 Cong.Rec. 4116.
Senator Holland was aware of California's expansive inland water
claims, but thought them altogether untenable.
"Mr. HOLLAND. My understanding is that California has no
provable case beyond 3 miles from its mainland, and that, as to the
islands, its provable case would be 3 miles around each of the
islands. I so stated in the hearings on this matter."
"Mr. DOUGLAS. That is a consummation devoutly to be desired, but
I am not at all satisfied that that it what the Senator's joint
resolution would accomplish, because the coastline is not fully and
clearly defined."
"Mr. HOLLAND. Under the joint resolution, no such contention
could be maintained."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. DOUGLAS. Is the Senator certain of that?"
"Mr. HOLLAND. That is what I believe, and that is what every
legal authority I have consulted on the subject believes.
Incidentally, the only reason why there was some thought to the
contrary was some wording in the original joint resolution, which
has been omitted, which would have made the outer boundary of
inland waters farther out than that which is now provided by the
joint resolution. The joint resolution simply continues the outer
boundary of inland waters pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme
Court already made. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"The Senator from Florida knows full well that, if the United
States Supreme Court should change its mind as to what constituted
the outer limits of inland waters, and should change it to a
sufficient degree,
Page 381 U. S. 157
it could open up, not only under this joint resolution, but of
its own initiative, questions which would reach out much farther
than anything we have been talking about here."
"The Senator from Florida believes that the laws, as announced
over and over and over again by the Supreme Court, as to the
delimitation of inland waters, are sufficiently fixed, definite,
and certain so that it would require a complete, cataclysmic change
of the Supreme Court's philosophy in that field to afford any hope
for an extension of the boundaries of the good State of California
so that they would go out beyond the islands as to all areas
contained within an outer line. There is no way for us to foreclose
the Supreme Court from changing its mind. It might change its mind
with reference to inland waters and their delimitation. But failing
such change, the Senator from Florida cannot see how, under this
joint resolution, there could possibly be any serious question
affecting California or any other State."
99 Cong.Rec. 2756-2757.
Senator Holland did not wish to foreclose California from
arguing (as it has done both here and before the Special Master)
that its waters are inland within the appropriate judicial
definition, but it was his opinion that no such definition would
permit California's claim to all waters shoreward of their remote
islands to prevail. Congress could have defined inland waters as it
wished for the purely domestic purposes of the Submerged Lands Act.
See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S.
1,
363 U.S.
30-36. It could have adopted California's theory, or the
Special Master's theory, or any other. Instead, it chose to leave
the definition of inland waters where it found it -- in the Court's
hands. The Act does not reveal a particular intent that courts
should broadly interpret "inland waters" so as to restore
California to its historic expectations regardless
Page 381 U. S. 158
of what its expectations might be. [
Footnote 23] Indeed, if the Court is to draw any
inference from the intent and structure of the Act as to how inland
waters should be
Page 381 U. S. 159
defined, the most plausible inference would be that Congress, in
adopting the three-mile limitation, must have intended some
baseline to be used other than one dependent
Page 381 U. S. 160
upon each State's subjective concept of its inland waters, for
such a limitation would prove to have been none at all, as full
acceptance of California's claims in the present case would
show.
Page 381 U. S. 161
III
THE MEANING OF "INLAND WATERS" IN THE SUBMERGED
LANDS
ACT SHOULD CONFORM TO THE CONVENTION ON THE
TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
We turn, then, to determining the judicial definition of "inland
waters." It immediately appears that the bulk of cases cited by
Congressmen during debates on the Submerged Lands Act for the
proposition that inland waters have "been defined time and time
again by the courts"
Page 381 U. S. 162
deal with interior waters such as lakes and rivers, and provide
no assistance in classifying bodies of water which join the open
sea. [
Footnote 24] In this
latter context, no prior case in this Court has ever precisely
defined the term. The 1947 California opinion clearly indicated
that "inland waters" was to have an international content, since
the outer limits of inland waters would determine the Country's
international coastline, but the Court did not particularize the
definition. [
Footnote 25] It
was that task which subsequently led to the appointment of the
Special Master.
Page 381 U. S. 163
The Special Master found that there was no internationally
accepted definition for inland waters, and decided, in those
circumstances, that it was the position which the United States
took on the question in the conduct of its foreign affairs which
should be controlling. He considered the relevant date on which to
determine our foreign policy position to be the date of the
California decree, October 27, 1947. He therefore rejected the
assertion that letters from the State Department written in 1951
and 1952 [
Footnote 26]
declaring the then present policy of the United States were
conclusive on the question before him. At the same time, that
decision required the Special Master to consider a great many
foreign policy materials dating back to 1793 in an attempt to
discern a consistent thread of United States policy on the
definition of inland waters. He ultimately decided that, as of
1947, the United States had taken the position that a bay was
inland water only if a closing line could be drawn across its mouth
less than 10 miles long enclosing a sufficient water area to
satisfy the Boggs formula. [
Footnote 27]
Since the filing of the Special Master's Report, the policy of
the United States has changed significantly. Indeed, it may now be
said that there is a settled international rule defining inland
waters. On March 24, 1961, the
Page 381 U. S. 164
United States ratified the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone (T.I.A.S. No. 5639), and, on September 10,
1964, when the requisite number of nations had ratified it, the
Convention went into force. For nations which do not use a straight
baseline method [
Footnote
28] to define inland waters (
see United Kingdom v.
Norway, [1951] I.C.J.Rep. 116), the Convention permits a
24-mile maximum closing line for bays and a "semicircle" test for
testing the sufficiency of the water area enclosed. The semicircle
test requires that a bay must comprise at least as much water area
within its closing line as would be contained in a semicircle with
a diameter equal to the length of the closing line. Unquestionably,
the 24-mile closing line, together with the semicircle test, now
represents the position of the United States. [
Footnote 29]
The United States contends that we must ignore the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in performing our duty
of giving content to "inland waters" as used in the Submerged Lands
Act, and must restrict ourselves to determining what our decision
would have been had the question been presented to us for decision
on May 22, 1953, the date of enactment. At that time, there was no
international accord on any definition of inland waters, and the
best evidence (although strenuously contested by California) of the
position of the United States was the letters of the State
Department which the Special Master refused to treat as
conclusive.
We do not think that the Submerged Lands Act has so restricted
us. Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for
defining inland waters to this Court. [
Footnote 30] We think that it did not tie our hands at
the same time.
Page 381 U. S. 165
Had Congress wished us simply to rubber-stamp the statements of
the State Department as to its policy in 1953, it could readily
have done so itself. [
Footnote
31] It is our opinion that we best fill our responsibility of
giving content to the words which Congress employed by adopting the
best and most workable definitions available. The Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, approved by the Senate and
ratified by the President, [
Footnote 32] provides such definitions. We adopt them for
purposes of the Submerged Lands Act. This establishes a single
coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act
and the conduct of our future international relations (barring an
unexpected change in the rules established by the Convention).
Furthermore the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides
answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which,
absent the Convention, would be most troublesome. [
Footnote 33]
Page 381 U. S. 166
California argues, alternatively to its claim that "inland
waters" embraces all ocean areas lying within a State's historic
seaward boundaries, that, if Congress intended "inland waters" to
be judicially defined in accordance with international usage, such
definition should possess an ambulatory quality so as to encompass
future changes in international law or practice. Thus, if, 10 years
from now, the definitions of the Convention were amended,
California would say that the extent of the Submerged Lands Act
grant would automatically shift, at least if the effect of such
amendment were to enlarge the extent of submerged lands available
to the States. We reject this open-ended view of the Act for
several reasons. Before today's decision, no one could say with
assurance where lay the line of inland waters as contemplated by
the Act; hence, there could have been no tenable reliance on any
particular line. After today, that situation will have changed.
Expectations will be established and reliance placed on the line we
define. Allowing future shifts of international understanding
respecting inland waters to alter the extent of the Submerged Lands
Act grant would substantially undercut the definiteness of
expectation which should attend it. Moreover, such a view might
unduly inhibit the United States in the conduct of its
Page 381 U. S. 167
foreign relations by making its ownership of submerged lands
vis-a-vis the States continually dependent upon the
position it takes with foreign nations. "Freezing" the meaning of
"inland waters" in terms of the Convention definition largely
avoids this, and also serves to fulfill the requirements of
definiteness and stability which should attend any congressional
grant of property rights belonging to the United States.
IV
SUBSIDIARY ISSUES
Once it is decided that the definitions of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone apply, many of the
subsidiary issues before us fall into place.
1.
Straight Base Lines. -- California argues that,
because the Convention permits a nation to use the straight
baseline method for determining its seaward boundaries if its
"coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe
of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity," California
is therefore free to use such boundary lines across the openings of
its bays and around its islands. [
Footnote 34] We agree with the United States that the
Convention recognizes
Page 381 U. S. 168
the validity of straight baselines used by other countries,
Norway for instance, and would permit the United States to use such
baselines if it chose, but that California may not use such
baselines to extend our international boundaries beyond their
traditional international limits against the expressed opposition
of the United States. The national responsibility for conducting
our international relations obviously must be accommodated with the
legitimate interests of the States in the territory over which they
are sovereign. Thus, a contraction of a State's recognized
territory imposed by the Federal Government in the name of foreign
policy would be highly questionable. But an extension of state
sovereignty to an international area by claiming it as inland water
would necessarily also extend national sovereignty, and, unless the
Federal Government's responsibility for questions of external
sovereignty is hollow, it must have the power to prevent States
from so enlarging themselves. We conclude that the choice under the
Convention to use the straight baseline method for determining
inland waters claimed against other nations is one that rests with
the Federal Government, and not with the individual States.
California relies upon
Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U. S. 240, for
the proposition that a State may draw its boundaries as it pleases
within limits recognized by the law of nations, regardless of the
position taken by the United States. Although some dicta in the
case may be read to support that view, we do not so interpret the
opinion. The case involved neither an expansion of our
Page 381 U. S. 169
traditional international boundary nor opposition by the United
States to the position taken by the State.
2.
Twenty-four-mile Closing Rule. -- The Convention
recognizes, and it is the present United States position, [
Footnote 35] that a 24-mile closing
rule, together with the semicircle test, should be used for
classifying bays in the United States. [
Footnote 36] Applying these tests to the segments of
California's
Page 381 U. S. 170
coast here in dispute, it appears that Monterey Bay is inland
water, and that none of the other coastal segments in dispute
[
Footnote 37] fulfill these
aspects of the Convention test. We so hold.
California asserts that the Santa Barbara Channel may be
considered a "fictitious bay" because the openings at both ends of
the channel and between the islands are each less than 24 miles.
[
Footnote 38] The United
States argues that the channel is no bay at all; that it is a
strait which serves as
Page 381 U. S. 171
a useful route of communication between two areas of open sea,
and, as such, may not be classified as inland waters. [
Footnote 39]
By way of analogy, California directs our attention to the
Breton and Chandleur Sounds off Louisiana, which the United States
claims as inland waters,
United States v. Louisiana,
363 U. S. 1,
363 U. S. 66-67,
n. 108. Each of these analogies only serves to point up the
validity of the United States' argument that the Santa Barbara
Channel should not be treated as a bay. The Breton Sound is a
cul de sac. The Chandleur Sound, if considered separately
from the Breton Sound, which it joins, leads only to the Breton
Sound. Neither is used as a route of passage between two areas of
open sea. In fact, both are so shallow as to not be readily
navigable. [
Footnote 40]
California also points to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. That strait
is not claimed by the United States as a "fictitious bay," and it
does not connect two areas of open sea.
Evidence submitted to the Special Master on the extent of
international use made of the Santa Barbara Channel was sparse.
What evidence there was indicated the usefulness of the route, but
did not specify whether the ships so using it were domestic or
international. [
Footnote 41]
California
Page 381 U. S. 172
now regards the point as important, for, under international law
as expressed in the
Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep.
4, the International Court of Justice held that a country could not
claim a strait as inland water if, in its natural state, it served
as a useful route for international passage. We do not consider the
point of controlling importance. The United States has not in the
past claimed the Santa Barbara Channel as inland water, and opposes
any such claim now. The channel has not been regarded as a bay
either historically or geographically. In these circumstances, as
with the drawing of straight baselines, we hold that if the United
States does not choose to employ the concept of a "fictitious bay"
in order to extend our international boundaries around the islands
framing Santa Barbara Channel, it cannot be forced to do so by
California. It is therefore unnecessary to reinstitute proceedings
before a master to determine the factual question of whether the
passageway is internationally useful.
3.
Historic Inland Waters. -- By the terms of the
Convention, the 24-mile closing rule does not apply to so-called
"historic" bays. [
Footnote
42] Essentially, these are bays over which a coastal nation has
traditionally asserted and maintained dominion, with the
acquiescence of foreign nations. [
Footnote 43] California claims that virtually all the
waters here in dispute are historic inland waters as the term is
internationally understood. It relies primarily on an
interpretation of its State Constitution to the effect that
Page 381 U. S. 173
the state boundaries run three miles outside the islands and
bays, [
Footnote 44] plus
several court decisions which so interpret it as applied to
Monterey, Santa Monica, and San Pedro Bays. [
Footnote 45] The United States counters that, as
with straight baselines, California can maintain no claim to
historic inland waters unless the claim is endorsed by the United
States. The Special Master found it unnecessary to decide that
question, because, on the evidence before him, he concluded that
California had not traditionally exercised dominion over any of the
claimed waters.
Since the 24-mile rule includes Monterey Bay, we do not consider
it here. As to Santa Monica Bay, San Pedro Bay, and the other water
areas in dispute, we agree with the Special Master that they are
not historic inland waters of the United States.
California contends that two studies of the criteria for
determining historic waters have been made since the Special Master
filed his report [
Footnote
46] which show that he applied the wrong standards, thus
vitiating his conclusions. In particular, it is said that the
Special Master
Page 381 U. S. 174
erroneously thought the concept of historic waters to be an
exception to the general rule of inland waters requiring a rigorous
standard of proof. We find no substantial indication of this in his
report.
On the evidence, California's claim that its constitution set a
boundary beyond the bays and islands is arguable, but many of the
state statutes drawing county boundaries which supposedly run to
the limit of the state boundaries cut the other way by indicating a
line only three miles from shore. [
Footnote 47] Furthermore, a legislative declaration of
jurisdiction without evidence of further active and continuous
assertion of dominion over the waters is not sufficient to
establish the claim. [
Footnote
48] There is a federal district court opinion,
United
States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp.
121 (1935), which dismissed federal criminal charges for an
offense which took place more than three miles from the shore of
San Pedro Bay on the ground that the bay was within California, not
federal, jurisdiction; but it is difficult to see this dismissal as
an assertion of dominion. In Santa Monica Bay, California did
successfully prosecute a criminal offense which took place more
than three miles from the shore,
People v.
Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d
617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939). However, the decision stands as the
only
Page 381 U. S. 175
assertion of criminal jurisdiction of which we have been made
aware. [
Footnote 49]
The United States disclaims that any of the disputed areas are
historic inland waters. We are reluctant to hold that such a
disclaimer would be decisive in all circumstances, for a case might
arise in which the historic evidence was clear beyond doubt. But,
in the case before us, with its questionable evidence of continuous
and exclusive assertions of dominion over the disputed waters, we
think the disclaimer decisive.
4.
Harbors and Roadsteads. -- The parties disagree as
to whether inland waters should encompass anchorages beyond the
outer harborworks of harbors. The Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone (Art. 8) states without qualification that
"the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part
of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the
coast." We take that to be the line incorporated in the Submerged
Lands Act.
As to open roadsteads used for loading, unloading and anchoring
ships, the Convention (Art. 9) provides that such areas should be
included in the territorial sea, and, by implication, that they are
not to be considered inland waters. We adopt that
interpretation.
5.
The Line of Ordinary Low Water. -- Along the
California coast, there are two low tides each day, one of which is
generally lower than the other. The assertion of the United States,
with which the Special Master agreed, is that the line of ordinary
low water is obtained by taking
Page 381 U. S. 176
the average of all the low tides. California would average only
the lower low tides.
We hold that California's position represents the better view of
the matter. The Submerged Lands Act defines coastline in terms of
the "line of ordinary low water." The Convention (Art. 3) uses "the
low water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts
officially recognized by the coastal State" (
i.e., the
United States). We interpret the two lines thus indicated to
conform, and, on the official United States coastal charts of the
Pacific Coast prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic
Survey, it is the lower low water line which is marked.
6.
Artificial Accretions. -- When this case was before
the Special Master, the United States contended that it owned all
mineral rights to lands outside inland waters which were submerged
at the date California entered the Union, even though since
enclosed or reclaimed by means of artificial structures. The
Special Master ruled that lands so enclosed or filled belonged to
California because such artificial changes were clearly recognized
by international law to change the coastline. Furthermore, the
Special Master recognized that the United States, through its
control over navigable waters, had power to protect its interests
from encroachment by unwarranted artificial structures, and that
the effect of any future changes could thus be the subject of
agreement between the parties.
The United States now contends that, whereas the Submerged Lands
Act recognized and confirmed state title within all artificial as
well as natural modifications to the shoreline prior to the passage
of the Act, Congress meant to recognize only natural modifications
after the date of the Act. The Act, however, makes no specific
reference to artificial accretions, and nowhere in the legislative
history did anyone focus on the question. [
Footnote 50] The United
Page 381 U. S. 177
States points by analogy to the rule of property law that
artificial fill belongs to the owner of the submerged land onto
which it is deposited.
Marine R. & Coal Co. v. United
States, 257 U. S. 47,
257 U. S. 65. We
think the situation different when a State extends its land domain
by pushing back the sea; in that case, its sovereignty should
extend to the new land, as was generally thought to be the case
prior to the 1947 California opinion. [
Footnote 51] The considerations which led us to reject
the possibility of wholesale changes in the location of the line of
inland waters caused by future changes in international Law,
supra, pp.
381 U. S.
166-167, do not apply with force to the relatively
slight and sporadic changes which can be brought about
artificially. Arguments based on the inequity to the United States
of allowing California to effect changes in the boundary between
federal and state submerged lands by making future artificial
changes in the coastline are met, as the Special Master pointed
out, by the ability of the United States to protect itself through
its power over navigable waters.
With the modifications set out in this opinion we approve the
recommendations of the Special Master. The parties, or either of
them, may, before September 1, 1965, submit a proposed decree to
carry this opinion into
Page 381 U. S. 178
effect, failing which the Court will prepare and enter an
appropriate decree at the next Term of Court.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2]
The late William H. Davis of New York City.
[
Footnote 3]
The segments were as follows:
1. From Point Conception to Point Hueneme;
2. San Pedro Bay;
3. From the southern extremity of San Pedro Bay to the western
headland at Newport Bay;
4. Crescent City Bay;
5. Monterey Bay;
6. San Luis Obispo Bay;
7. Santa Monica Bay.
We directed the Special Master to recommend answers to the
following questions:
"
Question 1. -- What is the status (inland waters or
open sea) of particular channels and other water areas between the
mainland and offshore islands, and, if inland waters, then by what
criteria are the inland water limits of any such channel or other
water area to be determined?"
"
Question 2. -- Are particular segments in fact bays or
harbors constituting inland waters, and from what landmarks are the
lines marking the seaward limits of bays, harbors, rivers, and
other inland waters to be drawn?"
"
Question 3. -- By what criteria is the ordinary low
water mark on the coast of California to be ascertained?"
342 U. S. 342 U.S.
891.
[
Footnote 4]
California's claim to the "overall unit area" runs from Point
Conception to Richardson Rock (21 miles across water), to San
Miguel Island, to Santa Rosa Island, to Gull Island; thence to Begg
Rock (35.8 miles), to San Nicolas Island, to San Clemente Island
(43 miles); thence back to the mainland at Point Loma (56.8 miles).
San Nicolas and San Clemente Islands are over 50 miles from shore.
See Map attached as Appendix C to the dissenting opinion,
post at 178 [omitted -- see printed edition of United
States Reports].
[
Footnote 5]
To determine whether a coastal indentation is of sufficient
depth and shape to be island water, the Boggs formula would (1)
draw the closing line across the mouth of the indentation; (2) draw
a belt around the shore of the indentation (similar to a small
marginal belt) having a width equal to one-fourth the length of the
closing line across the entrance; (3) compare the remaining area
inside the closing line with the area of a semicircle having a
diameter equal to one-half of the length of the closing line, and
if the enclosed area is larger than that of the semicircle, the
indentation is inland water. Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial
Sea, 24 Am.J.Int'l L. 541, 548.
[
Footnote 6]
The Special Master recommended as follows:
"
Question 1: The channels and other water areas between
the mainland and the offshore islands within the area referred to
by California as the 'over-all unit area' are not inland waters.
They lie seaward of the baseline of the marginal belt of
territorial waters, which should be measured in each instance along
the shore of the adjoining mainland or island, each island having
its own marginal belt."
"
Question 2: No one of the seven particular coastal
segments now under consideration for precise determination and
adjudication is a bay constituting inland waters. The landmarks
from which the lines marking the seaward limits (the straight line
segments of the baseline of the marginal belt) of bays, harbors,
rivers and other inland waters are to be drawn, are as
follows:"
"
Bays"
"The extreme seaward limit of inland waters of a bay is a line
ten nautical miles long. For indentations having pronounced
headlands not more than ten nautical miles apart, and having a
depth as hereinafter defined, a straight line is to be drawn across
the entrance. Where the headlands are more than ten nautical miles
apart, the straight line is to be drawn across the indentation at
the point nearest the entrance at which the width does not exceed
ten nautical miles. In either case, the requisite depth is to be
determined by the following criterion: the envelope of all arcs of
circles having a radius equal to one-fourth the length of the
straight line shall be drawn from all points around the shore of
the indentation; if the area enclosed by the straight line across
the entrance and the envelope of the arcs of the circles is greater
than that of a semicircle with a diameter equal to one-half the
length of the line across the entrance, the waters of the
indentation shall be regarded as inland waters; if otherwise, the
waters of the indentation shall be regarded as open sea."
"
Harbors (Ports)"
"In front of harbors, the outer limit of inland waters is to
embrace an anchorage reasonably related to the physical
surroundings and the service requirements of the port, and, absent
contrary evidence, may be assumed to be the line of the outermost
permanent harbor works."
"
River Mouths"
"Where rivers empty into the sea, the seaward limit of inland
waters is a line following the general direction of the coast drawn
across the mouth of the river whatever its width. If the river
flows into an estuary, the rules applicable to bays apply to the
estuary."
"
Landmarks"
Where pronounced headlands exist at tributary waterways, the
appropriate landmark is the point of intersection of the plane of
ordinary low water with the outermost extension of the natural
headland. Where there is no pronounced headland, the landmark is
the point of intersection of the ordinary low water mark with a
line bisecting the angle between the general trend line of the
ordinary low water mark along the open coast and the general trend
line of the ordinary low water mark along the shore of the
tributary waterway.
"
Question 3: The 'ordinary low water mark on the coast
of California' is the intersection with the shoreline (as it exists
at the time of survey) of the plane of the mean of all low waters,
to be established, subject to the approval of the Court, by the
United States Coast & Geodetic Survey from observations made
over a period of 18.6 years."
Report of Special Master 2-5 (footnotes omitted).
[
Footnote 7]
The Submerged Lands Act provides in relevant part:
"
AN ACT"
"To confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands
beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural
resources within such lands and waters, to provide for the use and
control of said lands and resources, and to confirm the
jurisdiction and control of the United States over the natural
resources of the seabed of the Continental Shelf seaward of State
boundaries."
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act
may be cited as the 'Submerged Lands Act.'"
"
TITLE I"
"
DEFINITION"
"SEC. 2 [43 U.S.C. § 1301]. When used in this Act --"
"(a) The term 'lands beneath navigable waters' means --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal
waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward
to a line three geographical miles distant from the coastline of
each such State and to the boundary line of each such State where
in any case such boundary as it existed at the time such State
became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by
Congress, extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three
geographical miles, and"
"(3) all filed in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were
lands beneath navigable waters, as hereinabove defined;"
"(b) The term 'boundaries' includes the seaward boundaries of a
State or its boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico or any of the Great
Lakes as they existed at the time such State became a member of the
Union, or as heretofore approved by the Congress, or as extended or
confirmed pursuant to section 4 hereof, but in no event shall the
term 'boundaries' or the term 'lands beneath navigable waters' be
interpreted as extending from the coastline more than three
geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or
more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico;"
"(c) The term 'coastline' means the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the
open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland
waters;"
"
* * * *"
"
TITLE II"
"
LANDS BENEATH NAVIGABLE WATERS"
"
WITHIN STATE BOUNDARIES"
"SEC. 3 (43 U.S.C. § 1311). RIGHTS OF THE STATES. --"
"(a) It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public
interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath
navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States,
and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the
right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the
said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable
State law be, and they are hereby, subject to the provisions
hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and
assigned to the respective States or the persons who were on June
5, 1950, entitled thereto under the law of the respective States in
which the land is located, and the respective grantees, lessees, or
successors in interest thereof;"
"(b) (1) The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto
said States and persons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved
herein, all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any
it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural
resources;"
"
* * * *"
"SEC. 4 (43 U.S.C. § 1312). SEAWARD BOUNDARIES. -- The seaward
boundary of each original coastal State is hereby approved and
confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its
coastline or, in the case of the Great Lakes, to the international
boundary. Any State admitted subsequent to the formation of the
Union which has not already done so may extend its seaward
boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant from its
coastline, or to the international boundaries of the United States
in the Great Lakes or any other body of water traversed by such
boundaries. Any claim heretofore or hereafter asserted either by
constitutional provision, statute, or otherwise, indicating the
intent of a State so to extend its boundaries is hereby approved
and confirmed, without prejudice to its claim, if any it has, that
its boundaries extend beyond that line. Nothing in this section is
to be construed as questioning or in any manner prejudicing the
existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond three geographical
miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or
at the time such State became a member of the Union, or if it has
been heretofore approved by Congress."
[
Footnote 8]
One English, statute, or land mile equals approximately .87
geographical, marine, or nautical mile. The conventional "3-mile
limit" under international law refers to three geographical miles,
or approximately 3.45 land miles.
[
Footnote 9]
S.Rep.No.133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 18 U.S.Code Cong. and
Adm.Laws 1953, p. 1487.
[
Footnote 10]
99 Cong.Rec. 4116. Senator Anderson proposed a similar amendment
while the bill was in committee. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J.Res. 13 and other
bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1348 (hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings). After discussion the proposal was voted down,
id. at 1416.
[
Footnote 11]
Closing Brief of California 14.
[
Footnote 12]
Senate Hearings 312-315, 1064-1065, 1085, 1304, 1378.
[
Footnote 13]
See also Senate Hearings 1285 (remarks of Senator
Cordon).
[
Footnote 14]
Senate Hearings 275-280.
[
Footnote 15]
Id. at 1052.
[
Footnote 16]
Id. at 1374-1380.
[
Footnote 17]
Id. at 1380-1385.
[
Footnote 18]
In the later debates, Senator Cordon answered an assertion that
the committee had rejected the Boggs formula by saying, "The
committee, as I recall, and I think I am correct, neither accepted
nor rejected the Boggs formula or any other formula." 99 Cong.Rec.
2633.
And see the material quoted in
n 23, infra.
[
Footnote 19]
See Senate Hearings 1415 (remarks of Senator
Cordon).
[
Footnote 20]
See, e.g., 99 Cong.Rec. 2881, 2916, 3038-3040,
3549-3564, 3655-3656, 3884-3886, 4085-4086, 4094-4099, 4109.
[
Footnote 21]
99 Cong.Rec. 3655 (remarks of Senator Kilgore).
[
Footnote 22]
99 Cong.Rec. 2695, 3039 (remarks of Senator Daniel), 2746
(remarks of Senator Holland), 2881 (remarks of Senator Anderson),
2916 (remarks of Senators Anderson and Douglas). Senate Hearings
957 (remarks of Senator Holland).
[
Footnote 23]
Several amendments were offered and defeated which would have
limited the grant to the international three-mile limit or to three
miles from the shoreline around the entire coastal perimeter of the
United States, thus cutting off any claims to a three-league limit
by the Gulf Coast States.
See 99 Cong.Rec. 4157, 4203,
4473-4478. The reason for the unacceptability of these amendments
to the leaders of the measure, largely composed of Senators from
the Gulf Coast States, is obvious, and had nothing to do with any
particular concept of inland waters.
Senator Douglas introduced amendments specifically designed to
prevent States from claiming as inland waters those water areas
between the mainland and remote islands. Section 2(c), as amended,
would have read:
"The term 'coastline' means the line of ordinary low water along
that portion of the coast
of the main continent which is
in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the
seaward limit of inland waters,
and in the case of any island
seaward of such coast, means the line of ordinary low water around
such island."
99 Cong.Rec. 4240. (Amendments italicized.) The colloquy leading
to the rejection of these amendments is extremely revealing in the
total absence of hostility to the basic idea which Senator Douglas
was pursuing and the absence of any understanding by the leaders of
the measure that it embodied an historical definition of inland
waters.
"Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, this amendment is designed to clear
up an ambiguity in the pending joint resolution and to conform to
what the distinguished Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], the
author of the joint resolution, stated was its real intention."
"One of the problems connected with the joint resolution is the
problem of where the baseline is, from which the submerged lands
seaward from the low water mark are to be measured. Senate Joint
Resolution 13 defines this location as the 'coastline,' but it is
not precisely certain in my mind or in the mind of the Senator from
Oregon (Mr. CORDON), whose interpretation I requested, what is
meant by the word 'coastline.' In the main debate on the joint
resolution, I pointed out that this definition might mean 1 of 2
things. First, it might mean, what I hoped it would mean; namely,
the shoreline of the main continental land mass and the external
limits of inland waters; and then, in the case of islands, the
shorelines of each of those islands."
"But I pointed out that probably there would be a contrary
claim, particularly in the case of California, and that an attempt
would be made to define the term 'coastline' as being a line drawn
from the main continent out to and along the outer edge of the
outer islands lying off the coast. This is a tremendously important
subject. It involves very substantial areas, particularly in the
case of California. If it is the latter definition which is to be
used, then the water between the remote islands -- however far out
-- and the main continental land mass would become inland waters,
not external waters, and all the intervening submerged lands would
become the property of the coastal State."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I can understand the argument made by
the Senator from Illinois, but I believe his amendment completely
fails to reach the objective he is striving to achieve."
"If one examines the testimony of the representative of the
Department of State, he will see that it is the position of the
State Department of the present administration, as it was also the
position of the previous administration, and, so far as I know, of
all other administrations, that the marginal sea begins wherever
the line of inland waters ends. That is a very simple position to
take in the case of a straight coastline, as is the situation with
regard to the State of Texas. There, the shore line and the
coastline are synonymous in almost all instances."
"However, the situation becomes more complicated when we
consider a coast having many indentures, islands, sounds, coves,
bays, and the like. At present, there is a difference of opinion
between the State governments and the Federal Government as to
precisely where the line of inland waters is located. But it is
well agreed, as it has always been agreed, that the marginal sea
begins at the point where the line of inland waters ends."
"I should like to apply that definition to the State of
Louisiana. I regret that I do not have here a map of Louisiana for
the purpose of demonstrating my point, but all who have made a
study of the question agree that a body of water known as
Chandeleur Sound is inland water. In that area, there is a large
number of islands, each island close to another. It is agreed by
both the Federal Government and the State government, and it has
always been agreed, that Chandeleur Sound is inland water. The
effect of the Douglas amendment would be to make Chandeleur Sound a
part of the high seas, although the Federal Government has never
contended that Chandeleur Sound was a part of the high seas, and
the State government has always claimed it was inland water."
"Likewise, in the case of bays, it is the position of the State
Department that bays not wider than 10 miles are inland waters. The
distance of 10 miles between headlands across the mouth of a bay
marks the place where the marginal sea begins. The amendment
offered by the Senator from Illinois would have the effect once
again of declaring such a bay to be a part of the high seas merely
because it is wider than 6 miles between headlands."
"Obviously, the Senator from Illinois is submitting his own
definition of inland waters. In effect, it is a definition of
inland waters which does not have the support of a single State
government in the United States; it does not have the support of
the State Department; it is a definition that does not meet with
the approval of the Department of Justice; it is a definition, in
effect, that does not meet with the approval of a single department
of either the Federal Government or the State governments."
"There is no authority for accepting the inference of this
amendment, namely, that the definition of inland waters is that
they begin at the shore line or where 3-mile lines from headlands
intersect in a bay. There is no support for this type of amendment,
other than that it appeals to the Senator from Illinois."
"The committee has struggled with this problem. The committee
struggled with several different formulas for defining inland
waters. Originally, the joint resolution provided that inland
waters should include all bays, sounds, straits, and estuaries.
However, there was some objection to that definition by the
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice contended that it
would be far more preferable not to attempt to define inland
waters, but simply to use the words 'inland waters' to meet the
standard that those words would ordinarily suggest. Therefore, at
the suggestion of the Department of Justice, and I suppose with the
support of the Department of State, the words 'including all bays,
estuaries, straits, and sounds,' were stricken from the joint
resolution."
"I submit that the language of the joint resolution is the best
agreement that could be reached, upon the advice of the competent
officials of the State Department and the Justice Department, as
well as the advice that the committee had available to it from all
the witnesses who testified, and therefore we should retain the
committee language rather than accept the definition of the Senator
from Illinois."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. DANIEL. Is it not true that there are some islands off the
main continent which are not as far as 3 miles distant, and that
this amendment would confuse the situation with reference to them?
. . . We would have to apply this amendment instead of the present
rule of inland waters which permits both the Nation and the State
to measure from the outer line along those islands."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. HOLLAND. . . ."
"I think I understand what the Senator [Douglas] is trying to
attain. What he is trying to attain is in complete accord with the
belief of the Senator from Florida, that islands which are far
remote from the coast, and clear beyond inland waters by any
reasonable conception, have a 3-mile submerged shelf around each of
them; and while that fact is clearly shown in the statement of
international law furnished to the committee in the last Congress
by the Secretary of State at that time, Mr. Dean Acheson, the
proposed amendment would not effectuate that situation at all. . .
."
The amendment was defeated 50 to 26. 99 Cong.Rec. 4240-4243.
[
Footnote 24]
See, e.g., 99 Cong.Rec. 3110-3112 (remarks of Senator
Hill).
[
Footnote 25]
The 1947 case raised the purely legal question -- who owned the
lands and mineral rights beneath the marginal sea belt? In deciding
that they belonged to the United States, the Court relied heavily
on the international responsibilities of the Federal
Government.
"But whatever any nation does in the open sea, which detracts
from its common usefulness to nations, or which another nation may
charge detracts from it, is a question for consideration among
nations as such, and not their separate governmental units. What
this Government does, or even what the states do, anywhere in the
ocean, is a subject upon which the nation may enter into and assume
treaty or similar international obligations."
332 U. S. 332 U.S.
19,
332 U. S. 35
(footnote omitted). The opinion also established that landlocked
waters not a part of the open sea are not part of the marginal
belt, and belong to the States. The only problem remaining in the
way of actually fixing the location of the marginal belt, and hence
the dividing line of ownership between the State and the United
States, was that of determining where the open sea ends and
landlocked waters begin. The Court specifically left that question
unresolved. It is precisely that problem of defining what
constitutes open sea and what constitutes inland waters which we
must decide in the present case.
Resolution of that question will (1) determine for the present
the location of the marginal belt which we claim against other
nations, and (2) define the areas within which ships of foreign
nations have no right of innocent passage. Unquestionably, the
definitions of what constitutes open sea and inland waters is, to
borrow the words of the 1947 opinion, " a subject upon which the
nation may enter into and assume treaty or similar international
obligations." Negotiations at The Hague beginning in 1930 were
directed to just that end, and the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, to which we became a party in 1961,
now establishes rules for separating the open sea from inland
waters.
[
Footnote 26]
Letter from Acting Secretary of State Webb to Attorney General
McGrath, November 13, 1951, Senate Hearings 460; letter from
Secretary of State Acheson to Attorney General McGrath, February
12, 1952, Senate Hearings 462.
[
Footnote 27]
See n 5,
supra. Neither the Special Master nor the United States
treated the Boggs formula as having been the "definitive" United
States position. The Special Master recommended it as an
"appropriate technical method" for measuring the sufficiency of the
depth of bays. Report of Special Master 26.
[
Footnote 28]
See n 34,
infra.
[
Footnote 29]
Letter from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy,
Attorney General, January 15, 1963, II, International Legal
Materials 527.
[
Footnote 30]
See discussion and legislative history,
381 U.
S. supra.
[
Footnote 31]
See 99 Cong.Rec. 2633 (remarks of Senators Long and
Cordon).
[
Footnote 32]
The Convention was approved by the Senate May 26, 1960, 106
Cong.Rec. 11196, and was ratified by the President March 24, 1961,
44 State Dept.Bull. 609.
See Treaties in Force -- January
1, 1965, 263.
[
Footnote 33]
In support of the position that we should ignore the
developments in the law and practice of nations respecting the
concept of inland waters which have transpired subsequent to the
passage of the Submerged Lands Act -- a position which the
Solicitor General frankly recognized in his oral presentation was
not an easy one for the Government to maintain -- the United States
cites a statement made by Senator Cordon during the hearings.
"Those who prepared the bill over the years took the view -- and
that is the way the bill is before us -- that 'coastline' means the
line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is
in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the
seaward limit of inland waters. That is in the present tense. It is
the coastline as of now. We have confirmed here 3 miles from the
coastline as of now. . . ."
"If we attempt now to discuss a coastline of 1783, or whenever
the Revolutionary War was concluded and the treaty was signed --
and I do not just now recall the date -- if we attempt now to
determine a coastline as of then, it would seem to me that we
increase our difficulties beyond what, as I understand the bill, we
envisioned in the first place, but which we left where by they
were."
Senate Hearings 1354-1355.
That statement was made in reply to a suggestion that a State
should have the choice of extending its boundaries three miles from
its present coastline or three miles from its coastline as of the
time it entered the Union. Senator Cordon's reply expresses his
opposition to that idea on the ground that the exact location of
the ancient shoreline would be extremely difficult to determine. It
reveals no intent to restrict the courts in framing the definitions
to be used to determine the present coastline.
[
Footnote 34]
Article 4 of the Convention provides:
"1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
"2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the
sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal
waters."
"3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations
unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently
above sea level have been built on them."
"4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under
the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining
particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region
concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly
evidenced by a long usage."
"5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a
State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas the
territorial sea of another State."
"6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines
on charts, to which due publicity must be given."
[
Footnote 35]
Letter from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy,
Attorney General, January 15, 1963, II International Legal
Materials 527; Brief for the United States in Answer to
California's Exceptions 148.
[
Footnote 36]
The full text of Article 7 is as follows:
"1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong
to a single State."
"2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well marked
indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of
its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than
a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however,
be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger
than, that of the semicircle whose diameter is a line drawn across
the mouth of that indentation."
"3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation
is that lying between the low water mark around the shore of the
indentation and a line joining the low water marks of its natural
entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an
indentation has more than one mouth, the semicircle shall be drawn
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines
across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be
included as if they were part of the water areas of the
indentation."
"4. If the distance between the low water marks of the natural
entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a
closing line may be drawn between these two low water marks, and
the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal
waters."
"5. Where the distance between the low water marks of the
natural entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a
straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the
bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that
is possible with a line of that length."
"6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called
'historic' bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system
provided for in article 4 is applied."
[
Footnote 37]
The parties stated that Crescent City Bay is no longer an area
in dispute.
[
Footnote 38]
The United States asserts that "international law recognizes no
principle of
fictitious bays.'" We find it unnecessary to
decide that question. The Government states:
"The expression seems to have originated in a proposal by the
Committee of Experts, made to the Fifth Session of the
International Law Commission, suggesting a 10-mile rule for bays, a
general 10-mile limit for straight baselines, providing that
baselines should not be drawn to islands more than 5 miles from
shore, and limiting baselines to 5 miles in groups of islands or
between such groups and the mainland, except that, in such a group,
one opening could be 10 miles. The latter situation was called a
'fictitious bay.' The Special Rapporteur adopted this proposal in
an Addendum to the Second Report on the Regime of the Territorial
Sea, International Law Commission, Fifth Session, 18 May 1953.
English text, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/61/Add.1, p. 7 and Annex, p. 4. The
subject of groups of islands was postponed by the Commission in
1954 (Article 11, Report of the International Law Commission
Covering the Work of Its Sixth Session (U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/88), p.
42), and there is no special provision on the subject in the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as
finally adopted. The Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Eighth Session, p. 45, fn. 1 (U.N.Doc.A/C.6/L.378),
makes clear that the original proposal on the subject was an
attempt to formulate a rule and not an expression of a rule already
in existence."
Brief for the United States in Answer to California's
Exceptions, 149-150, n. 112.
The openings at the ends of the Santa Barbara Channel are 11
miles and 21 miles.
[
Footnote 39]
See Letter from Acting Secretary of State Webb to
Attorney General McGrath, November 13, 1951. Senate Hearings 460.
See also Senate Hearings 1084-1085 (remarks of Jack B.
Tate).
[
Footnote 40]
The depth in general ranges between 6 and 12 feet according to
Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart No. 1270, but there is no passage
as much as 12 feet deep connecting the ends of the sounds. The
sounds are "navigable waters" in the legal sense even in the parts
too shallow for navigation.
See United States v. Turner,
175 F.2d 644, 647,
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851.
[
Footnote 41]
Testimony before the Special Master indicated that the channel
provided a substantial amount of protection from the rough seas of
the Pacific, and was used as an alternate route of passage for
ships "coming down from the Pacific Northwest." (Tr. 595.
See
also Tr. 608.) In its appendix, p. 57, California points to a
statement in Davidson, Coast Pilot of California, Oregon, and
Washington (4th ed. 1889), p. 53,
"The islands break the force of the large westerly swell of the
Pacific along the coastline, and, in winter, afford good lee from
the full force of the southeast gales."
[
Footnote 42]
See Art. 7, § 6,
supra, n 36.
[
Footnote 43]
See generally Juridical Regime of Historic Waters,
Including Historic Bays, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962).
[
Footnote 44]
Article XII of the California Constitution of 1849 described the
sea boundary of the State of California as follows:
". . . thence running west and along said boundary line to the
Pacific Ocean, and extending therein three English miles; thence
running in a northwesterly direction and following the direction of
the Pacific Coast to the 42d degree of north latitude, thence on
the line of said 42d degree of north latitude to the place of
beginning. Also all the islands, harbors, and bays, along and
adjacent to the Pacific Coast."
[
Footnote 45]
Ocean Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235,
252 P. 722 (1927);
Ocean Industries, Inc. v.
Greene, 15 F.2d 862
(D.C.N.D.Cal.1926) (Monterey Bay).
People v.
Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d
617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939) (Santa Monica Bay).
United States
v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp.
121 (D.C.1935) (San Pedro Bay).
[
Footnote 46]
Historic Bays, U.N.Doc. A/CN.12/1 (1957), and Juridical Regime
of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/143
(1962).
[
Footnote 47]
E.g., for San Diego County,
see Cal.Stat.1850,
c. 15, § 2, p. 58; Cal.Stat.1851, c. 14, § 2, p. 172; Cal.Political
Code 1872, §§ 3907, 3944; Cal.Political Code 1923, § 3945;
Cal.Stat.1919, c. 470, § 38, p. 895; Cal.Stat.1923, c. 160, § 38,
p. 361; Cal.Govt.Code § 23137; Cal.Stat.1947, c. 424, p. 1069. For
Los Angeles County,
see Cal.Stat.1850, c. 15, § 3, p. 59;
Cal.Stat.1851, c. 14, § 3, p. 172; Cal.Stat.1856, c. 46, § 1, p.
53; Cal.Political Code 1872, § 3945; Cal.Stat.1919, c. 470, § 20,
p. 877; Cal.Political Code 1923, § 3927; Cal.Stat.1923, c. 160, §
20, p. 343; Cal.Govt.Code, § 23119; Cal.Stat.1947, c. 424, p.
1055.
[
Footnote 48]
See generally Juridical Regime of Historic Waters,
Including Historic Bays, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/143, 80-105 (1962).
[
Footnote 49]
The United States Attorney for the Southern District of
California participated as an
amicus curiae in the
Stralla case, and supported the position of California. We
do not consider this action so significant as to foreclose the
United States in the controversy before us.
Compare the
discussion of actions taken by the Secretary of the Interior in
United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19,
332 U. S.
39-40.
[
Footnote 50]
See, e.g., 99 Cong.Rec. 2697 (remarks of Senator
Cordon); Senate Hearings 1344-1345, 1353-1358, 1374.
[
Footnote 51]
See, e.g., Statement of Robert Moses and the discussion
following it. Senate Hearings 137.
The United States points, by analogy to judicial interpretations
of the Swamp Land Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 519, to the effect that it
granted only those lands which were swamp at the date of its
passage. However, the terms of that Act were specific:
". . . those swamp and overflowed lands . . . which shall remain
unsold at the passage of this act, shall be, and the same are
hereby, granted . . . ;"
and it granted lands sovereignty over which had never been
thought to change because the nature of the land changed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
In 1947, in
United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19, this Court held that the United States had paramount
rights in the waters and submerged lands lying adjacent to its
coastlines. A Special Master was appointed to apply the rule of
that case to segments of submerged land off the mainland of
California. In 1953, Congress, believing that this Court's decision
unfairly denied to the coastal States submerged lands within their
historic boundaries, passed the Submerged Lands Act to upset that
decision and restore to the States what Congress believed had
historically and rightfully been theirs. The Court today decides
this case on the basis of the 13-year-old Master's Report which
attempted to carry out the 1947 California opinion and decree.
Instead of relying on that 1952 Report, which was based on a
decision which Congress in 1953 forcefully and emphatically
rejected in the Submerged Lands Act, I would refer this case to a
Master for new hearings, findings and recommendations to be made in
light of the Submerged Lands Act, the controlling statutory law as
it now exists.
I
The issue in this case is whether California or the United
States is the owner of seven segments of land lying under the sea
off the mainland of California. [
Footnote 2/1] Most
Page 381 U. S. 179
of the segments lie under or outside what are called bays in
popular usage, and as to them the question is whether and how much
of the land underlying them and the marginal sea beyond belongs to
California. [
Footnote 2/2] One
large segment, which also includes two of the bays in issue,
touches the sea opposite a chain of islands which lie up to
approximately 50 miles off the mainland, separated by the Santa
Barbara Channel, the San Pedro Channel, and the Gulf of Santa
Catalina. [
Footnote 2/3] As to that
segment, California claims ownership of the sea bottom under the
water separating the islands from the mainland and three miles
beyond the islands, while the United States argues that California
owns only a strip three geographic miles wide around each island
and one extending three geographic miles from the mainland shore,
with the intervening submerged land all belonging to the Federal
Government. In order to understand the present contentions of the
parties, it is necessary to go back to the years before 1945, the
year in which the dispute of which the present controversy is an
aftermath came before this Court.
For many decades, some of the States bordering on the sea had
claimed dominion over water and submerged lands lying off their
shores. Their claims usually were stated as extending into the open
sea a distance of three statute
Page 381 U. S. 180
miles, three geographic miles, or three marine leagues from
their "coastlines." [
Footnote 2/4]
But "coastline," as the term was used in many such claims, and as
it is used in modern geographic descriptions, does not mean simply
the low water mark of the mainland shore; rather, it means a
legally recognized line which follows the low water mark of the
shore where the shore is relatively straight and facing open sea,
and which at other points follows the recognized outside limits of
"inland waters," which flow into the sea or form indentations in
the land. Such "inland waters" may include certain estuaries, bays
and harbors, and waters between a mainland and offshore
islands.
For many years, the Federal Government raised no objection to
the various States' claims that their boundaries, including claims
to the marginal sea, extended outward for various distances into
the sea. However, by the 1930's, it became apparent that the
submerged lands off the shores of certain States contained rich and
valuable oil reserves and other natural resources. In the late
1930's, it was for the first time asserted that, in spite of the
States' historic claims, the United States, and not the respective
coastal States, was the owner of all submerged lands lying both
within and without the three-mile limits, except for land under
"inland waters." [
Footnote 2/5]
California and other States claimed that they were the owners of
all submerged lands within their historic boundaries dating back to
their respective admissions to the Union, including, of course,
both historic inland waters and a three-mile or three-league strip
of marginal sea beyond. To settle this controversy, the United
States in 1945
Page 381 U. S. 181
brought in this Court the action against California of which
today's decision is an aftermath, alleging that the United States
was
"the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in
and powers over, the lands, minerals and other things of value
underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary low
water mark on the coast of California and outside of the inland
waters of the State, extending seaward three nautical miles. . .
."
California objected immediately that the complaint was vague
because the Government did not make clear how broadly or narrowly
it defined "inland waters." California also answered that its
historic boundaries, as set out in its constitution in 1849,
approved when it was admitted to the Union, included not only a
strip out to three miles from its coast, but also "all the islands,
harbors, and bays along and adjacent to the Pacific coast," and
that therefore "all lands under all navigable waters within the
boundaries of the State" belonged to it. This Court then held in
1947, in
United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19, that the United States, and not California, had
paramount rights in all the waters and submerged lands within the
three-mile belt of marginal sea "outside of the inland waters."
332 U. S. 332 U.S.
804,
332 U. S. 805.
See also United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.
S. 699;
United States v. Texas, 339 U.
S. 707. As for the problem of deciding what were inland
waters and what were not, and of drawing an exact demarcation
between the inland waters and a three-mile strip of marginal sea,
this Court said that
"there is no reason why, after determining in general who owns
the three-mile belt here involved, the Court might not later, if
necessary, have more detailed hearings in order to determine with
greater definiteness particular segments of the boundary."
332 U.S. at
332 U. S.
26.
It was not long before such hearings did become necessary, for
the United States and California found themselves in sharp
disagreement as to what the term "inland
Page 381 U. S. 182
waters" meant when applied to specific segments of the
California coast. Both parties assumed at that time, long before
the Submerged Lands Act was passed, that the term was to be given a
content derived from the usage of international law and the United
States' foreign relations, since the
California decision,
in upholding the claim of the United States to land under the
three-mile belt of marginal sea, had relied on the necessity of
federal protection and control of the territorial seas as an
incident of national sovereignty. But the doctrines of
international law were so confused and contradictory as to exactly
what measurements a bay must have to be inland water, and under
what conditions a channel between islands and the mainland was
inland water, that both sides were able to find precedents
supporting them. This Court therefore submitted the case to a
Special Master to make findings of fact and recommendations of law
as to whether each of seven segments of submerged land off the
mainland of California, the same seven now in dispute, should be
treated as "inland waters" within the meaning of the California
opinion and decree, and therefore the property of the State.
[
Footnote 2/6]
342 U.
S. 891. On October 14, 1952, the Master filed his
Report, 344 U.S. 872, in which he said he assumed that the test of
whether the land in dispute belonged to California depended on
whether it was inland water
"by (1) any customary, generally recognized rule of
international Law . . . or by (2) effective assertion by the United
States on its own behalf in its international relations."
He thus considered any claim based on the historic boundaries of
the State as totally irrelevant, as having been rejected in this
Court's 1947 opinion, and he ruled in substance that the United
States was the owner of the submerged lands in question to the
extent it claimed.
Page 381 U. S. 183
Whether the test he used correctly interpreted the opinion need
not concern us at this point. California, of course, filed
exceptions, as did the United States. Then, in 1953, Congress
entered the picture by passing the Submerged Lands Act, and for
more than 10 years, during which neither of the parties took any
further steps in this Court and the Master's Report lay dormant, it
appeared that the Act of Congress had determined the dispute.
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 [
Footnote 2/7] gave to the coastal States
"title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters
within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural
resources within such lands and waters. . . . [
Footnote 2/8]"
It defined "lands beneath navigable waters" as all submerged
land lying within three geographic miles seaward of the "coastline"
of the State, [
Footnote 2/9] which
was, in turn, stated to be the low water mark where the mainland
was in direct contact with the open sea, and elsewhere the seaward
limit of the "inland waters." [
Footnote 2/10] The Act said, in language of extreme
importance to the resolution of the present dispute at the present
time, that each State was to have title to submerged lands "to the
boundary line of each such State," [
Footnote 2/11] with the term "boundaries" meaning
"the seaward boundaries of a State . . .
as they existed at
the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore
approved by the Congress, [
Footnote 2/12]"
up to a limit of three geographic miles from the coastline in
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and three leagues from the
coastline in the Gulf of Mexico. [
Footnote 2/13] Thus, each State was given title to the
submerged lands
Page 381 U. S. 184
off its shores out as far as its boundaries at the time the
State entered the Union, which were stated not to go more than
three miles (or leagues) beyond its "coastline." The "coastline"
was the outer limit of its "inland waters." The basic question here
is whether the State's "coastline" as the term is used in the Act
is to be determined by looking at the State's historic boundaries
when it entered the Union, or by the standard used by the Master in
carrying out the
California decree.
For 10 years after the Act was passed transferring title to
these submerged lands to the States, no further action in the case
pending in this Court was taken by either the United States or
California. [
Footnote 2/14]
California's original claim that these bays and channels were
inland waters within the meaning of this Court's decree had ceased
to be so important, since the States had been given title to all
the submerged lands out to their historic boundaries, including
recognition of their claims to three miles or leagues of the
marginal sea. After 10 years had passed, however, exploitation of
undersea oil resources had become possible in deep water at great
distances from the mainland, and the United States raised this
present dispute with California concerning where the outer limit of
the submerged land given the State by the Submerged Lands Act lay.
The United States contends that this depends on the location of the
"coastline," since the State's added rights extended three miles
from the "coastline," and that the location of the "coastline"
depends, in turn, on the location of the seaward edge of the
"inland waters," which the United States argues should be measured
according to the definition of "inland waters" used by the Master
in his hearings in the
California case; the United States
further argues that the report of the Master settled the case, and
that the subsequent passage of the Submerged
Page 381 U. S. 185
Lands Act had no effect on the correctness of the standard he
used. California replies that, since the stated purpose of the Act
was to restore the States' claims to the submerged lands within
their historic boundaries which included all waters within the
States' boundaries as inland waters and three miles beyond into the
territorial sea, the "coastline" or seaward edge of the "inland
waters" was to be defined in terms of what a State had historically
claimed was its coastline, the line from which it had measured its
boundary, by its three-mile claim to the marginal sea. In other
words, the United States proposes that, in measuring California's
submerged lands even under the Submerged Lands Act, this Court
should start with a line of internationally defined "inland waters"
as applied by the Master in carrying out the decree in the
California case, and measure three miles out. California
argues that, since the effect of the
California case was
rejected by the Submerged Lands Act, this Court should look only to
the Submerged Lands Act for the governing law, and, in defining the
State's boundary, should start with the coastline as historically
recognized when the State was admitted to the Union from which the
State measured its three-mile claim of marginal sea, and measure
three miles outward from that historic coastline, thus restoring
the State's historic boundaries. I think that the language and
purpose of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 show that California is
right.
II
This Court's 1947 holding precipitated one of the most hotly
contested political issues of the post-war decade. Critics of the
decision said that it had come as a complete surprise, and had
effectively taken away from the coastal States what they and others
had thought from the time they entered the Union and before
belonged to them. In 1952, a resolution passed both houses of
Congress designed to "restore" to the States the submerged lands
which they
Page 381 U. S. 186
had thought they owned before the
California decision.
[
Footnote 2/15] Many opposed this
bill as a "give away" of the federal public domain, and President
Truman prevented the bill's passage by vetoing it. [
Footnote 2/16] Even in so doing, however,
he recognized frankly that
"Even so careful and zealous a guardian of the public interest
as the late Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes at first
assumed that the undersea lands were owned by the States. [
Footnote 2/17]"
The controversy over whether to upset the Federal Government's
title which this Court had declared in the 1947 decision continued,
however, and, on January 9, 1953, Senator Holland of Florida, on
behalf of himself and 39 other Senators, introduced a bill, Senate
Joint Resolution 13, [
Footnote
2/18] which was identical with the bill which had passed the
previous year and which, with various amendments, passed both
houses of Congress, was signed by President Eisenhower, and became
law as the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. The stated purpose of the
law as enacted was
"To confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands
beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural
resources within such lands and waters . . . and to confirm the
jurisdiction and control of the United States over the natural
resources of the seabed of the Continental Shelf
seaward of
State boundaries. [
Footnote
2/19] "
Page 381 U. S. 187
As the first witness to testify at the Senate committee hearings
on his bill, Senator Holland said that
"the general purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 13 is to
recognize, confirm, establish, and vest in the several States --
and this means all 48 of them -- the submerged lands and the
natural resources therein within their respective boundaries,
subject to the exercise of all of the powers or regulation of the
Federal Government for the purpose of commerce, navigation,
national defense, and international affairs, none of which Federal
powers include any property rights. This joint resolution will
confirm to the maritime States -- of which there are 20 -- the
rights which they had respectively enjoyed since the founding of
our Nation and up to the date of the decision in the
California case, in
their offshore lands and waters
which lie within their constitutional boundaries. [
Footnote 2/20]"
Its object, he said, was
"restoring to the States their plenary rights, property,
jurisdiction, and control which they exercised without question for
150 years over the areas lying within State boundaries. [
Footnote 2/21]"
It dealt only, he said, with the area within "the States'
historic or constitutional boundaries." [
Footnote 2/22] Those who testified in favor of the bill
stated their objective the same way. Thus Secretary of the Interior
McKay said:
"I do believe that the national interest would be best served by
restoring to the various States the coastal offshore lands to the
limits of the line marked
Page 381 U. S. 188
by the historical boundaries of each of the respective States.
[
Footnote 2/23]"
There can be no doubt, I believe, and I do not understand the
Court to question, that, as proposed to the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs by Senator Holland and others, the
bill which became the Submerged Lands Act unquestionably was
intended to give the States title to all the offshore lands going
out at least as far as the respective States' historic boundaries.
A brief filed in this Court in another case shows that, in the
reported deliberations on the bill, the term "historic State
boundaries" was used 813 times, "original boundaries" 121 times,
and "traditional" boundaries 114 times. [
Footnote 2/24] Since I take it that the Court concedes
that this was the original purpose,
see ante, pp.
381 U. S.
153-154, I shall not bother to set forth all the
statements of proponents of the bill at the Senate hearings, as
well as at the House hearings, which stated flatly that this was
its purpose.
III
We start, then, from the conceded fact that the bill as
originally introduced gave California title to all the submerged
lands off its shore out to its historic boundaries, whatever they
might prove to be. The Court, however, pins its case for denying
California those historic boundaries on what it calls two
"relevant," indeed fundamental, changes,
ante, p.
381 U. S. 150,
made in the bill prior to its passage, which the Court says show
that the bill's sponsors suddenly altered their intent and decided
instead of restoring to California and other States mineral rights
within their historic boundaries, to limit them to a three-mile or
three-league
Page 381 U. S. 189
strip of marginal waters along "coastlines," which were to be
restrictively defined according to current policies of
international relations adhered to by the State Department. A study
of the legislative history convinces me that, in making the two
changes on which the Court relies, the Senators intended in no way
to alter the purpose of the original Holland bill to restore to the
States all the waters and submerged lands within their historic
constitutional boundaries. They expressly, vigorously and
repeatedly avowed that the original purpose was unchanged.
A. THE REMOVAL OF THE DEFINITION OF "INLAND WATERS"
As originally drafted, § 2 of the Holland bill defined "inland
waters," which extended to the "coastline," as including
"all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits,
historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water which join
the open sea. [
Footnote
2/25]"
This definition would, of course, unquestionably give California
title to submerged lands lying under all its historically
recognized bays and straits as part of California's "inland
waters," quite apart from the fact that they might also lie within
California's historic boundary of inland waters plus marginal sea.
The Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department testified that
such a legislative definition of inland waters, even though limited
to the purpose of the bill of affecting property rights between the
United States and the States, "a purely domestic matter," [
Footnote 2/26] might possibly embarrass
the State Department in its foreign relations if the Department
asserted a different definition of the words "inland waters" in its
relations
Page 381 U. S. 190
with foreign nations. [
Footnote
2/27] The Attorney General warned that to attempt to define the
coastline in a few words might increase, rather than diminish,
litigation. [
Footnote 2/28] As a
result, Senator Cordon, the Acting Chairman of the Committee, at
the conclusion of the hearings, quoted the language defining
"inland waters" for purposes of the Act, and said:
"That language was objectionable to the State Department and to
the Department of Justice. That isn't, in itself, in my opinion,
reason to strike it, but I am of the opinion that the objections
were sound. The matter of inland waters is one that has been
defined time and time again by the courts, not, I believe, in any
one all-inclusive definition, but it was felt that the use of these
words were an attempted legislative definition of the term 'inland
waters,' and it was inadvisable for us in this bill, which is a
transfer of title, to attempt to make law in the other field of
what is or is not inland water. [
Footnote 2/29]"
At another point, he explained that the language was struck
simply because
"It was sought not to get into that field, because you were in a
field then where, in our attempts to take care of a purely domestic
matter, we might be putting the United States on record with a
precedent which we intended only to apply domestically, but which
might be applied internationally. [
Footnote 2/30]"
He emphasized that
"The elimination of the language still follows what the Chair
understands to be the philosophy of the
Page 381 U. S. 191
bill, that we are putting the States where they thought they
were, and not attempting now to create either a situation in law or
a basis for a rule of evidence that may or may not have been sound
when the States came into the Union. [
Footnote 2/31]"
Senator Daniel of Texas, a leading advocate and sponsor of the
bill, said:
"I agree fully with the chairman that the striking of these
words was not done in any manner to prejudice the rights of the
States. . . . I just want to state that for the record, if this
record is ever used in the future. [
Footnote 2/32]"
Senator Cordon, who had proposed the change, replied:
"I appreciate the statement of the Senator, and I concur in it,
so far as the action taken here is concerned. [
Footnote 2/33]"
And Senator Anderson, another member of the Committee reporting
the bill, agreed:
"I subscribe fully to what the chairman said quite awhile ago in
pointing out that this bill does not seek to take away from or add
to the position of these States as they came into the Union.
[
Footnote 2/34]"
When the bill was reported out of committee and presented to the
Senate, its supporters made clear that the Committee had made no
change in its original objective of restoring to the States
everything within their historic boundaries. Senator Holland said
it was an "obvious fact" [
Footnote
2/35] that the bill was "giving to the States that which,
without question, was enjoyed by them for 150 or 160
Page 381 U. S. 192
years, namely, the ownership of everything within State
boundaries, and reserving to the Federal Government everything
beyond that." [
Footnote 2/36]
Senator Cordon expressed his understanding that
"The boundaries of the States cannot be changed by Congress
without the consent of the States. We cannot do anything
legislatively in that field, and we have not sought to do so in
this measure."
"I think that answers all and every one of the discussions with
reference to boundary lines of the States, including whether they
are measured from low water, high water, inland water, or some
island. [
Footnote 2/37]"
And Senator Holland said:
"By way of a brief summary, the general purpose of this measure
as reported by the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee is to
recognize, confirm, establish, and vest in and assign to the
respective States the title and ownership of the lands and
resources beneath navigable waters
within their respective
boundaries. . . . [
Footnote
2/38]"
And Senator Daniel explained:
"Until recently, the Federal Government never thought it owned
these lands, and even until now it has never possessed or used
them. The lands are still in the possession of the States. . . .
The passage of the pending proposed legislation will simply permit
the States to keep what they have always had since the foundation
of the Union. [
Footnote
2/39]"
If that were not enough to show that the removal of the
definition of inland waters from § 2 of the bill as a
Page 381 U. S. 193
courtesy to the State and Justice Departments was to have no
substantive effect, the Senate Committee said at the beginning of
its report on its version of the bill:
"The committee wishes to emphasize that, as will be seen from
comparison with the measure as introduced, the changes are
primarily those of form and language, and the committee amendment
is consistent throughout with the philosophy and intent of Senate
Joint Resolution 13 as introduced.
The only change of substance
is found in section 9, in which the jurisdiction and control
of the Federal Government over the natural resources of the seabed
of the Continental Shelf seaward of historic State boundaries is
confirmed. [
Footnote 2/40]"
Thus, the continued intention to confer on the State all
submerged lands within their "historic boundaries" was again
reiterated. And, in a specific reference to the elimination of the
definition of inland waters from § 2, the Committee Report said
that the words had been deleted
"because of the committee's belief that the question of what
constitutes inland waters should be left where Congress finds it.
The committee is convinced that the definition
neither adds nor
takes away anything a State may have now in the way of a coast
and the lands underneath waters behind it. [
Footnote 2/41]"
The Committee had before it the report of the Special Master in
this very case, [
Footnote 2/42]
and did not adopt his criteria, based on the California decision,
for determining inland waters, criteria which included the Boggs
formula for determining bays, a formula which many Senators
indicated they disapproved and which the Committee Report
specifically stated it did not mean to establish as the law.
Page 381 U. S. 194
Clearly the position of the Committee was that it really cared
only about restoring to the States their claims to submerged lands
within their historic boundaries, which, of course, included all
the lands, bays, harbors and channels within those boundaries --
their historic coastlines -- and three miles or leagues of marginal
sea. [
Footnote 2/43] The
Committee saw no reason to attempt to spell out its definition of
inland waters, as including all historic bays and channels, when
there was no reason to do so and when to do so might possibly have
embarrassing repercussions on American foreign relations, where
different definitions of
Page 381 U. S. 195
inland waters prevailed. Lest anyone misconstrue the change, the
Committee said with reference to it:
"The elimination of the language, in the committee's opinion, is
consistent with the philosophy of the Holland bill to place the
States in the position in which both they and the Federal
Government thought they were for more than a century and a half,
and not to create any situations with respect thereto. [
Footnote 2/44]"
The Court reads this change in words as showing "a legislative
intent to leave the definition of inland waters to the courts
without restriction."
Ante, p.
381 U. S. 154.
The Court agrees that, before this change was made, the bill gave
the States all the submerged lands out to their historic
boundaries. The Court admits that the 1947
California
decision rejected the States' claims to their historic boundaries
and, according to the Court, set up a test of international law and
foreign policy standards for measuring inland waters. But the Court
concludes that, when the Committee said that it was leaving the
States with the rights to inland waters which they had before the
California decision, it really meant to establish the
international law standard, including the Boggs formula (except
insofar as that formula has since been abandoned by treaty) which
many Senators had so strenuously opposed and which, in their
Committee Report, they specifically stated they did not mean to
adopt. I think that a fair reading of the discussion of this change
shows that the Committee members intended that all the States
should have their boundaries, including a belt of marginal sea and
all the lands and waters from which they had historically measured
their claims to the marginal sea, which they thought would have
been recognized as such by the courts up to the time of the
California decision, and that the test of inland waters
and coastlines was therefore an historical one. The Committee
regarded
Page 381 U. S. 196
the
California decision as a complete aberration, and
assumed that, before it, all courts would have judged inland waters
by historical tests, as in fact several California and federal
decisions show they had. [
Footnote
2/45] I cannot understand how the Court reasons that, when the
Committee said that it left the States as it thought they were
before the
California decision, it really meant
to put them in the position the Court says they were in
after that case insofar as inland waters and their
coastlines are concerned. I think that the amendment did just what
the Committee said it did: it freed Congress from the need of
"having to determine matters that are highly technical," [
Footnote 2/46] and left it for the States
to prove if they could the facts to support their historic claims
that particular bodies were inland waters behind the coastline.
Senator Kuchel of California, fully familiar with the problems of
California, and on the alert to protect that State's interest in
the bays and channels within its historic boundaries, interpreted
the bill properly, I think, when he said:
"In recognizing State ownership of lands beneath navigable
waters within historic State boundaries, this joint resolution
wisely makes no attempt to define exactly what those boundaries
are. In substance, the resolution provides that each of the States
has ownership of all lands beneath navigable waters extending, in
the case of littoral States, 3 geographical miles seaward from its
coastline, or to its historic boundary. [
Footnote 2/47]"
Thus, up to this point in the legislative history, I think it
can be said that (1) the Holland bill as originally
Page 381 U. S. 197
drafted unquestionably gave the States title to all submerged
lands out as far as their historic boundaries; and (2) the
elimination of the legislative definition of inland waters did not
alter the original intent of the bill in the slightest degree, but
rather left it up to the States to prove that particular bays,
channels, or harbors were inside their coastlines as part of their
"historic boundaries," according to "the position in which both
they and the Federal Government thought they were for more than a
century and a half." [
Footnote
2/48]
B. THE THREE-MILE OR THREE-LEAGUE LIMITATION
The Court calls attention to one other change in the bill before
its enactment, and on the significance attributed to this one small
change depends the validity of the Court's entire opinion. The
Court says that this change was fundamental, of vital importance.
It says that, to the extent of this change, "the philosophy [of the
Holland Bill] was modified."
Ante, p.
381 U. S. 154.
I find this altogether surprising, since, when the change was
introduced -- by Senator Holland himself -- and adopted almost
immediately without any opposition's being voiced, he said it was
"just a minor change of verbiage," [
Footnote 2/49] one of several "minor changes for the
purpose of clarification." [
Footnote
2/50] If the change was to have the dramatic effect which the
Court attributes to it, Senator Holland certainly did not recognize
it, for he said that it did "not depart in the slightest from the
intention of the sponsors of the joint resolution." [
Footnote 2/51] This amendment, along with
others, was adopted after discussion occupying less than two pages
in the Congressional Record, without a roll-call vote, without even
one single objection from the Senate floor. Fundamental
Page 381 U. S. 198
changes in the basic purpose of bills are never adopted in that
way. Senator Holland's explanation that this was "just a minor
change of verbiage" should be accepted by this Court, as I have no
doubt it was accepted by the Senate.
This change, which its sponsor thought was "minor" and which the
Court thinks is fundamental, and on which the Court's whole
argument depends, merely modified the definition of "boundaries" in
§ 2 of the Act by adding:
"but in no event shall the term 'boundaries' or the term 'lands
beneath navigable waters' be interpreted as extending from the
coastline more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic
Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into
the Gulf of Mexico. [
Footnote
2/52]"
The Court says that this language implicitly did away with the
original and continued intention of the proponents of the bill to
"restore" to the States the ownership of all submerged lands lying
under all waters within their historic boundaries, wherever those
boundaries lay, and instead established a rule that historic
boundaries would not be honored if they extended more than three
miles from the coastline,
i.e., from the seaward edge of
the inland waters as the Court today defines inland waters. The
Court then reads the legislative history as destroying the historic
definition of inland waters -- which is, of course, all waters
within a State's boundaries exclusive of claims to marginal sea --
and substituting a very restrictive one based on this Court's
decision in the
California case, a reading which I have
indicated above is, I think, flatly contrary to what the
legislative history shows. The Court thus holds that, by making two
minor changes in the bill, which changes they said over and over
again were of no substantive significance, the Senators supporting
it silently repudiated in large measure their own intention,
Page 381 U. S. 199
which they had proclaimed to the public and the Senate from the
beginning and continued to proclaim to the end, of restoring to the
States their historic constitutional boundaries.
This three-mile or three-league limitation amendment was added
for a very simple reason, which is plain in the Congressional
Record and which shows that the sponsors of the bill were
reaffirming, rather than abandoning, their basic original purpose
in offering this and similar bills: they wished to restore to the
States the submerged lands out to their historic boundaries,
including three miles or leagues of marginal sea, but no farther.
As reported from Committee, the bill gave the States submerged
lands out to their boundaries at the time they entered the Union
"or as heretofore or hereafter approved by Congress," without any
limitation. It was feared by some that one or more of the States,
none of which had ever claimed more than three miles (or leagues)
of the marginal sea, might suddenly assert claims that their
boundaries extended out hundreds of miles to the very limits of the
Continental Shelf. [
Footnote
2/53] If allowed to do this, the fear was expressed, such
States would be taking title to mineral wealth far beyond the
historic boundaries to which the sponsors of the bill wished to
confine them. The sponsors stated that their purpose was merely to
"restore" to the States what they had thought they had had as
boundaries -- the outer part of the Continental Shelf was to belong
to the Federal Government. [
Footnote
2/54] In order to prevent any States from trying to use the
word "boundaries" in the Act to push their boundaries out beyond
their historic
Page 381 U. S. 200
three-mile or three-league claims to the marginal sea, Senator
Holland himself introduced this amendment. It deleted the words "or
hereafter," thus limiting the States to any boundaries which they
had previously claimed, in spite of any claims they might make in
the future; and it also set forth as a limitation the Senators'
understanding of the maximum extent of the marginal sea
historically claimed by any State from or as a part of its historic
boundaries: three geographical miles in the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, and three leagues in the Gulf of Mexico. As Senator Holland
explained, a limitation to existing boundaries had been the
intention of the bill's sponsors all along, and it had been and was
the understanding of the sponsors that no States claimed that their
historic boundaries extended more than three miles from their
coastlines in the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. He said the
three-mile limitation was "just a minor change of verbiage"
[
Footnote 2/55] made in order
"to make very clear that Congress at this time is seeking to do
only those things which the authors and supporters of the joint
resolution have so very fully, and rather repeatedly, stated for
the record heretofore during the course of the debate. [
Footnote 2/56]"
He reiterated that
"The amendment will simply indicate that this Senate, in the
passage of the joint resolution, is certainly not inviting
additional claims, and it knows of no
additional
claims. [
Footnote 2/57]"
Senator Holland, as the record shows, and many other Senators
were well aware of California's existing claim which is now before
us, and could not have considered it to be "additional." [
Footnote 2/58]
Time and time again, the proponents of the bill stated before
the amendment was passed that no State claimed
Page 381 U. S. 201
more than three miles or leagues of marginal sea as part of its
historic boundaries, and no State would be given rights by the bill
beyond those original claims. Said Senator Holland, "I emphasize
the fact that this joint resolution does not extend the boundary of
any State beyond the 3-mile limit." [
Footnote 2/59] Said Senator Daniel, again before the
amendment:
". . . those of us who are coauthors of this measure have always
understood that it was not necessary to write into the pending
legislation a specific provision that it shall not apply to lands
beyond 3 miles, or 3 leagues, because all the States are claiming
is 3 miles, except in the Gulf of Mexico where historic boundaries
are 3 leagues from shore. [
Footnote
2/60]"
He added:
"I believe that the exchange here within the past few minutes
should make it very clear that the authors of this measure are not
trying to give to the States, or to restore to the States, any
lands outside their historic boundaries. [
Footnote 2/61]"
The claims of the States to a belt of marginal waters of course
did not determine the location of the coastline from which such a
belt would be measured. California's historic coastline, it says,
was the outer limit of the bays and islands. In limiting the States
to their historic claims of three miles or three leagues from their
"coastlines," wherever those "coastlines" might be, Congress
unquestionably, I think, was leaving totally undisturbed the
validity of their historic claims to the boundaries from which
those belts would be measured.
Page 381 U. S. 202
The Court's opinion lays great stress on an opinion expressed by
Senator Holland that California's claim that its historic boundary
of inland waters and marginal sea extended out to and three miles
beyond its off-shore islands was not persuasive. The Court leaves
the impression that Senator Holland made a ruling that California's
claim would not be covered by the Act. In fact, he did nothing of
the kind, but merely expressed the opinion to opponents of the bill
who said that restoring the States to their historic boundaries
would give them too large an area of submerged lands, and who cited
California's claim to the channel as an example, that he thought
California would have a difficult time in proving that its historic
boundary extended so far. The context of Senator Holland's remarks
is important to set out in full, since, when read in context, his
opinion, which he later repeated on several occasions, serves to
emphasize that he intended that each State be allowed to prove
where its historic boundaries lay, which is all that California is
asking that it be allowed to do here, and which is what the Court
now denies it.
The exchange began when Senator Long of Louisiana asked Senator
Holland about how far seaward Louisiana's boundary would extend
under the bill. Senator Long said:
"Now, if I understand correctly, the Senator is not proposing
that the actual determination of exactly what was the historic
boundary at the time Louisiana came into the Union be decided by
the Congress, but rather that the question of the
historic
boundary of the State might be one still subject to actual judicial
determination."
"Senator HOLLAND. Of course, the Senator is right."
"
* * * *
Page 381 U. S.
203
"
"Senator HOLLAND. We cannot draft general legislation that will
still every possible legal question. [
Footnote 2/62]"
Senator Anderson of New Mexico then asked Senator Holland
whether the bill validated the claim of California that its
historic boundary extended to the offshore islands with a
three-mile belt of marginal sea beyond them. To this Senator
Holland replied:
"The Senator from Florida can only give his opinion, and, in his
opinion, it would not, because of the great depths of the water
that exist between the coastline of California and the extrusions
from the sea bottom which appear out there, and some of which are
above the level of the water.
Again, though the Senator from
Florida states that that would be a matter, naturally, on which the
courts would be asked to rule. We are not going to find any
formula that displaces the function of the courts to go into cases
and find which cases come within the general doctrine announced by
legislation and which fall without that legislation. [
Footnote 2/63]"
In other words, the bill did not settle definitively the
question of fact as to whether California's historic boundary was
to be measured from the outer rim of the islands. That was a
question on which courts would have to hear evidence and then
decide according to "the general doctrine announced by [this]
legislation" -- the doctrine, as Senator Holland and others
repeated so many times, that the States were to be restored to
their "historic boundaries." And, as he said in summary, there was
nothing in his bill which would diminish California's claim to the
waters and submerged lands around its offshore islands. [
Footnote 2/64]
Page 381 U. S. 204
In later referring to the adoption of Senator Holland's
amendment to the bill, Senator Daniel of Texas said,
"the intention was to write specifically into the joint
resolution what the authors have said all along would be its effect
-- that it covered only land within the historic boundaries.
[
Footnote 2/65]"
As a further indication that the "three miles from coast line"
amendment was not intended to affect States' claims to their
historic boundaries, the record shows that opponents of the bill
subsequently tried to amend it to restrict the line from which the
three-mile limits would be measured, and failed. Senator Douglas of
Illinois, a leader of the opposition, proposed an amendment which
would have changed the definition of "coastline" in the bill so
that the three miles would be measured only from the main
continent, and separately around any islands, thus cutting off
California's claim to the submerged lands between the islands and
the mainland, which is largely the issue before us now. Senator
Douglas indicated specifically that his proposed amendment was
intended to destroy California's claim to those submerged lands,
and that he had warned Senator Kuchel of California of his
intention to introduce it. [
Footnote
2/66] Senator Long of Louisiana objected that "the Senator from
Illinois is submitting his own definition of inland waters."
[
Footnote 2/67] Senator Douglas'
amendment was defeated, [
Footnote
2/68] and California's historic
Page 381 U. S. 205
claims, for whatever they might prove to be worth, were left, as
Senator Holland had stated, undiminished.
I think that this review of the relevant hearings and debates in
the Senate makes clear three things: (1) As originally proposed,
the bill was intended to "restore" to the States title to submerged
lands within their historic boundaries, whatever those might prove
to be. (2) The removal of the explicit definition of inland waters,
far from being, as the Court views it, fundamental, was not a
"change of substance," [
Footnote
2/69] and was "not done in any manner to prejudice the rights
of the States;" [
Footnote 2/70]
it was intended merely to avoid possible embarrassment in the field
of international relations from a bill which had nothing
Page 381 U. S. 206
to do with international relations or international law, being
merely a "transfer of title." [
Footnote 2/71] (3) The addition of the limitation of
boundaries to three miles beyond the coastline, far from being, as
the Court views it, fundamental, was "just a minor change of
verbiage" [
Footnote 2/72]
intended to make clear what the bill's sponsors had intended all
along: that the bill was not designed to allow States in the future
to push their boundaries out to the limits of the Continental
Shelf, but rather to limit them to everything within their historic
boundaries, including historic coastlines and historic three-mile
or three-league claims to the marginal sea beyond.
Near the conclusion of the debates on the bill, Senator Holland,
in explaining its purpose, used these words, which I do not think
show any fundamental or even perceptible changes or modifications
of philosophy from those he had used in his first speech on the
bill:
"The truth is that Senate Joint Resolution 13 simply restores or
gives back to the States the submerged lands within their historic
boundaries which they have possessed, used and developed in good
faith for over 100 years. . . ."
"
* * * *"
". . . It would write the law for the future as it was believed
to exist in the past by restoring to the States all lands beneath
navigable waters within their historic boundaries. [
Footnote 2/73]"
C. THE HOUSE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The hearings and debates in the House were less extensive than
those in the Senate, but the intention of the legislators there to
restore to the States all submerged
Page 381 U. S. 207
lands within their historic boundaries was no less explicit.
Forty different bills, of which one [
Footnote 2/74] was identical with the Senate Joint
Resolution passed by both Houses the year before and with the
Senate bill introduced by Senator Holland, were considered by the
House Subcommittee and Committee. The Committee chose the latter
bill and, with minor perfecting amendments, reported it favorably
to the House. [
Footnote 2/75]
Typical of the testimony at the hearings was the statement by
Attorney General Brownell that:
"The States want, and we believe they are entitled to, all the
development rights, you might say, in these submerged lands within
their historic boundaries. [
Footnote
2/76]"
The House Committee Report on the bill said:
"Title II confirms and establishes the rights and claims of the
48 States, asserted and exercised by them throughout our country's
history, to the lands beneath navigable waters within State
boundaries and the resources within such lands and waters.
[
Footnote 2/77]"
In explaining the bill to the members of the House, Congressman
Willis of Louisiana, a member of the Committee and a supporter of
the bill, said:
"First, it restores to the States complete title to the
submerged lands up to the limit of their historic boundaries.
[
Footnote 2/78] "
Page 381 U. S. 208
And on the floor, Congressman Wilson of Texas, also a Committee
member and supporter of the bill, explained its purpose in the
following exchange:
"Mr. WILSON of Texas. . . . Bear in mind that this is Title II,
the title that returns or restores this seaward boundary within the
historical boundaries of the States to the States. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. HALLECK. If we stick to the provisions of the bill, then we
are just being consistent with respect to the title to the land
within the historic boundaries?"
"Mr. WILSON of Texas. That is true. [
Footnote 2/79]"
The House bill, passed with this intention, was then sent to the
Senate, which at that time was considering Senator Holland's bill,
a virtually identical measure. After the Senate passed the Holland
bill, with the two changes which the Court deems fundamental,
Congressman Reed, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which
had reported the House bill, asked the members of the House to
accede to their bill as amended by the Senate. He prefaced his
remarks by saying:
"Mr. Speaker, I trust that 3 minutes will be sufficient for me
to say all that I deem necessary about this resolution. [
Footnote 2/80]"
He then proceeded in these words to tell the members of the
House what had happened to their bill as adopted by the Senate:
"Titles I and II of the original bill, H.R. 4198, are now before
us.
There have been no substantial changes made by the Senate
in these titles. They are practically the same as when passed
by the House
Page 381 U. S. 209
except in a few instances where a few words and phrases here and
there have been changed or deleted for clarification."
"About the only thing that is substantially new in this bill is
a reassertion by the Senate in section 9 which confirms the rights
of the United States to the jurisdiction and control of the lands
under the Continental Shelf outside of State boundaries. [
Footnote 2/81]"
Relying on these assurances by Chairman Reed that there had been
"no substantial changes" made in the bill by the Senate, the House,
without further discussion of the portions of the bill here
involved, proceeded to adopt the Senate version, which, after being
signed by the President, became the Submerged Lands Act of
1953.
This, then, is the legislative history of the Submerged Lands
Act, both in the Senate and in the House, which, according to the
Court, shows that the sponsors and supporters of the Act completely
altered their intention of restoring to the States the submerged
lands within their historic boundaries, and instead left the States
with what the Court allows them today. I think that the statements
and actions of the supporters of the bill show, on the contrary,
that the intention of restoring all submerged lands under all
waters within historic state boundaries was plainly and explicitly
stated and understood by all from the beginning, and, despite
attacks from opponents of the bill, never varied. Time and time
again, the Senators and Congressmen repeated that the bill had not
been changed in any way to diminish the rights granted to the
States in the bill as originally introduced -- rights which, as the
Court does not dispute, included the right to all submerged lands
under all waters within historic state boundaries. I would follow
the understanding of the authors and supporters of the bill, and I
would take them at their word.
Page 381 U. S. 210
IV
In light of this legislative history, of which I have set forth
only a small part, I think that, under the Submerged Lands Act,
California is entitled to all the submerged lands within its
historic boundaries, and that it should be given an opportunity to
try to prove in hearings before a Master where those historic
boundaries were. The Court says that Congress left it up to this
Court to expound the legal principles which shall determine
California's claims, without any reference to the Submerged Lands
Act's stated purpose to restore the mineral rights of the States in
submerged lands within their historic boundaries. I think the Court
is completely misreading the intentions of the authors and
supporters of the Act. If there is anything clear in the
legislative history, it is that Congress was not satisfied with the
way in which this Court had decided the
California case,
and did not approve of the considerations of external sovereignty
used there in determining a domestic dispute over title. It seems
to me the height of irony to hold that an Act passed expressly to
escape the effect of this Court's opinion in this field is now
construed as leaving us free to announce principles directly
antithetic to the basic purpose of Congress of deciding that
question for itself once and for all. True, the Congress left to
the courts the exercise of their historic function to decide the
factual question of where a State's historic boundaries, based on
those approved when it was admitted to the Union, lie. But I think
the Court errs in arguing repeatedly that, by leaving it to the
courts to decide the issues of fact in particular cases, Congress
meant to leave it to this Court to determine the legal principles
governing California's claim, and in particular to do so by
adopting a formula of its own devising based on one used by the
State Department in its handling of foreign affairs.
Page 381 U. S. 211
California has never been given an opportunity to appear at a
hearing to determine where its boundaries were when it came into
the Union. The 13-year-old report of the Master quite naturally
considered this issue irrelevant, since the Submerged Lands Act had
not been passed at the time that report was made. Certainly it
cannot be asserted that California's claim that its 1849 boundaries
included these areas is frivolous. By the terms of its
Constitution, approved by Congress when the State was admitted to
the Union in 1850, and over the years, California appears to have
claimed that its boundaries extended beyond its outlying islands,
and has claimed as inland waters within those boundaries all the
bays, harbors and channels in question in this lawsuit. A statement
in the original California Constitution, [
Footnote 2/82] several official maps, including the one
used at the California
Page 381 U. S. 212
constitutional convention in 1849, [
Footnote 2/83] and other evidence tend to support
California's contention that it historically owned these bays and
the channel between the islands and the mainland. Both state and
federal court decisions have held as a matter of fact and law that
some of the very bays in question here, which the Government argues
are not inland waters in the international sense, were within the
boundaries of the State and subject to its jurisdiction.
Ocean
Industries, Inc. v. Greene, 15 F.2d 862
(D.C.N.D.Cal.) (Monterey Bay);
United States v.
Carrillo, 13 F. Supp.
121 (D.C.S.D.Cal.) (San Pedro Bay);
People v.
Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d
617, 96 P.2d 941 (Santa Monica Bay);
Ocean Industries, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 P. 722 (Monterey Bay).
Indeed, in one of these cases,
People v. Stralla, supra,
the United States Attorney, with the authorization of the Attorney
General of the United States, appeared as
amicus curiae
agreeing with the State's attorney that all of the bay in question
there, as here, was within California's boundaries and subject to
its exclusive territorial jurisdiction. [
Footnote 2/84]
There may be evidence which tends to disprove the historic
validity of California's claims. But what California has asked here
is an opportunity to prove where its boundaries historically were,
to use the test of ownership fixed by Congress in the Submerged
Lands Act, rather than the foreign relations tests set up by the
Special Master 13 years ago and approved by this Court today for
the first time. I think that the legislative history of the
Submerged Lands Act shows without question that the definitions in
it were to be read as preserving to the maritime States their
claims to submerged lands and waters within
Page 381 U. S. 213
their historic boundaries, and that those who offered and
supported the bill regarded California's claim to these bays,
harbors and the channel out to its offshore islands as something
the State would be allowed to try to prove. In litigation to
determine the extent of the outer limits of the States' historic
boundaries in the marginal sea in the Gulf of Mexico, Texas and
Florida were allowed to prove their historic boundaries, and won in
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S.
1, and
United States v. Florida, 363 U. S.
121, respectively. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
based their claims in the Gulf of Mexico on historic boundaries,
and this Court decided against them on the facts in
United
States v. Louisiana, supra. All five of those States were
given an opportunity to try to prove their historic boundaries in
order to determine the extent of the submerged lands to which they
were entitled by the Submerged Lands Act. California has had no
such opportunity. California set up as an affirmative defense in
1946 that its boundaries extended to the point it presently claims.
We did not pass on this contention then, for we held that,
regardless of where the historic boundaries were, the United States
had paramount rights in all its marginal sea. The Court today still
leaves the question of the State's historic boundaries undecided,
except insofar as relevant to international claims of the United
States, and instead decides this case on the basis of standards of
international law derived from the reasoning of the 1947
California case. Congress did not, I think, mean to
readopt the standards of the
California case, which the
authors of the Submerged Lands Act so violently criticized, and to
cut California off without any chance at all to establish ownership
of these bays and channels by proving that they were within the
State's historic boundaries. In order to carry out what I believe
to be the congressional command in the Submerged Lands Act, I would
refer the case to a Special Master to give California that
chance.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See Appendix A [omitted --
see printed version
of United States Reports].
[
Footnote 2/2]
See Appendix B [omitted --
see printed version
of United States Reports], which shows Monterey Bay, one of the
bays in question. California claims that all the submerged land and
waters landward of the line drawn across the headlands are inland
waters within the historic coastline of the State, and that its
historic boundary, the outer limit of its rights under the
Submerged Lands Act, extends three miles seaward of that line. The
United States claims that California owns only a belt of submerged
lands within three miles of the low water mark of the mainland
shore.
[
Footnote 2/3]
See Appendix C [omitted --
see printed version
of United States Reports]. California claims all the submerged land
between the line drawn along the islands from the mainland, and a
belt of marginal sea three miles to seaward of that line. The
United States contends that California is entitled only to a belt
within three miles of the mainland shore and three miles around
each of the islands.
[
Footnote 2/4]
One geographic (or marine or nautical) mile equals approximately
1.15 statute (or land or English) miles. One marine league equals
three geographic miles or approximately 3.45 statute miles.
[
Footnote 2/5]
See S.Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (hereafter
cited as Senate Report) 21.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Master was asked also to consider what criteria were proper
for measuring the ordinary low water mark on the shore.
[
Footnote 2/7]
67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/8]
§ 3, 67 Stat. 29, 30, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/9]
§ 2(a)(2), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/10]
§ 2(c), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/11]
§ 2(a)(2).
[
Footnote 2/12]
§ 2(b), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1958 ed.). (Emphasis
supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/13]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The constitutional power of Congress to enact the Submerged
Lands Act was upheld in
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.
S. 272.
[
Footnote 2/15]
S.J.Res. 20, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. For a summary of earlier
proposed legislation dealing with submerged lands,
see United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1,
363 U. S. 6, n.
4.
[
Footnote 2/16]
Message from the President, May 29, 1952, S.Doc. No. 139, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess.
[
Footnote 2/17]
Id., p. 2.
[
Footnote 2/18]
S.J.Res. 13, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. A substantially identical
bill, H.R. 2948, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced in the
House.
[
Footnote 2/19]
67 Stat. 29. (Emphasis supplied.) The latter clause, dealing
with the outer Continental Shelf, was added to the original bill in
committee.
[
Footnote 2/20]
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs on S.J.Res. 13 and Other Bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(hereafter cited as Senate Hearings), 31-32. (Emphasis
supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/21]
Senate Hearings 49.
[
Footnote 2/22]
Id., 34.
[
Footnote 2/23]
Id., 512. Unlike the Truman Administration, the
Eisenhower Administration supported legislation to grant mineral
rights in submerged offshore lands to the adjacent States.
[
Footnote 2/24]
Brief of the State of Texas,
United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, p.
50.
[
Footnote 2/25]
See Senate Report 14.
[
Footnote 2/26]
Senate Hearings 1378 (Senator Cordon).
Compare United States
v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1,
363 U. S. 33.
[
Footnote 2/27]
Id., 1053 (Deputy Legal Adviser Tate).
Compare
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1,
363 U.S. 30-32.
[
Footnote 2/28]
Id., 926. Attorney General Brownell suggested that a
line be drawn on a map as part of the bill. He said that, if the
Committee tried "to describe in words bays or other characteristics
of the coast, unnecessary litigation will almost surely result."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/29]
Senate Hearings 1304.
[
Footnote 2/30]
Id., 1378.
[
Footnote 2/31]
Id., 1383.
[
Footnote 2/32]
Id., 1384.
[
Footnote 2/33]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/34]
Id., 1385.
[
Footnote 2/35]
99 Cong.Rec. 2746.
[
Footnote 2/36]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/37]
Id., 2634.
[
Footnote 2/38]
Id., 2744. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/39]
Id., 2830.
[
Footnote 2/40]
Senate Report 2. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/41]
Id., 18, U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News 1953, p. 1493.
(Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/42]
Senate Hearings 1211-1229.
[
Footnote 2/43]
The Committee Report also reprinted the favorable report of a
Senate Committee during a previous session of a bill which the
Committee said was "identical in substance with Senate Joint
Resolution 13 as introduced." Senate Report 49. That earlier
report, S.Rep.No.1592, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., as quoted, criticized
the California decision for creating great uncertainty as to what
areas would be "inland waters" within the reasoning of the opinion.
Under the "federal external sovereignty" reasoning of the
California case, the Committee saw no clear answer to such
questions as:
"At what precise point does a bay become a part of the open sea?
Are waters landward of offshore islands inland waters? Are uplands
formed by nature subsequent to the date of fixing the low water
mark subject to 'the paramount power' of the United States as
defined by the Court's opinion?"
Senate Report 61. The Committee sought in the legislation to
avoid these "extreme complexities,"
ibid., by enacting "a
law consonant with what the States and the Supreme Court believed
for more than a century was the law,"
ibid., and restoring
to the States all their historic property rights both to inland
waters and to the marginal sea. The Report said:
"Unless S. 1988 as reported, is enacted, confusion will exist as
to the ownership and taxability of, and powers over, bays and the
3-mile belt. . . . We consider it against the public interest for
the Federal Government to commence a series of vexatious lawsuits
against the sovereign States to recover submerged lands within the
boundaries of the States, traditionally looked upon as the property
of the States under a century of pronouncements by the Supreme
Court reflecting its belief that the States owned these lands."
Id. at 62.
[
Footnote 2/44]
Senate Report 18.
[
Footnote 2/45]
See infra, p.
381 U. S.
212.
"[T]he sponsors understood this Court to have established, prior
to the
California decision, a rule of state ownership
itself defined in terms of state territorial boundaries. . . ."
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S.
1,
363 U. S.
19-20.
[
Footnote 2/46]
Senate Hearings 1383 (Senator Cordon).
[
Footnote 2/47]
99 Cong.Rec. 2984. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/48]
Senate Report 18,
supra, 381
U.S. 139fn2/44|>n. 44.
[
Footnote 2/49]
99 Cong.Rec. 4115.
[
Footnote 2/50]
Id. at 4114.
[
Footnote 2/51]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/52]
§ 2(b), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1958 ed.).
[
Footnote 2/53]
See, e.g., 99 Cong.Rec. 2917, 2975-2977, 3040, 3273,
3336-3337, 3381, 3549, 3552-3553, 3655, 3885-3886, 4085.
[
Footnote 2/54]
Compare the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat.
462, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1958 ed.), passed the same year,
claiming for the United States "jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition" of all submerged lands seaward of the area granted the
States in the Submerged Lands Act.
[
Footnote 2/55]
99 Cong.Rec. 4115.
[
Footnote 2/56]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/57]
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/58]
See, e.g., Senate Hearings 48-49.
[
Footnote 2/59]
99 Cong.Rec. 2746.
[
Footnote 2/60]
Id., 3039.
[
Footnote 2/61]
Id., 3051.
[
Footnote 2/62]
Senate Hearings 48. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/63]
Id., 48-49. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/64]
Id., 50-51.
[
Footnote 2/65]
99 Cong.Rec. 4175.
See also id., 4477, 4478 (remarks of
Senator Daniel).
[
Footnote 2/66]
Id., 4240. Senator Douglas said that his amendment was
aimed at
"preventing coastal States from pushing their coastal boundaries
out to a line along the outer shores of remote islands and claiming
everything in between."
Id., 4242.
[
Footnote 2/67]
Id., 4241.
[
Footnote 2/68]
Id., 4242. An earlier attempt by Senator Douglas and
others to strike from the bill reference to the historic boundaries
of the States when they entered the Union, and substitute a
limitation based on the marginal waters claimed by the Federal
Government under international law, had also failed.
See
99 Cong.Rec. 3957-3960, 4114. Senator Cordon had objected that the
"net result" of the amendment
"would be that an arbitrary 3-mile limit would be established,
rather than to follow the philosophy of the joint resolution
itself. The resolution provides that the limit be the statutory
boundary with which a State entered the Union, or as such boundary
may have been subsequently approved by an act of the Congress."
99 Cong.Rec. 4106.
Several similar attempts by opponents of the bill to amend it to
restrict the States to a belt within three miles of their mainland
shores also failed. Senator Monroney introduced an amendment to
limit the area restored to the States to three miles seaward of the
low tide mark on the shore. 99 Cong.Rec. 4157. Senator Long, a
supporter of the bill (which already contained the two changes
which the Court says were fundamental) protested:
"In view of the fact that the Congress has already indicated its
intention of vesting in the States proprietary rights within their
historic boundaries, does the Senator have any objection to the
Court's deciding what the historic boundaries are?"
99 Cong.Rec. 4160. The proposed amendment was defeated. 99
Cong.Rec. 4203. A similar measure introduced by Senator Magnuson,
which he emphasized would have limited the States to the amount of
marginal sea which the United States claimed in international
relations, was likewise defeated. 99 Cong.Rec. 4473-4478.
[
Footnote 2/69]
Senate Report 2.
[
Footnote 2/70]
Senate Hearings 1384 (Senator Daniel).
[
Footnote 2/71]
Id., 1304 (Senator Cordon).
[
Footnote 2/72]
99 Cong.Rec. 4115 (Senator Holland).
[
Footnote 2/73]
Id., 4361.
[
Footnote 2/74]
H.R. 2948, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. See H.R.Rep. No. 215, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (hereafter cited as House Report), 3.
[
Footnote 2/75]
H.R. 4198, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 2/76]
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, House Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 2948 and Similar Bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,
219-220.
[
Footnote 2/77]
House Report 14.
[
Footnote 2/78]
99 Cong.Rec. 2504.
[
Footnote 2/79]
Id., 2567.
[
Footnote 2/80]
Id., 4897.
[
Footnote 2/81]
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2/82]
Article XII of the California Constitution of 1849, approved
when the State was admitted to the Union (Act of Sept. 9, 1850, 9
Stat. 452), provides:
"The boundary of the State of California shall be as
follows:"
"Commencing at the point of intersection of forty-second degree
of north latitude with the one hundred and twentieth degree of
longitude west from Greenwich, and running south on the line of
said one hundred and twentieth degree of west longitude until it
intersects the thirty-ninth degree of north latitude; thence
running in a straight line in a southeasterly direction to the
river Colorado at a point where it intersects the thirty-fifth
degree of north latitude; thence down the middle of the channel of
said river to the boundary line between the United States and
Mexico, as established by the treaty of May 30, 1848; thence
running west and along said boundary line to the Pacific Ocean, and
extending therein three English miles; thence running in a
northwesterly direction, and following the direction of the Pacific
coast, to the forty-second degree of north latitude; thence on the
line of said forty-second degree of north latitude to the place of
beginning.
Also all the islands, harbors, and bays along and
adjacent to the Pacific coast."
(Emphasis supplied.) H.R.Doc. No. 357, 59th Cong., 2d Sess.,
405. California contends that the inclusion of the islands off the
shore also includes within the boundaries all waters between the
islands and the mainland.
[
Footnote 2/83]
Reproduced in part in Appendix D,
infra [omitted --
see printed version of United States Reports].
[
Footnote 2/84]
The brief of the United States Attorney, filed
sub nom.
People v. Adams, is reprinted as Appendix 3 to the Brief for
the State of California in the Proceedings Before the Special
Master, pp. 6-22.