In anticipation of the promulgation of the Twenty-fourth
Amendment abolishing the poll tax as a requirement for voting in
federal elections, Virginia eliminated the poll tax as an absolute
prerequisite to voting in federal elections and in its stead
substituted a provision whereby the federal voter could qualify
either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing a certificate
of residence six months before the election. In suits attacking the
constitutionality of the Virginia statutes, the three-judge
District Court refused to abstain to afford the Virginia courts an
opportunity to pass on underlying issues of state law and to
construe the statutes involved. Reaching the merits, the District
Court held the certificate of residence requirement invalid, as an
additional "qualification" imposed solely upon federal voters in
violation of Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment.
Held:
1. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to abstain: the state statutes are clearly and unambiguous, the
rights allegedly impaired are the fundamental civil rights of a
broad class of citizens, and the immediacy of the problem facing
the District Court was evident. Pp.
380 U. S.
534-537.
2. The certificate of residence requirement is a material
requirement imposed upon those who refuse to surrender their
constitutional right to vote in federal elections without paying a
poll tax, and thus constitutes an abridgment of the right to vote
in violation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Pp.
380 U. S.
538-544.
(a) The poll tax is abolished absolutely as a prerequisite to
voting in federal elections, and no equivalent or milder substitute
may be imposed. P.
380 U. S.
542.
(b) The statutory scheme may not be saved on the ground that the
certificate of residence requirement is a necessary method of
proving residence, for constitutional deprivations may not be
justified by some remote administrative benefit to the State. Pp.
380 U. S.
542-544.
235 F. Supp.
66, affirmed.
Page 380 U. S. 529
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon in this case to construe, for the first time,
the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for
electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax."
The precise issue is whether § 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code --
which provides that, in order to qualify to vote in federal
elections, one must either pay a poll tax or file a witnessed or
notarized certificate of residence [
Footnote 1] -- contravenes this command.
Page 380 U. S. 530
Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the
Virginia Constitution (Art. II, §§ 18-20) and statutes (Va.Code
Ann. §§ 24-17, 24-67 (1950)) established uniform standards for
qualification for voting in both federal and state elections. The
requirements were: (1) United States citizenship; (2) a minimum age
of twenty-one; (3) residence in the State for one year, in the city
or county for six months, and in the voting precinct for thirty
days; and (4) payment
"at least six months prior to any election . . . to the proper
officer all State
Page 380 U. S. 531
poll taxes ($1.50 annually) assessed or assessable against him
for three years next preceding . . . such election. [
Footnote 2]"
The statutes further provided for permanent registration.
[
Footnote 3] Once registered,
the voters could qualify for elections in subsequent years merely
by paying the poll taxes.
In 1963, in anticipation of the promulgation of the
Twenty-fourth Amendment, the Governor of Virginia convened a
special session of the Virginia General Assembly. On November 21 of
that year, the General Assembly enacted two Acts [
Footnote 4] designed
"(1) to enable persons to register and vote in federal elections
without the payment of poll tax or other tax, as required by the
24th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, (2) to
continue in effect in all other elections the present registration
and voting requirements of the Constitution of Virginia, and (3) to
provide methods by which all persons registered to vote in federal
or other elections may prove that they meet the residence
requirements of § 18 of the Constitution of Virginia. [
Footnote 5]"
"No changes were made with regard to qualification for voting in
state elections. With regard to federal elections, however, the
payment of a poll tax as an absolute prerequisite to registration
and voting was eliminated,
Page 380 U. S. 532
and a provision was added requiring the federal voter to file a
certificate of residence in each election year or, at his option,
to pay the customary poll taxes. The statute provides that the
certificate of residence must be filed no earlier than October 1 of
the year immediately preceding that in which the voter desires to
vote, and not later than six months prior to the election. The
voter must state in the certificate (which must be notarized or
witnessed) his present address, that he is currently a resident of
Virginia, that he has been a resident since the date of his
registration, and that he does not presently intend to remove from
the city or county of which he is a resident prior to the next
general election. Va.Code Ann. § 24-17.2 (1964 Supp.). Thus, as a
result of the 1963 Acts, a citizen, after registration, may vote in
both federal and state elections upon the payment of all assessable
poll taxes. Va.Code Ann. § 24-17 (1964 Supp.). If he has not paid
such taxes, he cannot vote in state elections, and may vote in
federal elections only upon filing a certificate of residence in
each election year. Va.Code Ann. §§ 24-17.1, 24-17.2 (1964
Supp.)."
The present appeal originated as two separate class actions,
brought by appellees in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, attacking the foregoing provisions of
the 1963 Virginia legislation as violative of Art. I, § 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, and the Fourteenth, Seventeenth,
and Twenty-fourth Amendments thereto. The complaints, which prayed
for declaratory and injunctive relief, named as defendants
(appellants here) the three members of the Virginia State Board of
Elections and, in one case, the County Treasurer of Roanoke County,
Virginia, and, in the other, the Director of Finance of Fairfax
County. The jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201 (1958 ed.), and
Page 380 U. S. 533
a court of three judges was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
2281, 2284 (1958 ed.).
The District Court denied the State's motion to stay the
proceedings in order to give the Virginia courts an opportunity to
resolve the issues and interpret the statutes involved. The court
further denied the State's motions to dismiss for failure to join
indispensable parties, for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted, and for want of a justiciable controversy.
[
Footnote 6] On the merits, the
District Court held that the certificate of residence requirement
was "a distinct qualification," or at least an "increase [in] the
quantum of necessary proof of residence" imposed solely on the
federal voter, and that it therefore violated Art. I, § 2, and the
Seventeenth Amendment, which provide that electors choosing a
Representative or Senator in the Congress of the United States
"shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most
numerous branch of the State legislature." The court rejected the
argument that the residency certificate was merely a method, like
the poll tax, of proving the residence qualification which is
imposed on both federal and state voters. Accordingly, the District
Court entered an order declaring invalid the portions of the 1963
Virginia legislation which required the filing of a certificate of
residence and enjoining appellants from requiring compliance by a
voter with said portions of the 1963 Acts. We noted probable
jurisdiction. 379 U.S. 810.
We hold that § 24-17.2 is repugnant to the Twenty-fourth
Amendment, and affirm the decision of the District
Page 380 U. S. 534
Court on that basis. We therefore find it unnecessary to
determine whether that section violates Art. I, § 2, and the
Seventeenth Amendment.
I
At the outset, we are faced with the State's contention that the
District Court should have stayed the proceedings until the courts
of Virginia had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass on
underlying issues of state law and to construe the statutes
involved. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to postpone the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
In applying the doctrine of abstention, a federal district court
is vested with discretion to decline to exercise or to postpone the
exercise of its jurisdiction in deference to state court resolution
of underlying issues of state law.
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U. S. 496.
[
Footnote 7] Where resolution
of the federal constitutional question is dependent upon, or may be
materially altered by, the determination of an uncertain issue of
state law, abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary
friction in federal-state relations, interference with important
state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and
premature constitutional adjudication.
E.g., Railroad Comm'n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., supra. The doctrine, however,
contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be
made where the issue of state law is uncertain.
Davis v.
Mann, 377 U. S. 678,
377 U. S. 690;
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.
S. 668,
373 U. S.
673-674;
City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. &
S.F.R. Co., 357 U. S. 77.
[
Footnote 8] If the state
statute
Page 380 U. S. 535
in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is
not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render
unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional
question, it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its
properly invoked jurisdiction.
Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U. S. 360,
377 U. S.
375-379. Thus,
"recognition of the role of state courts as the final expositors
of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal
judiciary in deciding questions of federal law."
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,
375 U. S. 411,
375 U. S.
415-416.
The state statutes involved here are clear and unambiguous in
all material respects. [
Footnote
9] While the State suggests that the Virginia tribunals are
"unquestionably far better equipped than the lower [federal]
court to unravel the skeins of local law and administrative
practices in which the Appellees' claims are entangled, [
Footnote 10] the State
Page 380 U. S. 536
does not point to any provision in the legislation which
leaves"
"reasonable room for a construction by the Virginia courts which
might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal
constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the
nature of the problem."
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167,
360 U. S.
177.
In spite of the clarity of the 1963 legislation, the State
argues that the District Court should have abstained on the ground
that, if the certificate of residence requirement were found to be
a qualification distinct from those specified in the Virginia
Constitution, it would be invalid as a matter of Virginia law, and
"a crucial federal constitutional issue would accordingly disappear
from the case." We find little force in this argument. The section
of the Virginia Constitution (Art. II, § 18) on which the State
relies expressly limits the franchise to citizens who have met
certain residency requirements. [
Footnote 11] The statute in issue, § 24-17.2, requires
the voter to certify that he meets those residence requirements. It
is thus difficult to envisage how § 24-17.2 could be construed as
setting forth a qualification not found in the Virginia
Constitution. [
Footnote
12]
Page 380 U. S. 537
In addition to the clarity of the Virginia statutes, support for
the District Court's refusal to stay the proceedings is found in
the nature of the constitutional deprivation alleged and the
probable consequences of abstaining.
Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.
S. 218,
377 U. S. 229;
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360,
377 U. S.
375-379. The District Court was faced with two class
actions attacking a statutory scheme allegedly impairing the right
to vote in violation of Art. I, § 2, and the Fourteenth,
Seventeenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments. As this Court has
stressed on numerous occasions,
"[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on
that right strike at the heart of representative government."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
377 U. S. 555.
The right is fundamental "because preservative of all rights."
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
118 U. S. 370.
In appraising the motion to stay proceedings, the District Court
was thus faced with a claimed impairment of the fundamental civil
rights of a broad class of citizens. The motion was heard about two
months prior to the deadline for meeting the statutory requirements
and just eight months before the 1964 general elections. Given the
importance and immediacy of the problem, and the delay inherent in
referring questions of state law to state tribunals, [
Footnote 13] it is evident that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain.
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
377 U. S. 218,
377 U. S. 229;
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360,
377 U. S.
375-379. [
Footnote
14]
Page 380 U. S. 538
II
Reaching the merits, it is important to emphasize that the
question presented is not whether it would be within a State's
power to abolish entirely the poll tax and require all voters --
state and federal -- to file annually a certificate of residence.
Rather, the issue here is whether the State of Virginia may
constitutionally confront the federal voter with a requirement that
he either pay the customary poll taxes as required for state
elections or file a certificate of residence. We conclude that this
requirement constitutes an abridgment of the right to vote in
federal elections in contravention of the Twenty-fourth
Amendment.
Prior to the proposal of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1962,
federal legislation to eliminate poll taxes, either by
constitutional amendment or statute, had been introduced in every
Congress since 1939. The House of Representatives passed anti-poll
tax bills on five occasions and
Page 380 U. S. 539
the Senate twice proposed constitutional amendments. [
Footnote 15] Even though, in 1962,
only five States retained the poll tax as a voting requirement,
Congress reflected widespread national concern with the
characteristics of the tax. Disenchantment with the poll tax was
many-faceted. [
Footnote 16]
One of the basic objections to the poll tax was that it exacted a
price for the privilege of exercising the franchise. Congressional
hearings and debates indicate a general repugnance to the
disenfranchisement of the poor occasioned by failure to pay the
tax. [
Footnote 17]
"While it is true that the amount of poll tax now required to be
paid in the several States is small, and imposes only a slight
economical obstacle for any citizen who desires to qualify in order
to vote, nevertheless, it is significant that the voting in poll
tax States is relatively low as compared to the overall population
which would be eligible. . . . [T]he historical analysis . . .
indicates that, where the poll tax has been abandoned . . . voter
participation increased."
H.R.Rep.No.1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. Another objection
to the poll tax raised in the congressional hearings was that the
tax usually had to be paid long before the election -- at a time
when political campaigns were still quiescent -- which tended to
eliminate from the franchise a substantial number of voters who
did
Page 380 U. S. 540
not plan so far ahead. [
Footnote 18] The poll tax was also attacked as a vehicle
for fraud which could be manipulated by political machines by
financing block payments of the tax. [
Footnote 19] In addition, and of primary concern to many,
the poll tax was viewed as a requirement adopted with an eye to the
disenfranchisement of Negroes and applied in a discriminatory
manner. [
Footnote 20] It is
against this background that Congress proposed, and three-fourths
of the States ratified, the Twenty-fourth Amendment abolishing the
poll tax as a requirement for voting in federal elections.
Upon adoption of the Amendment, of course, no State could
condition the federal franchise upon payment of a poll tax. The
State of Virginia accordingly removed the poll tax as an absolute
prerequisite to qualification for voting in federal elections, but,
in its stead substituted a provision whereby the federal voter
could qualify either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing
a certificate of residence six months before the election.
It has long been established that a State may not impose a
penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n
of California, 271 U. S. 583.
"Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be .
. . indirectly denied,"
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649,
321 U. S. 664,
or "manipulated out of existence."
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U. S. 339,
364 U. S. 345.
Significantly, the Twenty-fourth Amendment does not merely insure
that the franchise shall not be "denied" by reason of failure to
pay the poll tax; it expressly guarantees that the right to vote
shall not be "denied or abridged" for that reason. Thus, like the
Fifteenth Amendment, the Twenty-fourth "nullifies sophisticated, as
well as simple-minded modes" of impairing
Page 380 U. S. 541
the right guaranteed.
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.
S. 268,
307 U. S. 275.
"It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap
exercise of the franchise" by those claiming the constitutional
immunity.
Ibid.; cf. Gray v. Johnson, 234 F.
Supp. 743 (D.C.S.D.Miss.).
Thus, in order to demonstrate the invalidity of § 24-17.2 of the
Virginia Code, it need only be shown that it imposes a material
requirement solely upon those who refuse to surrender their
constitutional right to vote in federal elections without paying a
poll tax. Section 24-17.2 unquestionably erects a real obstacle to
voting in federal elections for those who assert their
constitutional exemption from the poll tax. As previously
indicated, the requirement for those who wish to participate in
federal elections without paying the poll tax is that they file in
each election year, within a stated interval ending six months
before the election, a notarized or witnessed certificate attesting
that they have been continuous residents of the State since the
date of registration (which might have been many years before under
Virginia's system of permanent registration), and that they do not
presently intend to leave the city or county in which they reside
prior to the forthcoming election. Unlike the poll tax bill which
is sent to the voter's residence, it is not entirely clear how one
obtains the necessary certificate. The statutes merely provide for
the distribution of the forms to city and county court clerks, and
for further distribution to local registrars and election
officials. Va.Code Ann. § 24-28.1 (1964 Supp.). Construing the
statutes in the manner least burdensome to the voter, it would seem
that the voter could either obtain the certificate of residence
from local election officials or prepare personally "a certificate
in form substantially" as set forth in the statute. The certificate
must then be filed "in person, or otherwise" with the city or
county treasurer. This is plainly a cumbersome procedure.
Page 380 U. S. 542
In effect, it amounts to annual re-registration, which Virginia
officials have sharply contrasted with the "simple" poll tax
system. [
Footnote 21] For
many, it would probably seem far preferable to mail in the poll tax
payment upon receipt of the bill. In addition, the certificate must
be filed six months before the election, thus perpetuating one of
the disenfranchising characteristics of the poll tax which the
Twenty-fourth Amendment was designed to eliminate. We are thus
constrained to hold that the requirement imposed upon the voter who
refuses to pay the poll tax constitutes an abridgment of his right
to vote by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.
The requirement imposed upon those who reject the poll tax
method of qualifying would not be saved even if it could be said
that it is no more onerous, or even somewhat less onerous, than the
poll tax. For federal elections, the poll tax is abolished
absolutely as a prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or milder
substitute may be imposed. Any material requirement imposed upon
the federal voter solely because of his refusal to waive the
constitutional immunity subverts the effectiveness of the
Twenty-fourth Amendment, and must fall under its ban.
Nor may the statutory scheme be saved, as the State asserts, on
the ground that the certificate is a necessary substitute method of
proving residence, serving the same function as the poll tax. As
this Court has held in analogous situations, constitutional
deprivations may not be justified by some remote administrative
benefit to the State.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S.
89, 96;
Oyama
Page 380 U. S. 543
v. California, 332 U. S. 633,
332 U. S.
646-647. Moreover, in this case the State has not
demonstrated that the alternative requirement is in any sense
necessary to the proper administration of its election laws. The
forty-six States which do not require the payment of poll taxes
have apparently found no great administrative burden in insuring
that the electorate is limited to bona fide residents. The
availability of numerous devices to enforce valid residence
requirements -- such as registration, use of the criminal sanction,
purging of registration lists, challenges and oaths, public
scrutiny by candidates and other interested parties -- demonstrates
quite clearly the lack of necessity for imposing a requirement
whereby persons desiring to vote in federal elections must either
pay a poll tax or file a certificate of residence six months prior
to the election.
The Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise the
Negro. [
Footnote 22] At the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902, the sponsor of the
suffrage plan of which the poll tax was an integral part frankly
expressed the purpose of the suffrage proposal:
"Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that,
exactly, is what this Convention was elected for -- to discriminate
to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations
of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of
every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without
materially impairing the numerical strength of the white
electorate. [
Footnote
23]
Page 380 U. S. 544
The poll tax was later characterized by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals as a device limiting 'the right of suffrage to
those who took sufficient interest in the affairs of the State to
qualify themselves to vote.'
Campbell v. Goode, 172 Va.
463, 466, 2 S.E.2d 456, 457. Whether, as the State contends, the
payment of the poll tax is also a reliable indicium of continuing
residence need not be decided, for even if the poll tax has served
such an evidentiary function, the confrontation of the federal
voter with a requirement that he either continue to pay the
customary poll tax or file a certificate of residence could not be
sustained. For federal elections, the poll tax, regardless of the
services it performs, was abolished by the Twenty-fourth Amendment.
That Amendment was also designed to absolve all requirements
impairing the right to vote in federal elections by reason of
failure to pay the poll tax. Section 24-17.2 of the Virginia Code
falls within this proscription."
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice HARLAN agrees with this opinion insofar as it rests
on the proposition that the Twenty-fourth Amendment forbids the use
of a state poll tax for any purpose whatever in determining voter
qualifications in all elections for federal office. He also agrees
that this is not a case for application of the abstention
doctrine.
[
Footnote 1]
Va.Code Ann. § 24-17.2 (1964 Supp.) provides:
"Proof of residence required; how furnished. --"
"(a) No person shall be deemed to have the qualifications of
residence required by § 18 of the Constitution of Virginia and §§
24-17 and 24-17.1 in any calendar year subsequent to that in which
he registered under either § 24-67 or § 24-67.1, and shall not be
entitled to vote in any election held in this State during any such
subsequent calendar year unless he has offered proof of continuing
residence by filing in person, or otherwise, a certificate of
residence at the time and in the manner prescribed in paragraph (b)
of this section, or, at his option, by personally paying to the
proper officer, at least six months prior to any such election in
which he offers to vote, all State poll taxes assessed or
assessable against him for the three years next preceding that in
which he offers to vote. Proof of continuing residence may only be
established by either of such two methods."
"(b) Any person who shall offer proof of continuing residence by
filing a certificate of residence as provided in paragraph (a) of
this section, shall file with the treasurer of his county or city
not earlier than the first of October of the year next preceding
that in which he offers to vote and not later than six months prior
to the election, a certificate in form substantially as
follows:"
" I do certify that I am now and have been a resident of
Virginia since the date of my registration to vote under the laws
of Virginia, that I am now a resident of _______ (city or county),
residing at ________ (street and number, or place of residence
therein), and that it is my present intention not to remove from
the city or county stated herein prior to the next general
election."
"______________________"
"Witnessed: ____________________"
"
or"
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of ______,
19__."
"______________________"
"Notary Public"
[
Footnote 2]
Members of the Armed Services are exempt from the poll tax
requirement. Va.Code Ann. § 24-23.1 (1950).
[
Footnote 3]
Va.Code Ann. §§ 24-52 to 24-119 (1950). Registration, effected
by filing an application showing that the statutory requirements
had been met (§ 24-68), was permanent. Thereafter, in order to
qualify for subsequent elections, the voter merely had to pay the
assessed poll taxes (unless, of course, his name had been removed
from the registration lists for,
inter alia, failure to
meet the statutory and constitutional requirements (§§ 24-94 to
24-96)).
[
Footnote 4]
Va.Acts, 1963, Extra Sess., cc. 1 and 2. Chapter 2 is now
codified in Title 24 of the Virginia Code. Chapter 1-applicable to
1964 elections only -- has not been codified.
[
Footnote 5]
Va.Acts, 1963, Extra Sess., c. 2, § 1(a).
[
Footnote 6]
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted and for failure to set forth a justiciable
controversy was directed solely at the complaint of appellee
Henderson, who was registered and had already paid his poll tax.
The District Court was patently correct in rejecting the State's
argument that appellee Henderson lacked standing to maintain this
action.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368,
372 U. S.
374-376;
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186,
369 U. S.
204-208.
[
Footnote 7]
See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U. S. 324,
377 U. S.
328-329;
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.
S. 360,
377 U. S. 375;
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,
375 U. S. 411,
375 U. S.
415-416.
[
Footnote 8]
To the same effect,
see England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411,
375 U. S.
415-416;
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement
Co., 369 U. S. 134,
369 U. S.
135-136;
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101,
323 U. S.
105.
[
Footnote 9]
The only ambiguity discussed in the briefs of the parties or
developed during argument concerned the question whether § 24-17.2
required the voter to secure a prepared certificate of residence
from local election officials or whether he could personally
prepare one "in form substantially" as set forth in the statute. We
do not regard this as a material ambiguity having any effect on the
constitutional question and accept, for the purposes of this
decision, the State's assertion that the voter may secure such a
form from local election officials or prepare one according to the
statutory description.
Infra, p.
380 U. S.
541.
[
Footnote 10]
The State also argues that, since the States are empowered by
Art. I, § 2, Art. II, § 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment to create
voter qualifications for federal elections, the question whether a
state statutory enactment creates a voter qualification must
initially be referred to the state tribunals. True, "[t]he States
have long been held to have broad powers to determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised."
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,
360 U. S. 45,
360 U. S. 50;
Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621,
193 U. S. 633;
Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328,
179 U. S. 335. The
right to vote, however, is constitutionally protected,
Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651,
110 U. S.
663-665;
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649,
321 U. S. 664;
and the conditions imposed by the States upon that right must not
contravene any constitutional provision or congressional
restriction enacted pursuant to constitutional power.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89,
380 U. S. 91;
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,
360 U. S. 45,
360 U. S. 50-51;
United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299,
313 U. S. 315.
The question presented in this case -- whether the Virginia statute
imposes a condition upon the franchise which violates the United
States Constitution -- is thus quite clearly a federal question.
The precise nature of the condition imposed is, of course, a
question of Virginia law. However, the statutory requirement is
clear and unambiguous, and the sole question remaining is whether
the state requirement is valid under the Federal Constitution.
[
Footnote 11]
Va.Const., Art. II, § 18, sets forth as a qualification for
voting: residency in the State for one year, in the city or county
six months, and in the voting precinct thirty days.
[
Footnote 12]
Moreover, the State cites no Virginia decisions in support of
its contention that the requirement might constitute an
impermissible "qualification" according to Virginia law.
[
Footnote 13]
See Baggett v. Builitt, 377 U.
S. 360,
377 U. S.
378-379;
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 375 U. S. 411,
375 U. S.
425-426 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 14]
The State also asserts that the District Court erred in denying
its motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties.
The argument is that the relief requested in the complaints was an
injunction against the enforcement of all provisions of the 1963
legislation, which included a system for separate registration of
state and federal voters. Va.Code Ann. §§ 24-67, 24-67.1 (1964
Supp.). Since registration in Virginia is entrusted to local
registrars, the State argues, their joinder was essential in order
to effect the relief requested.
Williams v. Fanning,
332 U. S. 490,
332 U. S.
493-494.
While the State is correct in asserting that the complaints were
phrased broadly enough to encompass all portions of the 1963 Acts,
the District Court was certainly warranted in concluding that the
basic aim of the complaints was to secure relief from the
certificate of residence requirement. The named defendants were
clearly capable of effecting this relief, and hence the District
Court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.
Ceballos v.
Shaughnessy, 352 U. S. 599,
352 U. S.
603-604. Moreover, even accepting the State's broad
construction of the complaints, it is apparent that, given the
State Board of Elections' power to supervise and to insure
"legality" in the election process (Va.Code Ann. §§ 24-25, 24-26,
24-27 (1950)), the local registrars were not indispensable parties.
See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.
S. 145,
380 U. S. 151,
n. 10.
[
Footnote 15]
H.R.Rep. No. 1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
[
Footnote 16]
See generally Ogden, The Poll Tax in the South
(1958).
[
Footnote 17]
See, e.g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on Amendments to Abolish Tax and
Property Qualifications for Electors in Federal Elections, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., 14-22, 48-58 (hereinafter cited as House
Hearings); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on S.J.Res. 29, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 33
(hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).
[
Footnote 18]
See, e.g., House Hearings 14-15.
See generally
Ogden,
supra, note
16 at 44-52.
[
Footnote 19]
See Ogden,
supra, note 16 at 59-110.
[
Footnote 20]
See House Hearings 14-22, 26-27, 48-58; Senate Hearings
33.
[
Footnote 21]
See, e.g., the testimony of Judge William Old before
the House Judiciary Committee, defending the poll tax as enabling
Virginia "to avoid the burdensome necessity for annual
registration." House Hearings 81.
See also id. at 98-99
(Attorney General Button); 108 Cong.Rec. 4532 (Senator Byrd); 108
Cong.Rec. 4641 (Senator Robertson); R. 73, 76 (Governor
Harrison).
[
Footnote 22]
See 2 Virginia Constitutional Convention (Proceedings
and Debates, 1901-1092) 2937-3080.
[
Footnote 23]
Statement of the Honorable Carter Glass,
id. at
3076-3077. This statement was characteristic of the entire debate
on the suffrage issue; the only real controversy was whether the
provisions eventually adopted were sufficient to accomplish the
disenfranchisement of the Negro.
See id. at 2937-3080.