These three cases involve the exemption claims under § 6(j) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act of conscientious
objectors who did not belong to an orthodox religious sect. Section
6(j) excepts from combatant service in the armed forces those who
are conscientiously opposed to participation in war by reason of
their "religious training and belief,"
i.e., belief in an
individual's relation to a Supreme Being involving duties beyond a
human relationship but not essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. In all the
cases, convictions were obtained in the District Courts for refusal
to submit to induction in the armed forces; in Nos. 50 and 51 the
Court of Appeals reversed, and in No. 29, the conviction was
affirmed.
Held:
1. The test of religious belief within the meaning of the
exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful
belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the
exemption. Pp.
380 U. S.
173-180.
(a) The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a
merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong
on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic
considerations, rather than religious belief. P.
380 U. S.
173.
(b) There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and,
accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question. Pp.
380 U. S.
173-174.
(c) This test accords with long established legislative policy
of equal treatment for those whose objection to military service is
based on religious beliefs. Pp.
380 U. S.
177-180.
2. Local boards and courts are to decide whether the objector's
beliefs are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme
of things, religious; they are not to require proof of the
religious
Page 380 U. S. 164
doctrines, nor are they to reject beliefs because they are not
comprehensible. Pp.
380 U. S.
184-185.
3. Under the broad construction applicable to § 6(j), the
applications involved in these cases, none of which was based on
merely personal moral codes, qualified for exemption. Pp.
380 U. S.
185-188.
326 F.2d 846 and 325 F.2d 409 affirmed; 324 F.2d 173
reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under §
6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50
U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant
training and service in the armed forces of the United States those
persons who, by
Page 380 U. S. 165
reason of their religious training and belief, are
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. The
cases were consolidated for argument, and we consider them together
although each involves different facts and circumstances. The
parties raise the basic question of the constitutionality of the
section which defines the term "religious training and belief," as
used in the Act, as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
The constitutional attack is launched under the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold:
(1) the section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious
objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of
religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Jakobson (No. 51) and Peter (No. 29) also claim
that their beliefs come within the meaning of the section. Jakobson
claims that he meets the standards of § 6(j) because his opposition
to war is based on belief in a Supreme Reality, and is therefore an
obligation superior to one resulting from man's relationship to his
fellow man. Peter contends that his opposition to war derives from
his acceptance of the existence of a universal power beyond that of
man, and that this acceptance, in fact, constitutes belief in a
Supreme Being, qualifying him for exemption. We granted certiorari
in each of the cases because of their importance in the
administration of the Act. 377 U.S. 922.
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression
"Supreme Being," rather than the designation "God," was merely
clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to
embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views. We believe that, under this
construction, the test of belief
Page 380 U. S. 166
"in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief
that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs
have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders,
we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and
the other is not. We have concluded that the beliefs of the
objectors in these cases meet these criteria, and, accordingly, we
affirm the judgments in Nos. 50 and 51 and reverse the judgment in
No. 29.
THE FACTS IN THE CASES
No. 50: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to
induction in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in
1953 by his local board, but this classification was changed in
1955 to 2-S (student), and he remained in this status until 1958,
when he was reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a
conscientious objector in 1957, after successive annual renewals of
his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the
printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by
reason of his "religious" belief; that he preferred to leave the
question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, "rather than
answer
yes' or `no'"; that his "skepticism or disbelief in the
existence of God" did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in
anything whatsoever"; that his was a "belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a
purely ethical creed." R. 69-70, 73. He cited such personages as
Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in
intellectual and moral integrity "without belief in God, except in
the remotest sense." R. 73. His belief was found to be sincere,
honest,
Page 380 U. S.
167
and made in good faith, and his conscientious objection to
be based upon individual training and belief, both of which
included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger's claim,
however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a "belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by § 6(j) of the Act.
At trial, Seeger's counsel admitted that Seeger's belief was not in
relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended
that he was entitled to the exemption because, "under the present
law, Mr. Seeger's position would also include definitions of
religion which have been stated more recently," R. 49, and could be
"accommodated" under the definition of religious training and
belief in the Act, R. 53. He was convicted, and the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the
section distinguished "between internally derived and externally
compelled beliefs," and was therefore an "impermissible
classification" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 326 F.2d 846.
No. 51: Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District of
New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. On his
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection
of his claim may have rested on the factual finding, erroneously
made, that he did not believe in a Supreme Being, as required by §
6(j). 325 F.2d 409.
Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953, and
intermittently enjoyed a student classification until 1956. It was
not until April, 1958, that he made claim to noncombatant
classification (1-A-O) as a conscientious objector. He stated on
the Selective Service System form that he believed in a "Supreme
Being" who was "Creator of Man" in the sense of being "ultimately
responsible for the existence of" man, and who was "the Supreme
Reality" of which "the existence of man is the
result." R.
44. (Emphasis in the original.) He explained that his religious
Page 380 U. S. 168
and social thinking had developed after much meditation and
thought. He had concluded that man must be "partly spiritual," and,
therefore, "partly akin to the Supreme Reality," and that his "most
important religious law" was that "no man ought ever to wilfully
sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end. . . ." R.
45-46. In December, 1958, he requested a 1-O classification, since
he felt that participation in any form of military service would
involve him in "too many situations and relationships that would be
a strain on [his] conscience that [he felt he] must avoid." R. 70.
He submitted a long memorandum of "notes on religion" in which he
defined religion as the "
sum and essence of one's basic
attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence," R.
72 (emphasis in the original); he said that he believed in
"Godness," which was "the Ultimate Cause for the fact of the Being
of the Universe"; that to deny its existence would but deny the
existence of the universe, because "anything that Is, has an
Ultimate Cause for its Being." R. 73. There was a relationship to
Godness, he stated, in two directions,
i.e., "vertically,
towards Godness directly," and "horizontally, towards Godness
through Mankind and the World." R. 74. He accepted the latter one.
The Board classified him 1-A-O, and Jakobson appealed. The hearing
officer found that the claim was based upon a personal moral code,
and that he was not sincere in his claim. The Appeal Board
classified him 1-A. It did not indicate upon what ground it based
its decision,
i.e., insincerity or a conclusion that his
belief was only a personal moral code. The Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of §
6(j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had
found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory
definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity,
it directed dismissal of the indictment.
Page 380 U. S. 169
No. 29: Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern
District of California on a charge of refusing to submit to
induction. In his Selective Service System form, he stated that he
was not a member of a religious sect or organization; he failed to
execute section VII of the questionnaire, but attached to it a
quotation expressing opposition to war, in which he stated that he
concurred. In a later form, he hedged the question as to his belief
in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definition,
and he appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his
moral code to take human life, and that he considered this belief
superior to his obligation to the state. As to whether his
conviction was religious, he quoted with approval Reverend John
Haynes Holmes' definition of religion as
"the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps
man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands . . . ;
[it] is the supreme expression of human nature; it is man thinking
his highest, feeling his deepest, and living his best."
R. 27. The source of his conviction he attributed to reading and
meditation "in our democratic American culture, with its values
derived from the western religious and philosophical tradition."
Ibid. As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated
that he supposed "you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being
or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use." R. 11. In
1959, he was classified 1-A, although there was no evidence in the
record that he was not sincere in his beliefs. After his conviction
for failure to report for induction the Court of Appeals, assuming
arguendo that he was sincere, affirmed, 324 F.2d 173.
BACKGROUND OF § 6(j)
Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion in
United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605
(1931), enunciated the rationale behind the long recognition of
conscientious objection
Page 380 U. S. 170
to participation in war accorded by Congress in our various
conscription laws when he declared that, "in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has always
been maintained." At
283 U. S. 633
(dissenting opinion). In a similar vein, Harlan Fiske Stone, later
Chief Justice, drew from the Nation's past when he declared
that
"both morals and sound policy require that the state should not
violate the conscience of the individual. All our history gives
confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and
social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of
the state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to
the integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing
short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its
violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state which
preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the
conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by
the process."
"Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 Col.Univ.Q. 253, 269
(1919)."
Governmental recognition of the moral dilemma posed for persons
of certain religious faiths by the call to arms came early in the
history of this country. Various methods of ameliorating their
difficulty were adopted by the Colonies, and were later perpetuated
in state statutes and constitutions. Thus, by the time of the Civil
War, there existed a state pattern of exempting conscientious
objectors on religious grounds. In the Federal Militia Act of 1862,
control of conscription was left primarily in the States. However,
General Order No. 99, issued by the Adjutant General pursuant to
that Act, provided for striking from the conscription list those
who were exempted by the States; it also established a commutation
or substitution system fashioned from earlier state enactments.
With the Federal Conscription Act of 1863,
Page 380 U. S. 171
which enacted the commutation and substitution provisions of
General Order No. 99, the Federal Government occupied the field
entirely, and, in the 1864 Draft Act, 13 Stat. 9, it extended
exemptions to those conscientious objectors who were members of
religious denominations opposed to the bearing of arms and who were
prohibited from doing so by the articles of faith of their
denominations. Selective Service System Monograph No. 11,
Conscientious Objection 40-41 (1950). In that same year, the
Confederacy exempted certain pacifist sects from military duty.
Id. at 46.
The need for conscription did not again arise until World War I.
The Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, 78, afforded exemptions to
conscientious objectors who were affiliated with a
"well recognized religious sect or organization [then] organized
and existing and whose existing creed or principles [forbade] its
members to participate in war in any form. . . ."
The Act required that all persons be inducted into the armed
services, but allowed the conscientious objectors to perform
noncombatant service in capacities designated by the President of
the United States. Although the 1917 Act excused religious
objectors only, in December, 1917, the Secretary of War instructed
that "personal scruples against war" be considered as constituting
"conscientious objection." Selective Service System Monograph No.
11, Conscientious Objection at 54-55 (1950). This Act, including
its conscientious objector provisions, was upheld against
constitutional attack in the
Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U. S. 366,
245 U. S.
389-390 (1918).
In adopting the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act,
Congress broadened the exemption afforded in the 1917 Act by making
it unnecessary to belong to a pacifist religious sect if the
claimant's own opposition to war was based on "religious training
and belief." 54 Stat. 889. Those found to be within the exemption
were
Page 380 U. S. 172
not inducted into the armed services, but were assigned to
noncombatant service under the supervision of the Selective Service
System. The Congress recognized that one might be religious without
belonging to an organized church just as surely as minority members
of a faith not opposed to war might, through religious reading,
reach a conviction against participation in war. Congress Looks at
the Conscientious Objector (National Service Board for Religious
Objectors, 1943) 71, 79, 83, 87, 88, 89. Indeed, the consensus of
the witnesses appearing before the congressional committees was
that individual belief -- rather than membership in a church or
sect -- determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his
everyday conduct, and that "there is a higher loyalty than loyalty
to this country, loyalty to God."
Id. at 29-31.
See
also the proposals which were made to the House Military
Affairs Committee but rejected.
Id. at 21-23, 82-83, 85.
Thus, while shifting the test from membership in such a church to
one's individual belief, the Congress nevertheless continued its
historic practice of excusing from armed service those who believed
that they owed an obligation, superior to that due the state, of
not participating in war in any form.
Between 1940 and 1948, two courts of appeals [
Footnote 1] held that the phrase "religious
training and belief" did not include philosophical, social or
political policy. Then, in 1948, the Congress amended the language
of the statute and declared that "religious training and belief"
was to be defined as
"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
The only significant mention of
Page 380 U. S. 173
this change in the provision appears in the report of the Senate
Armed Services Committee recommending adoption. It said simply
this:
"This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were
found in subsection 5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to
anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his
relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to
combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant
military service. (
See United States v. Berman
(
sic), 156 F.2d 377,
certiorari denied, 329 U.S.
795)."
S.Rep.No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 14; U.S.Code Cong. Service
1948, p. 2002.
I
NTERPRETATION OF § 6(j)
1. The crux of the problem lies in the phrase "religious
training and belief," which Congress has defined as "belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation." In assigning meaning to this
statutory language, we may narrow the inquiry by noting briefly
those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section
excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on
the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic
considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of
it. These judgments have historically been reserved for the
Government, and, in matters which can be said to fall within these
areas, the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to
override that of the state.
United States v. Macintosh,
supra (dissenting opinion). The statute further excludes those
whose opposition to war stems from a "merely personal moral code,"
a phrase to which we shall have occasion to turn later in
discussing the application of § 6(j) to these cases. We also pause
to take note of what is not involved in this litigation. No party
claims to be an atheist, or attacks the statute on this ground. The
question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic
beliefs. We do not deal with
Page 380 U. S. 174
or intimate any decision on that situation in these cases. Nor
do the parties claim the monotheistic belief that there is but one
God; what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger, who
bases his position here not on factual, but on purely
constitutional, grounds) is that they adhere to theism, which is
the "Belief in the existence of a god or gods; . . . Belief in
superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods," as
opposed to atheism. [
Footnote
2] Our question, therefore, is the narrow one: does the term
"Supreme Being," as used in § 6(j), mean the orthodox God or the
broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, "to which all else
is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent"?
Webster's New International Dictionary (Second Edition). In
considering this question, we resolve it solely in relation to the
language of § 6(j), and not otherwise.
2. Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no
field of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so
inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with
the fundamental questions of man's predicament in life, in death,
or in final judgment and retribution. This fact makes the task of
discerning the intent of Congress in using the phrase "Supreme
Being" a complex one. Nor is it made the easier by the richness and
variety of spiritual life in our country. Over 250 sects inhabit
our land. Some believe in a purely personal God, some in a
supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life
envisioning, as its ultimate goal, the day when all men can live
together in perfect understanding and peace. There are those who
think of God as the depth of our being; others, such as the
Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting rest through self-denial
and inner purification; in Hindu philosophy, the Supreme Being
is
Page 380 U. S. 175
the transcendental reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss.
Even those religious groups which have traditionally opposed war in
every form have splintered into various denominations: from 1940 to
1947, there were four denominations using the name "Friends,"
Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection
13 (1950); the "Church of the Brethren" was the official name of
the oldest and largest church body of four denominations composed
of those commonly called Brethren,
id. at 11; and the
"Mennonite Church" was the largest of 17 denominations, including
the Amish and Hutterites, grouped as "Mennonite bodies" in the 1936
report on the Census of Religious Bodies,
id. at 9. This
vast panoply of beliefs reveals the magnitude of the problem which
faced the Congress when it set about providing an exemption from
armed service. It also emphasizes the care that Congress realized
was necessary in the fashioning of an exemption which would be in
keeping with its long established policy of not picking and
choosing among religious beliefs.
In spite of the elusive nature of the inquiry, we are not
without certain guidelines. In amending the 1940 Act, Congress
adopted almost intact the language of Chief Justice Hughes in
United States v. Macintosh, supra:
"The essence of religion is belief in a relation to
God
involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation."
At
283 U. S.
633-634. (Emphasis supplied.)
By comparing the statutory definition with those words, however,
it becomes readily apparent that the Congress deliberately broaden
them by substituting the phrase "Supreme Being" for the appellation
"God." And, in so doing, it is also significant that Congress did
not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which
it chose to designate as "Supreme Being." By so refraining, it must
have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief
Page 380 U. S. 176
Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word
"God" had myriad meanings for men of faith:
"[P]utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of
deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate
conviction of paramount duty. The battle for religious liberty has
been fought and won with respect to religious beliefs and
practices, which are not in conflict with good order, upon the very
ground of the supremacy of conscience within its proper field."
At
283 U. S.
634.
Moreover, the Senate Report on the bill specifically states that
§ 6(j) was intended to reenact "substantially the same provisions
as were found" in the 1940 Act. That statute, of course, refers to
"religious training and belief," without more. Admittedly, all of
the parties here purport to base their objection on religious
belief. It appears, therefore, that we need only look to this clear
statement of congressional intent as set out in the report. Under
the 1940 Act, it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon
religious training and belief; we believe that is all that is
required here. Within that phrase would come all sincere religious
beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent. The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly
qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.
This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify
different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others,
and is in accord with the well established congressional policy of
equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded
in their religious tenets.
Page 380 U. S. 177
3. The Government takes the position that, since
Berman v.
United States, supra, was cited in the Senate Report on the
1948 Act, Congress must have desired to adopt the
Berman
interpretation of what constitutes "religious belief." Such a
claim, however, will not bear scrutiny. First, we think it clear
that an explicit statement of congressional intent deserves more
weight than the parenthetical citation of a case which might stand
for a number of things. Congress specifically stated that it
intended to reenact substantially the same provisions as were found
in the 1940 Act. Moreover, the history of that Act reveals no
evidence of a desire to restrict the concept of religious belief.
On the contrary, the Chairman of the House Military Affairs
Committee, which reported out the 1940 exemption provisions,
stated:
"We heard the conscientious objectors and all of their
representatives that we could possible hear, and, summing it all
up, their whole objection to the bill, aside from their objection
to compulsory military training, was based upon the right of
conscientious objection and, in most instances, to the right of the
ministerial students to continue in their studies, and we have
provided ample protection for those classes and those groups."
86 Cong.Rec. 11368 (1940). During the House debate on the bill,
Mr. Faddis of Pennsylvania made the following statement:
"We have made provision to take care of conscientious objectors.
I am sure the committee has had all the sympathy in the world with
those who appeared claiming to have religious scruples against
rendering military service in its various degrees. Some appeared
who had conscientious scruples against handling lethal weapons, but
who had no
Page 380 U. S. 178
scruples against performing other duties which did not actually
bring them into combat. Others appeared who claimed to have
conscientious scruples against participating in any of the
activities that would go along with the Army. The committee took
all of these into consideration, and has written a bill which, I
believe, will take care of all the reasonable objections of this
class of people."
86 Cong.Rec. 11418 (1940). Thus, the history of the Act belies
the notion that it was to be restrictive in application and
available only to those believing in a traditional God.
As for the citation to
Berman, it might mean a number
of things. But we think that Congress' action in citing it must be
construed in such a way as to make it consistent with its express
statement that it meant substantially to reenact the 1940
provision. As far as we can find, there is not one word to indicate
congressional concern over any conflict between
Kauten and
Berman. Surely, if it thought that two clashing
interpretations as to what amounted to "religious belief" had to be
resolved, it would have said so somewhere in its deliberations.
Thus, we think that, rather than citing
Berman for what it
said "religious belief" was, Congress cited it for what it said
"religious belief" was not. For both
Kauten and
Berman hold in common the conclusion that exemption must
be denied to those whose beliefs are political, social or
philosophical in nature, rather than religious. Both, in fact,
denied exemption on that very ground. It seems more likely,
therefore, that it was this point which led Congress to cite
Berman. The first part of the § 6(j) definition -- belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being -- was indeed set out in
Berman, with the exception that the court used the word
"God," rather than "Supreme Being." However, as the Government
recognizes,
Berman took that language word for word from
Macintosh. Far from
Page 380 U. S. 179
requiring a conclusion contrary to the one we reach here, Chief
Justice Hughes' opinion, as we have pointed out, supports our
interpretation.
Admittedly, the second half of the statutory definition -- the
rejection of sociological and moral views -- was taken directly
from
Berman. But, as we have noted, this same view was
adhered to in
United States v. Kauten, supra. Indeed, the
Selective Service System has stated its view of the cases'
significance in these terms:
"The
United States v. Kauten and
Herman Berman v.
United States cases ruled that a valid conscientious objector
claim to exemption must be based solely on 'religious training and
belief,' and not on philosophical, political, social, or other
grounds. . . ."
Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious
Objection 337 (1950).
See id. at 278. That the conclusions
of the Selective Service System are not to be taken lightly is
evidenced in this statement by Senator Gurney, Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and sponsor of the Senate bill
containing the present version of § 6(j):
"The bill which is now pending follows the 1940 act, with very
few technical amendments, worked out by those in Selective Service
who had charge of the conscientious objector problem during the
war."
94 Cong.Rec. 7305 (1948). Thus, we conclude that, in enacting §
6(j), Congress simply made explicit what the courts of appeals had
correctly found implicit in the 1940 Act. Moreover, it is perfectly
reasonable that Congress should have selected
Berman for
its citation, since this Court denied certiorari in that case, a
circumstance not present in
Kauten.
Section 6(j), then, is no more than a clarification of the 1940
provision involving only certain "technical amendments," to use the
words of Senator Gurney. As such, it continues the congressional
policy of providing exemption from military service for those whose
opposition
Page 380 U. S. 180
is based on grounds that can fairly be said to be "religious."
[
Footnote 3] To hold otherwise
would not only fly in the face of Congress' entire action in the
past; it would ignore the historic position of our country on this
issue since its founding.
4. Moreover, we believe this construction embraces the
ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious community.
The eminent Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, whose views
the Government concedes would come within the statute, identifies
God not as a projection "out there" or beyond the skies, but as the
ground of our very being. The Court of Appeals stated in No. 51
that Jakobson's views "parallel [those of] this eminent theologian
rather strikingly." 325 F.2d at 415-416. In his book, Systematic
Theology, Dr. Tillich says:
"I have written of the God above the God of theism. . . . In
such a state [of self-affirmation], the God of both religious and
theological language disappears. But something remains, namely, the
seriousness of that doubt in which meaning within meaninglessness
is affirmed. The source of this affirmation of meaning within
meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God of
traditional theism, but the 'God above God,' the power of being,
which works through those who have no name for it, not even the
name God."
II Systematic Theology 12 (1957).
Page 380 U. S. 181
Another eminent cleric, the Bishop of Woolwich, John A. T.
Robinson, in his book, Honest To God (1963), states:
"The Bible speaks of a God 'up there.' No doubt its picture of a
three-decker universe, of 'the heaven above, the earth beneath, and
the waters under the earth,' was once taken quite literally. . .
."
At 11.
"[Later,]
in place of a God who is literally or physically
'up there,' we have accepted, as part of our mental furniture, a
God who is spiritually or metaphysically 'out there.' . . .
But now it seems there is no room for him, not merely in the inn,
but in the entire universe: for there are no vacant places left. In
reality, of course, our new view of the universe had made not the
slightest difference. . . ."
At 13-14.
"But the idea of a God spiritually or metaphysically 'out there'
dies very much harder. Indeed, most people would be seriously
disturbed by the thought that it should need to die at all. For it
is their God, and they have nothing to put in its place. . . .
Every one of us lives with some mental picture of a God 'out
there,' a God who 'exists' above and beyond the world he made, a
God 'to' whom we pray and to whom we 'go' when we die."
At 14.
"But the signs are that we are reaching the point at which the
whole conception of a God 'out there,' which has served us so well
since the collapse of the three-decker universe, is itself becoming
more of a hindrance than a help."
At 15-16. (Emphasis in original.)
The Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council included a most
significant declaration on religion: [
Footnote 4]
Page 380 U. S. 182
"The community of all peoples is one. One is their origin, for
God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth.
One, too, is their ultimate end, God. Men expect from the various
religions answers to the riddles of the human condition: What is
man? What is the meaning and purpose of our lives? What is the
moral good and what is sin? What are death, judgment, and
retribution after death?"
"
* * * *"
"Ever since primordial days, numerous peoples have had a certain
perception of that hidden power which hovers over the course of
things and over the events that make up the lives of men; some have
even come to know of a Supreme Being and Father. Religions in an
advanced culture have been able to use more refined concepts and a
more developed language in their struggle for an answer to man's
religious questions."
"
* * * *"
"Nothing that is true and holy in these religions is scorned by
the Catholic Church. Ceaselessly the Church proclaims Christ, 'the
Way, the Truth, and the Life,' in whom God reconciled all things to
Himself. The Church regards with sincere reverence those ways of
action and of life, precepts and teachings which, although they
differ from the ones she sets forth, reflect nonetheless a ray of
that Truth which enlightens all men."
Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture
Movement, states in his book, Ethics As a Religion (1951), that
"[e]verybody except the avowed atheists (and they are comparatively
few) believes in some kind of God," and that
"The proper question to ask, therefore, is
Page 380 U. S. 183
not the futile one, Do you believe in God? but rather, What kind
of God do you believe in?"
Id. at 86-87. Dr. Muzzey attempts to answer that question:
"Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can
neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human
experience. It is anthropocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for
all the various definitions that have been given of it, must surely
mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive.
And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the latent moral
potentialities of men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal
endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men. What ultimate
reality is we do not know; but we have the faith that it expresses
itself in the human world as the power which inspires in men moral
purpose."
At 95.
"Thus, the 'God' that we love is not the figure on the great
white throne, but the perfect pattern, envisioned by faith, of
humanity as it should be, purged of the evil elements which retard
its progress toward 'the knowledge, love and practice of the
right.'"
At 98.
These are but a few of the views that comprise the broad
spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate
very clearly the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally
paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated.
They further reveal the difficulties inherent in placing too narrow
a construction on the provisions of § 6(j), and thereby lend
conclusive support to the construction which we today find that
Congress intended.
5. We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the
trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay
down proves less onerous. The examiner is furnished
Page 380 U. S. 184
a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he
has had considerable experience. While the applicant's words may
differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an
objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same
place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God
holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?
Moreover, it must be remembered that, in resolving these
exemption problems, one deals with the beliefs of different
individuals who will articulate them in a multitude of ways. In
such an intensely personal area, of course, the claim of the
registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious
faith must be given great weight. Recognition of this was implicit
in this language, cited by the
Berman court from
State
v. Amana Society, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894 (1906):
"Surely a scheme of life designed to obviate [man's inhumanity
to man], and, by removing temptations and all the allurements of
ambition and avarice, to nurture the virtues of unselfishness,
patience, love, and service, ought not to be denounced as not
pertaining to religion
when its devotees regard it as an
essential tenet of their religious faith."
132 Iowa at 315, 109 N.W. at 898, cited in
Berman v. United
States, 156 F.2d 377, 381. (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.)
The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some
theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to
question the existence of the registrant's "Supreme Being" or the
truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to
Government. As MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS stated in
United States v.
Ballard, 322 U. S. 78,
322 U. S. 86
(1944):
"Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to
the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious
experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others."
Local
Page 380 U. S. 185
boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs
because they consider them "incomprehensible." Their task is to
decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely
held, and whether they are, in his own scheme of things,
religious.
But we hasten to emphasize that, while the "truth" of a belief
is not open to question, there remains the significant question
whether it is "truly held." This is the threshold question of
sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a
question of fact -- a prime consideration to the validity of every
claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides a
comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Boards in making this
determination, placing at their service the facilities of the
Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and hearing officers. Finally, we would point out
that, in
Estep v. United States, 327 U.
S. 114, (1946), this Court held that:
"The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final'
means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action
under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains
under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the
evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local
boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in
conformity with the regulations are final, even though they may be
erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is
reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification
which it gave the registrant."
At
327 U. S.
122-123.
APPLICATION OF § 6(j) TO THE INSTANT CASES
As we noted earlier, the statutory definition excepts those
registrants whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral
code." The records in these cases, however,
Page 380 U. S. 186
show that at no time did any one of the applicants suggest that
his objection was based on a "merely personal moral code." Indeed,
at the outset, each of them claimed in his application that his
objection was based on a religious belief. We have construed the
statutory definition broadly, and it follows that any exception to
it must be interpreted narrowly. The use by Congress of the words
"merely personal" seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral
code which is not only personal, but which is the sole basis for
the registrant's belief, and is in no way related to a Supreme
Being. It follows, therefore, that, if the claimed religious
beliefs of the respective registrants in these cases meet the test
that we lay down, then their objections cannot be based on a
"merely personal" moral code.
In
Seeger, No. 50, the Court of Appeals failed to find
sufficient "externally compelled beliefs." However, it did find
that
"it would seem impossible to say with assurance that [Seeger] is
not bowing to 'external commands' in virtually the same sense as is
the objector who defers to the will of a supernatural power."
326 F.2d at 853. It found little distinction between Jakobson's
devotion to a mystical force of "Godness" and Seeger's compulsion
to "goodness." Of course, as we have said, the statute does not
distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs. Such
a determination would, as the Court of Appeals observed, prove
impossible as a practical matter, and we have found that Congress
intended no such distinction.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was no question of
the applicant's sincerity. He was a product of a devout Roman
Catholic home; he was a close student of Quaker beliefs from which
he said "much of [his] thought is derived"; he approved of their
opposition to war in any form; he devoted his spare hours to the
American
Page 380 U. S. 187
Friends Service Committee, and was assigned to hospital
duty.
In summary, Seeger professed "religious belief" and "religious
faith." He did not disavow any belief "in a relation to a Supreme
Being"; indeed, he stated that "the cosmic order does, perhaps,
suggest a creative intelligence." He decried the tremendous
"spiritual" price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human
life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with
which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we
propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it
clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same
place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the
lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr.
Tillich's thoughts:
"And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate
it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your
being, or your ultimate concern,
of what you take seriously
without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must
forget everything traditional that you have learned about God. . .
."
Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations. 57 (1948). (Emphasis
supplied.) It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what
his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term
"Supreme Being." But, as we have said, Congress did not intend that
to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment in No. 50.
In
Jakobson, No. 51, the Court of Appeals found that
the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war
was related to a Supreme Being. We agree, and affirm that
judgment.
We reach a like conclusion in No. 29. It will be remembered that
Peter acknowledged "some power manifest in
Page 380 U. S. 188
nature . . . the supreme expression" that helps man in ordering
his life. As to whether he would call that belief in a Supreme
Being, he replied, "you could call that a belief in the Supreme
Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use." We
think that, under the test we establish here, the Board would grant
the exemption to Peter, and we therefore reverse the judgment in
No. 29.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 51,
United States v. Jakobson, on
certiorari to the same court, and No. 29,
Peter v. United
States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (C.A.2d Cir.
1943);
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (C.A.9th Cir.
1946).
[
Footnote 2]
See Webster's New International Dictionary (Second
Edition); Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1949).
[
Footnote 3]
A definition of "religious training and belief" identical to
that in § 6(j) is found in § 337 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 66 Stat. 258, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1958 ed.). It is noteworthy
that, in connection with this Act, the Senate Special Subcommittee
to Investigate Immigration and Naturalization stated:
"The subcommittee realizes and respects the fact that the
question of whether or not a person must bear arms in defense of
his country may be one which invades the province of religion and
personal conscience."
Thus, it recommended that an alien not be required to vow to
bear arms when he asserted "his opposition to participation in war
in any form because of his personal religious training and belief."
S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 742, 746.
[
Footnote 4]
Draft declaration on the Church's relations with non-Christians,
Council Daybook, Vatican II, 3d Sess., p. 282, N.C.W.C.,
Washington, D.C., 1965.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have
difficulties. For then those who embraced one religious faith,
rather than another, would be subject to penalties; and that kind
of discrimination, as we held in
Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398,
would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It
would also result in a denial of equal protection by preferring
some religions over others -- an invidious discrimination that
would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497.
The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the dark. But
it is, in my opinion, not a
tour de force if we construe
the words "Supreme Being" to include the cosmos, as well as an
anthropomorphic entity. If it is a
tour de force so to
hold, it is no more so than other instances where we have gone to
extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on
constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present
one, we said that the words of a statute may be strained "in the
candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt."
United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41,
345 U. S. 47.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Page 380 U. S. 189
The words "a Supreme Being" have no narrow technical meaning in
the field of religion. Long before the birth of our Judeo-Christian
civilization, the idea of God had taken hold in many forms. Mention
of only two -- Hinduism and Buddhism -- illustrates the fluidity
and evanescent scope of the concept. In the Hindu religion, the
Supreme Being is conceived in the forms of several cult Deities.
The chief of these, which stand for the Hindu Triad, are Brahma,
Vishnu and Siva. Another Deity, and the one most widely worshipped,
is Sakti, the Mother Goddess, conceived as power, both destructive
and creative. Though Hindu religion encompasses the worship of many
Deities, it believes in only one single God, the eternally existent
One Being, with his manifold attributes and manifestations. This
idea is expressed in Digveda, the earliest sacred text of the
Hindus, in verse 46 of a hymn attributed to the mythical seer
Dirghatamas (Rigveda, I, 164):
"They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuna and Agni"
"And also heavenly beautiful Garutman:"
"The Real is One, though sages name it variously --"
"They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan."
See Smart, Reasons and Faiths p. 35, n. 1 (1958); 32
Harvard Oriental Series pp. 434-435. (Lanman, ed. 1925).
See
generally 31 and 32
id.; Editors of Life Magazine,
The World's Great Religions Vol. 1, pp. 17-48 (1963).
Indian philosophy, which comprises several schools of thought,
has advanced different theories of the nature of the Supreme Being.
According to the Upanisads, Hindu sacred texts, the Supreme Being
is described as the power which creates and sustains everything,
and to which the created things return upon dissolution. The word
which is commonly used in the Upanisads to indicate the Supreme
Being is Brahman. Philosophically, the
Page 380 U. S. 190
Supreme Being is the transcendental Reality which is Truth,
Knowledge, and Bliss. It is the source of the entire universe. In
this aspect, Brahman is Isvara, a personal Lord and Creator of the
universe, an object of worship. But, in the view of one school of
thought, that of Sankara, even this is an imperfect and limited
conception of Brahman which must be transcended: to think of
Brahman as the Creator of the material world is necessarily to form
a concept infected with illusion, or
maya -- which is what
the world really is, in highest truth. Ultimately, mystically,
Brahman must be understood as without attributes, as
neti
neti (not this, not that).
See Smart,
op. cit.,
supra, p. 133.
Buddhism -- whose advent marked the reform of Hinduism --
continued somewhat the same concept. As stated by Nancy Wilson
Ross,
"God -- if I may borrow that word for a moment -- the universe,
and man are one indissoluble existence, one total whole. Only
THIS-capital THIS -- is. Anything and everything that appears to
use as an individual entity or phenomenon, whether it be a planet
or an atom, a mouse or a man, is but a temporary manifestation of
THIS in form; every activity that takes place, whether it be birth
or death, loving or eating breakfast, is but a temporary
manifestation of THIS in activity. When we look at things this way,
naturally we cannot believe that each individual person has been
endowed with a special and individual soul or self. Each one of us
is but a cell, as it were, in the body of the Great Self, a cell
that comes into being, performs its functions, and passes away,
transformed into another manifestation. Though we have temporary
individuality, that temporary, limited individuality is not either
a true self or our true self. Our true self is the Great Self; our
true body is the Body of Reality, or the Dharmakaya, to give it its
technical Buddhist name."
The World of Zen, p. 18 (1960).
Page 380 U. S. 191
Does a Buddhist believe in "God" or a "Supreme Being"? That, of
course, depends on how one defines "God," as one eminent student of
Buddhism has explained:
"It has often been suggested that Buddhism is an atheistic
system of thought, and this assumption has given rise to quite a
number of discussions. Some have claimed that, since Buddhism knew
no God, it could not be a religion; others, that, since Buddhism
obviously was a religion which knew no God, the belief in God was
not essential to religion. These discussions assume that God is an
unambiguous term, which is by no means the case."
Conze, Buddhism, pp. 38-39 (1959). Dr. Conze then says that, if
"God" is taken to mean a personal Creator of the universe, then the
Buddhist has no interest in the concept.
Id., p. 39. But
if "God" means something like the state of oneness with God as
described by some Christian mystics, then the Buddhist surely
believes in "God," since this state is almost indistinguishable
from the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, "the supreme Reality; . . .
the eternal, hidden and incomprehensible Peace."
Id., pp.
39-40. And, finally, if "God" means one of the many Deities in an
at least superficially polytheistic religion like Hinduism, then
Buddhism tolerates a belief in many Gods:
"the Buddhists believe that a Faith can be kept alive only if it
can be adapted to the mental habits of the average person. In
consequence, we find that, in the earlier Scriptures, the deities
of Brahmanism are taken for granted, and that, later on, the
Buddhists adopted the local Gods of any district to which they
came."
Id., p. 42.
When the present Act was adopted in 1948, we were a nation of
Buddhists, Confucianists, and Taoists, as well as Christians.
Hawaii, then a Territory, was indeed filled with Buddhists,
Buddhism being "probably the major
Page 380 U. S. 192
faith, if Protestantism and Roman Catholicism are deemed
different faiths." Stokes and Pfeffer, Church and State in the
United States, p. 560 (1964). Organized Buddhism first came to
Hawaii in 1887 when Japanese laborers were brought to work on the
plantations. There are now numerous Buddhist sects in Hawaii, and
the temple of the Shin sect in Honolulu is said to have the largest
congregation of any religious organization in the city.
See Mulholland, Religion in Hawaii pp. 44-50 (1961).
In the continental United States, Buddhism is found "in real
strength" in Utah, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, and California.
"Most of the Buddhists in the United States are Japanese or
Japanese-Americans; however, there are 'English' departments in San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Tacoma."
Mead, Handbook of Denominations, p. 61 (1961). The Buddhist
Churches of North America, organized in 1914 as the Buddhist
Mission of North America and incorporated under the present name in
1942, represent the Jodo Shinshu Sect of Buddhism in this country.
This sect is the only Buddhist group reporting information to the
annual Yearbook of American Churches. In 1961, the latest year for
which figures are available, this group alone had 55 churches and
an inclusive membership of 60,000; it maintained 89 church schools,
with a total enrollment of 11,150. Yearbook of American Churches,
p. 30 (1965). According to one source, the total number of
Buddhists of all sects in North America is 171,000.
See
World Almanac, p. 636 (1965).
When the Congress spoke in the vague general terms of a Supreme
Being, I cannot, therefore, assume that it was so parochial as to
use the words in the narrow sense urged on us. I would attribute
tolerance and sophistication to the Congress, commensurate with the
religious complexion of our communities. In sum, I agree with the
Court that any person opposed to war on the basis of a sincere
belief, which, in his life, fills the same place as a belief
Page 380 U. S. 193
in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist, is entitled
to exemption under the statute. None comes to us an avowedly
irreligious person or as an atheist; [
Footnote 2/2] one as a sincere believer in "goodness and
virtue for their own sakes." His questions and doubts on
theological issues, and his wonder, are no more alien to the
statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout
Buddhist.
[
Footnote 2/1]
And see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.
22,
285 U. S. 62;
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.
S. 422,
350 U. S. 433;
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S. 341,
297 U. S. 348
(concurring opinion).
[
Footnote 2/2]
If he was an atheist, quite different problems would be
presented.
Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.
S. 488.