A decision of a Joint Conference Committee purported to
determine the relative seniority rights of employees of two
companies under a collective bargaining contract. Respondent Moore,
on behalf of himself and other aggrieved employees of one of the
companies, brought this class action in a Kentucky state court for
an injunction against the union and the company to prevent the
decision of the Committee to dovetail seniority lists from being
carried out. The Kentucky Court of Appeals decreed a permanent
injunction.
Held:
1. The action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, and is a case controlled by federal law, even though
brought in the state court. Pp.
375 U. S.
342-344.
(a) Moore contends that the decision of the Committee was not
one which it was empowered to make; in his view the resulting award
was therefore a nullity and any discharge pursuant thereto would be
a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. P.
375 U. S.
342.
(b) The complaint alleges that the Committee's decision was
obtained by dishonest union conduct, and could therefore not be
relied on as a basis for discharge without breaching the collective
bargaining agreement. Pp.
375 U. S.
342-343.
2. The decision of the Joint Conference Committee to dovetail
seniority lists was a decision which § 5 of the contract empowered
the Committee to make. Pp.
375 U. S. 345-348.
3. There is not adequate support in the record in this case for
the complaint's attack upon the integrity of the union and of the
procedures which led to the Committee's decision. P.
375 U. S.
348.
4. The evidence in this case shows no breach by the union of its
duty of fair representation. P.
375 U. S.
350.
5. The complaining employees were not inadequately represented
at the hearing before the Committee and were not deprived of a fair
hearing. Pp.
375 U. S.
350-351.
Page 375 U. S. 336
6. The decision of the Committee, reached after proceedings
adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon the
parties, as provided by the contract. P.
375 U. S.
351.
356
S.W.2d 241 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether the Kentucky Court of Appeals properly
enjoined implementation of the decision of a joint
employer-employee committee purporting to settle certain grievances
in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining contract.
The decision of the committee determined the relative seniority
rights of the employees of two companies, Dealers Transport Company
of Memphis, Tennessee, and E & L Transport Company of Detroit,
Michigan. We are of the opinion that the Kentucky court erred, and
we reverse its judgment.
Part of the business of each of these companies was the
transportation of new automobiles from the assembly plant of the
Ford Motor Company in Louisville, Kentucky. In the face of
declining business resulting from several factors, the two
companies were informed by Ford that there was room for only one of
them in the Louisville operation. After considering the matter for
some time, the two companies made these arrangements: E & L
would sell to Dealers its "secondary" authority out of Louisville,
the purchase price to be a nominal sum roughly equal to the cost of
effecting the transfer of authority; E & L would also sell to
Dealers its authority
Page 375 U. S. 337
to serve certain points in Mississippi and Louisiana; and
Dealers would sell to E & L its initial authority out of
Lorain, Ohio, along with certain equipment and terminal facilities.
The purpose of these arrangements was to concentrate the
transportation activities of E & L in the more northerly area,
and those of Dealers in the southern zone. The transfers were
subject to the approval of regulatory agencies.
The employees of both Dealers and E & L were represented by
the same union, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local
Union No. 89. Its president, Paul Priddy, as the result of inquiry
from E & L by his assistant, understood that the transaction
between the companies involved no trades, sales, or exchanges of
properties but only a withdrawal by E & L at the direction of
the Ford Motor Company. He consequently advised the E & L
employees that their situation was precarious. When layoffs at E
& L began, three E & L employees filed grievances claiming
that the seniority lists of Dealers and E & L should be
"sandwiched," and the E & L employees be taken on at Dealers
with the seniority they had enjoyed at E & L. The grievances
were placed before the local joint committee, Priddy or his
assistant meanwhile advising Dealers employees that they had
"nothing to worry about," since E & L employees had no contract
right to transfer under these circumstances.
The collective bargaining contract involved covered a
multi-employer, multi-local union unit negotiated on behalf of the
employers by Automobile Transporters Labor Division and on behalf
of the unions by National Truckaway and Driveaway Conference.
Almost identical contracts were executed by each company in the
unit and by the appropriate local union. According to Art. 4, § 1
of the contract "seniority rights for employees shall prevail" and
"any controversy over the employees' standing
Page 375 U. S. 338
on such lists shall be submitted to the joint grievance
procedure. . . ." Section 5 of the same article, of central
significance here, was as follows:
"In the event that the Employer absorbs the business of another
private, contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of
lines, the seniority of the employees absorbed or affected thereby
shall be determined by mutual agreement between the Employer and
the Unions involved. Any controversy with respect to such matter
shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure."
Article 7 called for grievances to be first taken up between the
employer and the local union and, if not settled, to be submitted
to the local joint committee, where the union and the employer were
to have equal votes. Failing settlement by majority vote of the
members of the local committee, the matter could be taken to the
Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee, upon which the
employers and the unions in the overall bargaining unit had an
equal number of representatives. Decisions of the Joint Conference
Committee were to be "final and conclusive and binding upon the
employer and the union, and the employees involved." However, if
the Joint Conference Committee was unable to reach a decision, the
matter was to be submitted to arbitration as provided in the
contract.
Article 7 also provided that:
"(d) It is agreed that all matters pertaining to the
interpretation of any provision of this Agreement, whether
requested by the Employer or the Union, must be submitted to the
full Committee of the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference
Committee, which Committee, after listening to testimony on both
sides, shall make a decision. "
Page 375 U. S. 339
Other provisions of the contract stated that it was "the
intention of the parties to resolve all questions of interpretation
by mutual agreement," and that the employer agreed
"to be bound by all of the terms and provisions of this
Agreement, and also agrees to be bound by the interpretations and
enforcement of the Agreement."
The grievances of the E & L employees were submitted
directly to the local joint committee and endorsed "Deadlocked to
Detroit for interpretation" over the signatures of the local union
president and the Dealers representative on the committee. Later,
however, the local union, having been more fully advised as to the
nature of the transaction between the two companies, decided to
recommend to the Joint Conference Committee that the seniority
lists of the two companies be dovetailed, and the E & L
employees be employed at Dealers with seniority rights based upon
those which they had enjoyed at E & L. The three shop stewards
who represented the Dealers employees before the Joint Conference
Committee meeting in Detroit were so advised by the union
immediately prior to the opening of the hearing. After hearing from
the company, the union and the stewards representing Dealers
employees, the Joint Conference Committee thereupon determined
that, "in accordance with Article 4 and particularly subsections 4
and 5" of the agreement, the employees of E & L and of Dealers
should "be sandwiched in on master seniority boards using the
presently constituted seniority lists and the dates contained
therein. . . ."
Since E & L was an older company and most of its employees
had more seniority than the Dealers employees, the decision
entailed the layoff of a large number of Dealers employees to
provide openings for the E & L drivers.
Page 375 U. S. 340
Respondent Moore, on behalf of himself and other Dealers
employees, then brought this class action in a Kentucky state court
praying for an injunction against the union and the company to
prevent the decision of the Joint Conference Committee from being
carried out. Damages were asked in an alternative count, and
certain E & L employees were added as defendants by amendment
to the complaint. [
Footnote 1]
The complaint alleged that Dealers employees had relied upon the
union to represent them, that the president of Local 89, Paul
Priddy, assured Dealers employees that they had nothing to worry
about, and that precedent in the industry provided that, when a new
business is taken over, its employees do not displace the original
employees of the acquiring company; it further alleged that Priddy
had deliberately "deadlocked" the local joint committee, and that
the Dealers employees learned for the first time before the Joint
Conference Committee in Detroit that Priddy favored dovetailing the
seniority lists. Priddy's actions, the complaint went on, "in
deceiving these plaintiffs as to his position left them without
representation before the Joint Conference Committee." The
decision, according to the complaint, was "contrived, planned and
brought about by Paul Priddy" who "has deceived and failed
completely to represent said employees," and whose "false and
deceitful action" and "connivance . . . with the employees of E
& L" threatened the jobs of Dealers employees. The
International union is said to have "conspired with and assisted
the defendant, Local No. 89, and its president, Paul Priddy, in
bringing about this result. . . ." The decision of the Joint
Conference Committee was charged to be arbitrary and capricious,
contrary to the existing practice in the industry, and violative of
the collective bargaining contract.
Page 375 U. S. 341
After hearing, the trial court denied a temporary and permanent
injunction. [
Footnote 2] The
Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Kentucky reversed and
granted a permanent injunction, two judges dissenting.
356
S.W.2d 241. In the view of that court, Art. 4, § 5 could have
no application to the circumstances of this case, since it came
into play only if the absorbing company agreed to hire the
employees of the absorbed company. The clause was said to deal with
seniority, not with initial employment. Therefore, it was said, the
decision of the Joint Conference Committee was not binding, because
the question of employing E & L drivers was not "arbitrable" at
all under this section. The Court of Appeals, however, went on to
hold that, even if it were otherwise, the decision could not stand,
since the situation involved antagonistic interests of two sets of
employees represented by the same union advocate. The result was
inadequate representation of the Dealers employees in a context
where Dealers itself was essentially neutral. Against such a
backdrop, the erroneous decision of the board became "arbitrary and
violative of natural justice." Kentucky cases were cited and relied
upon. We granted both the petition filed by the E & L employees
in No. 17 and the petition in No. 18, filed by the local union. 371
U.S. 966, 967.
I
Since issues concerning the jurisdiction of the courts and the
governing law are involved, it is well at the outset to elaborate
upon the statement of the Kentucky court that this is an action to
enforce a collective bargaining contract, an accurate observation
as far as we are concerned.
Page 375 U. S. 342
First, Moore challenges the power of the parties and of the
Joint Conference Committee to dovetail seniority lists of the two
companies because there was no absorption here within the meaning
of § 5 of Art. 4 and because, as the court below held, that section
granted no authority to deal with jobs as well as seniority. His
position is that neither the parties nor the committee has any
power beyond that delegated to them by the precise terms of § 5.
Since, in his view, the Joint Committee exceeded its power in
making the decision it did, the settlement is said to be a nullity,
and his impending discharge a breach of contract.
Second, Moore claims the decision of the Committee was obtained
by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair
representation, and that a decision so obtained cannot be relied
upon as a valid excuse for his discharge under the contract. The
undoubted broad authority of the union as exclusive bargaining
agent in the negotiation and administration of a collective
bargaining contract is accompanied by a responsibility of equal
scope, the responsibility and duty of fair representation.
Syres v. Oil Workers Intern. Union, 350 U.S. 892,
reversing 223 F.2d 739;
Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768;
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210;
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.
S. 192.
"By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become
the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of
representing their interests fairly and impartially."
Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U.
S. 248,
323 U. S. 255.
The exclusive agent's obligation
"to represent all members of an appropriate unit requires [it]
to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of those
members, without hostility to any . . . ,"
and its powers are "subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."
Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330,
345 U. S.
337-338.
Page 375 U. S. 343
In the complaint which Moore filed here, the union is said to
have deceived the Dealers employees concerning their job and
seniority rights, deceitfully connived with the E & L drivers
and with the International union to deprive Moore and others of
their employment rights, and prevented the latter from having a
fair hearing before the Joint Committee by espousing the cause of
the rival group of drivers after having indicated that the
interests of the men at Dealers would be protected by the union.
These allegations are sufficient to charge a breach of duty by the
union in the process of settling the grievances at issue under the
collective bargaining agreement.
Both the local and international unions are charged with
dishonesty, and one-half of the votes on the Joint Committee were
cast by representatives of unions affiliated with the
international. No fraud is charged against the employer, but,
except for the improper action of the union, which is said to have
dominated and brought about the decision, it is alleged that
Dealers would have agreed to retain its own employees. The fair
inference from the complaint is that the employer considered the
dispute a matter for the union to decide. Moreover, the award had
not been implemented at the time of the filing of the complaint,
which put Dealers on notice that the union was charged with
dishonesty and a breach of duty in procuring the decision of the
Joint Committee. In these circumstances, the allegations of the
complaint, if proved, would effectively undermine the decision of
the Joint Committee as a valid basis for Moore's discharge.
[
Footnote 3]
For these reasons, this action is one arising under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, [
Footnote 4] and is
Page 375 U. S. 344
a case controlled by federal law,
Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
even though brought in the state court.
Local 174, Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95;
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.
S. 195. Although there are differing views on whether a
violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice under the Labor Management Relations Act, [
Footnote 5] it is not necessary for us to
resolve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be, an
unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's
discharge would violate the contract, and was therefore within the
cognizance of federal and state courts,
Smith v. Evening News
Assn., supra, subject, of course, to the applicable federal
law. [
Footnote 6]
We now come to the merits of this case.
Page 375 U. S. 345
II
If we assume with Moore and the courts below that the Joint
Conference Committee's power was circumscribed by § 5 [
Footnote 7] and that its interpretation
of the section is open to court review, Moore's cause is not
measurably advanced. For, in our opinion, the section reasonably
meant what the Joint Committee said or assumed it meant. There was
an absorption here within the meaning of the section, and that
section did deal with jobs as well as with seniority. [
Footnote 8]
Page 375 U. S. 346
Prior to this transaction, both E & L and Dealers were
transporting new cars out of Louisville for the Ford Motor Company.
Afterwards, only one company enjoyed this business, and clearly
this was no unilateral withdrawal by E & L. There was an
agreement between the companies, preceded by long negotiation. E
& L's authority to engage in the transportation of new cars out
of Louisville was sold to Dealers. The business which E & L had
done in that city was henceforth to be done by Dealers. While there
was no sale of tangible assets at that location, the Joint
Conference Committee reasonably concluded that there was an
absorption by Dealers of the E & L business within the meaning
of § 5 of the contract.
It was also permissible to conclude that § 5 dealt with
employment, as well as seniority. Mergers, sales of assets and
absorptions are commonplace events. It is not unusual for
collective bargaining agreements to deal with them, especially in
the transportation industry, where the same unions may represent
the employees of both parties to the transaction. [
Footnote 9] Following any of such events, the
business of the one company will probably include the former
business of the other; and the recurring question is whether it is
the employees of the absorbed company or those of the acquiring
company who are to have first call upon the available work at the
latter concern. Jobs, as well as seniority, are at stake; and it
was to solve just such problems that § 5 was designed. Its
interpretation should be commensurate with its purposes.
Seniority has become of overriding importance, and one of its
major functions is to determine who gets or who
Page 375 U. S. 347
keeps an available job. Here, § 5 provided for resolving the
seniority of not only those employees who are "absorbed," but all
who were "affected" by the absorption. Certainly the transaction
"affected" the E & L employees; and the seniority of these
drivers, which the parties or the Joint Conference Committee could
determine, was clearly seniority at Dealers, the company which had
absorbed the E & L business. The parties very probably,
therefore, intended the seniority granted an E & L employee at
Dealers to carry the job with it, just as seniority usually would.
If it did not, and if Dealers unilaterally could determine whether
to hire any E & L employee, it might decide to hire none,
excluding E & L employees from any of the work which they had
formerly done. Or, if it did hire E & L employees to fill any
additional jobs resulting from the absorption of the E & L
business, it might select E & L employees for jobs without
regard to length of service at E & L, or it might insist on an
agreement from the union to grant only such seniority as might suit
the company. Section 5 would be effectively emasculated.
The power of the Joint Conference Committee over seniority gave
it power over jobs. It was entitled under § 5 to integrate the
seniority lists upon some rational basis, and its decision to
integrate lists upon the basis of length of service at either
company was neither unique nor arbitrary. On the contrary, it is a
familiar and frequently equitable solution to the inevitably
conflicting interests which arise in the wake of a merger or an
absorption such as occurred here. [
Footnote 10] The Joint Conference Committee's
Page 375 U. S. 348
decision to dovetail seniority lists was a decision which § 5
empowered the committee to make.
Neither do we find adequate support in this record for the
complaint's attack upon the integrity of the union and of the
procedures which led to the decision. Although the union at first
advised the Dealers drivers that they had nothing to worry about,
but later supported the E & L employees before the Joint
Conference Committee, there is no substantial evidence of fraud,
deceitful action or dishonest conduct. Priddy's early assurances to
Dealers employees were not well founded, it is true, but Priddy was
acting upon information then available to him, information received
from the company which led him to think there was no trade or
exchange involved, no "absorption" which might bring § 5 into play.
Other sections of the contract, he thought, would protect the jobs
of Moore and his fellow drivers. [
Footnote 11] Consistent with this view, he also advised E
& L employees that the situation appeared unfavorable for them.
However, when he learned of the pending acquisition by Dealers of E
& L operating authority in Louisville and of the involvement of
other locations in the transaction, he considered the matter to be
one for the Joint Committee. Ultimately
Page 375 U. S. 349
he took the view that an absorption was involved, that § 5 did
apply, and that dovetailing seniority lists was the most equitable
solution for all concerned. We find in this evidence insufficient
proof of dishonesty or intentional misleading on the part of the
union. And we do not understand the court below to have found
otherwise.
The Kentucky court, however, made much of the antagonistic
interests of the E & L and Dealers drivers, both groups being
represented by the same union, whose president supported one group
and opposed the other at the hearing before the Joint Conference
Committee. But we are not ready to find a breach of the collective
bargaining agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good
faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it
represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees
against that of another. In
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U. S. 330, the
Court found no breach of duty by the union in agreeing to an
amendment of an existing collective bargaining contract, granting
enhanced seniority to a particular group of employees and resulting
in layoffs which otherwise would not have occurred.
"Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which
the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion."
Id. at
345 U. S. 338.
Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous
grievances which would only clog the grievance process, so it must
be free to take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor
should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets
of employees. Conflict between employees represented
Page 375 U. S. 350
by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the
union in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining
and grievance processes.
As far as this record shows, the union took its position
honestly, in good faith, and without hostility or arbitrary
discrimination. After Dealers absorbed the Louisville business of E
& L, there were fewer jobs at Dealers than there were Dealers
and E & L drivers. One group or the other was going to suffer.
If any E & L drivers were to be hired at Dealers, either they
or the Dealers drivers would not have the seniority which they had
previously enjoyed. Inevitably the absorption would hurt someone.
By choosing to integrate seniority lists based upon length of
service at either company, the union acted upon wholly relevant
considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors. The
evidence shows no breach by the union of its duty of fair
representation.
There is a remaining contention. Even though the union acted in
good faith and was entitled to take the position it did, were the
Dealers employees, if the union was going to oppose them, deprived
of a fair hearing by having inadequate representation at the
hearing? Dealers employees had notice of the hearing, they were
obviously aware that they were locked in a struggle for jobs and
seniority with the E & L drivers, and three stewards
representing them went to the hearing at union expense and were
given every opportunity to state their position. Thus the, issue is
in reality a narrow one. There was no substantial dispute about the
facts concerning the nature of the transaction between the two
companies. It was for the Joint Conference Committee initially to
decide whether there was an "absorption" within the meaning of § 5
and, if so, whether seniority lists were to be integrated and the
older employees of E & L given jobs at Dealers. The Dealers
employees made no request to continue the hearing until they could
secure further representation, and have not yet suggested what they
could
Page 375 U. S. 351
have added to the hearing by way of facts or theory if they had
been differently represented. The trial court found it "idle
speculation to assume that the result would have been different had
the matter been differently presented." We agree.
Moore has not, therefore, proved his case. Neither the parties
nor the Joint Committee exceeded their power under the contract,
and there was no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive
bargaining agent. The decision of the committee, reached after
proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and binding upon
the parties, just as the contract says it is.
General Drivers
Union v. Riss & Co., 372 U. S. 517.
The decision below is reversed, and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 18,
General Drivers, Warehousemen &
Helpers, Local Union No. 89, v. Moore et al., also on
certiorari to the same Court.
[
Footnote 1]
The International union was also named as a party, but service
was quashed, and the action dismissed as against it.
[
Footnote 2]
The denial of a temporary injunction by the trial court was set
aside and temporary injunction ordered by the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter the trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Court
of Appeals reversed and made the temporary injunction
permanent.
[
Footnote 3]
In its brief filed here, Dealers does not support the decision
of the Joint Committee. It suggests, rather, that the matter be
finally settled by arbitration under the terms of the contract.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 301(a) of the L.M.R.A. is as follows:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
[
Footnote 5]
Compare, for example, Labor Board v. Local 294,
International Bro. of Teamsters, 317 F.2d 746 (C.A.2d Cir.),
with Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962);
enforcement denied, Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326
F.2d 172 (C.A.2d Cir.).
See also Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 Villanova L.Rev. 151, 172-175.
[
Footnote 6]
The union contended in the state courts that the jurisdiction of
the state courts had been preempted by the federal statutes. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled otherwise, and the union appears to
have abandoned the view here, since it says, relying upon
Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330,
that individual employees "may undoubtedly maintain suits against
their representative when the latter hostilely discriminates
against them."
We note that, in
Syres v. Oil Workers International
Union, 350 U.S. 892, individual employees sued the exclusive
agent and the company to enjoin and declare void a collective
bargaining agreement alleged to violate the duty of fair
representation. Dismissal in the trial court was affirmed in the
Court of Appeals. This Court reversed, and ordered further
proceedings in the trial court in the face of contentions made both
in this Court and the lower courts that the employees should have
brought their proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Board.
Cf. Cosmark v. Struthers Wells Corp., 194 A.2d 325
(Pa. Oct. 17, 1963).
The E & L employees, petitioners in No. 17, urge that, even
if the federal courts may entertain suits such as this, the state
courts may not. Since, in our view, the complaint here charged a
breach of contract, we find no merit in this position. It is clear
that suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization may be brought in either state or federal
courts.
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.
S. 502.
[
Footnote 7]
We need not consider the problem posed if § 5 had been omitted
from the contract or if the parties had acted to amend the
provision. The act is that they purported to proceed under the
section. They deadlocked at the local level, and it was pursuant to
§ 5 that the matter was taken to the Joint Conference Committee
which, under Art. 7, was to make a decision "after listening to
testimony on both sides." The committee expressly recited that its
decision was in accordance with § 5 of the contract. Even in the
absence of § 5, however, it would be necessary to deal with the
alleged breach of the union's duty of fair representation.
[
Footnote 8]
We also put aside the union's contention that Art. 7, § (d) --
providing that all matters of interpretation of the agreement be
submitted to the Joint Conference Committee -- makes it inescapably
clear that the committee had the power to decide that the transfer
of operating authority was an absorption within the scope of § 5.
But it is by no means clear that this provision in Art. 7 was
intended to apply to interpretations of § 5, for the latter
section, by its own terms, appears to limit the authority of the
committee to disputes over seniority in the event of an absorption.
Reconciliation of these two provisions, going to the power of the
committee under the contract, itself presented an issue ultimately
for the court, not the committee, to decide. Our view of the scope
and applicability of § 5,
infra, renders an accommodation
of these two sections unnecessary.
[
Footnote 9]
See cases cited in
footnote 10 infra.
[
Footnote 10]
See for example, Kent v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 204
F.2d 263 (C.A.2d Cir. 1953);
Keller v. Teamsters Local
249, 43 CCH Labor Cases � 17,119 (D.C.W.D.Pa.1961);
Pratt
v. Wilson Trucking Co., 214 Ga. 385,
104 S.E.2d
915 (1958);
Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore
Lines, 142 N.J.Eq. 588, 61 A.2d 453 (1948);
In re Western
Union Telegraph Co. and American Communications Association
(Decisions of War Labor Board 1944) 14 L.R.R.M. 1623.
Cf.
Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9
(C.A.9th Cir. 1953);
Labor Board v. Wheland Co., 271 F.2d
122 (C.A.6th Cir. 1959);
Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound
Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (C.A.9th Cir. 1962);
Fagan v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 173 F.
Supp. 465 (D.C.M.D.Pa.1959). "Integration of seniority lists
should ordinarily be accomplished on the basis of each employee's
length of service with his original employer. . . ." Kahn,
Seniority Problems in Business Mergers, 8 Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 361, 378.
[
Footnote 11]
The Dealers employees rely upon a rider to the Dealers contract
protecting the seniority of the employees at a terminal when
another terminal of that company is closed down. The court below
did not believe the rider dispositive, and we agree.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the judgment and in the holding of the Court that,
since "Moore has not . . . proved his case . . . ," the decision
below must be reversed.
Supra. I do not, however, agree
that Moore stated a cause of action arising under § 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
It is my view, rather, that Moore's claim must be treated as an
individual employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of
fair representation -- a duty derived not from the collective
bargaining contract, but from the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141
Page 375 U. S. 352
et seq. See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,
350 U.S. 892,
reversing 223 F.2d 739;
Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768;
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210;
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.
S. 192.
Cf. International Association of Machinists
v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682.
The complaint does not expressly refer either to § 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act or to the National Labor Relations
Act as the source of the action. Since substance, and not form,
must govern, however, we look to the allegations of the complaint
and to the federal labor statutes to determine the nature of the
claim.
The opinion of the Court correctly describes Moore's complaint
as alleging that the decision of the Joint Conference Committee
dovetailing the seniority lists of the two companies violated
Moore's rights because: (1) the Joint Committee exceeded its powers
under the existing collective bargaining contract in making its
decision dovetailing seniority lists, and (2) the decision of the
Committee was brought about by dishonest union conduct in breach of
its duty of fair representation.
Neither ground, it seems to me, sustains an action under §
301(a) of the L.M.R.A. A mutually acceptable grievance settlement
between an employer and a union, which is what the decision of the
Joint Committee was, cannot be challenged by an individual
dissenting employee under § 301(a) on the ground that the parties
exceeded their contractual powers in making the settlement. It is
true that this Court, in a series of decisions dealing with labor
arbitrations, has recognized that the powers of an arbitrator arise
from and are defined by the collective bargaining agreement.
[
Footnote 2/1] "For arbitration,"
as the
Page 375 U. S. 353
Court said in
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574,
363 U. S. 582,
"is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."
Thus, the existing labor contract is the touchstone of an
arbitrator's powers. But the power of the union and the employer
jointly to settle a grievance dispute is not so limited. The
parties are free by joint action to modify, amend, and supplement
their original collective bargaining agreement. They are equally
free, since "[t]he grievance procedure is . . . a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process," to settle grievances not
falling within the scope of the contract.
Id. at
363 U. S. . In
this case, for example, had the dispute gone to arbitration, the
arbitrator would have been bound to apply the existing agreement
and to determine whether the merger-absorption clause applied.
However, even in the absence of such a clause, the contracting
parties -- the multiemployer unit [
Footnote 2/2] and the union -- were free to resolve the
dispute by amending the contract to dovetail seniority lists or to
achieve the same result by entering into a grievance settlement.
The presence of the merger-absorption clause did not restrict the
right of the parties to resolve their dispute by joint agreement
applying, interpreting, or a ending the contract. [
Footnote 2/3] There are too many unforeseeable
Page 375 U. S. 354
contingencies in a collective bargaining relationship to justify
making the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and
duties.
These principles were applied in
Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U. S. 330.
There, the union and the employer, during a collective bargaining
agreement, entered into a "supplementary agreement" providing
seniority credit for the pre-employment military service of
veterans, a type of seniority credit not granted in the original
agreement.
Id. at
345 U. S. 334, n. 6. Huffman, on behalf of himself and
other union members whose seniority was adversely affected, brought
suit to have the supplementary provisions declared invalid and to
obtain appropriate injunctive relief against the employer and the
union. There was no doubt that Huffman and members of his class
were injured as a result of the "supplementary agreement"; they
were subjected to layoffs that would not have affected them if the
seniority rankings had not been altered. Despite the change in
rights under the prior agreement, this Court held that the existing
labor agreement did not limit the power of the parties jointly, in
the process of bargaining collectively, to make new and
Page 375 U. S. 355
different contractual arrangements affecting seniority
rights.
It necessarily follows from
Huffman that a settlement
of a seniority dispute, deemed by the parties to be an
interpretation of their agreement, not requiring an amendment, is
plainly within their joint authority. Just as, under the
Huffman decision, an amendment is not to be tested by
whether it is within the existing contract, so a grievance
settlement should not be tested by whether a court could agree with
the parties' interpretation. If collective bargaining is to remain
a flexible process, the power to amend by agreement and the power
to interpret by agreement must be coequal.
It is wholly inconsistent with this Court's recognition that
"[t]he grievance procedure is . . . a part of the continuous
collective bargaining process,"
United Steelworkers of America
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at
363 U. S. 581,
to limit the parties' power to settle grievances to the confines of
the existing labor agreement, or to assert, as the Court now does,
that an individual employee can claim that the collective
bargaining contract is violated because the parties have made a
grievance settlement going beyond the strict terms of the existing
contract.
I turn now to the second basis of the complaint,
viz.,
that the decision of the Joint Conference Committee was brought
about by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair
representation. In my view, such a claim of breach of the union's
duty of fair representation cannot properly be treated as a claim
of breach of the collective bargaining contract supporting an
action under § 301(a). This is particularly apparent where, as
here, "[n]o fraud is charged against the employer. . . ."
Ante at
375 U. S.
343.
This does not mean that an individual employee is without a
remedy for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation. I
read the decisions of this Court to hold that
Page 375 U. S. 356
an individual employee has a right to a remedy against a union
breaching its duty of fair representation -- a duty derived not
from the collective bargaining contract, but implied from the
union's rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor
statutes.
See Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, supra
(National Labor Relations Act);
Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Howard, supra (Railway Labor Act);
Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, supra
(Railway Labor Act);
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
supra (Railway Labor Act).
Cf. International Association
of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., supra (Railway Labor
Act). There is nothing to the contrary in
Smith v. Evening News
Assn., 371 U. S. 195. In
that case, the gravamen of the individual employee's § 301(a)
action was the employer's discharge of employees in violation of
the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement. No breach
of the union's duty of fair representation was charged. To the
contrary, the union supported the employee's suit which was brought
as an individual suit out of obeisance to what the union deemed to
be the requirements of
Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.
S. 437.
The remedy in a suit based upon a breach of the union's duty of
fair representation may be extended to the employer under
appropriate circumstances. This was recognized in
Steele v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., supra, where the Court extended
the remedy against the union to include injunctive relief against a
contract between the employer and the union. There, the employer
willfully participated in the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation, and that breach arose from discrimination based on
race, a classification that was held "irrelevant" to a union's
statutory bargaining powers. The Court observed:
[I]t is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory
power to represent a craft and to make contracts
Page 375 U. S. 357
as to wages, hours and working conditions does not include the
authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not
based on . . . relevant differences.
Id. at
323 U. S.
.
The Court distinguished classifications and differences which
are
"relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract . . . such
as differences in seniority, the type of work performed, [and] the
competence and skill with which it is performed. . . ."
Ibid. Where the alleged breach of a union's duty
involves a differentiation based on a relevant classification -- in
this case, seniority rankings following an amalgamation of employer
units -- and where the employer has not willfully participated in
the alleged breach of the union's duty, the collective bargaining
agreement should not be open to the collateral attack of an
individual employee merely because the union alone has failed in
its duty of fair representation. We should not and indeed we need
not strain, therefore, as the Court does, to convert a breach of
the union's duty to individual employees into a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
union.
I do not agree with the Court that employer willfulness was
claimed in this case by "[t]he fair inference from the complaint"
that Dealers "considered the dispute a matter for the union to
decide."
Ante at
375 U. S. 343.
Nor can I agree that willfulness could be predicated on the
rationale that, since "the award had not been implemented at the
time of the filing of the complaint," Dealers was "put . . . on
notice that the union was charged with dishonesty and a breach of
duty in procuring the decision of the Joint Committee."
Ibid. Dealers may indeed have been neutral when the case
was presented to the Joint Conference Committee, but the Court
overlooks that the employer party to the collective bargaining
contract was the multiemployer unit whose representatives -- acting
on behalf of both Dealers and E & L -- fully participated in
the Joint Committee's
Page 375 U. S. 358
decision resolving the dispute. [
Footnote 2/4] Furthermore, an employer not willfully
participating in union misconduct should not be restrained from
putting a grievance settlement into effect merely by being "put . .
. on notice" that an individual employee has charged the union with
dishonesty. Such a rule would penalize the honest employer and
encourage groundless charges frustrating joint grievance
settlements. Finally, it is difficult to conceive how mere notice
to an employer of union dishonesty can transform the union's breach
of its duty of fair representation into a contractual violation by
the employer.
In summary, then, for the reasons stated, I would treat Moore's
claim as a
Syres-Steele type cause of action, rather than
as a § 301(a) contract action. So considering it, I nevertheless
conclude, as the Court does, that, since "there was no fraud or
breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent,"
ante at
375 U. S. 351,
Moore is not entitled to the relief sought.
I have written at some length on what may seem a narrow point. I
have done so because of my conviction that, in this Court's
fashioning of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the
utmost importance that the law reflect the realities of industrial
life and the nature of the collective bargaining process. We should
not assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts will be equally
well adapted to the collective bargaining process. Of course, we
must protect the rights of the individual. It must not be
forgotten, however, that many individual rights, such as the
seniority rights involved in this case, in fact arise from the
concerted exercise of the right to bargain collectively.
Consequently, the understandable desire to protect the individual
should not emasculate the right to bargain by placing undue
restraints upon the contracting parties. Similarly, in safeguarding
the individual
Page 375 U. S. 359
against the misconduct of the bargaining agent, we must
recognize that the employer's interests are inevitably involved
whenever the labor contract is set aside in order to vindicate the
individual's right against the union. The employer's interest
should not be lightly denied where there are other remedies
available to insure that a union will respect the rights of its
constituents. Nor should trial-type hearing standards or
conceptions of vested contractual rights be applied so as to hinder
the employer and the union in their joint endeavor to adapt the
collective bargaining relationship to the exigencies of economic
life. I have deemed it necessary to state my views separately
because I believe that the Court's analysis in part runs contrary
to these principles.
[
Footnote 2/1]
E.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing Co., 363 U. S. 564;
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U. S. 574;
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U. S. 593.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court states that, "In its brief filed here Dealers does not
support the decision of the Joint Committee."
See ante at
375 U. S. 343,
n. 3. The Court overlooks, however, that Dealers throughout the
litigation has acknowledged that it is a part of the multiemployer
unit, which is the employer party to the collective bargaining
agreement and that the employer representatives on the Joint
Conference Committee acted honestly and properly on behalf of the
employer members including Dealers.
See infra at
375 U. S.
357.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The contract in this case specifically envisioned such a result.
Section 5 of Article 4 provided that:
"In the event that the Employer absorbs the business of another
private, contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of
lines, the seniority of the employees absorbed or affected thereby
shall be determined by mutual agreement between the Employer and
the Unions involved. Any controversy with respect to such matter
shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure. . . ."
Section 2 of Article 7 also provided that:
"(d) It is agreed that all matters pertaining to the
interpretation of any provision of this Agreement, whether
requested by the Employer or the Union, must be submitted to the
full Committee of the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference
Committee, which Committee, after listening to testimony on both
sides, shall make a decision."
Moreover, as the Court itself points out, other provisions
stated that it was "the intention of the parties to resolve all
questions of interpretation by mutual agreement," and that the
employer agreed
"to be bound by all of the terms and provisions of this
Agreement, and also agrees to be bound by the interpretations and
enforcement of the Agreement."
Ante at
375 U. S.
339.
[
Footnote 2/4]
See 375
U.S. 335fn2/2|>note 2,
supra.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I agree with the Court's opinion and judgment insofar as it
relates to the claim that the Joint Conference Committee exceeded
its authority under the collective bargaining agreement. Although
it is undoubtedly true as a general proposition that bargaining
representatives have power to alter the terms of a contract with an
employer, the challenge here is not to a purported exercise of such
power, but to the validity of a grievance settlement reached under
proceedings allegedly not authorized by the terms of the collective
agreement. Moreover, a committee with authority to settle
grievances whose composition is different from that in the
multi-union multi-employer bargaining unit cannot be deemed to
possess power to effect changes in the bargaining agreement. When
it is alleged that the union itself has engaged or acquiesced in
such a departure from the collective bargaining agreement, I can
see no reason why an individually affected employee may not step
into the shoes of the union and maintain a § 301 suit himself.
Page 375 U. S. 360
But insofar as petitioners' claim rests upon alleged unfair
union representation in the grievance proceeding, I agree with the
views expressed in the concurring opinion of my Brother GOLDBERG
(ante,
375 U. S.
355-358) (except that I would expressly reserve the
question of whether a suit of this nature would be maintainable
under § 301 where it is alleged or proved that the employer was a
party to the asserted unfair union representation). However, the
conclusion that unilateral unfair union representation gives rise
only to a cause of action for violation of a duty implicit in the
National Labor Relations Act brings one face-to-face with a further
question: Does such a federal cause of action come within the play
of the preemption doctrine,
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236,
contrary to what would be the case were such a suit to lie under §
301,
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.
S. 195? Short of deciding that question, I do not think
it would be appropriate to dispose of this case simply by saying
that no unfair union representation was shown in this instance. For
if there be preemption in this situation,
Garmon would not
only preclude state court jurisdiction, but would also require this
Court initially to defer to the primary jurisdiction of the Labor
Board.
The preemption issue is a difficult and important one, carrying
ramifications extending far beyond this particular case. It should
not be decided without our having the benefit of the views of those
charged with the administration of the labor laws. To that end, I
would reverse the judgment of the state court to the extent that it
rests upon a holding that the Joint Conference Committee acted
beyond the scope of its authority, set the case for reargument on
the unfair representation issue, and invite the National Labor
Relations Board to present its views by brief and oral argument on
the preemption question.
Cf. Retail Clerks International Assn.
v. Schermerhorn, 373 U. S. 746,
373 U. S.
757.