Petitioners sued respondent in a Nebraska State Court to quiet
title to certain land on the Missouri River, which is the boundary
between Nebraska and Missouri. The Nebraska Court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter only if the land was in Nebraska, and that
depended on whether a shift in the river's course had been caused
by avulsion or accretion. Respondent appeared in the Nebraska Court
and fully litigated the issues, including that as to the Court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court found in favor of
petitioners, and ordered that title to the land be quieted in them.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, finding specifically that the
rule of avulsion was applicable, that the land was in Nebraska,
that the Nebraska courts had jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and that title to the land was in petitioners. Subsequently,
respondent sued in a Missouri State Court to quiet title to the
same land, claiming that it was in Missouri. The case was removed
to a Federal District Court.
Held: The judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court was
res judicata as to all issues, including the issue of
jurisdiction, and it was binding on the District Court under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and the federal
statute enacted to implement it.
Pp.
375 U. S.
107-116.
308 F.2d 209 reversed.
Page 375 U. S. 107
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States Constitution requires that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial
Proceedings of every other State." [
Footnote 1] The case before us presents questions arising
under this constitutional provision and under the federal statute
enacted to implement it. [
Footnote
2]
In 1956, the petitioners brought an action against the
respondent in a Nebraska court to quiet title to certain bottom
land situated on the Missouri River. The main channel of that river
forms the boundary between the States of Nebraska and Missouri. The
Nebraska court
Page 375 U. S. 108
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy only
if the land in question was in Nebraska. Whether the land was
Nebraska land depended entirely upon a factual question -- whether
a shift in the river's course had been caused by avulsion or
accretion. [
Footnote 3] The
respondent appeared in the Nebraska court and, through counsel,
fully litigated the issues, explicitly contesting the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. [
Footnote 4] After a hearing, the court
found the issues in favor of the petitioners and ordered that title
to the land be quieted in them. The respondent appealed, and the
Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the judgment after a trial
de novo on the record made in the lower court. The State
Supreme Court specifically found that the rule of avulsion was
applicable, that the land in question was in Nebraska, that the
Nebraska courts therefore had jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the litigation, and that title to the land was in the petitioners.
Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272,
95 N.W.2d
618. The respondent did not petition this Court for a writ of
certiorari to review that judgment.
Two months later, the respondent filed a suit against the
petitioners in a Missouri court to quiet title to the same land.
Her complaint alleged that the land was in Missouri. The suit was
removed to a Federal District Court by reason of diversity of
citizenship. The District Court, after hearing evidence, expressed
the view that the land was in Missouri, but held that all the
issues had been
Page 375 U. S. 109
adjudicated and determined in the Nebraska litigation, and that
the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court was
res
judicata, and "is now binding upon this court." The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court was not required
to give full faith and credit to the Nebraska judgment, and that
normal
res judicata principles were not applicable,
because the controversy involved land, and a court in Missouri was
therefore free to retry the question of the Nebraska court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 308 F.2d 209. We granted
certiorari to consider a question important to the administration
of justice in our federal system. 371 U.S. 946. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse the judgment before us.
The constitutional command of full faith and credit, as
implemented by Congress, requires that
"judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they
are taken. [
Footnote 5]"
Full faith and credit thus generally requires every State to
give to a judgment at least the
res judicata effect which
the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.
"By the Constitutional provision for full faith and credit, the
local doctrines of
res judicata, speaking generally,
become a part of national jurisprudence, and therefore federal
questions cognizable here."
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.
S. 343,
315 U. S.
349.
It is not questioned that the Nebraska courts would give full
res judicata effect to the Nebraska judgment quieting
title in the petitioners. [
Footnote
6] It is the respondent's
Page 375 U. S. 110
position, however, that whatever effect the Nebraska courts
might give to the Nebraska judgment, the federal court in Missouri
was free independently to determine whether the Nebraska court in
fact had jurisdiction over the subject matter,
i.e.,
whether the land in question was actually in Nebraska.
In support of this position, the respondent relies upon the many
decisions of this Court which have held that a judgment of a court
in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a court in another
State only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the
merits -- had jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment. As Mr.
Justice Bradley stated the doctrine in the leading case of
Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Wall. 457,
"we think it clear that the jurisdiction of the court by which a
judgment is rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral
proceeding in another State, notwithstanding the provision of the
fourth article of the Constitution and the law of 1790, and
notwithstanding the averments contained in the record of the
judgment itself."
18 Wall. at
85 U. S. 469.
The principle has been restated and applied in a variety of
contexts. [
Footnote 7]
Page 375 U. S. 111
However, while it is established that a court in one State, when
asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in another State,
may constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction
to render that judgment, the modern decisions of this Court have
carefully delineated the permissible scope of such an inquiry. From
these decisions there emerges the general rule that a judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit -- even as to questions of
jurisdiction -- when the second court's inquiry discloses that
those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally
decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.
With respect to questions of jurisdiction over the person,
[
Footnote 8] this principle was
unambiguously established in
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Assn., 283 U. S. 522.
There, it was held that a federal court in Iowa must give binding
effect to the judgment of a federal court in Missouri despite the
claim that the original court did not have jurisdiction over the
defendant's person, once it was shown to the court in Iowa that
that question had been fully litigated in the Missouri forum.
"Public policy," said the Court,
"dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who
have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the
contest; and that matters once tried shall be considered forever
settled as between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine
should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears,
presents
Page 375 U. S. 112
his case and is fully heard, and why he should not, in the
absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by the judgment of the
tribunal to which he has submitted his cause."
283 U.S. at
283 U. S.
525-526. [
Footnote
9]
Following the
Baldwin case, this Court soon made clear
in a series of decisions that the general rule is no different when
the claim is made that the original forum did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S.
32;
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.
S. 165; [
Footnote
10]
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S.
66;
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.
S. 343. [
Footnote
11] In each of these cases, the claim was made that a court,
when asked to enforce the judgment of another forum, was free to
retry the question of that forum's jurisdiction over the subject
matter. In each case, this Court held that, since the question of
subject matter jurisdiction had been fully litigated in the
original forum, the issue could not be retried in a subsequent
action between the parties.
In the
Davis case, it was held that the courts of the
District of Columbia were required to give full faith and credit to
a decree of absolute divorce rendered in Virginia, despite the
claim that the Virginia court had lacked jurisdiction because the
plaintiff in the Virginia proceedings
Page 375 U. S. 113
had not been domiciled in that State. In the course of the
opinion, the Court stated:
"As to petitioner's domicil for divorce and his standing to
invoke jurisdiction of the Virginia court, its finding that he was
a
bona fide resident of that State for the required time
is binding upon respondent in the courts of the District. She may
not say that he was not entitled to sue for divorce in the state
court, for she appeared there and by plea put in issue his
allegation as to domicil, introduced evidence to show it false,
took exceptions to the commissioner's report, and sought to have
the court sustain them and uphold her plea. Plainly, the
determination of the decree upon that point is effective for all
purposes in this litigation."
305 U.S. at
305 U. S.
40.
This doctrine of jurisdictional finality was applied even more
unequivocally in
Treinies, supra, involving title to
personal property, and in
Sherrer, supra, involving, like
Davis, recognition of a foreign divorce decree. In
Treinies, the rule was succinctly stated:
"One trial of an issue is enough. 'The principles of
res
judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to
other issues,' as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of
the parties."
308 U.S. at
308 U. S.
78.
The reasons for such a rule are apparent. In the words of the
Court's opinion in
Stoll v. Gottlieb, supra,
"We see no reason why a court, in the absence of an allegation
of fraud in obtaining the judgment, should examine again the
question whether the court making the earlier determination on an
actual contest over jurisdiction between the parties, did have
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation. . . . Courts
to determine the rights of parties are an integral part of our
system of government. It is just as important that there should be
a place to end
Page 375 U. S. 114
as that there should be a place to begin litigation. After a
party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his
evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the
decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue
previously determined. There is no reason to expect that the second
decision will be more satisfactory than the first."
305 U.S. at
305 U. S.
172.
To be sure, the general rule of finality of jurisdictional
determinations is not without exceptions. Doctrines of federal
preemption or sovereign immunity may, in some contexts, be
controlling.
Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.
S. 433;
United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506.
[
Footnote 12] But no such
overriding considerations are present here. While this Court has
not before had occasion to consider the applicability of the rule
of
Davis, Stoll, Treinies, and
Sherrer to a case
involving real property,
Page 375 U. S. 115
we can discern no reason why the rule should not be fully
applicable. [
Footnote
13]
It is argued that an exception to this rule of jurisdictional
finality should be made with respect to cases involving real
property because of this Court's emphatic expressions of the
doctrine that courts of one State are completely without
jurisdiction directly to affect title to land in other States.
[
Footnote 14] This argument
is wide of the mark. Courts of one State are equally without
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriages of those domiciled in other
States. But the location of land, like the domicile of a party to a
divorce action, is a matter "to be resolved by judicial
determination."
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at
334 U. S. 349.
The question remains whether, once the matter has been fully
litigated and judicially determined, it can be retried in another
State in litigation between the same parties. Upon the reason and
authority of the cases we have discussed, it is clear that the
answer must be in the negative.
It is to be emphasized that all that was ultimately determined
in the Nebraska litigation was title to the land in question as
between the parties to the litigation there. Nothing there decided,
and nothing that could be decided in litigation between the same
parties or their privies in Missouri, could bind either Missouri or
Nebraska with respect to any controversy they might have, now or in
the future, as to the location of the boundary between them, or as
to their respective sovereignty over the land in question.
Fowler v.
Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411;
New York
v.
Page 375 U. S. 116
Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1;
Land v. Dollar,
330 U. S. 731,
330 U. S.
736-737. Either State may at any time protect its
interest by initiating independent judicial proceedings here.
Cf. Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U. S.
23. [
Footnote
15]
For the reasons stated, we hold in this case that the federal
court in Missouri had the power and, upon proper averments, the
duty to inquire into the jurisdiction of the Nebraska courts to
render the decree quieting title to the land in the petitioners. We
further hold that, when that inquiry disclosed, as it did, that the
jurisdictional issues had been fully and fairly litigated by the
parties and finally determined in the Nebraska courts, the federal
court in Missouri was correct in ruling that further inquiry was
precluded. Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
U.S.Const. Art. IV, § 1.
[
Footnote 2]
"The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or
Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be
authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or
Possession thereto."
"The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved
or admitted in other courts within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and
seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a
certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in
proper form."
"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof,
so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 947, 28 U.S.C. §
1738.
The progenitor of the present statute was enacted by the First
Congress in 1790. 1 Stat. 122.
"The Act extended the rule of the Constitution to all courts,
Federal as well as State.
Mills v.
Duryee, 7 Cranch 481,
11 U. S. 485."
Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32,
305 U. S.
40.
[
Footnote 3]
Throughout this litigation there has been no dispute as to the
controlling effect of this factual issue.
See Nebraska v.
Iowa, 143 U. S. 359,
143 U. S.
370.
[
Footnote 4]
This is, therefore, not a case in which a party, although
afforded an opportunity to contest subject matter jurisdiction, did
not litigate the issue.
Cf. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371.
[
Footnote 5]
See note 2
supra.
[
Footnote 6]
The Nebraska Supreme Court has clearly postulated the relevant
law of the State:
"This court adheres to the rule that if a court is one competent
to decide whether or not the facts in any given proceeding confer
jurisdiction, decides that it has jurisdiction, then its judgments
entered within the scope of the subject matter over which its
authority extends in proceedings following the lawful allegation of
circumstances requiring the exercise of its jurisdiction, are not
subject to collateral attack, but conclusive against all the world
unless reversed on appeal or avoided for error or fraud in a direct
proceeding.
Brandeen v. Lau, 113 Neb. 34, 201 N.W. 665;
Douglas County v. Feenan, 146 Neb. 156, 18 N.W.2d
740."
Gergen v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 149 Neb. 203,
210, 30 N.W.2d 558, 562.
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., 52 U. S.
Ketchum, 11 How. 165;
Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke
Co., 19 Wall. 58;
Hall v. Lanning,
91 U. S. 160;
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107;
Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe,
137 U. S. 287;
Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350;
Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175;
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14;
National Exchange Bank of Tiffin v. Wiley, 195 U.
S. 257;
Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v.
McDonough, 204 U. S. 8;
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S.
25;
Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 254 U. S. 348;
Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.
S. 470.
[
Footnote 8]
It is not disputed in the present case that the Nebraska courts
had jurisdiction over the respondent's person. She entered a
general appearance in the trial court, and initiated the appeal to
the Nebraska Supreme Court.
[
Footnote 9]
This decision was adhered to the following year in
American
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156. In
his opinion for a unanimous Court in the case, Mr. Justice Brandeis
said: "The principles of
res judicata apply to questions
of jurisdiction, as well as to other issues." 287 U.S. at
287 U. S.
166.
[
Footnote 10]
The question in
Stoll was what effect the courts of
Illinois must give to the judgment of a federal court sitting in
that State. The case, therefore, did not directly involve the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, but, like the present
case, it involved the federal statute enacted to implement the
constitutional provision. 305 U.S. at
305 U. S. 170,
n. 5.
See note 2
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
See also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U. S. 381,
310 U. S. 403;
Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.
S. 494.
[
Footnote 12]
It is to be noted, however, that in neither of these cases had
the jurisdictional issues actually been litigated in the first
forum.
THE RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS recognizes the possibility
of such exceptions:
"Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines
that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties
cannot collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the
policy underlying the doctrine of
res judicata is
outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond
its jurisdiction. Among the factors appropriate to be considered in
determining that collateral attack should be permitted are
that"
"(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was
clear;"
"(b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a
question of law rather than of fact;"
"(c) the court was one of limited and not of general
jurisdiction;"
"(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually
litigated;"
"(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its
jurisdiction is strong."
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 451(2) (Supp.1948).
See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 10 (1942).
[
Footnote 13]
In two previous cases, the Court has expressly left open the
question of the applicability of the rule of jurisdictional
finality to cases involving real property.
See Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. at
305 U. S. 176;
United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. at
309 U. S.
514.
[
Footnote 14]
See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1;
Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87,
141 U. S.
105-106;
Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.
S. 386.
[
Footnote 15]
The alternative of a negotiated settlement of any dispute
between the States over the location of the boundary would also
always be available.
See U.S.Const. Art. I, § 10.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
Petitioners and respondents dispute the ownership of a tract of
land adjacent to the Missouri River, which is the boundary between
Nebraska and Missouri. Resolution of this question turns on whether
the land is in Nebraska or Missouri. Neither State, of course, has
power to make a determination binding on the other as to which
State the land is in. U.S.Const. Art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §
1251(a). However, in a private action brought by these Nebraska
petitioners, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the disputed
tract is in Nebraska. In the present suit, brought by this Missouri
respondent in Missouri, the United States Court of Appeals has
refused to be bound by the Nebraska court's judgment. I concur
in
Page 375 U. S. 117
today's reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment, but with the
understanding that we are not deciding the question whether the
respondent would continue to be bound by the Nebraska judgment
should it later be authoritatively decided, either in an original
proceeding between the States in this Court or by a compact between
the two States under Art. I, § 10, that the disputed tract is in
Missouri.