Petitioners, Negro students in an Illinois public school,
brought suit in a Federal District Court under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to vindicate their rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that the enrollment at the
school consisted of 251 Negroes and 254 whites and that, with a few
exceptions, the Negro students attended classes in one part of the
school, separate and apart from the whites, and were compelled to
use entrances and exits separate from the whites. They prayed for
equitable relief, including their registration in racially
integrated schools. The District Court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that petitioners had not exhausted their administrative
remedies under Illinois law, which forbids racial segregation in
public schools and prescribes administrative procedures for
enforcement of the prohibition. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp.
373 U. S.
669-676.
(a) Relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated though
relief was not first sought under a state law which provided a
remedy.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167. P.
373 U. S.
671.
(b) The purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983 were to override certain
kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where a state law is
inadequate, to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, is not available in practice, and to
provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy
any State might provide; and those purposes would be defeated if it
were held that assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must
await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court. Pp.
373 U. S.
671-673.
(c) In this case, the right alleged is plainly federal in origin
and nature; there is no underlying issue of state law controlling
this litigation; nor is the federal right in any way entangled in a
skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case
can proceed. P.
373 U. S.
674.
Page 373 U. S. 669
(d) It is by no means clear that Illinois law provides
petitioners with an administrative remedy sufficiently adequate to
preclude prior resort to a federal court for protection of their
federal rights. Pp.
373 U. S.
674-676.
305 F.2d 783, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit, which invokes the jurisdiction of the District Court
under the Civil Rights Act, is brought to vindicate the rights of
plaintiffs who are Negro students in the Illinois public school
system. The complaint alleges that Chenot School, St. Clair County,
was built and its attendance area boundaries drawn in 1957 so as to
make it exclusively a Negro school. It alleges that, due to
overcrowded conditions in an adjacent school, Centreville, which is
in the same school district, all fifth and sixth grade classes in
that school (containing 97% white students) were transferred to
Chenot and kept segregated there. It alleges that enrollment at
Chenot consists of 251 Negroes and 254 whites, all of the whites
being in the group transferred from Centreville. It alleges that
Negro students, with the exception of the eight transferred from
Centreville, attend classes in one part of the school, separate and
apart from the whites, and are compelled to use entrances and exits
separate from the whites'. It alleges that Chenot school is a
segregated
Page 373 U. S. 670
school in conflict with the Constitution of the United States,
and it prays for equitable relief, including registration of
plaintiffs in racially integrated schools pursuant to a plan
approved by the District Court.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground,
inter alia, that the plaintiffs had not exhausted the
administrative remedies provided by Illinois law. The District
Court granted the motion. 199 F. Supp. 403. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. 305 F.2d 783. The case is here on a petition for a writ
of certiorari which we granted.
371 U. S. 933.
The administrative remedy, which the lower courts held
plaintiffs must first exhaust, is contained in the Illinois School
Code. Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, c. 122, § 22-19. By that Code, 50
residents of a school district or 10%, whichever is lesser, can
file a complaint with the Superintendent of Public Instruction
alleging that a pupil has been segregated in a school on account of
race. The Superintendent, on notice to the school board, puts the
complaint down for hearing within a prescribed time. After hearing,
the Superintendent notifies the parties of his decision and, if he
decides that the allegations in the complaint are "substantially
correct," requests the Attorney General to bring suit to rectify
the practice. Any final decision of the Superintendent may be
reviewed by the courts. Moreover, under the School Code, a school
district may not file a claim for state aid unless it files with
the Superintendent a sworn statement that the school district has
complied with the constitutional and statutory provisions outlawing
segregation in the public schools.
See Ill.Const., Art.
VIII, § 1; School Code §§ 10-22:5, 22-11, 22-12.
Respondents, while saying that Illinois law does not require the
Superintendent to refuse to certify claims for state aid if he
finds the particular school board practices segregation, contends
that the Superintendent would have
Page 373 U. S. 671
the power to withhold his certificate and, as a practical
matter, would do so.
We have previously indicated that relief under the Civil Rights
Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under
state law which provided a remedy. We stated in
Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
365 U. S.
183:
"It is no answer that the State has a law which, if enforced,
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked."
The cause of action alleged here [
Footnote 1] is pleaded in terms of R.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which reads:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
That is the statute that was involved in
Monroe v. Pape,
supra, and we reviewed its history at length in that case. 365
U.S. at
365 U. S. 171
et seq. The purposes were several-fold
Page 373 U. S. 672
-- to override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy
where state law was inadequate, "to provide a federal remedy where
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice" (
id., 365 U. S.
174), and to provide a remedy in the federal courts
supplementary to any remedy any State might have.
Id.,
365 U. S.
180-183.
We would defeat those purposes if we held that assertion of a
federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate
the same claim in a state court. The First Congress created federal
courts as the chief -- though not always the exclusive -- tribunals
for enforcement of federal rights. The heads of jurisdiction of the
District Court, at the start limited, [
Footnote 2] are now numerous. In the beginning, the main
concern was the security of commercial intercourse, which
"parochial prejudice" might endanger. [
Footnote 3]
"Maritime commerce was then the jugular vein of the Thirteen
States. The need for a body of law applicable throughout the nation
was recognized by every shade of opinion in the Constitutional
Convention. From this recognition, it was an easy step to entrust
the development of such law to a distinctive system of courts,
administering the same doctrines, following the same procedure, and
subject to the same nationalist influences. [
Footnote 4]"
As the beneficiaries of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
became articulate and the nationalist needs multiplied, the heads
of jurisdiction of the District Courts
Page 373 U. S. 673
increased, and that increase was a measure of the broadening
federal domain in the area of individual rights.
Where strands of local law are woven into the case that is
before the federal court, we have directed a District Court to
refrain temporarily from exercising its jurisdiction until a suit
could be brought in the state court.
See Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496;
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.
S. 478;
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.
S. 167. Thus, we have stayed the hands of a Federal
District Court when it sought to enjoin enforcement of a state
administrative order enforcing state law, since any federal
question could be reviewed when the cases came here through the
hierarchy of state courts.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U. S. 315. The
variations on the theme have been numerous. [
Footnote 5]
Page 373 U. S. 674
We have, however, in the present case no underlying issue of
state law controlling this litigation. The right alleged is as
plainly federal in origin and nature as those vindicated in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483. Nor is the federal right in any way entangled in
a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case
can proceed. For petitioners assert that respondents have been and
are depriving them of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct is legal or illegal
as a matter of state law.
Monroe v. Pape, supra, at
365 U. S.
171-187. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in
the federal courts. [
Footnote
6]
Monroe v. Pape, supra, at
365 U. S. 183;
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903,
affirming 142 F.
Supp. 707;
Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271.
Cf., e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.
S. 268;
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649;
Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933,
affirming 81 F. Supp.
872;
Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.
S. 350.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that Illinois law provides
petitioners with an administrative remedy sufficiently adequate to
preclude prior resort to a federal court
Page 373 U. S. 675
for protection of their federal rights. Under § 22-19 of the
Illinois School Code, petitioners could file a complaint alleging
discrimination if they could obtain the subscription of the lesser
of 50 residents or 10% of the school district. The Superintendent
would then be required to hold a hearing on the matter. And,
"[i]f he so determines [that the allegations of the complaint
are substantially correct], he shall
request the Attorney
General to apply to the appropriate circuit court for such
injunctive or other relief as may be necessary to rectify the
practice complained of."
(Emphasis added.)
The Superintendent himself apparently has no power to order
corrective action. In other words, his
"only function . . . is to investigate, recommend and report.
[He] can give no remedy. [He] can made no controlling finding of
law or fact. [His] recommendation need not be followed by any court
. . . or executive officer."
United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States,
325 U. S. 196,
325 U. S. 210.
It would be anomalous to conclude that such a remedy forecloses
suit in the federal courts when the most it could produce is a
state court action that would have no such effect.
See Lane v.
Wilson, supra, at
307 U. S.
274-275;
Monroe v. Pape, supra.
Respondents urge, however, that prior resort to the
Superintendent is necessary because, by § 2-3.25, he can revoke
recognition of a school district guilty of violating pupils'
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and recognition is a necessary
condition to state financial aid. Furthermore, state aid cannot be
received by a district unless it submits a sworn statement that it
does not discriminate between students "on account of color, creed,
race or nationality." §§ 10-22.5, 18-12. Respondents say that the
Superintendent would not certify a district for state aid if he
determined that its sworn statement was false.
Page 373 U. S. 676
Apparently no Illinois cases have held that the Superintendent
has authority to withhold funds once he has received an affidavit
from the district, even if he determines that the affidavit is
false. In any event, the withholding of state aid is, at best, only
an indirect sanction of Fourteenth Amendment rights. When federal
rights are subject to such tenuous protection, prior resort to a
state proceeding is not necessary.
See Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620,
326 U. S.
625-626.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Federal jurisdiction is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which,
in material part, reads as follows:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:"
"
* * * *"
"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States."
[
Footnote 2]
General "arising under" jurisdiction was not conferred on
federal courts of first instance until passage of the Judiciary Act
of 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 727-733.
[
Footnote 3]
Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1928)
pp. 8-9.
[
Footnote 4]
Id., p. 7.
[
Footnote 5]
See Note, 59 Col.L.Rev. 749. Yet, where Congress
creates a head of federal jurisdiction which entails a
responsibility to adjudicate the claim on the basis of state law,
viz., diversity of citizenship, as was true in
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.
S. 228, we hold that difficulties and perplexities of
state law are no reason for referral of the problem to the state
court:
"We are pointed to no public policy or interest which would be
served by withholding from petitioners the benefit of the
jurisdiction which Congress has created with the purpose that it
should be availed of and exercised subject only to such limitations
as traditionally justify courts in declining to exercise the
jurisdiction which they possess. To remit the parties to the state
courts is to delay further the disposition of the litigation which
has been pending for more than two years and which is now ready for
decision. It is to penalize petitioners for resorting to a
jurisdiction which they were entitled to invoke, in the absence of
any special circumstances which would warrant a refusal to exercise
it."
Id., p.
320 U. S.
237.
And we held in
Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,
260 U. S. 226,
that, apart from contests over a
res (
Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 294 U. S. 176), a
suit in personam based on diversity of citizenship could continue
in the federal court even though a suit on the same cause of action
had been started in the state court:
"Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own
time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court.
Whenever a judgment is rendered in one of the courts and pleaded in
the other, the effect of that judgment is to be determined by the
application of the principles of
res adjudicata by the
court in which the action is still pending in the orderly exercise
of its jurisdiction, as it would determine any other question of
fact or law arising in the progress of the case. The rule,
therefore, has become generally established that where the action
first brought is
in personam and seeks only a personal
judgment, another action for the same cause in another jurisdiction
is not precluded."
Id., p.
260 U. S.
230.
[
Footnote 6]
As well stated by Judge Murrah in
Stapleton v.
Mitchell, 60 F. Supp.
51, 55,
appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 326
U.S. 690:
"We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit,
human rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper
subject for adjudication, and that we have not the right to decline
the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights
asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum."
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
In
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.
S. 315,
319 U. S.
317-318, this Court said:
"Although a federal equity court does have jurisdiction of a
particular proceeding, it may, in its sound discretion, whether its
jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship
or otherwise, 'refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the
exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest;'
[citing
United States v. Dern, 289 U. S.
352,
289 U. S. 360] for it 'is in
the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise
their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful
independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic
policy.' . . . [Citing
Pennsylvania v. Williams,
294 U. S.
176,
294 U. S. 185.] Assuming
that the federal district court had jurisdiction, should it, as a
matter of sound equitable discretion, have declined to exercise
that jurisdiction here?"
This wise approach has been followed by the lower federal courts
in "school segregation" cases (
see, e.g., Carson v. Board of
Education, 227 F.2d 789;
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d
724;
Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780;
Holt v.
Raleigh City Board of Education, 265 F.2d 95;
Parham
Page 373 U. S. 677
v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132;
Shepard v. Board of
Education, 207 F.Supp. 341), and, more than once, this Court
has refused to interfere (
see Carson v. Warlick, supra, cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 910;
Holt v. Raleigh City Board of
Education, supra, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818). [
Footnote 2/1] For several reasons, I think
the present case is peculiarly one where, as was said in
Burford (at p.
319 U. S.
334), "a sound respect for the independence of state
action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand."
1. It is apparent on the face of the complaint that this case is
quite atypical of others that have come before this Court, in that
the Chenot School's student body includes both white and Negro
students -- in almost equal numbers -- and in that none of the
petitioners (or others whom they purport to represent) has been
refused enrollment in the school. The alleged discriminatory
practices relate, rather, to the manner in which this particular
school district was formed and to the way in which the internal
affairs of the school are administered. These are matters in which
the federal courts should not initially become embroiled. Their
exploration and correction, if need be, are much better left to
local authority in the first instance.
2. There is nothing that leaves room for serious doubt as to the
efficacy of the administrative remedy which Illinois has provided.
(The text of the statute is set forth in the
373
U.S. 668app|>Appendix to this opinion.) The fact that the
Superintendent of Public Instruction himself possesses no
corrective power, and that he can only "request" the Attorney
Page 373 U. S. 678
General to enforce his findings by appropriate court proceedings
does not, in my opinion, leave the administrative proceeding
sanctionless (
compare United States Alkali Export Ass'n v.
United States, 325 U. S. 196),
or, as in
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.
S. 268, serve to remove this case from the "exhaustion"
requirements of
Burford. If the Superintendent refuses to
activate the Attorney General, his decision (as with a contrary
one) is subject to judicial review. It is not suggested that the
Attorney General could not also be compelled to act if he
improperly refused to do so. And it must, of course, be assumed
that these two responsible public officials will fully perform
their sworn duty. Moreover, the terms of the statute itself which,
among other things, provides for the use of compulsory process,
strongly attest to the fact that the administrative remedy was
intended as serious business, and not as an exercise that might
abort before fulfillment.
Nor can this administrative remedy otherwise be regarded as
deficient. The fact that it takes a minimal number of school
district residents to initiate a complaint before the
Superintendent can hardly be deemed an untoward or unduly
burdensome requirement. And the proceeding surely finds a strong
practical even though "indirect sanction" (
ante, p.
373 U. S. 676)
in the power of the Superintendent at least to make it more
difficult for a school, guilty of racial discrimination, to obtain
state financial aid -- either by revoking "recognition" of the
school district (
ante, p.
373 U. S. 675)
or, as suggested to us by respondents' attorneys, by refusing to
certify such a school for state aid. [
Footnote 2/2]
Page 373 U. S. 679
3. Finally, we should be slow to hold unavailing an
administrative remedy afforded by a State which long before
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483, had outlawed both by its constitution and
statutes racial discrimination in its public schools, [
Footnote 2/3] and which, since
Brown, has passed the further implementing legislation
drawn in question in this litigation (
373
U.S. 668app|>Appendix). For myself I am
Page 373 U. S. 680
unwilling to assume that these solemn constitutional and
legislative pronouncements of Illinois mean anything less than what
they say or that the rights assured by them and by the Fourteenth
Amendment will not be fully and promptly vindicated by the State if
petitioners can make good their grievances.
I would affirm.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Cases such as
Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction,
277 F.2d 370, and
Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (where
the school boards had taken no affirmative steps whatever to
desegregate the schools), and
Orleans Parish School Board v.
Bush, 242 F.2d 156, and
Gibson v. Board of Public
Instruction, 246 F.2d 913 (arising in States having school
segregation statutes on their books), are wide of the mark in the
circumstances of this case.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Section 18-12 of the School Code of Illinois provides in
part:
"No State aid claim may be filed for any district unless the
clerk or secretary of the school board executes and files with the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, on forms prescribed by him, a
sworn statement that the district has complied with the
requirements of Section 10-22.5 in regard to the nonsegregation of
pupils on account of color, creed, race or nationality."
[
Footnote 2/3]
As early as 1901, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in
People
v. Mayor of Alton, 193 Ill. 309, 312, 61 N.E. 1077, 1078,
construing Art. VIII, § 1, of the Illinois Constitution, held:
"The complaint of the relator is that his children have been
excluded, on account of their color, from the public school of said
city located near his residence, and been required to attend a
school located a mile and a half distant from his residence,
established exclusively for colored children. Such complaint is not
met by showing that the schools established for colored children in
said city equal or surpass in educational facilities the schools
established in said city for white children. Under the law, the
common council of said city had no right to establish different
schools for the white children and colored children of said city,
and to exclude the colored children from the schools established
for white children, even though the schools established for colored
children furnished educational facilities equal or superior to
those of the schools established for white children."
Section 10-22.5 of the School Code of Illinois has provided
since 1945 that:
". . . no pupil shall be excluded from or segregated in any such
school on account of his color, race or nationality."
Sections 22-11 and 22-12 of the School Code, enacted in 1909,
provide:
"Any school officer or other person who excludes or aids in
excluding from the public schools, on account of color, any child
who is entitled to the benefits of such school shall be fined not
less than $5 nor more than $100."
"Whoever by threat, menace or intimidation prevents any colored
child entitled to attend a public school in this State from
attending such school shall be fined not exceeding $25."
|
373
U.S. 668app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.
Section 22-19 of the School Code of Illinois provides:
"Upon the filing of a complaint with the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, executed in duplicate and subscribed with the
names and addresses of at least 50 residents of a school district
or 10%, whichever is lesser, alleging that any pupil has been
excluded from or segregated in any school on account of his color,
race, nationality, religion or religious affiliation, or that any
employee of or applicant for employment or assignment with any such
school district has been questioned concerning his color, race,
nationality, religion or religious affiliation or subjected to
discrimination by reason thereof, by or on behalf of the school
board of such district, the Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall promptly mail a copy of such complaint to the secretary or
clerk of such school board."
"The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall fix a date, not
less than 20 nor more than 30 days from the date of the filing of
such complaint, for a hearing upon the allegations therein. He may
also fix a date for a hearing whenever he has reason to believe
that such discrimination may exist in any school district.
Reasonable notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be
mailed to the secretary or clerk of the school board and to the
first subscriber to such complaint. "
Page 373 U. S. 681
"The Superintendent of Public Instruction may designate an
assistant to conduct such hearing and receive testimony concerning
the situation complained of. The complainants may be represented at
such hearing by one of their number or by counsel. Each party shall
have the privilege of cross examining witnesses. The Superintendent
of Public Instruction or the hearing officer appointed by him shall
have the power to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, and
require the production of evidence relating to any relevant matter
under this Act. Any Circuit or Superior Court of this State, or any
judge thereof, either in term time or vacation, upon the
application of the Superintendent of Public Instruction or the
hearing officer appointed by him, may, in its or his discretion,
compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of books,
papers, records or memoranda and the giving of testimony before the
Superintendent of Public Instruction or the hearing officer
appointed by him conducting an investigation or holding a hearing
authorized by this Act, by an attachment for contempt, or
otherwise, in the same manner as production of evidence may be
compelled before said court. The Superintendent of Public
Instruction or the hearing officer appointed by him may cause the
depositions of witnesses within the State to be taken in the manner
prescribed by law for like depositions in civil actions in courts
of this State, and to that end compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of books, papers, records or memoranda. All
testimony shall be taken under oath administered by the hearing
officer, but the formal rules pertaining to evidence in judicial
proceedings shall not apply. The Superintendent of Public
Instruction shall provide a competent reporter to take notes of all
testimony. Either party desiring a transcript of the hearing shall
pay for the cost of such transcript. The hearing officer shall
report a summary of the testimony to the Superintendent
Page 373 U. S. 682
of Public Instruction, who shall determine whether the
allegations of the complaint are substantially correct. The
Superintendent of Public Instruction shall notify both parties of
his decision. If he so determines, he shall request the Attorney
General to apply to the appropriate circuit court for such
injunctive or other relief as may be necessary to rectify the
practice complained of."
"The provisions of the 'Administrative Review Act', approved May
8, 1945, and all amendments and modifications thereof and the rules
adopted pursuant thereto shall apply to and govern all proceedings
for the judicial review of any final decision rendered by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction pursuant to this Section."