Arrested on a charge of murder, petitioner was taken before a
Maryland magistrate for a preliminary hearing, and he pleaded
guilty without having the advice or assistance of counsel. Counsel
was later appointed for him, and he pleaded not guilty at his
formal "arraignment," but the plea of guilty made at the
preliminary hearing was introduced in evidence at his trial, and he
as convicted and sentenced to death.
Held: absence of counsel for petitioner when he entered
the plea of guilty before the magistrate violated his rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U. S. 52. Pp.
373 U. S.
59-60.
227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, who was sentenced to death while his codefendant was
given life, appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals, which
affirmed his conviction. 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877. We granted
certiorari "limited to the point of law raised in
Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U. S. 52."
See 371 U.S. 909.
Petitioner was arrested on May 27, 1960, and brought before a
magistrate on May 31, 1960, for a preliminary hearing. But that
hearing was postponed, and not actually held until August 9, 1960.
At that time, petitioner was not yet represented by a lawyer. When
arraigned at that preliminary hearing, he pleaded guilty. What
Maryland
Page 373 U. S. 60
calls the "arraignment" was first held September 8, 1960, but,
since petitioner was not represented by counsel, his arraignment
was postponed and counsel appointed for him on September 9, 1960.
He was finally arraigned on November 25, 1960, and entered pleas of
"not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity." At his trial,
the plea of guilty made at the preliminary hearing on August 9,
1960, was introduced in evidence.
* Since he did not
have counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing, he argued that
Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, applied. The Court of Appeals
disagreed, saying that arraignment in Alabama is "a critical stage
in a criminal proceeding" where rights are preserved or lost (368
U.S.
368 U. S.
53-54), while, under Maryland law, there was "no
requirement (nor any practical possibility under our present
criminal procedure) to appoint counsel" for petitioner at the
"preliminary hearing . . . nor was it necessary for appellant to
enter a plea at that time.
227 Md. at 625, 177 A.2d at 882.
Whatever may be the normal function of the "preliminary hearing"
under Maryland law, it was in this case as "critical" a state as
arraignment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before
the magistrate, and that plea was taken at a time when he had no
counsel.
We repeat what we said in
Hamilton v. Alabama, supra,
at
368 U. S. 55,
that we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: "Only
the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all
the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently." We
therefore hold that
Hamilton v. Alabama governs, and that
the judgment below must be, and is,
Reversed.
* Although petitioner did not object to the introduction of this
evidence at the trial (227 Md. at 619-620, 177 A.2d at 879), the
rationale of
Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, does not rest, as
we shall see, on a showing of prejudice.