Feeling aggrieved by laws of South Carolina which allegedly
"prohibited Negro privileges," petitioners, 187 Negro high school
and college students, peacefully assembled at the site of the State
Government and there peacefully expressed their grievances "to the
citizens of South Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of
South Carolina." When told by police officials that they must
disperse within 15 minutes on pain of arrest, they failed to do so,
and sang patriotic and religious songs after one of their leaders
had delivered a "religious harangue." There was no violence or
threat of violence on their part or on the part of any member of
the crowd watching them, but petitioners were arrested and
convicted of the common law crime of breach of the peace, which the
State Supreme Court said "is not susceptible of exact
definition."
Held: In arresting, convicting and punishing
petitioners under the circumstances disclosed by this record, South
Carolina infringed their rights of free speech, free assembly and
freedom to petition for a redress of grievances -- rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by the States. Pp. 229-238.
239 S.C. 339,
123
S.E.2d 247, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners, 187 in number, were convicted in a magistrate's
court in Columbia, South Carolina, of the
Page 372 U. S. 230
common law crime of breach of the peace. Their convictions were
ultimately affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, 239 S.C.
339,
123 S.E.2d
247. We granted certiorari,
369 U. S. 870, to
consider the claim that these convictions cannot be squared with
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
There was no substantial conflict in the trial evidence.
[
Footnote 1] Late in the
morning of March 2, 1961, the petitioners, high school and college
students of the Negro race, met at the Zion Baptist Church in
Columbia. From there, at about noon, they walked in separate groups
of about 15 to the South Carolina State House grounds, an area of
two city blocks open to the general public. Their purpose was
"to submit a protest to the citizens of South Carolina, along
with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina, our feelings and our
dissatisfaction with the present condition of discriminatory
actions against Negroes in general, and to let them know that we
were dissatisfied, and that we would like for the laws which
prohibited Negro privileges in this State to be removed."
Already on the State House grounds when the petitioners arrived
were 30 or more law enforcement officers, who had advance knowledge
that the petitioners were coming. [
Footnote 2] Each group of petitioners entered the grounds
through a driveway and parking area known in the record as the
"horseshoe." As they entered, they were told by the law enforcement
officials that "they had a right, as a citizen, to go through the
State House grounds, as any other citizen has, as long as they were
peaceful." During
Page 372 U. S. 231
the next half hour or 45 minutes, the petitioners, in the same
small groups, walked single file or two abreast in an orderly way,
[
Footnote 3] through the
grounds, each group carrying placards bearing such messages as "I
am proud to be a Negro" and "Down with segregation."
During this time, a crowd of some 200 to 300 onlookers had
collected in the horseshoe area and on the adjacent sidewalks.
There was no evidence to suggest that these onlookers were anything
but curious, and no evidence at all of any threatening remarks,
hostile gestures, or offensive language on the part of any member
of the crowd. The City Manager testified that he recognized some of
the onlookers, whom he did not identify, as "possible
troublemakers," but his subsequent testimony made clear that nobody
among the crowd actually caused or threatened any trouble.
[
Footnote 4] There was no
obstruction of pedestrian
Page 372 U. S. 232
or vehicular traffic within the State House grounds. [
Footnote 5] No vehicle was prevented
from entering or leaving the horseshoe area. Although vehicular
traffic at a nearby street intersection was slowed down somewhat,
an officer was dispatched to keep traffic moving. There were a
number of bystanders on the public sidewalks adjacent to the State
House grounds, but they all moved on when asked to do so, and there
was no impediment of pedestrian traffic. [
Footnote 6] Police protection at the scene was at
all
Page 372 U. S. 233
times sufficient to meet any foreseeable possibility of
disorder. [
Footnote 7]
In the situation and under the circumstances thus described, the
police authorities advised the petitioners that they would be
arrested if they did not disperse within 15 minutes. [
Footnote 8] Instead of dispersing, the
petitioners engaged in what the City Manager described as
"boisterous," "loud," and "flamboyant" conduct, which, as his later
testimony made clear, consisted of listening to a "religious
harangue" by one of their leaders, and loudly singing "The Star
Spangled Banner" and other patriotic and religious songs, while
stamping their feet and clapping their hands. After 15 minutes had
passed, the police arrested the petitioners and marched them off to
jail. [
Footnote 9]
Page 372 U. S. 234
Upon this evidence, the state trial court convicted the
petitioners of breach of the peace, and imposed sentences ranging
from a $10 fine or five days in jail to a $100 fine or 30 days in
jail. In affirming the judgments, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina said that, under the law of that State, the offense of
breach of the peace "is not susceptible of exact definition," but
that the "general definition of the offense" is as follows:
"In general terms, a breach of the peace is a violation of
public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility, by any act
or conduct inciting to violence . . . , it includes any violation
of any law enacted to preserve peace and good order. It may consist
of an act of violence or an act likely to produce violence. It is
not necessary that the peace be actually broken to lay the
foundation for a prosecution for this offense. If what is done is
unjustifiable and unlawful, tending with sufficient directness to
break the peace, no more is required. Nor is actual personal
violence an essential element in the offense. . . ."
"By 'peace,' as used in the law in this connection, is meant the
tranquility enjoyed by citizens of a municipality or community
where good order reigns among its members, which is the natural
right of all persons in political society."
239 S.C. at 343-344, 123 S.E.2d at 249.
The petitioners contend that there was a complete absence of any
evidence of the commission of this offense, and that they were thus
denied one of the most basic elements
Page 372 U. S. 235
of due process of law.
Thompson v. Louisville,
362 U. S. 199;
see Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157;
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154.
Whatever the merits of this contention, we need not pass upon it in
the present case. The state courts have held that the petitioners'
conduct constituted breach of the peace under state law, and we may
accept their decision as binding upon us to that extent. But it
nevertheless remains our duty in a case such as this to make an
independent examination of the whole record.
Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U. S. 199,
361 U. S. 205,
n. 5;
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.
S. 331,
328 U. S. 335;
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380,
274 U. S.
385-386. And it is clear to us that, in arresting,
convicting, and punishing the petitioners under the circumstances
disclosed by this record, South Carolina infringed the petitioners'
constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly,
and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.
It has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the
States.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.
S. 652;
Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357;
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.
S. 359;
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.
S. 353;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296. The circumstances in this case reflect an
exercise of these basic constitutional rights in their most
pristine and classic form. The petitioners felt aggrieved by laws
of South Carolina which allegedly "prohibited Negro privileges in
this State." They peaceably assembled at the site of the State
Government, [
Footnote 10]
and there peaceably expressed their grievances "to the citizens of
South Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of South
Carolina."
Page 372 U. S. 236
Not until they were told by police officials that they must
disperse on pain of arrest did they do more. Even then, they but
sang patriotic and religious songs after one of their leaders had
delivered a "religious harangue." There was no violence or threat
of violence on their part, or on the part of any member of the
crowd watching them. Police protection was "ample."
This, therefore, was a far cry from the situation in
Feiner
v. New York, 340 U. S. 315,
where two policemen were faced with a crowd which was "pushing,
shoving and milling around,"
id. at
340 U. S. 317,
where at least one member of the crowd "threatened violence if the
police did not act,"
id. at
340 U. S. 317,
where "the crowd was pressing closer around petitioner and the
officer,"
id. at
340 U. S. 318,
and where "the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion
and undertakes incitement to riot."
Id. at
340 U. S. 321.
And the record is barren of any evidence of "fighting words."
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.
S. 568.
We do not review in this case criminal convictions resulting
from the evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn
regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain
specific conduct be limited or proscribed. If, for example, the
petitioners had been convicted upon evidence that they had violated
a law regulating traffic, or had disobeyed a law reasonably
limiting the periods during which the State House grounds were open
to the public, this would be a different case. [
Footnote 11]
Page 372 U. S. 237
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S.
307-308;
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.
S. 157,
368 U. S. 202
(concurring opinion). These petitioners were convicted of an
offense so generalized as to be, in the words of the South Carolina
Supreme Court, "not susceptible of exact definition." And they were
convicted upon evidence which showed no more than that the opinions
which they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to
the views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and
necessitate police protection.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make
criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.
"[A] function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions, and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is .
. . protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. .
. . There is no room under our Constitution for a more
restrictive
Page 372 U. S. 238
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas
either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community
groups."
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S.
1,
337 U. S. 5. As in
the
Terminiello case, the courts of South Carolina have
defined a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the
petitioners if their speech
"stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those
grounds may not stand."
Id. at
337 U. S. 5.
As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in
Stromberg v.
California,
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute
which, upon its face and as authoritatively construed, is so vague
and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this
opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."
283 U.S.
359,
283 U. S.
369.
For these reasons, we conclude that these criminal convictions
cannot stand.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The petitioners were tried in groups, at four separate trials.
It was stipulated that the appeals be treated as one case.
[
Footnote 2]
The Police Chief of Columbia testified that about 15 of his men
were present, and that there were, in addition,
"some State Highway Patrolmen; there were some South Carolina
Law Enforcement officers present and I believe, I'm not positive, I
believe there were about three Deputy Sheriffs."
[
Footnote 3]
The Police Chief of Columbia testified as follows:
"Q. Did you, Chief, walk around the State House Building with
any of these persons?"
"A. I did not. I stayed at the horseshoe. I placed men over the
grounds."
"Q. Did any of your men make a report that any of these persons
were disorderly in walking around the State House Grounds?"
"A. They did not."
"Q. Under normal circumstances, your men would report to you
when you are at the scene?"
"A. They should."
"Q. Is it reasonable to assume then that there was no disorderly
conduct on the part of these persons, since you received no report
from your officers?"
"A. I would take that for granted, yes."
The City Manager testified:
"Q. Were the Negro college students or other students well
demeaned? Were they well dressed and were they orderly?"
"A. Yes, they were."
[
Footnote 4]
"Q. Who were those persons?"
"A. I can't tell you who they were. I can tell you they were
present in the group. They were recognized as possible
troublemakers."
"Q. Did you and your police chief do anything about placing
those people under arrest?"
"A. No, we had no occasion to place them under arrest."
"Q. Now, sir, you have stated that there were possible trouble
makers, and your whole testimony has been that, as City Manager, as
supervisor of the City Police, your object is to preserve the peace
and law and order?"
"A. That's right."
"Q. Yet you took no official action against people who were
present, and possibly might have done some harm to these
people?"
"A. We took no official action because there was none to be
taken. They were not creating a disturbance, those particular
people were not at that time doing anything to make trouble, but
they could have been."
[
Footnote 5]
The Police Chief of Columbia testified:
"Q. Each group of students walked along in column of twos?"
"A. Sometimes two, and I did see some in single file."
"Q. There was ample room for other persons going in the same
direction or the opposite direction to pass on the same
sidewalk?"
"A. I wouldn't say they were blocking the sidewalk; now, that
was through the State House grounds."
[
Footnote 6]
The Police Chief of Columbia testified:
"A. At times, they blocked the sidewalk and we asked them to
move over, and they did."
"Q. They obeyed your commands on that?"
"A. Yes."
"Q. So that nobody complained that he wanted to use the sidewalk
and he could not do it?"
"A. I didn't have any complaints on that."
[
Footnote 7]
The City Manager testified:
"Q. You had ample time, didn't you, to get ample police
protection, if you thought such was needed on the State louse
grounds, didn't you?"
"A. Yes, we did."
"Q. So, if there were not ample police protection there, it was
the fault of those persons in charge of the Police Department,
wasn't it?"
"A. There was ample police protection there."
[
Footnote 8]
The City Manager testified:
"Q. Mr. McNayr, what action did you take?"
"A. I instructed Dave Carter to tell each of these groups, to
call them up and tell each of the groups and the group leaders that
they must disperse, they must disperse in the manner which I have
already described, that I would give them fifteen minutes from the
time of my conversation with him to have them dispersed, and, if
they were not dispersed, I would direct my Chief of Police to place
them under arrest."
[
Footnote 9]
The City Manager testified:
"Q. You have already testified, Mr. McNayr, I believe, that you
did order these students dispersed within fifteen minutes?"
"A. Yes."
"Q. Did they disperse in accordance with your order?"
"A. They did not."
"Q. What then occurred?"
"A. I then asked Chief of Police Campbell to direct his men to
line up the students and march them or place them under arrest and
march them to the City Jail and the County Jail."
"Q. They were placed under arrest?"
"A. They were placed under arrest."
[
Footnote 10]
It was stipulated at trial
"that the State House grounds are occupied by the Executive
Branch of the South Carolina government, the Legislative Branch and
the Judicial Branch, and that, during the period covered in the
warrant in this matter, to wit: March the 2nd, the Legislature of
South Carolina was in session."
[
Footnote 11]
Section 117 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina
(Cum.Supp. 1960) provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person: "
"(1) Except State officers and employees and persons having
lawful business in the buildings, to use any of the driveways,
alleys or parking spaces upon any of the property of the State,
bounded by Assembly, Gervais, Bull and Pendleton Streets in
Columbia, upon any regular weekday, Saturdays and holidays
excepted, between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., whenever
the buildings are open for business; or"
"(2) To park any vehicle except in the spaces and manner marked
and designated by the State Budget and Control Board, in
cooperation with the Highway Department, or to block or impede
traffic through the alleys and driveways."
The petitioners were not charged with violating this statute,
and the record contains no evidence whatever that any police
official had this statute in mind when ordering the petitioners to
disperse on pain of arrest, or indeed that a charge under this
statute could have been sustained by what occurred.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.
The convictions of the petitioners, Negro high school and
college students, for breach of the peace under South Carolina law
are accepted by the Court "as binding upon us to that extent," but
are held violative of "petitioners' constitutionally protected
rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for
redress of their grievances." Petitioners, of course, had a right
to peaceable assembly, to espouse their cause and to petition, but,
in my view, the manner in which they exercised those rights was by
no means the passive demonstration which this Court relates;
rather, as the City Manager of Columbia
Page 372 U. S. 239
testified, "a dangerous situation was really building up" which
South Carolina's courts expressly found had created "an actual
interference with traffic and an imminently threatened disturbance
of the peace of the community." [
Footnote 2/1] Since the Court does not attack the state
courts' findings, and accepts the convictions as "binding" to the
extent that the petitioners' conduct constituted a breach of the
peace, it is difficult for me to understand its understatement of
the facts and reversal of the convictions.
The priceless character of First Amendment freedoms cannot be
gainsaid, but it does not follow that they are absolutes immune
from necessary state action reasonably designed for the protection
of society.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S. 304
(1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.
S. 147,
308 U. S. 160
(1939). For that reason, it is our duty to consider the context in
which the arrests here were made. Certainly the city officials
would be constitutionally prohibited from refusing petitioners
access to the State House grounds merely because they disagreed
with their views.
See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 (1951). But here, South Carolina's courts have
found:
"There is no indication whatever in this case that the acts of
the police officers were taken as a subterfuge or excuse for the
suppression of the appellants' views and opinions. [
Footnote 2/2]"
It is undisputed that the city officials specifically granted
petitioners permission to assemble, imposing only the requirement
that they be "peaceful." Petitioners then gathered on the State
House grounds, during a General Assembly session, in a large number
of almost 200, marching and carrying placards with slogans
Page 372 U. S. 240
such as "Down with segregation" and "You may jail our bodies,
but not our souls." Some of them were singing. The activity
continued for approximately 45 minutes, during the busy noon-hour
period, while a crowd of some 300 persons congregated in front of
the State House and around the area directly in front of its
entrance known as the "horseshoe," which was used for vehicular as
well as pedestrian ingress and egress. During this time, there were
no efforts made by the city officials to hinder the petitioners in
their rights of free speech and assembly; rather, the police
directed their efforts to the traffic problems resulting from
petitioners' activities. It was only after the large crowd had
gathered, among which the City Manager and Chief of Police
recognized potential troublemakers, and which, together with the
students, had become massed on and around the "horseshoe" so
closely that vehicular and pedestrian traffic was materially
impeded, [
Footnote 2/3]
Page 372 U. S. 241
that any action against the petitioners was taken. Then the City
Manager, in what both the state intermediate and Supreme Court
found to be the utmost good faith, decided that danger to peace and
safety was imminent. Even at this juncture, no orders were issued
by the City Manager for the police to break up the crowd, now about
500 persons, and no arrests were made. Instead, he approached the
recognized leader of the petitioners and requested him to tell the
various groups of petitioners to disperse within 15 minutes,
failing which they would be arrested. Even though the City Manager
might have been honestly mistaken as to the imminence of danger,
this was certainly a reasonable request by the city's top executive
officer in an effort to avoid a public brawl. But the response of
petitioners and their leader was defiance, rather than cooperation.
The leader immediately moved from group to group among the
students, delivering a "harangue" which, according to testimony in
the record, "aroused [them] to a fever pitch causing this
boisterousness, this singing and stomping."
For the next 15 minutes, the petitioners sang "I Shall Not Be
Moved" and various religious songs, stamped their feet, clapped
their hands, and conducted what the South Carolina Supreme Court
found to be a "noisy demonstration in defiance of [the dispersal]
orders." 239 S.C. 339, 345,
123
S.E.2d 247, 250. Ultimately, the petitioners were arrested, as
they apparently planned from the beginning, and convicted on
evidence the sufficiency of which the Court does not challenge. The
question thus seems to me whether a State is constitutionally
prohibited from enforcing laws to prevent breach of the peace in a
situation where city officials in good faith believe, and the
record shows, that disorder and violence are imminent, merely
because the activities constituting that breach contain claimed
elements of constitutionally protected speech
Page 372 U. S. 242
and assembly. To me, the answer under our cases is clearly in
the negative.
Beginning, as did the South Carolina courts, with the premise
that the petitioners were entitled to assemble and voice their
dissatisfaction with segregation, the enlargement of constitutional
protection for the conduct here is as fallacious as would be the
conclusion that free speech necessarily includes the right to
broadcast from a sound truck in the public streets.
Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77
(1949). This Court said in
Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U. S. 88,
310 U. S. 105
(1940), that
"[t]he power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to
preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the
property of its residents cannot be doubted."
Significantly, in holding that the petitioner's picketing was
constitutionally protected in that case, the Court took pains to
differentiate it from "picketing
en masse or otherwise
conducted which might occasion . . . imminent and aggravated
danger. . . ."
Ibid. Here, the petitioners were permitted
without hindrance to exercise their rights of free speech and
assembly. Their arrests occurred only after a situation arose in
which the law enforcement officials on the scene considered that a
dangerous disturbance was imminent. [
Footnote 2/4] The County Court found that
"[t]he evidence
Page 372 U. S. 243
is clear that the officers were motivated solely by a proper
concern for the preservation of order and the protection of the
general welfare in the face of an actual interference with traffic
and an imminently threatened disturbance of the peace of the
community. [
Footnote 2/5]"
In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court said the action
of the police was
"reasonable and motivated solely by a proper concern for the
preservation of order and prevention of further interference with
traffic upon the public streets and sidewalks."
239 S.C. at 345, 123 S.E.2d at 249-250.
In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra at
310 U. S. 308,
this Court recognized that,
"[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference
with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to
prevent or punish is obvious."
And in
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.
S. 315 (1951), we upheld a conviction for breach of the
peace in a situation no more dangerous than that found here. There,
the demonstration was conducted by only one person, and the crowd
was limited to approximately 80, as compared with the present
lineup of some 200 demonstrators and 300 onlookers. There, the
petitioner was "endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against the
whites, urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal
rights."
Id. at
340 U. S. 317.
Only one person -- in a city having an entirely different
Page 372 U. S. 244
historical background -- was exhorting adults. Here, 200
youthful Negro demonstrators were being aroused to a "fever pitch"
before a crowd of some 300 people who undoubtedly were hostile.
Perhaps their speech was not so animated, but, in this setting,
their actions, their placards reading "You may jail our bodies, but
not our souls," and their chanting of "I Shall Not Be Moved,"
accompanied by stamping feet and clapping hands, created a much
greater danger of riot and disorder. It is my belief that anyone
conversant with the almost spontaneous combustion in some Southern
communities in such a situation will agree that the City Manager's
action may well have averted a major catastrophe.
The gravity of the danger here surely needs no further
explication. The imminence of that danger has been emphasized at
every stage of this proceeding, from the complaints charging that
the demonstrations "tended directly to immediate violence" to the
State Supreme Court's affirmance on the authority of
Feiner,
supra. This record, then, shows no steps backward from a
standard of "clear and present danger." But to say that the police
may not intervene until the riot has occurred is like keeping out
the doctor until the patient dies. I cannot subscribe to such a
doctrine. In the words of my Brother Frankfurter:
"This Court has often emphasized that, in the exercise of our
authority over state court decisions, the Due Process Clause must
not be construed in an abstract and doctrinaire way by disregarding
local conditions. . . . It is pertinent, therefore, to note that
all members of the New York Court accepted the finding that Feiner
was stopped not because the listeners or police officers disagreed
with his views, but because these officers were honestly concerned
with preventing a breach of the peace. . . . "
Page 372 U. S. 245
"As was said in
Hague v. C.I.O., supra, uncontrolled
official suppression of the speaker 'cannot be made a substitute
for the duty to maintain order.' 307 U.S. at
307 U. S.
516. Where conduct is within the allowable limits of
free speech, the police are peace officers for the speaker, as well
as for his hearers. But the power effectively to preserve order
cannot be displaced by giving a speaker complete immunity. Here,
there were two police officers present for 20 minutes. They
interfered only when they apprehended imminence of violence. It is
not a constitutional principle that, in acting to preserve order,
the police must proceed against the crowd, whatever its size and
temper, and not against the [demonstrators]."
340 U.S. at
340 U. S.
288-289, (concurring opinion in
Feiner v. New
York and other cases decided that day)
I would affirm the convictions.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Unreported order of the Richland County Court, July 10, 1961, on
appeal from the Magistrate's Court of Columbia, South Carolina. The
Supreme Court's affirmance of that order, 239 S.C. 339,
123
S.E.2d 247, is now before us on writ of certiorari.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Supra, 372
U.S. 229fn2/1|>note 1 .
[
Footnote 2/3]
The City Manager testified as follows:
"Q. Now with relation, Mr. McNayr, to the sidewalks around the
horseshoe and the lane for vehicular traffic, how was the crowd
distributed, with regard to those sidewalks and roadways?"
"A. Well, the conditions varied from time to time, but, at
numerous times, they were blocked almost completely with probably
as many as thirty or forty persons, both on the sidewalks and in
the street area. . . ."
"Q. Did you observe the pedestrian traffic on the walkway?"
"A. Yes, I did."
"Q. What was the condition there?"
"A. The condition there was that it was extremely difficult for
a pedestrian wanting to get through, to get through. Many of them
took to the street area, even to get through the street area or the
sidewalk."
The Chief of Police testified as follows:
"Q. Was the street blocked?"
"A. We had to place a traffic man at the intersection of Gervais
and Main to handle traffic and pedestrians."
"Q. Was a vehicular traffic lane blocked?"
"A. It was, that was in the horseshoe."
[
Footnote 2/4]
The City Manager testified as follows:
"Q. Did you hear any singing, chanting or anything of that
nature from the student group?"
"A. Yes."
"Q. Describe that as best you can."
"A. With the harangues, which I have just described, witnessed
frankly by everyone present and in this area, the students began
answering back with shouts. They became boisterous. They stomped
their feet. They sang in loud voices to the point where, again, in
my judgment, a dangerous situation was really building up."
The Police Chief testified as follows:
"Q. Chief, you were questioned on cross-examination at length
about the appearance and orderliness of the student group. Were
they orderly at all times?"
"A. Not at the last."
"Q. Would you describe the activities at the last?"
"A. As I have stated, they were singing, and, also, when they
were getting certain instructions, they were very loud and
boisterous."
[
Footnote 2/5]
Supra, 372
U.S. 229fn2/1|>note 1.