A longshoreman employed by petitioner, a stevedoring contractor,
was injured while helping to unload a vessel, and he sued
respondents, the shipowners, in a Federal District Court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, alleging that the vessel was
unseaworthy and that they were negligent. Respondents impleaded
petitioner and asked indemnity, alleging that it was negligent in
the manner of unloading. The jury found that the injury resulted
from unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligence of respondents,
and not from any failure of petitioner to do its work in accordance
with its contract. The District Court entered judgment in favor of
the longshoreman against respondents and in favor of petitioner on
respondents' claim for indemnity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment in favor of the longshoreman, but reversed the judgment in
favor of petitioner on the ground that it also was negligent.
Held: redetermination by the Court of Appeals of the
facts found by the jury was contrary to the provision of the
Seventh Amendment that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." Pp.
369 U. S.
356-364.
(a) Even though a stevedoring contract is a maritime contract,
the Seventh Amendment was applicable in this case, because the
suit, being in a Federal Court by reason of diversity of
citizenship, carried with it the right to trial by jury. Pp.
369 U. S.
359-360.
(b) On the record in this case, it cannot be said that
petitioner was liable as a matter of law, that the trial judge, in
the charge to the jury, omitted any ingredient from petitioner's
contractual liability, or that the jury's verdict was inconsistent.
Pp.
369 U. S.
360-364.
(c) Where an appellate court is asked to review the jury's
answers to special interrogatories, the Seventh Amendment prohibits
a reversal on the ground that the jury's answers are inconsistent
if, under any view of the case, they are, or can be made,
consistent. P.
369 U. S.
364.
289 F.2d 201, reversed.
Page 369 U. S. 356
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the court.
Leighton Board was a longshoreman employed by Atlantic and Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. Atlantic, the petitioner, performed stevedoring
services for respondents. Beard received injuries while helping to
discharge bales of burlap from a vessel owned by respondents. These
bales, loaded in India, were bound by four parallel one-inch steel
bands that petitioner had not placed around the bales, but were
part of the cargo, and each bale, containing 30 to 40 bolts of
burlap, was stowed in tiers. The discharging operation consisted of
pulling the bales from their stowed positions to the hatch and then
raising them vertically through the hatch and lowering them onto
the pier. This was accomplished by using a ring to which six
equal-length ropes were attached. A hook was on the end of each
rope; and two hooks were used on each bale, three bales being
raised in one operation. Beard and his co-workers would signal the
winch operator to pull the bales from their stow to a position
under the hatch. When the sideways movement had ended, the bales
would be raised vertically. After several hours of one unloading
operation, two bands of one bale broke. The bale fell, injuring
Beard.
The evidence showed that Atlantic played no part in the loading
or stowage of this cargo of burlap. There were sixty-three tons of
bales in the forward end of the
Page 369 U. S. 357
hold destined for New York, and they extended halfway into the
space under the hatch. The bales being unloaded were in the after
end of the hold. The bale that fell struck the New York cargo and
bounded toward Beard, pinning him against the after bulkhead and
causing injuries resulting in the amputation of his right leg.
Beard sued respondents in the District Court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, alleging that their vessel was
unseaworthy and that they were negligent. Respondents impleaded
petitioner, alleging that it was negligent in its manner and method
of unloading and asking indemnity from it in case respondents were
held liable to Beard. Counsel, near the end of the trial, agreed
upon five special interrogatories, to which the jury responded as
follows:
"1. Was unseaworthiness a substantial factor in causing the
injuries to the plaintiff?"
"Yes."
"2. Was there negligence on the part of Ellerman Lines, Ltd.,
which was a substantial factor in causing injuries to the
plaintiff?"
"Yes."
"3. In what amount, if any, did you assess the damages to be
awarded the plaintiff?"
"$100,000."
"4. If you have answered yes to Interrogatories 1 or 2, did the
fault of Ellerman Lines, Ltd., and the City Line, Ltd., arise out
of any failure on the part of Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc.,
to do its work in accordance with the contractual obligation?"
"No."
"5. If you have answered yes to Interrogatory No. 4, was
Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc.'s breach of this contract a
substantial factor in bringing about the injuries to the
plaintiff?"
"No. "
Page 369 U. S. 358
The District Court thereupon entered judgment in favor of Beard
against respondents and in favor of petitioner on respondents'
claim for indemnity.
On appeal it was argued,
inter alia, that a finding of
negligence on the part of respondents was warranted because they
failed to provide a safe place to work in view of the manner in
which the New York cargo was stowed. With this, the Court of
Appeals agreed. Negligence on the part of respondents, it said, was
also established by the knowledge of their chief mate that the use
of bale books was a dangerous way to discharge burlap bales, and
from evidence that bands on the bales broke in "roughly between 3
and 5 percent of the bales" during discharging operations. The
court said that, though the use of bale hooks may have been
customary in Philadelphia, such use was not sufficient to relieve
respondents of negligence.
It went on to say that there was evidence to show that
respondents, by virtue of the manner of loading, were negligent in
not affording Beard a safe place to work. It held, however, that,
since the "warranty of workmanlike service extends to the handling
of cargo . . . as well as to the use of equipment incidental to
cargo handling" (
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan &
McNamara, 364 U. S. 421,
364 U. S.
423), petitioner was liable, as a matter of law, to
respondents. For if it was negligent for respondents to permit
Beard to work in an unsafe place, it was "equally negligent" for
petitioner to handle the cargo in the manner in did, in light of
the unsafe place where Beard worked. 289 F.2d 201, 207.
The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of
Beard and against respondents on the issue of negligence (without
reaching the question of unseaworthiness), but reversed the
judgment in favor of Atlantic. The case is here on a petition for
certiorari. 368 U.S. 874.
We might agree with the Court of Appeals had the questions of
fact been left to us. But neither we nor the
Page 369 U. S. 359
Court of Appeals can redetermine facts found by the jury, any
more than the District Court can predetermine them. For the Seventh
Amendment says that
"no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."
The requirements of the Seventh Amendment were brought into play
in this case, even though a stevedoring contract is a maritime
contract. [
Footnote 1] Since
"loading and stowing a ship's cargo" is part of the "maritime
service," a stevedore can recover against his employer in admiralty
for the latter's negligence (
Atlantic Transport Co. of West
Virginia v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52,
234 U. S. 61),
on the conditions provided in the Longshoremen's Act, 33 U.S.C. §
905. And when the shipowner is held liable, it may in the same suit
recover over against the stevedoring company on the stevedore
contract in order to prevent needless multiplicity of litigation.
American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.
S. 446,
330 U. S.
456.
Congress, since 1789, in giving Federal District Courts original
jurisdiction of civil cases in admiralty, has saved "to suitors in
all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Therefore, a suit for breach of a maritime
contract, while it may be brought in admiralty, may also be pursued
in an ordinary civil action, [
Footnote 2] since, unlike the proceeding in
The Moses
Page 369 U. S. 360
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, it is a suit
in
personam.
"Where the suit is
in personam, it may be brought
either in admiralty or, under the saving clause, in an appropriate
non-maritime court, by ordinary civil action."
Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty (1957), p. 36. And such
suits on the law side are not restricted to enforcement of common
law rights, but extend as well to maritime torts.
Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85,
328 U. S.
88-89.
This suit, being in the federal courts by reason of diversity of
citizenship, carried with it, of course, the right to trial by
jury. As in cases under the Jones Act (
Schulz v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 350 U. S. 523;
Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.
S. 370) and under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(
Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. R. Co., 321 U. S.
29;
Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 329 U.
S. 649,
329 U. S. 653;
Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U.
S. 359;
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.,
352 U. S. 500),
trial by jury is part of the remedy. Thus, the provisions of the
Seventh Amendment, noted above, are brought into play.
Schulz
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, at
350 U. S. 524.
As we recently stated in another diversity case, it is the Seventh
Amendment that fashions "the federal policy favoring jury decisions
of disputed fact questions."
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Cooperative, 356 U. S. 525,
356 U. S.
538-539.
And see Herron v. Southern Pac. Co.,
283 U. S. 91,
283 U. S.
94-95.
In answer to interrogatories Nos. 4 and 5, the jury found that
petitioner had not failed to perform its contractual obligation to
respondents. The contract provided that petitioner should do the
work "with every care and due dispatch to the satisfaction" of the
owners. In its charge to the jury, the District Court said that the
owner had a duty to provide longshoremen a safe place to work; and
it left to the jury whether respondents had warning that the method
of unloading was unsafe and whether the manner of loading the cargo
by respondents made this an unsafe place for Beard to work. It left
to
Page 369 U. S. 361
the jury respondents' contention that, if anyone was negligent
in leaving the New York cargo in the place where it was and in not
shifting it, it was petitioner's negligence, not theirs. It also
charged the jury on petitioner's liability should Beard be found to
have established his case. It referred the jury to the contract
saying petitioner was obliged "to unload and discharge this cargo
of burlap with the utmost care."
The Court of Appeals held that the jury had been charged too
restrictively, that their attention had been called only to the
manner of using the hook. The trial judge did indeed charge:
"You must answer the question, was that a reasonable and safe
method of operation for the discharge of that cargo? Taking into
consideration that it had been done over a period of years, that it
was a usual and accepted method in various places, you will have to
examine into the nature of the application of the hook to the bale,
and you will take into consideration the testimony of both experts,
and both counsel argued to you in their interpretation of the
testimony the results that they feel favor their side."
But it went further and charged that, if petitioner was
responsible for the breaking of the bands, petitioner would be
liable:
". . . if you . . . find that that negligent conduct was such
that it broke the band, rather than any unseaworthiness of the
band, [
Footnote 3] then you
must find for the defendant shipping companies; but you have to
make that finding in the light of all the circumstances, whether or
not there was sufficient evidence
Page 369 U. S. 362
that persuades you that that conduct of the longshoremen was
responsible for the breaking of the band -- not any unseaworthiness
in the band itself."
It also charged that, if the verdict was for Beard, the jury
should determine whether petitioner created the condition that made
respondents liable. It charged:
"There again, you have to run the whole gamut of facts in the
case. You will have to decide whether or not there was an
unreasonable discharge of this cargo, an unsafe method used in the
discharge of this cargo, in the placing of the hook. Did they
breach that contract to do it in a workmanlike manner with the
utmost care? The steamship company says,"
"Yes, they did. They breached that contract. They did not do it
in a workmanlike manner. All the evidence here points to the fact
that they did not do it with the utmost care, and therefore they
caused the condition which created the liability which is ours,
which the plaintiff has secured against us as defendants."
The trial judge further charged:
". . . Whether or not there was a breach of that contract, what
you look to decide is whether or not there was reasonably safe
discharge of that cargo by the Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores. If
it was not, if it was not done in a reasonably safe manner, then
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores would breach their warranty under
the contract. If there was substandard performance on which it was
foreseeable by them that some injury might happen or eventuate,
then Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores would be responsible to the
plaintiff shipping company."
More specifically, the trial judge charged:
". . . you will have to determine whether there was negligence
in the leaving of that New York part of
Page 369 U. S. 363
that cargo in the place where it was, and whether it was an
interference, as the plaintiff claims, with his condition of
safety."
"On the other hand, the defendant says,"
"This was not our job; the shifting should have been done by the
stevedores. We, the shipping company, were not negligent in failing
to get it out of the way."
"The plaintiff asserts here and asks you to believe, and to
weigh in the balance toward meeting the burden which he has to
establish by the fair preponderance of the evidence, that this
officer was there, but did not stop the operation. The defendant
says,"
"If you find, no matter what the officer says, that this was
being unloaded in a reasonably safe manner, then we were not
liable; it may well be that the Atlantic & Gulf stevedores are
liable, but we were not liable."
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the trial judge
limited the issue of petitioner's liability to "the use of the bale
hook method in discharging the cargo." 289 F.2d at p. 208. When the
District Court charged that, in determining petitioner's
contractual obligation, the jury should decide "whether or not
there was a reasonably safe discharge" of the cargo, it included
the totality of the circumstances.
The question of the manner in which the New York cargo had been
stored was prominent in the case, and the trial judge left it to
the jury on the question of respondents' negligence. On the issue
of petitioner's liability, his charge was no more precise than has
been indicated. Yet respondents did not ask for more on this phase
of the controversy. In their requested charge, they were no more
specific, except they maintained, [
Footnote 4] as did the Court
Page 369 U. S. 364
of Appeals, that, under these circumstances, the stevedore is
liable under its contract as a matter of law.
We cannot say that petitioner was liable as a matter of law, nor
that the trial judge, in the charge to the jury, omitted any
ingredient from petitioner's contractual liability. Moreover, we
cannot say that the jury's verdict was inconsistent. The Court of
Appeals said that the case of the respondents' negligence was
established because
". . . the record affords ample basis for a jury factfinding
that (1) use of the bale hook method in the discharge of the burlap
bales constituted negligence, and (2) that the injured longshoreman
was not afforded a safe place to work."
289 F.2d, p. 207.
So far as we know, the jury may have found respondents liable
not on either of those two grounds, but solely on a third, namely,
because of defective bands -- a matter which was covered by the
charge to the jury on the issue of unseaworthiness, and properly
so.
Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.,
355 U. S. 563,
355 U. S. 567.
If that was the jury's view of the facts, then petitioner plainly
would not be liable under its warranty. Where there is a view of
the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories
consistent, they must be resolved that way. For a search for one
possible view of the case which will make the jury's finding
inconsistent results in a collision with the Seventh Amendment.
Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F. R. Co., 353 U.
S. 360.
Cf. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
359 U. S. 437,
359 U. S.
446.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result.
Page 369 U. S. 365
[
Footnote 1]
A stevedore's contract with a shipowner is
"comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its
manufactured product. The shipowner's action is not changed from
one for a breach of contract to one for a tort simply because
recovery may turn upon the standard of the performance"
of the stevedoring service.
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124,
350 U. S.
133-134.
[
Footnote 2]
Suits on maritime contracts may be brought in the federal courts
under the head of diversity jurisdiction.
Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406;
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.
S. 310.
[
Footnote 3]
The trial judge also charged that
"if you find that the bands of the bale were defective, were
inadequate, or insufficient . . . then you might find the
defendants liable under the doctrine of unseaworthiness."
[
Footnote 4]
One of respondents' requested charges was:
"If, on the other hand, you find in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, and the basis of your finding is that the
method of discharging was not reasonably safe and proper under the
circumstances existing at the time of the accident, then I charge
you that, under these circumstances, you must further find a
verdict in favor of the defendant and against Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc."
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins,
dissenting.
In my view, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
respondents were entitled to indemnity from the petitioner under
principles first set forth by this Court in
Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.
S. 124, and followed in
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v.
Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U. S. 563,
Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.
S. 423, and
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan &
McNamara, 364 U. S. 421.
Beard's action was based upon both negligence and
unseaworthiness. The respondents were alleged to have been
negligent (1) in permitting the use of the bale hook method of
discharging the bales, particularly in view of the chief officer's
statement that he thought the method dangerous, and (2) in
improperly stowing the New York cargo and thereby failing to use
ordinary care to provide Beard with a safe place to work.
* The Court of
Appeals properly determined that there was sufficient evidence on
either ground to support the jury's general finding of negligence,
a determination which I do not understand to be contested here. But
a finding of negligence on either ground would necessarily carry
with it the conclusion that the petitioner had breached its
contractual obligation to the respondents.
As we said only last Term in
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan
& McNamara, supra, at
364 U. S. 423,
the stevedore's "warranty of workmanlike service extends to the
handling of cargo . . . as well as to the use of equipment
incidental to cargo handling. . . ." If the respondents were
negligent in permitting the petitioner's use of a dangerous method
of unloading cargo, the petitioner surely breached its
"warranty
Page 369 U. S. 366
of workmanlike service" by using such a method in the first
instance. Similarly, if the location of the so-called New York
bales in the hold made the hold an unsafe place to work, the
petitioner necessarily breached its warranty to the respondents by
unloading the cargo before first moving those bales. The petitioner
is in the business of handling cargo, and any danger created by the
New York bales was at least as apparent to the petitioner as to the
respondents. Under its warranty the petitioner had a duty to see
that the danger was removed before proceeding to unload the
Philadelphia cargo.
It is questionable whether the right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment is involved in this case, since the respondents'
rights against the petitioner depend upon a maritime contract, not
upon the common law.
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello,
330 U. S. 446,
330 U. S. 456.
We need not pursue that inquiry, however, because, in any event,
nothing in the Seventh Amendment removes the duty of a trial judge
to give proper instructions to a jury, or the duty of a reviewing
court to correct a trial judge's errors. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 50.
Here, each possible ground of the respondents' negligence
vis-a
-vis the original plaintiff involved a breach of the
petitioner's warranty as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals
correctly held that the trial judge was in error in not so
instructing the jury.
I would affirm.
* The opinion of the Court suggests that there was a third
possible ground for the jury's finding of negligence, namely,
failure to inspect the bands on the bale which fell. No such issue
was ever submitted to the jury. The only issues submitted to the
jury with respect to the bands related to the plaintiff's
unseaworthiness claim.