Appellants, Negroes living in Jackson, Mississippi, brought this
civil rights action in a Federal District Court on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, seeking injunctions to
enforce their constitutional rights to nonsegregated service in
interstate and intrastate transportation. They alleged that such
rights had been denied them under color of state statutes,
municipal ordinances, and state custom and usage. A three-judge
District Court convened to consider the case abstained from further
proceedings, pending construction of the challenged laws by the
state courts, and appellants appealed directly to this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Held:
1. Appellants lack standing to enjoin criminal prosecutions
under Mississippi's breach of peace statutes, since they do not
allege that they have been prosecuted or threatened with
prosecution thereunder; but, as passengers using the segregated
transportation facilities, they have standing to enforce their
rights to nonsegregated treatment. Pp.
369 U. S.
32-33.
2. That no State may require racial segregation of interstate or
intrastate transportation facilities has been so well settled that
it is foreclosed as a litigable issue, and a three-judge court was
not required to pass on this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2281. P.
369 U. S.
33.
3. Since this case is not one required to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges under 28 U.S.C. §
2281, it cannot be brought to this Court on direct appeal under
§1253; but this Court has jurisdiction to determine the authority
of the Court below and to make such corrective order as may be
appropriate to the enforcement of the limitation which that section
imposes. P.
369 U. S.
34.
4. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the
District Court for expeditious disposition, in the light of this
opinion, of appellants' claims of right to nonsegregated
transportation service. P.
369 U. S. 34.
199 F.
Supp. 595, judgment vacated and case remanded.
Page 369 U. S. 32
PER CURIAM.
Appellants, Negroes living in Jackson, Mississippi, brought this
civil rights action, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, seeking temporary and
permanent injunctions to enforce their constitutional rights to
nonsegregated service in interstate and intrastate transportation,
alleging that such rights had been denied them under color of state
statutes, municipal ordinances, and state custom and usage.
* A three-judge
District Court was convened, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, and, Circuit Judge
Rives dissenting, abstained from further proceedings pending
construction of the challenged laws by the state courts.
199 F.
Supp. 595. Plaintiffs have appealed, 28 U.S.C. § 1253;
NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U. S. 471. We
denied a motion to stay the prosecution of a number of criminal
cases pending disposition of this appeal.
368 U.
S. 346.
Appellants lack standing to enjoin criminal prosecutions under
Mississippi's breach of peace statutes, since they do not allege
that they have been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under
them. They cannot
Page 369 U. S. 33
represent a class of whom they are not a part.
McCabe v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 235 U.
S. 151,
235 U. S.
162-163. But, as passengers using the segregated
transportation facilities, they are aggrieved parties, and have
standing to enforce their rights to nonsegregated treatment.
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S.
80,
313 U. S. 93;
Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202.
We have settled beyond question that no State may require racial
segregation of interstate or intrastate transportation facilities.
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373;
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903;
Boynton v.
Virginia, 364 U. S. 454. The
question is no longer open; it is foreclosed as a litigable issue.
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court when the claim
that a statute is unconstitutional is wholly insubstantial, legally
speaking nonexistent.
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S.
30;
Bell v. Waterfront Comm., 279 F.2d 853,
857-858. We hold that three judges are similarly not required when,
as here, prior decisions make frivolous any claim that a state
statute on its face is not unconstitutional.
Willis v.
Walker, 136 F.
Supp. 181;
Bush v. Orleans Parish School
Board, 138 F.
Supp. 336;
Kelley v. Board of
Education, 139 F.
Supp. 578. We denied leave to file petitions for mandamus in
Bush, 351 U.S. 948, and from a similar ruling in
Booker v. Tennessee Board of Education, 351 U.S. 948. The
reasons for convening an extraordinary court are inapplicable in
such cases, for the policy behind the three-judge requirement --
that a single judge ought not to be empowered to invalidate a state
statute under a federal claim -- does not apply. The three-judge
requirement is a technical one, to be narrowly construed,
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.
S. 246,
312 U. S. 251.
The statute comes into play only when an injunction is sought "upon
the ground of the unconstitutionality" of a statute. There is no
such ground when the constitutional issue presented is essentially
fictitious.
Page 369 U. S. 34
This case is therefore not one "required . . . to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges," 28 U.S.C. § 1253,
and therefore cannot be brought here on direct appeal. However, we
have jurisdiction to determine the authority of the court below and
"to make such corrective order as may be appropriate to the
enforcement of the limitations which that section imposes,"
Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S.
16,
292 U. S. 18;
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co.,
292 U. S. 386,
292 U.S. 392;
Phillips
v. United States, 312 U. S. 246,
312 U. S. 254.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the
District Court for expeditious disposition, in light of this
opinion, of the appellants' claims of right to unsegregated
transportation service.
Vacated and remanded.
* The statutes in question are Miss.Code 1942, Tit. 11, §§ 2351,
2351.5, 2351.7, and Tit. 28, §§ 7784, 7785, 7786, 7786-01, 7787,
7787.5.
