This action under § 4 of the Clayton Act to recover treble
damages for losses allegedly resulting from violations of §§1 and 2
of the Sherman Act was brought by petitioner, who is the assignee
of a dissolved corporation which formerly owned and operated WCAN,
an ultra high frequency (UHF) television broadcasting station in
Milwaukee, which was affiliated with the Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) network. He alleged that, pursuant to a conspiracy to
restrain and monopolize trade in the television broadcasting
business, CBS purchased WOKY, a competing UHF station in Milwaukee,
cancelled WCAN's network affiliation, thereby forced petitioner to
sell WCAN to CBS at much less than its true value, and eliminated
him from the broadcasting business in Milwaukee. He also alleged
that a purpose of the conspiracy was to eliminate UHF broadcasting
in Milwaukee and possibly throughout the United States. On the
basis of pleadings, affidavits, depositions and interrogatories
filed in the case, the District Court granted respondents' motion
for a summary judgment on the ground that the injury suffered by
petitioner was
damnum absque injuria, since CBS had a
right to purchase WOKY, subject to approval by the Federal
Communications Commission, and to cancel its affiliation contract
with WCAN.
Held: on this record, it cannot be said that "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact," within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), and the motion for summary
judgment should not have been granted. Pp.
368 U. S.
465-474.
(a) If the cancellation of WCAN's network affiliation and the
purchase of WOKY by CBS were part and parcel of unlawful conduct or
agreement with others or were conceived in a purpose to
unreasonably restrain trade, control a market, or monopolize, as
alleged in the complaint, then such conduct might well violate the
Sherman Act, and the record indicates that, on a trial, petitioner
might be able to substantiate his claim of conspiracy. Pp.
368 U. S.
467-473.
(b) Summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex
antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles,
the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and
hostile witnesses thicken the plot. P.
368 U. S.
473.
Page 368 U. S. 465
(c) It cannot be said that no restraint of trade resulted from
termination by CBS of its affiliation with WCAN because the public
would still receive the same service from another source.
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.
S. 207. P.
368 U. S.
473.
109 U.S. App.D.C. 170, 284 F.2d 599, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question involved here is whether this treble damage action
based on alleged violations of the restraint of trade and monopoly
sections of the Sherman Law [
Footnote 1] was rightly terminated by a summary judgment
of dismissal. The petitioner, Lou Poller, is the assignee of the
Midwest Broadcasting Company, a dissolved corporation. In 1954,
Midwest was the owner and operator of WCAN, an ultra high frequency
(UHF) [
Footnote 2] broadcasting
station
Page 368 U. S. 466
located in Milwaukee. The station was affiliated with the
Columbia Broadcasting System network, and was of the alleged value
of $2,000,000. Poller charged that the respondents in 1954 entered
into an unlawful conspiracy to eliminate WCAN from the broadcast
field in Milwaukee. [
Footnote
3] It was a part of the conspiracy that respondent Holt was to
secure in his name an option to purchase WOKY, a competing but
inferior UHF broadcaster in Milwaukee. When and if the Federal
Communications Commission amended its multiple ownership rules,
then under consideration, so as to permit CBS to own UHF stations
in addition to its VHF ones, Holt was to assign his option to CBS
if it so elected. In that event, it was agreed CBS would cancel its
affiliation agreement with WCAN pursuant to its option in that
contract, and, in due course, consummate its purchase of WOKY. This
would place WCAN in the precarious position of competing with the
two major national networks with stations in Milwaukee. Being
unable to survive such competition, its only course would be to
liquidate at distressed prices its valuable equipment and
facilities only recently acquired. CBS might then acquire them at
its own price for use in its new operation, which was necessary
because of the inferior quality of those of WOKY. CBS would then
have Midwest's superior facilities and equipment, which, with the
WOKY license, would enable it to start broadcasting at a minimum
expense and the least possible delay. Poller further claimed that
the overall purpose of CBS was to destroy UHF broadcasting, which
had only been permitted to enter the field in 1952, in order to
protect its vast interest in VHF stations throughout the United
States. Finally, he alleged the conspiracy was so successful that
CBS not only acquired WCAN at a loss of
Page 368 U. S. 467
$1,450,000 to Midwest, but that the latter was obliged to buy
the facilities and equipment of WOKY at exorbitant prices, and to
agree to continue broadcasting from the latter's premises -- which
was done "in order to pretend that there was no restraint of trade
or elimination of competition. . . ." However, WCAN continued in
business only 10 days after CBS started its broadcasts on February
17, 1955. CBS discontinued UHF broadcasting in 1959, when it became
affiliated with a Milwaukee VHF station.
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial
judge held that the injury suffered was
damnum absque
injuria, stating that CBS had a right to purchase WOKY,
subject to Federal Communications Commission approval, and to
cancel its affiliation contract with WCAN. 174 F.Supp 802. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, with Judge Washington dissenting, 109
U.S.App.D.C. 170, 284 F.2d 599, and we granted certiorari, 365 U.S.
840. We now conclude that there was a genuine issue as to material
facts, and that summary judgment was not therefore in order.
I
Summary judgment should be entered only when the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and admissions filed in the case
"show that [except as to the amount of damages] there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.. This rule authorizes summary
judgment
"only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, . . . [and
where] no genuine issue remains for trial . . . , [for] the purpose
of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial
by jury if they really have issues to try."
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.
S. 620,
321 U. S. 627
(1944). We now examine the contentions of the parties to determine
whether under the rule summary judgment was proper.
Page 368 U. S. 468
II
The respondents, in their motion for summary judgment, depended
upon the affidavits of four persons. The first is Richard Salant,
Vice President of CBS ; another, Jay Eliasberg, Director of its
Research Division; a third, Lee Bartell, who made the sale of WOKY
to CBS at a $50,000 profit; finally, Thad Holt, a codefendant who
received $10,000 from the transaction. These were supplemented by
material taken from petitioner's depositions of Salant and CBS
President Stanton. It is readily apparent that each of these
persons was an interested party.
Respondents appear to place most reliance on the Salant
testimony, and we shall, therefore, take it up in some detail. It
projects three defenses, the first being that there was no
conspiracy for the following reasons: CBS-TV was not a separate
entity, but only a division of CBS, and therefore there could be no
conspiracy between the two; Holt, the cover man in securing the
option and purchase of WOKY, "had been given the particular job" by
CBS, and therefore was not a conspirator; and Bartell never shared
in any illegal purpose that would bring him into the conspiracy.
Secondly, in any event, the only issue in the case is the legality
of the cancellation of the affiliation agreement by CBS which was
merely the legal exercise by CBS of "the normal right of a producer
to select the outlet for its product." And, finally, the monopoly
charges are entirely "frivolous." The trial judge accepted the
second defense.
III
It may be that CBS, by independent action, could have exercised
its granted right to cancel WCAN's affiliation upon six months'
notice and independently purchased its own outlet in Milwaukee.
However, if such a cancellation and purchase were part and parcel
of unlawful
Page 368 U. S. 469
conduct or agreement with others or were conceived in a purpose
to unreasonably restrain trade, control a market, or monopolize,
then such conduct might well run afoul of the Sherman Law.
See
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.
S. 594,
345 U. S.
624-625 (1953);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359,
273 U. S. 375
(1927). Poller alleges and the affidavits, depositions, and
exhibits indicate much more than the free exercise by CBS of the
granted right of cancellation. A conspiracy is alleged to restrain
trade in the Milwaukee television market; to eliminate WCAN from
that market; to secure its facilities at depressed prices; and to
occupy the UHF band in that market exclusively. The right of
cancellation was merely one of the means used to effectuate this
conspiracy. Moreover, "in its wider sense," Poller claims that a
part of their conspiracy was
"to wipe out the most outstanding UHF operator in the county
[WCAN], and, by wiping him out, they destroyed the UHF industry,
which was a threat to them, despite their protestations, because of
the enormous economic investment they had in VHF."
It is argued that CBS cannot conspire with itself. However, this
begs the question, for the allegation is that independent parties,
i.e., Holt and Bartell, conspired with CBS and its
officers. [
Footnote 4] While
respondents' affidavits assert that Holt acted in good faith as a
special agent or employee for CBS, and that Bartell was completely
free of any evil motives directed toward WCAN, the trial judge
indicated a belief that Holt was "an independent actor," and would
have submitted the question of his status to the jury had he not
disposed of the case on other grounds. Furthermore, Poller
submitted a deposition of Holt, an exhibit to which showed CBS had
furnished Holt
Page 368 U. S. 470
a complete analysis in writing of the Milwaukee market and the
ownership and affiliation of the TV stations there, including WCAN.
The deposition revealed that Holt had knowledge that the obvious
purpose and necessary effect of the plan would be to eliminate
independent UHF in Milwaukee, and that he had a personal stake in
its success. This included,
inter alia, Holt's statements
that he met with top CBS officials in New York for a briefing on
his role, that he was a close friend of these officials, and that
he would have retained the option for himself if unused by CBS. The
latter admissions, when coupled with the uncertainty at that time
of a Federal Communications Commission rule permitting CBS to
purchase WCAN, suggest that the alternative plan was to let Holt
exercise the option and take the affiliation if CBS could not.
Likewise, Bartell's affidavit, barely a page and a half in the
record, does not negative the allegations of conspiracy.
Unquestionably, after knowing that Holt had in truth been acting
for CBS, and that the sale would prove disastrous to WCAN, he did
file certain papers with the Federal Communications Commission
requesting approval of the sale of WOKY. Poller had no opportunity
to cross-examine him, although he was a key witness to respondents'
theory of the case. And it is noted that, even though the transfer
was uncontested before the Federal Communications Commission, it
received approval by a vote of only three Commissioners, with the
remaining two strongly dissenting. [
Footnote 5] It might be that, on a trial, Poller could
substantiate his claims of conspiracy even against Bartell,
although this would not be necessary to his case.
Respondents' answer to the charge that one of the purposes of
the alleged conspiracy was to exert a restraining effect upon the
development of UHF is that this is a
Page 368 U. S. 471
"fantastic assumption -- for which there is not a shred of
evidence." An analysis of the record seems to indicate that, in
1954, prior to the purchase of WOKY, there were three UHF channels
assigned to Milwaukee by the Federal Communications Commission, two
of which (WCAN and WOKY) were operating; that, since December,
1953, CBS had been studying UHF markets preparatory to an expected
change in Commission rules that would allow it to purchase two UHF
stations in addition to its five VHF ones; that its staff rated
Pittsburgh, St. Louis, New Haven-Hartford, and Milwaukee, in that
order, as the most attractive; that CBS chose to enter the latter
market and buy WOKY rather than to operate in Milwaukee on the
third available channel; that WCAN's profitable operation in 1954,
even with lower rates and competition from WOKY, was "immediately
converted to a losing" one, although in 1955, WOKY was out of
business; and that this reported loss of about $130,000 under CBS
operation in 1955 contrasted sharply with the 66% increase in its
profits nationally. Furthermore, reports in the record from CBS
itself show that it always had recognized "a VHF station . . .
would be preferable to a UHF . . . ," but that the latter had
"specially good
short-term prospects" (emphasis supplied)
in Milwaukee, because it had "the characteristic of being at
present" (1954) a "single station" market. CBS further recognized
that, since its programing was
"already working to build up UHF population . . . [through
WCAN], [t]here would be no short-term loss to the network in
continuing to give the support of CBS programing to the buildup of
a UHF population . . . ,
at least until more VHF stations come
in."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The record indicates that Poller had built up a profitable UHF
operation, which was recognized as "the most successful" in the
United States. Even CBS officials pointed to it as an example of
how "a vigorously and
Page 368 U. S. 472
aggressively managed new UHF station in that community can do
well." In the short period of a year, its public acceptance in
Milwaukee was so great that 90% of the 260,000 TV sets in the area
had been modified at an expense of some $20 to each owner, so as to
be able to receive UHF signals. While CBS had refused to enlarge
the six-month cancellation clause, at no time prior to the alleged
conspiracy did it indicate an intention to cancel the WCAN
affiliation. [
Footnote 6] It
was, Poller claims, only pursuant to the conspiracy that CBS came
into the Milwaukee market and eliminated both WCAN and WOKY. Since
that time, the total number of commercial UHF stations in the
United States has steadily declined from 121 at the end of 1953 to
94 by mid-year 1956. At the close of 1957, the number was only 88.
In 1958, CBS itself abandoned a UHF station in Hartford, and, in
1959, the very station in controversy here was likewise abandoned,
leaving Milwaukee with no commercial UHF service. Instead, CBS has
switched to VHF, affiliating with a Storer Broadcasting Company
station which was authorized there the same year. It will be
remembered that Mr. Storer is the same prospect who, Poller claims,
indicated he would pay $2,000,000 for WCAN when the multiple rule
was adopted, but who cooled after a CBS warning. All of this may
not be sufficient to warrant the finding that Poller contends for
on this charge, but it does indicate more than fantasy,
particularly in the light of the testimony of CBS Vice President
Salant in his deposition that "it would be the kiss of death to UHF
if either NBC or CBS abandoned a UHF station."
It may be that, upon all of the evidence, a jury would be with
the respondents. But we cannot say on this record that "it is quite
clear what the truth is." Certainly
Page 368 U. S. 473
there is no conclusive evidence supporting the respondents'
theory. We look at the record on summary judgment in the light most
favorable to Poller, the party opposing the motion, and conclude
here that it should not have been granted. We believe that summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation
where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in
the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses
thicken the plot. [
Footnote 7]
It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to
cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given
their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no
substitute for trial by jury, which so long has been the hallmark
of "evenhanded justice."
IV
Other contentions of respondents are subject to ready
disposition. They say that no restraint of trade resulted from CBS'
termination of its affiliation with WCAN, for this enabled it to
support WOKY, the other UHF station in the Milwaukee area, which,
based upon Poller's own allegations, was doomed without an
affiliation. To the extent that this argument suggests that there
is no violation of the antitrust laws because the public will still
receive the same service, it has been foreclosed by this Court's
decision in
Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
359 U. S. 207
(1959). And if it is meant to say that there was no restraint,
because CBS, in canceling its affiliation with WCAN, was merely
doing what it had a right to do, and the resulting demise of WCAN
followed from normal market conditions, it erroneously assumes that
CBS had an absolute right, despite violations of the antitrust
laws, to exercise its contractual privilege.
See
368 U. S.
supra. A further answer to the respondents' contention
Page 368 U. S. 474
in this regard is that Poller has an additional claim that part
of the conspiracy was the destruction of UHF broadcasting entirely.
The sole answer of CBS to that is "there is not a shred of
evidence" to support such a charge. However, there has been no
trial as yet, and the issue remains a factual one disputed under
the pleadings and still undetermined.
CBS contends that the monopolization charges are frivolous. We
find the record unclear on these claims. In view of our remand for
a trial on the merits, we forego any comment thereon. The complaint
does not allege the relevant market involved. In the trial court,
it was argued that UHF broadcasting in Milwaukee was the market,
but, on the record here, we are unable to determine that issue. It
may well be that, on a trial, appropriate allegations and proof can
be adduced showing violations of § 2.
See generally
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.
S. 242,
358 U. S.
249-252 (1959);
United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586,
353 U. S.
648-654 (1957) (dissenting opinion). We believe it to be
good judicial administration to withhold decision on these
issues.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
. . ."
26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that:
"Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . .
."
26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
[
Footnote 2]
The terms ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency
(VHF) refer to the wave lengths of the electrical impulses which
are projected by broadcasting stations to carry programs to
receiving sets. Prior to 1952, only the VHF portion of the spectrum
was authorized. Generally, TV receivers are manufactured only to
receive VHF signals, and must be modified by an owner to receive
UHF.
[
Footnote 3]
The conspirators were alleged to be Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.; CBS-TV; J. L. Van. Volkenburg, President of CBS-TV;
H. K. Akerberg, Vice President of CBS-TV; Bartell Broadcasters,
Inc., owners of WOKY; and Thad Holt, a management consultant.
[
Footnote 4]
We do not pass upon the point urged by Poller that, under the
CBS corporate arrangement of divisions, with separate officers and
autonomy in each, the divisions came within the rule as to
corporate subsidiaries.
[
Footnote 5]
11 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 913, 914.
[
Footnote 6]
Indeed, such action would be unreasonable in light of the
success of Midwest's initial operation and its highly favorable
prospects with the expanded facilities and new equipment.
[
Footnote 7]
Compare Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.
S. 249,
334 U. S.
256-257 (1948);
Arenas v. United States,
322 U. S. 419,
322 U. S. 434
(1944).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR.
JUSTICE WHITTAKER and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
As I see it, this is one of those cases, not unfamiliar in
treble damage litigation, where injury resulting from normal
business hazards is sought to be made redressable by casting the
affair in antitrust terms. I think that the antitrust laws do not
fit this case, and that the courts below were quite correct in
holding that the respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
The litigation arises out of CBS' cancellation of an affiliation
arrangement with WCAN, a UHF television broadcasting station in
Milwaukee, owned by Midwest
Page 368 U. S. 475
Broadcasting Company of whose property Poller is assignee. CBS
maintains that such cancellation was but the legitimate exercise of
a contractual right. Poller says that it was part of a conspiracy
to restrain and monopolize trade in the television broadcasting
business, violative of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Suing under §
4 of the Clayton Act, [
Footnote
2/1] Poller seeks to recover as damages the trebled fair value
of the WCAN station and equipment, whose sale to CBS at a distress
price he claims was forced upon him in consequence of CBS'
cancellation of the WCAN affiliation contract.
Poller asserts that CBS, joined by others as conspirators,
wanted to put him out of business as the first step in a grand
design to destroy UHF broadcasting in Milwaukee, if not indeed
throughout the United States. It is said that CBS looked with
disfavor upon the growth of UHF broadcasting, being itself already
heavily committed to VHF. As subsidiary steps towards the
effectuation of this plan, it is charged that CBS chilled
prospective purchasers of WCAN; acquired the only then competing
UHF station in Milwaukee, WOKY; and later closed that station down.
[
Footnote 2/2] CBS' co-conspirators
are said to have been CBS Television, an unincorporated division of
CBS; certain officers of CBS; Bartell, the then owner of WOKY; and
Holt, a management consultant who, at CBS' behest, obtained from
Bartell an option to purchase WOKY.
I assume that Poller would be entitled to proceed to trial if
the record before the District Court had left open
Page 368 U. S. 476
a genuine question of fact as to whether the alleged conspiracy
had as its object the elimination of all UHF stations in the
Milwaukee area, or even if it appeared that petitioner might prove
that the respondents entered upon this course in order to reduce
the number of UHF stations in Milwaukee from two to one, which was
to be owned outright by CBS. [
Footnote
2/3] But, for reasons given below, I think that the depositions
and affidavits which were before the District Court disclosed to a
practical certainty that such proof could not be made.
What did remain open to proof was an alleged arrangement among
CBS, its television division, and its officers and agents whereby
CBS canceled an affiliation with one UHF station and purchased the
facilities of a competing station. Even if somewhere among those
sought to be drawn into petitioner's net there can be found two
independent actors whose meeting of minds would satisfy the usual
conspiracy requirement of "plurality of parties," [
Footnote 2/4] their agreement to carry out that
design would not, in my
Page 368 U. S. 477
view, of itself offend anything proscribed by §§ 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act.
I
In passing on the motion for summary judgment, the District
Court had before it more than the four affidavits of interested
parties to which the Court's opinion seems especially to refer
(
ante, pp.
368 U. S. 468,
368 U. S.
473). In the record was the testimony of four key
witnesses taken by pretrial depositions. Petitioner's counsel had
examined Frank Stanton, President of CBS; Richard Salant, a
Vice-President of CBS; and Thad Holt, who acted for CBS in
procuring the option on the Bartell station. [
Footnote 2/5] Petitioner's testimony was also in the
record in the form of a deposition taken by respondents' counsel,
and two affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. In addition, the record contained the
respondents' answers to written interrogatories put by the
petitioner. It is in light of this far from meager pretrial
discovery that the appropriateness of summary judgment must be
evaluated.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes a District
Court to enter summary judgment
"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."
In so providing, the draftsmen of the Rule, of course, did not
intend to cut off a litigant's right to a trial before the
appropriate factfinder if triable issues remained unresolved after
the pleadings were closed and pretrial discovery
Page 368 U. S. 478
had.
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.
S. 620,
321 U. S. 627;
Fountain v. Filson, 336 U. S. 681. On
the other hand, it is equally clear that their purpose was to
obviate trials which would serve no useful purpose. In
administering the Rule, the availability of pretrial discovery, as
well as matter actually discovered, is a factor to be considered in
determining whether a "genuine issue as to any material fact" is
open.
E.g., Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254
F.2d 827, 831. Further, the Rule does not indicate that it is to be
used any more "sparingly" in antitrust litigation (
ante,
p.
368 U. S. 473)
than in other kinds of litigation, or that its employment in
antitrust cases is subject to more stringent criteria than in
others. On the contrary, without reflecting in any way upon the
good faith of this particular lawsuit, having regard for the
special temptations that the statutory private antitrust remedy
affords for the institution of vexatious litigation, and the
inordinate amount of time that such cases sometimes demand of the
trial courts, there is good reason for giving the summary judgment
rule its full legitimate sweep in this field.
In this case, petitioner, the party opposing the motion, had
complete access by means of pretrial discovery to all the evidence
he could marshal at a trial on the merits. [
Footnote 2/6] Neither his cross-examination of hostile
witnesses nor his own direct testimony by way of deposition and
affidavit produced any evidence which would indicate that the
respondents sought to accomplish anything more than to purchase for
CBS a UHF station in Milwaukee. As the Court's opinion seems to
recognize, such a purchase (accompanied by a cancellation of
petitioner's station affiliation) would be unlawful only if
"
conceived in a purpose to unreasonably restrain trade,
control a market, or
Page 368 U. S. 479
monopolize." (
Ante, p.
368 U. S.
469.) (Emphasis added.) In other words, unless a purpose
to cancel petitioner's affiliation and purchase the Bartell station
would, by itself, be unlawful, petitioner could prevail in this
suit only if he proved that the respondents intended to stifle
competition in, or monopolize, television broadcasting, either by
closing down his station or, more broadly, by destroying the UHF
business in whole or in part. [
Footnote
2/7]
This crucial issue, therefore, turns on proof of the
respondents' motives. Had petitioner proceeded to trial and
introduced no more evidence of motive than was
Page 368 U. S. 480
revealed by the pretrial depositions and affidavits, the case,
in my opinion, could not well have been permitted to go to the
jury. There being no extrinsic evidence of an unlawful purpose, and
CBS' executives having unequivocally denied any purpose to
eliminate petitioner as a competitor, the jury would be left with
no affirmative evidence of any intent to restrain trade. The
possibility that the jury might disbelieve the respondents'
assertions of innocence is not enough to forestall the entry of
summary judgment in their favor.
Dyer v. MacDougall, 201
F.2d 265.
Despite the ample opportunity afforded him by the availability
of pretrial discovery procedures, petitioner, as will be shown, was
able to produce no evidence to support his charges that a
conspiracy, narrow or far-reaching, had been hatched. He should not
be permitted to proceed to trial just on the hope that in the more
formal atmosphere of the courtroom witnesses will revise their
testimony or that a clever trial tactic will produce helpful
evidence. Courts do not exist to afford opportunities for such
litigating gambles.
See Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United
States, 135 F.2d 715;
Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., supra; cf. Orvis v. Brickman, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 266, 270,
196 F.2d 762, 765-766;
Lavine v. Shapiro, 257 F.2d 14,
20-21.
II
I find nothing in this record to support a claim that CBS, in
proceeding as it did, was actuated by a desire to restrain or
monopolize trade.
It appears from questions asked of Stanton and Salant, two CBS
officers, that petitioner sought to imply an unlawful motive to
destroy competition from CBS' failure to negotiate with him in the
first instance for the purchase of WCAN. Were it shown that
respondents refused to consider purchasing petitioner's instead of
Bartell's station, although the former was available on
satisfactory
Page 368 U. S. 481
terms, such a showing might be some evidence of an intent to
eliminate petitioner as a competitor of the other station bought by
CBS. But the record shows that respondents throughout insisted that
their refusal to deal with petitioner was the result of information
that he had placed an exorbitant price on his station. That
insistence, which Poller did not controvert or himself impugn, is
confirmed by his own computation of damages in this case, as well
as by his deposition testimony which reveals that he valued the
WCAN property at $2,000,000 and demanded that price of all
interested purchasers. CBS bought the Bartell station, although, to
be sure, it had substantially inferior facilities, for
$335,000.
Nor is there any evidence in the record to indicate that the
respondents anticipated petitioner's offer to sell his facilities
to CBS. It is clear from the affidavits and depositions, and is, in
fact, conceded in petitioner's brief before this Court, that it was
petitioner who initiated the negotiations and "importuned CBS to
take his equipment off his hands." Petitioner contends that the
respondents knew he would have no use for the recently enlarged
plant once his CBS affiliation was canceled, so that his offer of
sale was a necessary consequence of the disaffiliation. But this
proves only that petitioner's injury may as readily have been the
result of CBS' lawful program of expansion as of an invidious
scheme to restrain competition. It buttresses the conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals (109 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 173, 176,
284 F.2d 599, 602, 605) that the diminution in the value of
petitioner's property was attributable to petitioner's imprudent
investment, [
Footnote 2/8] rather
than to any antitrust conspiracy
Page 368 U. S. 482
by the respondents. In addition, petitioner's surmise that the
respondents must have known that the cancellation of Poller's
affiliation would result in his offering his equipment to CBS is
hardly consistent with the fact, sworn to by Salant and never
traversed, that CBS had its engineering department draw up complete
plans as to how the Bartell facilities could be expanded to make
them suitable for CBS' intended use.
Finally, it is entirely clear from the record that petitioner
was unable to prove that the respondents' motive was to eliminate
his station. It is undisputed that, at the time Holt obtained the
option on the Bartell station, both the American Broadcasting and
DuMont networks had no primary affiliates in the Milwaukee market.
There is nothing to indicate that respondents should have
anticipated at the birth of their alleged conspiracy that such
affiliations would be unavailable to petitioner if the CBS tie were
broken. Moreover, it is patent from the terms of the contract under
which CBS purchased petitioner's equipment that petitioner
represented to the respondents that he would continue broadcasting
operations as an independent from the studio formerly occupied by
Bartell. [
Footnote 2/9] It was only
after this representation was made, albeit, as petitioner now
claims, with only "about a 5 percent
Page 368 U. S. 483
hope" that he would be able to continue, that the exchange of
facilities was consummated. The transaction was in all ways
consistent with the parties' written intention to maintain two
operating UHF stations in Milwaukee. For it was surely much more
likely that petitioner could survive as an independent by using the
smaller Bartell plant than by remaining in his enlarged studio,
which had absorbed a large amount of capital that could not, at
least immediately, be put to fruitful use.
In sum, the District Court had before it on this motion for
summary judgment a record on which it was apparent that petitioner
could prove only that CBS had undertaken to cancel its affiliation
with petitioner's station and, with Holt's assistance, to purchase
a competing UHF station. Only if such a "conspiracy" is prohibited
by § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act should the petitioner have been
permitted to proceed to trial.
III
Respondents freely admit that the purchase of the Bartell
station and the cancellation of petitioner's affiliation were parts
of one course of action. They maintain, however, that their
intention was to purchase a UHF station in Milwaukee as the first
step in an incipient program of expansion into the UHF market, made
possible by the Federal Communications Commission's then recently
adopted "5-and-2" amendment to its multiple ownership rule. By
reason of this amendment, a single licensee was permitted to own
two UHF stations in addition to the maximum five VHF stations
theretofore allowed. I would hold that an arrangement to attain
this objective did not, of itself, violate § 1 of the Sherman
Act.
It must be obvious that the cancellation of an affiliation
agreement by one network, not acting in concert with any other,
does not alone give rise to a cause of action under the antitrust
laws.
Federal Broadcasting System, Inc.,
Page 368 U. S. 484
v. American Broadcasting Co., 167 F.2d 349. A network
is surely free to cut its ties to one station and affiliate with
another in the same market. Such an act is analogous to a
manufacturer's transfer of an exclusive distributorship from one
dealer in the market to another. This freedom to choose with whom
one deals is preserved under the antitrust laws not only because it
is a unilateral decision, but because it does not amount to an
unreasonable restraint of trade in any meaningful sense of the
term,
cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,
100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418;
Fargo Glass & Paint Co.
v. Globe American Corp., 201 F.2d 534.
To overcome these apparent barriers to any holding that § 1 of
the Sherman Act was here violated, petitioner suggests two theories
under which respondents' conduct might constitute a forbidden
restraint of trade: (1) that, by reason of the "leverage of its
network power," CBS was able to restrain trade among the
independently owned UHF stations in the Milwaukee area; and (2)
that CBS' purchase of a television station amounted,
per
se, to an unreasonable restraint of trade. How either of these
alleged restraints, assuming they are unlawful, caused petitioner's
alleged loss is left a mystery. Regardless of any question of
causation, however, petitioner can prevail on neither theory.
To the extent that the "leverage" complained of charges CBS with
monopolizing a market, petitioner's claim falls under § 2, a matter
to which I will revert in a moment.
Infra, pp.
368 U. S.
485-486. Apart from monopoly power, the respondents
could have violated the antitrust laws only by conspiring in some
manner to use CBS' "leverage" to restrain trade. Clearly, the
disaffiliation alone was not an unlawful use of the network's
power. Having built up the value of his station substantially
because of its CBS affiliation, petitioner is hardly in a position
to claim that, by depriving him, in the exercise of a contract
right, of
Page 368 U. S. 485
the benefit of such an affiliation, CBS was unreasonably
exercising its superior power to restrain trade. And there is no
indication in the record that this "leverage" in any way affected
the purchase price of petitioner's equipment, even were it to be
assumed that the respondents foresaw that petitioner would be
willing to sell. The charges here are unlike those in
United
States v. Radio Corporation of America, 158 F.
Supp. 333,
reversed, 358 U. S. 358 U.S.
334, in which the Government sought to enjoin, as violating § 1, a
network's attempt to coerce an independent owner into selling his
station to the network under threat of canceling the network's
affiliation with other stations under the same ownership. In this
case, there is no claim made that CBS conditioned the continuation
of some network service upon petitioner's consent to sell his
equipment, or on his willingness to reduce his price.
Nor can I agree that the contract whereby CBS became a station
owner in the Milwaukee market was, in and of itself, a contract in
restraint of trade. Petitioner is unable to point to any convincing
differences between the vertical integration that is accomplished
when a network purchases a station and that which results from an
affiliation contract. Moreover, the very contention now being made
here by the petitioner has repeatedly been presented to the Federal
Communications Commission, and that agency has consistently adhered
to the view that network ownership of stations, subject, of course,
to the maximum ownership limitation, is not contrary to the public
interest.
E.g., ABC-Paramount Merger, 8 Pike and Fischer
Radio Reg. 541;
St. Louis Telecast, Inc., 12 Pike and
Fischer Radio Reg. 1289, 1372;
National Broadcasting Co.,
20 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 411, 419.
This Court has also been reluctant to hold that vertical
expansion alone can amount to an unreasonable restraint prohibited
by § 1 of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U. S. 131,
334 U. S.
173-174;
United
Page 368 U. S. 486
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.
S. 495,
334 U. S. 525.
Without, of course, suggesting that the Federal Communications
Commission has authority to alleviate an applicant for a station
license from the requirements of the antitrust laws,
United
States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U.
S. 334, in light of the uniform course of decisions by
the agency familiar with the field, and in the absence of any
indication that this particular purchase in fact restrained trade,
I think it is clear that petitioner's injury, even if it be assumed
partially attributable to CBS' purchase, may not be made the basis
of a treble damage action.
Petitioner's § 2 claim is, if anything, even more insubstantial.
He contends that respondents conspired to monopolize the UHF market
in Milwaukee, and perhaps across the country, and that they
succeeded in their attempt, at least in Milwaukee. But it is
undisputed that the television sets being produced and sold in the
Milwaukee area at the time of the alleged conspiracy were all
equipped to receive VHF broadcasts, and could be adapted to receive
UHF signals as well. Thus, any UHF station was necessarily in
competition with all VHF stations in the market with respect to
both the viewing and the advertising public. Indeed, as the record
uncontrovertedly shows, the CBS station ultimately succumbed
because the VHF competition was too strong. Since CBS was patently
not a monopolist in the Milwaukee market (which included both UHF
and VHF), and since there was no allegation that it approached
monopoly power in any other market in which petitioner was a
competitor, the entry of summary judgment in favor of the
respondents on this claim too was eminently correct.
I have gone into this matter at some length because, in my
opinion, the Court's encouragement of this sort of antitrust
"enforcement" does disservice to the healthy observance of these
laws. I would affirm.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Under 15 U.S.C. § 15,
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws is given a
private right of action."
[
Footnote 2/2]
The last of these allegations was not included in the complaint,
since the station acquired by CBS did not cease operations until
after this suit was brought. It was alleged, however, in
petitioner's supplemental affidavit in response to the motion for
summary judgment.
[
Footnote 2/3]
If such issues of fact were open and petitioner could prove at
the trial that respondents' motives were unlawful, I think it would
still be incumbent upon him to prove that the disaffiliation of
WCAN was part of the illegal scheme. There is evidence in the
record, not contradicted, tending to show that CBS would have
canceled that affiliation without regard to its purchase of the
Bartell station. If so, much, if not all, of petitioner's alleged
loss would have been incurred because of this unilateral act, and
not "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
[
Footnote 2/4]
While I do not reach respondents' contention that no consensual
arrangement of any kind was shown, I must say that the Court has
stretched very fair in suggesting that Holt may have been a
"conspirator." The record shows, beyond any real possibility of
contradiction, that Holt was simply engaged by CBS to act for it,
as undisclosed principal, in procuring from Bartell an option to
purchase WOKY. So far as Bartell is concerned, it stands
uncontroverted in the record that he never knew of CBS' interest in
Holt's option until it was exercised by CBS.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The record shows that the undisclosed employment of Holt was due
to CBS' desire to keep its competitors, particularly the National
Broadcasting Company, from knowledge of its intentions respecting
WOKY. This is, of course, a perfectly normal business
phenomenon.
[
Footnote 2/6]
There is no suggestion that petitioner was not afforded
opportunity to examine any witness he wanted, either before or
after respondents made their motion for summary judgment.
[
Footnote 2/7]
The assertion that respondents sought to destroy "the UHF
industry . . . because of the enormous economic investment they had
in VHF," upon which the Court relies (
ante, p.
368 U. S.
469), was not made in any of the papers filed with the
District Court. It was first raised during oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment. There is nothing in the record to
support this charge except the hindsight inference arising from the
fact that, after four years of operating the UHF station in
Milwaukee, CBS discontinued it, claiming that the VHF competition
was too powerful.
The Court's opinion takes out of context certain statements in a
CBS report and infers from them that CBS was intending to make only
a short-term venture out of its UHF purchase. But a full reading of
the report in question, which was appended to petitioners'
affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, reveals
that CBS rejected the suggestion that it purchase a UHF station in
a market that was primarily VHF for the very reason that it would
have only short-term advantages. Moreover, the Court's construction
of the passage on which it relies hardly reflects its real meaning.
The central question on which the report focused was "the degree of
short-term cost and inconvenience that is to be undergone in order
to obtain the eventual gain" in the purchase of a UHF station. In
this context, the report noted that CBS television programs,
broadcast by a CBS affiliate in the area (
i.e., WCAN), had
already built up a UHF viewing market, so that the losses that
might be expected at the outset of any such venture would be
minimized. The inference is that it would be wise for CBS to
capitalize on this headstart before it was cut into by more VHF
stations, not that CBS should purchase the station and abandon it
as soon as other VHF stations entered the market.
[
Footnote 2/8]
The record shows that Poller from the beginning had
unsuccessfully tried to persuade CBS to enlarge the term of his
affiliation contract cancellation clause from six months to two
years, and that, with eyes thus open, he nonetheless proceeded with
his substantial equipment investment.
[
Footnote 2/9]
One of the introductory clauses of the contract provided:
"WHEREAS, Midwest [petitioner] has represented to CBS that
Midwest intends to continue the operation of WCAN and all business
incidental thereto, and for that purpose CBS proposes to make the
sale and transfers hereinafter set forth; . . ."
I find no persuasive basis in the record for petitioner's
assertion that this was designed as a self-serving declaration to
cloak CBS' alleged antitrust malefactions. By that same contract,
CBS sold to Poller the WOKY equipment, in part consideration for
the purchase of his equipment, the thought quite evidently being
that such equipment would suffice for his continued operations,
while the superior WCAN equipment would relieve CBS from the
necessity of completely re-equipping WOKY.