The State of Louisiana sued in a state court to enjoin the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People from
doing business in the State because of its failure to comply with a
state law requiring certain types of organizations to file annually
with the Secretary of State lists of their officers and members.
That suit was removed to a Federal District Court, and appellees
sued there for a judgment declaring unconstitutional that statute
and another requiring each nontrading association to file annually
an affidavit that none of the officers of any out-of-state
association with which it is affiliated is a member of any
Communist, Communist-front, or subversive organization. The cases
were consolidated, and, after a hearing on affidavits and oral
argument, the District Court entered a temporary injunction that
denied relief to the State and its officers and enjoined them from
enforcing thc two statutes in question.
Held: the judgment is affirmed. Pp.
366 U. S.
294-297.
(a) It is not consonant with due process to require a person to
swear to a fact that he cannot be expected to know, or,
alternatively, to refrain from a wholly lawful activity. Pp.
366 U. S.
294-295.
(b) The case is in a preliminary stage, and it is not now known
what facts will be disclosed in further hearings before the
injunction becomes final; but, if it be shown that disclosure of
the Association's membership lists results in reprisals and
hostility to members, such disclosure may not be required
consistently with the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449;
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516. Pp.
366 U. S.
295-297.
181 F. Supp. 37 affirmed.
Page 366 U. S. 294
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
One of the suits that is consolidated in this appeal was
instituted in 1956 by the then Attorney General of Louisiana
against appellee, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, in a Louisiana court and sought to enjoin it from
doing business in the State. It was removed to the federal court.
[
Footnote 1] Thereafter, NAACP
sued appellants in the federal court asking for a declaratory
judgment that two laws of Louisiana were unconstitutional. A
three-judge court was convened (28 U.S.C. § 2281) and the cases
were consolidated. After a hearing (on affidavits) and oral
argument, the court entered a temporary injunction that denied
relief to appellants and enjoined them from enforcing the two laws
in question. 181 F. Supp. 37. The case is here on appeal. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction. 364 U.S. 869.
One of the two statutes of Louisiana in question prohibits any
"non-trading" association from doing business in Louisiana if it is
affiliated with any "foreign or out of state non-trading"
association
"any of the officers or members of the board of directors of
which are members of Communist, Communist-front or subversive
organizations, as cited by the House of Congress [
sic]
un-American Activities Committee, or the United States Attorney.
[
Footnote 2]"
Every non-trading association affiliated with an
Page 366 U. S. 295
out-of-state association must file annually with Louisiana's
Secretary of State an affidavit that "none of the officers" of the
affiliate is "a member" of any such organization. [
Footnote 3] Penalties against the officers
and members are provided for failure to file the affidavit and for
false filings.
The NAACP is a New York corporation with some forty-eight
directors, twenty vice-presidents, and ten chief executive
officers. Only a few reside or work in Louisiana. The District
Court commented that the statute "would require the impossible" of
the Louisiana residents or workers. 181 F. Supp. at 40. We have
received no serious reply to that criticism. Such a requirement in
a law compounds the vices present in statutes struck down on
account of vagueness.
Cf. Winters v. New York,
333 U. S. 507. It
is not consonant with due process to require a person to swear to a
fact that he cannot be expected to know (
cf. Tot v. United
States, 319 U. S. 463) or
alternatively to refrain from a wholly lawful activity.
The other statute [
Footnote
4] requires the principal officer of
"each fraternal, patriotic, charitable, benevolent, literary,
scientific, athletic, military, or social organization, or
organization created for similar purposes"
and operating in Louisiana to file with the Secretary of State
annually "a full, complete and true list of the names and addresses
of all of the members and officers" in the State. Members of
organizations whose lists have not been filed are prohibited from
holding or attending any meeting of the organization. Criminal
penalties are attached both to officers and to members.
We are told that this law was passed in 1924 to curb the Ku Klux
Klan, but that it was never enforced against any other organization
until this litigation started; that, when the State brought its
suit, some affiliates of NAACP
Page 366 U. S. 296
in Louisiana filed membership lists; and that after those
filings, members were subjected to economic reprisals. 181 F. Supp.
at 39. The State denies that this law is presently being enforced
only against NAACP; it also challenges the assertions that
disclosure of membership in the NAACP results in reprisals. While
hearings were held before the temporary injunction issued, the case
is in a preliminary stage, and we do not know what facts further
hearings before the injunction becomes final may disclose. It is
clear from our decisions that NAACP has standing to assert the
constitutional rights of its members.
NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U. S. 449,
357 U. S. 459.
We deal with a constitutional right, since freedom of association
is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable
to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id., p.
357 U. S. 460;
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516,
361 U. S. 523.
And where it is shown, as it was in
NAACP v. Alabama,
supra, 357 U. S.
462-463, that disclosure of membership lists results in
reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is not
required.
And see Bates v. Little Rock, supra,
361 U. S.
523-524.
We are in an area where, as
Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U. S. 479,
emphasized, any regulation must be highly selective in order to
survive challenge under the First Amendment. As we there
stated:
". . . even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved."
Id., 364 U. S.
488.
The most frequent expressions of that view have been made in
cases dealing with local ordinances regulating the distribution of
literature. Broad comprehensive regulations of those First
Amendment rights have been repeatedly struck down (
Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444;
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147;
Cantwell v.
Connecticut,
Page 366 U. S. 297
310 U. S. 296),
though the power to regulate the time, manner, and place of
distribution was never doubted. As stated in
Schneider v.
State, supra, 308 U. S.
160-161, the municipal authorities have the right to
"regulate the conduct of those using the streets," to provide
traffic regulations, to prevent "throwing literature broadcast in
the streets," and the like. Yet, while public safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience can be safeguarded by regulating the time
and manner of solicitation (
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
supra, 310 U. S.
306-307), those regulations need to be "narrowly drawn
to prevent the supposed evil."
Id., 310 U. S. 307.
And see Talley v. California, 362 U. S.
60,
362 U. S.
64.
Our latest application of this principle was in
Shelton v.
Tucker, supra, where we held that, while a State has the
undoubted right to inquire into the fitness and competency of its
teachers, a detailed disclosure of every conceivable kind of
associational tie a teacher has had probed into relationships that
"could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational
competence or fitness."
Id., 364 U. S.
488.
At one extreme is criminal conduct which cannot have shelter in
the First Amendment. At the other extreme are regulatory measures
which, no matter how sophisticated, cannot be employed in purpose
or in effect to stifle, penalize, or curb the exercise of First
Amendment rights. These lines mark the area in which the present
controversy lies, as the District Court rightly observed.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART concur in the
result.
[
Footnote 1]
See also State v. NAACP, La.App., 90 So. 2d 884.
[
Footnote 2]
La.Rev.Stat., 1950, § 14:385 (1958 Supp.).
[
Footnote 3]
La.Rev.Stat., 1950, § 14:386 (1958 Supp.).
[
Footnote 4]
La.Rev.Stat., 1950, §§ 12:401 to 12:409.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins,
concurring in the judgment.
One of the important considerations that led to the enactment of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70
Page 366 U. S. 298
limiting the jurisdiction of the District Courts to grant
injunctions in labor controversies, was that such injunctions were
granted, usually by way of temporary relief, on the basis of
affidavits. I am of the view that the issues that arise in
controversies like the present one are likewise more securely
adjudicated upon a foundation of oral testimony, rather than
affidavits. At all events, I am dubious about a fixed rule, such as
that which is apparently in effect in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, barring oral testimony -- subject to
the usual safeguards of cross-examination -- in proceedings for a
temporary injunction. I assume that oral testimony will be
available in a proceeding to make the temporary injunction
permanent.
In this understanding, I concur in the judgment of the
Court.