Appellees sued in a three-judge Federal District Court for a
declaratory judgment that five Virginia statutes enacted in 1956
and never construed by the Virginia courts were unconstitutional,
and to enjoin their enforcement. Appellant moved to dismiss the
action on the ground that the District Court should not exercise
its jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes that
have not been authoritatively construed by the state courts. The
District Court found two of the statutes vague and ambiguous, and
withheld judgment on them, retaining jurisdiction, pending
construction by the state courts; but it declared the other three
unconstitutional, and enjoined their enforcement against
appellees.
Held: As to the three statutes which it held
unconstitutional, the District Court should have abstained from
deciding the merits of the issues tendered to it, and should have
retained jurisdiction until the Virginia courts had been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to construe them. Pp.
360 U. S.
168-179.
(a) The federal courts should not adjudicate the
constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation
until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity
to pass upon them. Pp.
360 U. S.
176-177.
(b) The three statutes here involved leave reasonable room for a
construction by the Virginia courts which might avoid in whole or
in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or
at least materially change the nature of the problem. Pp.
360 U.S. 177-178.
(c) These enactments should be exposed to state construction or
limiting interpretation before the federal courts are asked to
decide upon their constitutionality, so that federal judgment will
be based on something that is a complete product of the State, each
enactment as phrased by its legislature and as construed by its
highest court. P.
360 U. S.
178.
Page 360 U. S. 168
(d) Appellants having represented to this Court that they would
never prosecute appellees for conduct engaged in during the
pendency of these proceedings, the judgment of the District Court
is vacated, and the case remanded to that Court with instructions
to afford appellee a reasonable opportunity to bring appropriate
proceedings in the Virginia court, meanwhile retaining its own
jurisdiction of the case, and for further proceedings consistent
with the opinion of this Court. P.
360 U. S.
179.
159 F.
Supp. 503, judgment vacated and caue remanded.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 to hear federal constitutional challenges
against five Virginia statutes. It declared three invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and permanently enjoined the appellants from
enforcing them against the appellees; the other two statutes it
found vague and ambiguous, and accordingly retained jurisdiction
pending a construction by the state courts.
159 F.
Supp. 503. Only the former disposition was appealed. The appeal
raises two questions: first, whether, in the circumstances of this
case, the District Court should have abstained from a
constitutional adjudication, retaining the cause while the parties,
through appropriate proceedings, afforded the Virginia courts an
opportunity to construe the three statutes in light of state and
federal constitutional requirements. Second, if such an
abstention
Page 360 U. S. 169
was not called for, whether the District Court's constitutional
holdings were correct. Because of our views upon the first
question, we do not reach the second.
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Incorporated
(Fund), appellees herein, are organizations engaged in furthering
the rights of colored citizens. Both are membership corporations
organized under the laws of New York, and have registered under the
laws of Virginia as foreign corporations doing business within the
State. NAACP's principal relevant activities in Virginia are
appearing before legislative bodies and commissions in support of,
or opposition to, measures affecting the status of the Negro race
within the State, and furnishing assistance to Negroes concerned in
litigation involving their constitutional rights. Fund performs
functions similar to those of NAACP in the field of litigation, but
is precluded by its charter from attempting to influence
legislation. The revenues of NAACP are derived both from membership
dues and general contributions, those of Fund entirely from
contributions.
NAACP and Fund brought this action against the Attorney General
of Virginia and a number of other Commonwealth officials,
appellants herein, for declaratory and injunctive relief with
respect to Chapters 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 of the Acts of the
Virginia Assembly, passed in 1956. 4 Va.Code, 1958 Supp., §§
18-349.9 to 18-349.37; 7 Va.Code, 1958, §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79. The
complaint, alleging irreparable injury on account of these
enactments, sought a declaration that each infringed rights assured
under the Fourteenth Amendment and an injunction against its
enforcement. Jurisdiction was predicated upon the civil rights
statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, diversity of
citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the presence of a federal
question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Page 360 U. S. 170
The Attorney General and his codefendants moved to dismiss the
action on the ground, among others, that the District Court should
not "exercise its jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state
statutes which have not been authoritatively construed by the state
courts." The District Court, recognizing "the necessity of
maintaining the delicate balance between state and federal courts
under the concept of separate sovereigns," stated that
"the constitutionality of state statutes requiring special
competence in the interpretation of local law should not be
determined by federal courts in advance of a reasonable opportunity
afforded the parties to seek an adjudication by the state
court,"
but considered that relief should be granted where "the statute
is free from ambiguity, and there remains no reasonable
interpretation which will render it constitutional. . . ." 159 F.
Supp. at 522, 523. On this basis, the court, one judge dissenting,
held Chapters 31, 32, and 35 unconstitutional, and permanently
enjoined their enforcement against NAACP and Fund. Chapters 33 and
36, on the other hand, the court unanimously found vague and
ambiguous. It accordingly retained jurisdiction as to those
Chapters, without reaching their constitutionality, allowing the
complaining parties a reasonable time within which to obtain a
state interpretation.
The Commonwealth defendants, proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1253,
appealed to this Court the lower court's disposition of Chapters
31, 32, and 35. We noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U.S. 807. NAACP
and Fund did not appeal the disposition of Chapters 33 and 36.
The three Virginia statutes before us are lengthy, detailed, and
sweeping. Chapters 31 and 32 are registration statutes. Chapter 31
deals with the rendering of financial assistance in litigation. It
proscribes the public solicitation of funds, and the expenditure of
funds from whatever source derived, for the commencement or
further
Page 360 U. S. 171
prosecution of an "original proceeding," by any person, broadly
defined to include corporations and other entities, which is
neither a party nor possessed of a "pecuniary right or liability"
in such proceeding, unless a detailed annual filing is made with
the State Corporation Commission. If such person is a corporation,
the filing must include, among other things, (1) certified copies
of its charter and by-laws; (2) "a certified list of the names and
addresses of the officers, directors, stockholders, members, agents
and employees or other persons acting for or in (its) behalf;" (3)
a certified statement of the sources of its income, however
derived, including the names and addresses of contributors or
donors if required by the Commission; (4) a detailed certified
statement of the corporation's expenditures for the preceding year,
the objects thereof, and whatever other information relative
thereto may be required by the Commission; and (5) a certified
statement of the "counties and cities in which it proposes to or
does finance or maintain litigation to which it is not a party."
Correspondingly broad disclosures are required of individuals who
fall within the statutory proscription.
Violation of this Chapter is punishable as a misdemeanor for
individuals, and by a fine of not more than $10,000 for
corporations, plus a mandatory denial or revocation of authority to
do business within the State in the case of a foreign corporation.
An individual "acting as an agent or employee" of a corporation or
other entity with respect to activity violative of the Chapter is
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. And directors, officers, and "those
persons responsible for the management or control of the affairs"
of a corporation or other entity are made jointly and severally
liable for whatever fines might be imposed on it.
Chapter 32 deals with activities relating to the passage of
racial legislation, with advocacy of "racial integration or
segregation," and also with the raising and expenditure
Page 360 U. S. 172
of funds in connection with racial litigation. Declaring that
the "continued harmonious relations between the races are . . .
essential to the welfare, health and safety of the people of
Virginia," the Chapter finds it "vital to the public interest" that
registration be made with the State Corporation Commission by
"persons, firms, partnerships, corporations and associations whose
activities are causing or may cause interracial tension and
unrest." Specifically, under § 2 of this Chapter, annual filings
are required of
"[e]very person, firm, partnership, corporation or association,
whether by or through its agents, servants, employees, officers, or
voluntary workers or associates, who or which engages as one of its
principal functions or activities in the promoting or opposig in
any manner the passage of legislation by the General Assembly in
behalf of any race or color, or who or which has as one of its
principal functions or activities the advocating of racial
integration or segregation or whose activities cause or tend to
cause racial conflicts or violence, or who or which is engaged or
engages in raising or expending funds for the employment of counsel
or payment of costs in connection with litigation in behalf of any
race or color, in this State. . . ."
The extent of such filing is comparable to that required by
Chapter 31. The information so furnished is a matter of public
record, to "be open to the inspection of any citizen at any time
during the regular business hours of" the State Corporation
Commission.
Failure to register subjects individuals to punishment as for a
misdemeanor, and corporations to a fine not exceeding $10,000. Like
Chapter 31, Chapter 32 also makes "responsible" persons liable
jointly and severally for corporate fines. Further,
"[e]ach day's failure to
Page 360 U. S. 173
register and file the information required . . . shall
constitute a separate offense, and be punished as such."
The Chapter is not applicable to persons or organizations which
carry on the proscribed activities through matter which may qualify
as second-class mail in the United States mails, or by radio or
television, nor to persons or organizations acting in connection
with any political campaign.
Chapter 35 is a "barratry" statute. Barratry is defined as "the
offense of stirring up litigation." A "barrator" is thus a person
or organization which "stirs up litigation." Stirring up litigation
means "instigating," which, in turn, "means bringing it about that
all or part of the expenses of the litigation are paid by the
barrator," or by those, other than the plaintiffs, acting in
concert with him, "unless the instigation is justified." An
instigation is "justified" when
"the instigator is related by blood or marriage to the plaintiff
whom he instigates, or . . . is entitled by law to share with the
plaintiff in money or property that is the subject of the
litigation or . . . has a direct interest ('personal right or a
pecuniary right or liability') in the subject matter of the
litigation or occupies a position of trust in relation to the
plaintiff; or . . . is acting on behalf of a duly constituted legal
aid society approved by the Virginia State Bar which offers advice
or assistance in all kinds of legal matters to all members of the
public who come to it for advice or assistance and are unable
because of poverty to pay legal fees."
Individuals guilty of barratry as defined in the Chapter are
punishable as for a misdemeanor, and "shall" have their licenses
"to practice law or any other profession . . . revoked for such
period as provided by law." Corporations are subject to a fine of
not more than $10,000 and, if they are foreign, mandatory
revocation of their authority to do business within the State.
Moreover, a
"person who aids and abets a barrator by giving money or
rendering
Page 360 U. S. 174
services to or for the use or benefit of the barrator for
committing barratry shall be guilty of barratry and punished. . .
."
A host of exceptions to which the Chapter is not applicable is
provided; [
Footnote 1] none of
these has thus far been asserted to include, or to be capable of
including, appellees.
The majority below held Chapters 31 and 32 [
Footnote 2] unconstitutional on similar grounds,
centering its treatment of both around § 2 of Chapter 32, the
material provisions of which have already been set forth, p.
360 U. S. 172,
supra. In essence, § 2 was found to infringe rights
assured under the Fourteenth Amendment in that, taken in
conjunction with the registration requirements of the statute, (1)
the clause relating to the promoting or opposing of racial
legislation invaded rights of free speech because it was not
restricted to lobbying activities; [
Footnote 3] (2) the clause directed
Page 360 U. S. 175
at advocacy of racial "integration or segregation" had the same
infirmity because it was not supported by a compelling state
interest or some clear and present danger; [
Footnote 4] (3) the clause referring to activities
causing or tending to cause racial conflicts or violence was too
vague and indefinite to satisfy constitutional requirements;
[
Footnote 5] and (4) the clause
aimed at the raising and expending of funds in connection with
racial litigation unduly burdened the right of access to the
courts, and did not serve an interest which could support a
disclosure as broad as the one demanded. [
Footnote 6]
Chapter 35, the "barratry" statute, was held to offend due
process, in that it was found to be aimed not at the legitimate
regulation of the practice of law, but at preventing NAACP and Fund
from continuing "their legal operations." In addition, the court
held the Chapter to violate equal protection by unjustifiably
discriminating between the racial litigation activities of the
appellees and the general litigation efforts of "approved" legal
aid societies.
These constitutional holdings were made in the context of
findings that Chapters 31, 32, and 35, as well as Chapters 33 and
36, not presently before us, were passed by the Virginia
Legislature
"to nullify as far as possible the effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 . . . as parts of the general plan of massive
resistance to the integration of
Page 360 U. S. 176
schools of the state under the Supreme Court's decrees."
159 F. Supp. at 511, 515. In the view we take of this case, we
do not reach appellants' objections to these findings.
According every consideration to the opinion of the majority
below, we are nevertheless of the view that the District Court
should have abstained from deciding the merits of the issues
tendered it, so as to afford the Virginia courts a reasonable
opportunity to construe the three statutes in question. In other
words, we think that the District Court, in dealing with Chapters
31, 32, and 35, should have followed the same course that it did
with respect to Chapters 33 and 36.
This now well established procedure is aimed at the avoidance of
unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper and
validly administered state concerns, a course so essential to the
balanced working of our federal system. To minimize the possibility
of such interference, a "scrupulous regard for the rightful
independence of state governments . . . should at all times actuate
the federal courts,"
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.
S. 521,
284 U. S. 525,
as their "contribution . . . in furthering the harmonious relation
between state and federal authority. . . ."
Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496,
312 U. S. 501.
In the service of this doctrine, which this Court has applied in
many different contexts, no principle has found more consistent or
clear expression than that the federal courts should not adjudicate
the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to
interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to pass upon them.
See, e.g., Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., supra; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies,
Inc., 316 U. S. 168;
Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.
S. 101;
American Federation of Labor v. Watson,
327 U. S. 582;
Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U. S. 321;
Albertson v.
Millard, 345 U.S.
Page 360 U. S. 177
242;
Government & Civic Employees v. Windsor,
353 U. S. 364.
This principle does not, of course, involve the abdication of
federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise; it
serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention;
and it spares the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional
adjudication.
See Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.,
supra, at
316 U. S.
172-173.
The present case, in our view, is one which calls for the
application of this principle, since we are unable to agree that
the terms of these three statutes leave no reasonable room for a
construction by the Virginia courts which might avoid in whole or
in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or
at least materially change the nature of the problem.
It certainly cannot be said that Chapter 35 does not require a
construction by the state courts. As appellants asserted here and
in the court below, the Chapter might well be read as requiring a
"stirring up" of litigation in the conventional common law sense,
in addition to the "unjustified" payment of litigation expenses.
Were it to be so read, the statute might then not even apply to
these appellees, since the lower court found the evidence
"uncontradicted that the initial steps which have led to the
institution and prosecution of racial suits in Virginia with the
assistance of the Association and the Fund have not been taken
until the prospective plaintiffs made application to one or the
other of the corporations for help."
159 F. Supp. at 533. Further, the "personal right" component of
"direct interest" in the statutory definition of "justified"
instigation (
see p.
360 U. S. 173,
supra) might lend itself to a construction which would
embrace nonparty Negro contributors to litigation expense,
including NAACP because of the relationship of that organization to
its members.
Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.
S. 449.
The possibility of limiting interpretation, characteristic of
constitutional adjudication, also cannot be ignored.
Page 360 U. S. 178
Government & Civic Employees v. Windsor, supra. The
"advocacy" clause of Chapter 32, for example, might be construed as
reaching only that directed at the incitement of violence.
Cf.
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298.
Similar construction might be employed with respect to the clause
in that Chapter relating to the influencing of legislation "in any
manner,"
cf. United States v. Harriss, supra; United States v.
Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. And,
in connection with these and the membership and contributor list
requirements of Chapters 31 and 32,
cf. NAACP v. Alabama,
supra, we note that Chapter 32 contains a separability clause,
and that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia treats
legislative acts as separable, where possible, even in the absence
of such an express provision.
See Woolfolk v. Driver, 186
Va. 174, 41 S.E.2d 463.
We do not intimate the slightest view as to what effect any such
determinations might have upon the validity of these statutes. All
we hold is that these enactments should be exposed to state
construction or limiting interpretation before the federal courts
are asked to decide upon their constitutionality, so that federal
judgment will be based on something that is a complete product of
the State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as
construed by its highest court. The Virginia declaratory judgment
procedure, 2 Va.Code, 1950, §§ 8-578 to 8-585, which the appellees
are now pursuing with reference to Chapters 33 and 36, also
provides an expeditious avenue here. And, of course, we shall not
assume that the Virginia courts will not do their full duty in
judging these statutes in light of state and federal constitutional
requirements.
Because of its findings, amply supported by the evidence, that
the existence and threatened enforcement of these statutes worked
great and immediate irreparable injury on appellees, the District
Court's abstention with respect to Chapters 33 and 36 proceeded on
the assumption
Page 360 U. S. 179
"that the defendants will continue to cooperate, as they have in
the past, in withholding action under the authority of the statutes
until a final decision is reached. . . ."
159 F. Supp. at 534. In this Court, counsel for the appellants
has given similar assurances with respect to the three statutes
presently before us, assurances which we understand embrace also
the intention of these appellants never to proceed against
appellees under any of these enactments with respect to activities
engaged in during the full pendency of this litigation. While there
is no reason to suppose that such assurances will not be honored by
these or other Virginia officials not parties to this litigation,
the District Court, of course, possesses ample authority in this
action, or in such supplemental proceedings as may be initiated, to
protect the appellees while this case goes forward.
Accordingly, the judgment below will be vacated, and the case
remanded to the District Court with instructions to afford the
appellees a reasonable opportunity to bring appropriate proceedings
in the Virginia courts, meanwhile retaining its own jurisdiction of
the case, and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
"This article shall not be applicable to attorneys who are
parties to contingent fee contracts with their clients where the
attorney does not protect the client from payment of the costs and
expense of litigation, nor shall this article apply to any matter
involving annexation, zoning, bond issues, or the holding or
results of any election or referendum, nor shall this article apply
to suits pertaining to or affecting possession of or title to real
or personal property, regardless of ownership, nor shall this
article apply to suits involving the legality of assessment or
collection of taxes or the rates thereof, nor shall this article
apply to suits involving rates or charges or services by common
carriers or public utilities, nor shall this article apply to
criminal prosecutions, nor to the payment of attorneys by legal aid
societies approved by the Virginia State Bar, nor to proceedings to
abate nuisances. Nothing herein shall be construed to be in
derogation of the constitutional rights of real parties in interest
to employ counsel or to prosecute any available legal remedy under
the laws of this State."
[
Footnote 2]
Chief Judge Hutcheson, the dissenting judge, did not reach the
constitutionality of any of these statutes, because of his views on
the "abstention" issue.
[
Footnote 3]
In this, the District Court relied on
United States v.
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612.
[
Footnote 4]
The lower court cited, among other cases,
American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.
S. 382;
Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S.
47;
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.
S. 494;
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.
60;
Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U. S. 233;
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; and
distinguished
New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U. S. 63.
[
Footnote 5]
Citing
United States v. Harriss, supra.
[
Footnote 6]
On the latter ground, the court distinguished such cases as
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, and
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.
S. 534; and cited
Thomas v. Collins, supra.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN concur, dissenting.
The rule invoked by the Court to require the Federal District
Court to keep hands off this litigation until the state court has
construed these laws is a judge-made rule. It was fashioned in 1941
in the decision of
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496, as
a device to avoid needless decisions under the Federal Constitution
where a resolution of state law questions might make those
adjudications unnecessary. Since that time, the rule of the
Pullman case has been greatly expanded. It
Page 360 U. S. 180
has indeed been extended so far as to make the presence in
federal court litigation of a state law question a convenient
excuse for requiring the federal court to hold its hand while a
second litigation is undertaken in the state court. This is a
delaying tactic that may involve years of time, and that inevitably
doubles the cost of litigation. When used widespread, it dilutes
the stature of the Federal District Courts, making them secondary
tribunals in the administration of justice under the Federal
Constitution.
With all due deference, this case seems to me to be the most
inappropriate one of all in which to withhold the hand of the
Federal District Court. Congress has ordained in the Civil Rights
Act that
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State . . . to sue, be parties, give
evidence . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 1981. It has subjected to suit
"Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the
Constitution and laws. . . ."
42 U.S.C. § 1983; and has given the District Courts "original
jurisdiction" of actions
"to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, . . .
of any right . . . secured by the Constitution of the United States
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens. .
. ."
28 U.S.C. § 1343. The latter section was invoked here. From the
time when Congress first implemented the Fourteenth Amendment by
the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1871, the thought has
prevailed that the federal courts are the unique tribunals which
are to be utilized to preserve the civil rights of the people.
Representative Dawes, in the debate on the 1871 bill, asked "what
is the proper method of thus securing the free and undisturbed
enjoyment of these rights?" Looking to the Act which eventually
Page 360 U. S. 181
became law, he answered,
"The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the
courts of the United States.
* Is that a proper place in
which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be power to
call into the courts of the United States an offender against these
rights, privileges and immunities, and hold him to account there, I
submit . . . that there is no tribunal so fitted, where equal and
exact justice would be more likely to be meted out in temper, in
moderation, in severity, if need be, but always according to the
law and fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1871).
It seems plain to me that it was the District Court's duty to
provide this remedy, if the appellees, who invoked that court's
jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, proved their charge that
the appellants, under the color of the Virginia statutes, had
deprived them of civil rights secured by the Federal Constitution.
See Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496,
307 U. S.
530-532.
Judge Soper, speaking for the three-judge District Court, said
that the five statutes against which the suits were directed "were
enacted for the express purpose of impeding the integration of the
races in the public schools" of Virginia.
159 F.
Supp. 503, 511. He reviewed at length the legislative history
of the five Virginia statutes (
id., 511-515) concluding
that "they were
Page 360 U. S. 182
passed to nullify as far as possible the effect of the decision"
of this Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483;
349 U. S. 349 U.S.
294.
Id., 159 F. Supp. 511. They were indeed "parts of the
general plan of massive resistance" which Virginia inaugurated
against those decisions.
Id., 515.
Of course, Virginia courts were not parties to the formulation
of that legislative program. But they are interpreters of Virginia
laws, and bound to construe them, if possible, so that the
legislative purpose is not frustrated. Where state laws made such
an assault as these do on our decisions and a State has spoken
defiantly against the constitutional rights of the citizens,
reasons for showing deference to local institutions vanish. The
conflict is plain and apparent; and the federal courts stand as the
one authoritative body for enforcing the constitutional right of
the citizens.
This Court has had before it other state schemes intended to
emasculate constitutional provisions or circumvent our
constitutional decisions. In
Guinn v. United States,
238 U. S. 347, a
"Grandfather Clause" in an Oklahoma suffrage statute, exempting
citizens who were qualified to vote on January 1, 1866, and their
lineal descendants from the requirements of a literacy test was
said to have "no discernible reason other than the purpose to
disregard the prohibitions of the [Fifteenth] Amendment," and was
struck down because in "direct and positive disregard" of that
Amendment.
Id., at
238 U. S. 363,
238 U. S. 365.
Oklahoma sought to avoid the effects of that decision (rendered in
1915) by requiring all qualified voters in 1916 to register within
a named 12-day period, else the right to vote would be lost to them
permanently. Persons who voted in the 1914 election were, however,
exempt from the requirement. The new statute was invalidated, this
Court noting that the Fifteenth Amendment barred "sophisticated, as
well as simple-minded," "contrivances by a state to thwart equality
in
Page 360 U. S. 183
the enjoyment of the right to vote."
Lane v. Wilson,
307 U. S. 268,
307 U. S. 275.
The Boswell Amendment to the Alabama Constitution required
prospective voters to understand and explain a section of the
Alabama Constitution to the satisfaction of a registrar. A
three-judge court found it to be a device, in purpose and in
practice, to perpetuate racial distinctions in regulation of
suffrage. We affirmed the judgment without requiring any submission
of the amendment to the state courts to see how they might narrow
it.
Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933,
affirming 81 F. Supp.
872. All these cases originated in federal courts and
implicated state laws evasive of our decisions; and we decided them
without rerouting them through the state courts.
A similar history is evidenced by the "White Primary" cases. It
starts with
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.
S. 536, where a Texas statute prohibiting Negroes from
participating in Democratic Party primary elections was
characterized as a "direct and obvious infringement" of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. As a result of that
decision, the Texas Legislature enacted a new statute authorizing
the State Executive Committee of a political party to prescribe the
qualifications for voters in its primary elections. Pursuant
thereto, the Democratic Party Committee adopted a resolution
limiting the voting privilege to white Democrats. Finding that the
Committee was an arm of the State, and that it discharged its power
in such a way as to "discriminate invidiously between white
citizens and black," this Court overturned the restriction.
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73,
286 U. S. 89. In
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, we
held that approval by the state party convention of he
discriminating prohibition did not save it.
And see Terry v.
Adams, 345 U. S. 461.
These cases too originated in federal courts and were aimed at
state laws at war with our decisions. Here, again, we decided them
without
Page 360 U. S. 184
making the parties first repair to the state courts for a
construction of the state statutes.
We need not -- we should not -- give deference to a state policy
that seeks to undermine paramount federal law. We fail to perform
the duty expressly enjoined by Congress on the federal judiciary in
the Civil Rights Acts when we do so.
To return to the present case: the error, if any, of the
District Court was not in passing on the constitutionality of three
of the five Virginia statutes now before us, but in remitting the
parties to the Virginia courts for a construction of the other
two.
* It was not until 1875 that Congress gave the federal courts
general jurisdiction over federal question cases. 18 Stat. 470. The
choice made in the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871 to utilize
the federal courts to insure the equal rights of the people was a
deliberate one, reflecting a belief that some state courts, which
were charged with original jurisdiction in the normal federal
question case, might not be hospitable to claims of deprivation of
civil rights. Whether or not that premise is true today, the fact
remains that there has been no alteration of the congressional
intent to make the federal courts the primary protector of the
legal rights secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
the Civil Rights Acts.