168 F. Supp. 382 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
On July 23, 1954, an information was filed in the District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania charging appellee with a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 214 (originally § 1 of the Act of December
11, 1926, 44 Stat. 918). That statute provides:
"Whoever pays or offers or promises any money or thing of value,
to any person, firm, or corporation
Page 359 U. S. 256
in consideration of the use or promise to use any influence to
procure any appointive office or place under the United States for
any person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both."
The information alleged that appellee had offered S. Walter
Stauffer, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, to contribute
$1,000 a year to the Republican Party in consideration of
Stauffer's use of influence to procure for appellee the
postmastership of York, Pennsylvania. The District Court granted a
motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute an offense against the United States. 168 F. Supp. 382.
The Government appealed directly to this Court, 18 U.S.C. § 3731,
and we noted probable jurisdiction, 358 U.S. 806, to determine
whether the allegations of the information constituted a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 214. [
Footnote
1]
We turn first to the language of the statute. There are
alternative constructions of its language. One sensible reading is
to say that, even though the Republican Party was to be the
ultimate recipient of the money, this was a promise to Stauffer of
money (which it plainly was) in consideration of his use of
influence. Since Stauffer is a "person," the statute covers the
alleged offense. It may be urged that, although a promise was made
to
Page 359 U. S. 257
Stauffer, it was not a promise of money to him. Since the word
"to" immediately follows the words "money or thing of value," and
not the word "promises," it is possible to read the statute as
requiring that the recipient of the money or thing of value be the
"person, firm, or corporation" which the statute describes. But
either construction of the statute covers the classic three-party
case:
e.g., A tells X he will give $1,000 to Y if X will
use influence to get him a job. Under the first construction, this
is a promise of $1,000 to X in consideration of the use of
influence. Under the second construction, this is a promise to give
money to Y in consideration of a promise to use influence; a
standard third-party beneficiary situation. The only difficulty
with this second construction in the context of this case is the
necessity of finding that the Republican Party is a "person firm,
or corporation," as those words are used in the statute. The
Republican Party is not a legal entity. It is an amorphous group of
individuals that acts and only can act through persons. Its funds
are received and managed by persons. Certainly the word "person" in
the statute is broad enough to include the Republican Party, and,
since the content and manifest purpose of the statute confirm, as
we shall see, such a construction, it would unjustifiably contract
the law to withdraw gifts to the Republican Party from its scope.
[
Footnote 2]
Page 359 U. S. 258
Thus, no matter how the statute is read, one thing is clear --
its terms cover this case. Shirey's endeavor to purchase himself a
postmastership, as alleged, has been interdicted by the Congress.
Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings,
each of which is satisfied by the allegations of the information,
constitute a want of definiteness.
Not only does the compulsion of language within the statutory
framework seem clear, but the purpose and history of the enactment
powerfully reaffirm the meaning
Page 359 U. S. 259
yielded by its language. The bill was first introduced in
Congress with a Committee Report which stated:
"This bill seeks to punish the purchase and sale of public
offices. Certain Members of Congress have brought to the attention
of the House both by speeches on the floor and statements before
the Judiciary Committee a grave situation, disclosing corruption in
connection with postal appointments in Mississippi and South
Carolina. It is believed that this bill will prevent corrupt
practices in connection with patronage appointments in the
future."
H.R.Rep. No. 1366, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
The information in this case deals with the very kind of
situation that gave rise to the provision under scrutiny. In the
years preceding the enactment of this legislation, members of
Congress referred to contributions to party treasuries and to
campaign funds, as well as direct payments to those in charge of
patronage, as among the corrupt methods of obtaining
postmasterships. [
Footnote 3]
See, e.g., 65 Cong.Rec. 1408-1413. These revelations on
the floor of the Congress, as disclosed by the authoritative
history of enactment, indicate the aim of Congress to proscribe
Page 359 U. S. 260
payments to political parties in return for influence. Indeed,
this form of payment was a major concern of Congress. Certainly we
cannot infer that Congress expressed this concern in self-defeating
terms. [
Footnote 4]
Statutes, including penal enactments, are not inert exercises in
literary composition. They are instruments of government, and, in
construing them, "the general purpose is a more important aid to
the meaning than any
Page 359 U. S. 261
rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down."
United
States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135,
197 U. S. 143.
This is so because the purpose of an enactment is embedded in its
words, even though it is not always pedantically expressed in
words.
See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.
S. 396,
280 U. S. 399.
Statutory meaning, it is to be remembered, is more to be felt than
demonstrated,
see United States v. Johnson, 221 U.
S. 488,
221 U. S. 496,
or, as Judge Learned Hand has put it, the art of interpretation is
"the art of proliferation a purpose."
Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 451. In ascertaining this purpose,
it is important to remember that, no matter how elastic is the use
to which the term scientific may be put, it cannot be used to
describe the legislative process. That is a crude but practical
process of the adaptation by the ordinary citizen of means to an
end, except when it concerns technical problems beyond the ken of
the average man.
Applying these generalities to the immediate occasion, it is
clear that the terms, the history, and the manifest purpose of 18
U.S.C. § 214 coalesce in a construction of that statute which
validates the information against Shirely. [
Footnote 5] The evil which Congress sought to check and
the mischief wrought by what it proscribed are the same when the
transaction is triangular as when only two parties are
Page 359 U. S. 262
involved. [
Footnote 6] It is
incredible to suppose that Congress meant to prohibit Shirey from
giving $1,000 to Stauffer, to be passed on by the latter to the
Party fund, but that Shirey was outside the congressional
prohibition for securing the same influence by a promise to deposit
$1,000 directly in the Party's fund. That is not the kind of
finessing by which this Court has heretofore allowed penal
legislation to be construed.
See, e.g., United States v.
Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, and
United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385.
The judgment is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The information charges as follows:
"On or about the 5th day of December 1953, in the City of York,
Middle District of Pennsylvania, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, George Donald Shirey, in violation of the Act of
Congress, June 25, 1948, c. 645, Sec. 1, 62 Stat. 694, 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 214, did Knowingly, Wilfully and Unlawfully offer or promise
to S. Walter Stauffer, a Member of Congress of the 19th
Congressional District of Pennsylvania, to donate $1,000 a year to
the Republican Party to be used as they see fit, in consideration
of the use or the promise to use any influence to procure for him
the appointive office, under the United States, of Postmaster of
York, Pennsylvania."
[
Footnote 2]
Whether the word "person" in a particular statute includes a
particular body, a corporation, or association is essentially a
matter of construction of that statute, aided, where possible, by
general statutory definitions. If the purpose of a statute is such
as to dictate the inclusion of a particular body within its scope
then the statute is generally so interpreted. Since 18 U.S.C. § 214
was aimed at prohibiting the purchase of influence, it is difficult
to conclude that Congress would prohibit payments to firms and
corporations and not proscribe payments to political organizations,
since the influence of political parties in securing jobs and their
involvement in the patronage process is greater than that of
private companies. We must be blind not to know that, among the
abuses which led to the legislation were gifts to political parties
and campaign treasuries, etc. Although these mostly took the form
of payments to local chairmen, etc., there is no reason to assume
that Congress meant to proscribe the payment to the officer of the
Party, but, if a check were made out to the Party itself, a check
which could be cashed and used by the officers of the Party, it was
not outlawed.
In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, the
Court decided that § 7 of the Sherman Act, allowing "any person" to
bring a treble damage action, allowed the State of Georgia to bring
such an action. This was in the face of an earlier case holding
that the same act did not allow the United States to sue. In
reconciling the cases, the Court pointed out that the scope of the
word "person" depended on its "legislative environment," and
pointed to the differences in considerations which led to the
exclusion of the United States and the inclusion of Georgia.
In
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, a
statute taxed "persons" selling liquor. "Person" was defined to
include "partnership, association, company, or corporation, as well
as a natural person." The Court decided this allowed a State to be
taxed, saying that the meaning of the word person "depends upon the
connection in which the word is found."
In
Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.
S. 508, the Court said that the word "person" in a Texas
statute of limitations included the United States, and, thus, the
United States could claim the benefit of the statute. The Court
said that "the word "person" in the statute would include them as a
body politic and corporate."
Under these principles, the statutory context here clearly calls
for including the Republican Party within the term "person."
[
Footnote 3]
The bill was introduced by Congressman Stevenson. 67 Cong.Rec.
6419. Two years before, in describing the "corruption in connection
with postal appointments in . . . South Carolina" to which the
Committee Report refers, Congressman Stevenson said, in response to
the question "where did this money finally find its home?":
"I do not know. As I said here once before, I doubt if much of
it gets to the Republican executive committee, but I do not care
where it goes. Either it goes into his pocket and the pockets of
his machine or it goes into the coffers of the Republican Party. If
it does, it is the most blatant defiance of the civil service law
that any party has ever had the hardihood to put over, and it is as
disgraceful as the Teapot Dome proposition any day."
65 Cong.Rec. 1410.
[
Footnote 4]
When the bill which became § 1 of the Act of December 11, 1926
(now 18 U.S.C. § 214) was introduced in the House, it was coupled
with a bill requiring the filing of an affidavit by certain
officers of the United States. (This bill, with changes from its
original wording, is now 5 U.S.C. § 21a.) Mr. Graham, introducing
both bills, said:
"They are correlative. I promised the committee and the
gentlemen who are proponents of the bill that I would try to get
unanimous consent to consider both bills together."
67 Cong.Rec. 10840.
The text of this "correlative" bill was as follows:
"
Be it enacted, etc., That each individual hereafter
appointed as an officer of the United States by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the President
alone, or by a court of law, or by the head of a department, shall,
within 30 days after the effective date of his appointment, file
with the Comptroller General of the United States an affidavit
under oath stating that neither he nor anyone acting in his behalf
has given, transferred, or paid any consideration for or in the
expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such
appointment."
"
* * * *"
"Sec. 3. When used in this Act, the term 'consideration'
includes a payment, distribution, gift, subscription, loan,
advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value, or a contract,
promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make
such a payment, distribution, gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit."
Ibid.
This Act has been since amended, but the portions here relevant
-- the last phrases of § 1 -- remain unchanged. This is the
affidavit Shirey would have to file were he appointed Postmaster of
York. It is clear that he could not truthfully file such an
affidavit if the allegations of the information are true. The fact
that the sponsor of both bills expressly declared them to be
correlative is persuasive evidence that an act which would make the
oath impossible to take is a violation of § 214.
[
Footnote 5]
This Court reviews judgments, not arguments assailing them or
seeking to sustain them.
See Williams v. United States,
168 U. S. 382,
168 U. S. 389.
The judgment which the Government brought here for review under the
Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 is that "[t]he information does not
state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United
States." The correctness of this judgment depends on the
construction of 18 U.S.C. § 214, and, more particularly, whether
that section supports the allegations of the information. Arguments
invoked by the Government do not determine the meaning of a
statute, nor do they define the scope of our inquiry into its
meaning. If § 214 brings the allegations of this information within
its scope, an offense is charged, and the course of the
Government's reasoning is beside the point.
[
Footnote 6]
It is claimed that, because § 2 of the Act of December 11, 1926,
44 Stat. 918, which deals with the user of influence, is restricted
in scope to the "payee" of the money or thing of value, a similar
restriction must be read into § 1. There is not one shred of
evidence in the legislative history or in the statutes themselves
to indicate that the two sections are in any way to be read "
in
pari materia." In fact, normal principles of statutory
construction tell us that the use of the word "payee" in § 2, and
its absence in § 1, is convincing evidence that the provisions are
different in scope, and not congruent. A look at the other statutes
in the bribery and graft section of 18 U.S.C. shows that the
wording of other Acts directed to the receipt and offer of bribes,
etc., is not identical in the statute directed to offer and that
directed to receipt. Whether this would mean a difference in
ultimate construction is not now our concern.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
The argument that § 214 requires the payment of money or other
thing of value be made to the person who is to use his influence
"to procure" an "appointive office" is not frivolous. The
legislative history shows that that was one of the evils against
which Congress acted. But I am also convinced that Congress moved
against the other evil as well -- payment to a political party for
the use of "influence to procure any appointive office." The abuse
in appointing postmasters during the Coolidge administration was
the occasion for the law; and then, as now (if the allegations in
the information are to be
Page 359 U. S. 263
believed) payments for those offices sometimes went to the
party, sometimes to a politician. As Congressman Stevenson, who
later introduced the measure in the House, said in answering a
question as to who gets the money paid for "the appointive
office":
"Either it goes into his pocket and the pockets of his machine
or it goes into the coffers of the Republican Party. If it does, it
is the most blatant defiance of the civil service law that any
party has ever had the hardihood to put over, and it is as
disgraceful as the Teapot Dome proposition any day."
65 Cong.Rec. 1410.
The words used in § 214 are broad enough to include both
evils.
I have sometimes felt, as my dissents show (
see United
States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299,
319 U. S. 331;
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.
S. 273,
346 U. S. 310;
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.
S. 121,
358 U. S.
127), that the Court has not always construed a criminal
statute so as to resolve doubts in favor of the citizen. But that
principle -- as highly preferred as any in a government of laws --
does no service here. To hold the conduct charged in this
information outside the Act is to find ambiguities and doubts not
obvious on the face of the legislation nor justifiably imputed from
the legislative history. The inclusion in the original version of §
215 of limiting words can indicate no more than that Congress
intended a narrower scope for that section than for § 214. It does
not show that § 214 was to be similarly narrowed.
Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE
WHITTAKER, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
The Government's primary contention in this case is that an
offer to a Congressman to make contributions of
Page 359 U. S. 264
money to his political party is an offer of a "thing of value"
to that Congressman within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 214. The
Court, in ignoring this contention, appears to believe that it is
not supportable. The Court holds, however, that the information
here involved nevertheless states an offense under § 214 on either
of two theories, (1) that the offer alleged is an offer of money to
Congressman Stauffer (a theory not even advanced by the
Government), or (2) that the Republican Party is a "person" within
the meaning of § 214, and that the offer alleged is an offer of
money to that "person." In light of the history of § 214, and with
proper regard for the principle that an essentially ambiguous
criminal statute is to be strictly construed, I cannot agree that
this information states an offense under § 214.
Dealing with the Government's principal contention, which the
Court bypasses, the information does not charge that Congressman
Stauffer would have received any direct, tangible benefit from the
payment of money to the Republican Party. The initial problem,
therefore, is to decide whether the term "thing of value" is
sufficiently broad to embrace any act which might constitute an
inducement to the person to whom the offer to do the act is made.
The history of the statute of which § 214 was passed as a part
sheds clarifying light on this problem.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 214 was originally enacted as § 1 of a statute
(44 Stat. 918) designed to "punish the purchase and sale of public
offices."
See H.R.Rep. No. 1366, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
Section 2 of that statute read on the "seller" of influence, as
opposed to the "purchaser," and, in the 1948 codification, became
what is now the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 215. [
Footnote 2/1] As originally enacted § 2
provided:
"It shall be unlawful to solicit or receive from anyone
whatsoever, either as a political contribution
Page 359 U. S. 265
or for personal emolument, any sum of money or thing of value
whatsoever in consideration of the promise of support, or use of
influence, or for the support or influence
of the payee,
in behalf of the person paying the money, or any other person, in
obtaining any appointive office under the Government of the United
States."
(Emphasis added.)
I think it plain that this language would not have reached one
who solicited, in consideration of the promise of his influence, a
general political contribution of money to be paid directly to his
party. Under such circumstances, the political party would be the
"payee" of the money, but it would be the influence of the
solicitor, as opposed to that of the party, which was promised. And
although the payment of money to the solicitor's party might well
be "valuable" to him in the sense that it would induce him to exert
influence, the use of the word "payee," an extremely unconventional
term to describe the recipient of indefinite and intangible
benefits which might flow from the payment of money to another,
shows that it was not contemplated that such an indirect inducement
should be considered a "thing of value" in the statutory sense.
Confirmation for this view is found in a letter of Attorney
General Clark written to the Senate on February 19, 1946, in
connection with an amendment to 44 Stat. 918 proposed to deal with
the solicitation of fees by private employment agencies for
referring persons to federal employment openings. In contrasting
the language of the proposed amendment with that of § 2 of 44 Stat.
918, the Attorney General was of the opinion that the solicitation
provisions of the existing statute reached only the solicitation of
political contributions or emoluments "on behalf of the solicitor
himself." [
Footnote 2/2]
Page 359 U. S. 266
This proposed amendment was enacted into law in 1951, 65 Stat.
320. Its effect was merely to add to present § 215 what is now the
second paragraph of that section. [
Footnote 2/3] The amendment did not disturb the first
paragraph of § 215, which alone is relevant in the "use of
influence" context, and which, as it had formerly stood in 44 Stat.
918, had been construed by the Attorney General as already
indicated.
In the 1948 codification, the Revisers, in carrying over into §
215 of the present Code § 2 of 44 Stat. 918, omitted the language
which had expressly restricted its scope to a situation where the
influence of the "payee" is promised. [
Footnote 2/4] But it is apparent that this omission was
not
Page 359 U. S. 267
intended to work a substantive change in the statute. [
Footnote 2/5] Under these circumstances,
the solicitation provisions of present § 215 must be read in the
light of their history, and, so read, they require the conclusion
that their impact is restricted to "the solicitation or receipt of
compensation . . . on behalf of the solicitor himself." [
Footnote 2/6]
Given this conclusion, I turn once more to § 214, the provision
directly involved in this case. The Government has strongly urged,
in an effort to avoid the District Court's holding that the
specific mention of "political contribution" in § 215 implied its
exclusion from the term "thing of value" in § 214, that the two
sections are plainly reciprocal, and must be construed
in pari
materia. I agree. There is not the slightest indication in the
sparse legislative history that Congress intended that the
"purchase" and "sale" provisions of the statute should have
different scope, nor has any reason which would reasonably support
a difference in scope been suggested to us. [
Footnote 2/7] I
Page 359 U. S. 268
cannot believe that Congress intended that although a
Congressman soliciting the kind of party contribution charged in
this information in return for his influence would not be covered
under § 215 (as the Court appears to concede is so), nevertheless
the individual from whom the contribution was solicited would, by
promising to make it, become guilty of a crime against the United
States under § 214 (as the Court now holds). For surely Congress
could not have been less eager to reach corruption on the part of
government officials than attempts by individuals to take advantage
of that corruption. It follows that, just as the solicitation of
political contributions to be paid directly to a party treasury in
return for the promise of the solicitor's influence is not
interdicted by § 215, the converse of that situation, the offering
to a Congressman of a contribution payable directly to his party's
treasury, in return for the promise of his influence, is not
reached by § 214. [
Footnote
2/8]
Given these considerations, even if the Court were right in
holding that the Conduct here alleged is an offer of money to
Congressman Stauffer, I would think it wrong in going on to decide
that the information states an offense under § 214. Entirely apart
from the statutory history, however, I think it a remarkable
construction of the language of § 214 to find that an offer to X to
pay money to Y, with whom X is not claimed to have any
Page 359 U. S. 269
financial relationship, is an offer of money to X. Under these
circumstances, there is an offer to X, but it is plainly an offer
to perform an act (pay money to Y), rather than an offer of money
to X. The statute does not say that any offer to a person involving
money is rendered criminal if the other statutory criteria are met,
but only that an offer of money to a person may be.
My reading of the statute makes it unnecessary to decide
whether, as the Government further contends and the Court holds,
the Republican Party is a "person" within the meaning of § 214,
although I would have considerable difficulty in holding that what
is characterized by the Court as an "amorphous group of
individuals" fits within this term, particularly when Congress saw
fit explicitly to add references to "firm" and "corporation" to
secure the inclusion of these entities. [
Footnote 2/9] I think that the use of the words "of the
payee" in what is now § 215 merely made explicit what was intended
to be implicit in § 214 -- that the "influence" sought must be that
of the "person, firm, or corporation" to whom any money or thing of
value is promised or paid. [
Footnote
2/10] And although the information does not charge in terms
that it was the influence of Congressman Stauffer, as opposed to
that of the Republican Party, which was sought by appellee, it is
clear from the brief and argument of the Government in this Court
that it stands on the former construction of the information.
It is, of course, true, as the Government argues, that
relatively indirect and subtle inducements may contain the seeds of
the same mischief as the crudest bribery. But
"it would be dangerous indeed to carry the principle
Page 359 U. S. 270
that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute,
is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not
enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of
kindred character, with those which are enumerated."
United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
18 U. S. 96. In
light of the considerations discussed above, it cannot be said that
Congress, in 18 U.S.C. § 214, has unequivocally seen fit to outlaw
conduct of the kind charged in this information. [
Footnote 2/11] The most that can be said in favor
of the Government's position is that the statute is highly
ambiguous in the respect involved here, and this, in any event,
should require rejection of the Government's position under
principles discussed in
Bell v. United States,
349 U. S. 81. I
would affirm.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See 359
U.S. 255fn2/4|>Note 4,
infra.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Attorney General wrote:
"Further, under the proposed language, the solicitation or
receipt of compensation, either on behalf of the solicitor or
another, would be prohibited, whereas the existing law merely
prohibits the solicitation or receipt of compensation, either as a
political contribution or personal emolument
on behalf of the
solicitor himself."
(Emphasis added.)
The Attorney General's letter first appears in S.Rep. No. 1036,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., and was carried over into a series of Senate
Reports on bills embodying the proposed amendment. S.Rep. No. 2,
80th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 7, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep.
No. 3, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 2/3]
That paragraph provides:
"Whoever solicits or receives any thing of value in
consideration of aiding a person to obtain employment under the
United States either by referring his name to an executive
department or agency or the United States or by requiring the
payment of a fee because such person has secured such employment
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both. This section shall not apply to such services
rendered by an employment agency pursuant to the written request of
an executive department or agency of the United States."
[
Footnote 2/4]
The relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 215, reads:
"Whoever solicits or receives, either as a political
contribution or for personal emolument, any money or thing of value
in consideration of the promise of support or use of influence in
obtaining for any person any appointive office or place under the
United States shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both."
[
Footnote 2/5]
The Reviser's Note refers expressly to other substantive changes
made in the section at the time of codification, and appears to
class the omission of the "payee" language under "changes of
style."
It is also noteworthy that the Senate Report on the bill which
became the "employment agency" amendment to § 215 in the 82d
Congress, three years after the codification of Title 18, contained
the letter of the Attorney General construing the pre-codification
language with no suggestion that the meaning of that language had
been altered by the changes made at the time of codification.
See S.Rep. No. 3, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See 359
U.S. 255fn2/2|>Note 2,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/7]
That the two provisions are reciprocal is further shown by the
fact that the same substantive and stylistic changes were made in
both of them in 1948, the Reviser's Note under § 215 merely
incorporating that under § 214 by reference.
It is argued that this conclusion is controverted by the
circumstance that, on the same day as 44 Stat. 918 was introduced,
another bill, also 44 Stat. 918 (now 5 U.S.C. § 21a) was also
introduced requiring those appointed to public office under the
United States to file affidavits that they had not paid any
consideration to
anyone in the expectation of receiving
appointment, and that the two bills were described as
"correlative." There is no reason to take the word "correlative" to
imply an identity of scope between the two bills, since the word
equally well bears the interpretation that 5 U.S.C. § 21a was
intended to be merely supplementary to the criminal provisions of
§§ 214 and 215. Indeed, it is, on its face, broader than § 214 in
its reference to mere "assistance," as opposed to "influence."
[
Footnote 2/8]
This is not, of course, to suggest that an offer of a "political
contribution" to a Congressman's personal campaign fund in return
for his promise of influence would be without the scope of § 214,
or that the solicitation of such a contribution would not fall
within § 215.
[
Footnote 2/9]
All of the cases cited by the Court in this connection involve
clearly defined entities -- not "amorphous" groups.
[
Footnote 2/10]
It is apparent that the Revisers believed that the omission of
the words "of the payee" in the recodification of 44 Stat. 918
added nothing to the meaning of § 215.
See p.
359 U. S. 266,
supra.
[
Footnote 2/11]
The Court derives support for its holding from various
statements concerning official corruption in office selling made on
the floor of the House of Representatives some two years before the
passage of the bill which is now §§ 214 and 215. Since these
statements were directed exclusively to revelations of corruption
on the part of sellers of influence and the Court appears to
concede that the seller of influence is not covered by § 215 unless
he is a "payee," it is difficult to see how these statements can be
utilized to support a broader reading of § 214.