Petitioner, a mentally dull 19-year-old Negro with a fifth-grade
education, was convicted in a state court of first degree murder
and sentenced to death. At his trial, there was admitted in
evidence, over his objection, a confession shown by undisputed
evidence to have been obtained in the following circumstances: he
was arrested without a warrant, and never taken before a magistrate
or advised of his right to remain silent or to have counsel, as
required by state law. After being held incommunicado for three
days without counsel, advisor, or friend, and with very little
food, he confessed after being told by the Chief of Police that
"there would be 30 or 40 people there in a few minutes that wanted
to get him," and that, if he would tell the truth, the Chief of
Police probably would keep them from coming in.
Held: Petitioner was denied due process of law contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment; the judgment of the State Supreme
Court affirming the conviction is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. Pp.
356 U. S.
561-569.
(a) It is obvious from the
totality of the course of
conduct shown by undisputed evidence that the confession was
coerced, and did not constitute an "expression of free choice." Pp.
356 U. S.
562-567.
(b) Even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart
from the coerced confession, to support a conviction, the admission
in evidence of the coerced confession over petitioner's objection
vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
356 U. S.
567-568.
(c)
Stein v. New York, 346 U.
S. 156, distinguished. P.
356 U. S.
568.
226 Ark. 910, 225 S.W.2d 312, reversed, and cause remanded.
Page 356 U. S. 561
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a 19-year-old Negro, was convicted by a jury in
Jefferson County, Arkansas, of first degree murder, and sentenced
to death by electrocution. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Arkansas, he pressed two main contentions: (1) that the trial court
erred in overruling his motion to suppress, and in receiving in
evidence over his objection a coerced and false confession, and
that the error takes and deprives him of his life without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, and (2) that the trial court erred in overruling his
motion to quash the panel of petit jurors upon the ground that
Negroes were systematically excluded, or their number limited, in
the selection of the jury panel, and that the error deprives him of
the equal protection of the laws and of due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The
court held that these contentions were without merit, and affirmed
the judgment. 226 Ark. 910,
295 S.W.2d
312. He then applied to us for a writ of certiorari, based on
these contentions, which we granted because the constitutional
questions presented appeared to be substantial. 353 U.S. 929.
We will first consider petitioner's contention that the
confession was coerced, and that its admission in evidence over his
objection denied him due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession
obtained by coercion -- whether physical or mental -- is forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 1] Enforcement
Page 356 U. S. 562
of the criminal laws of the States rests principally with the
state courts, and generally their findings of fact, fairly made
upon substantial and conflicting testimony as to the circumstances
producing the contested confession -- as distinguished from
inadequately supported findings or conclusions drawn from
uncontroverted happenings -- are not this Court's concern;
[
Footnote 2] yet where the
claim is that the prisoner's confession is the product of coercion,
we are bound to make our own examination of the record to determine
whether the claim is meritorious. "The performance of this duty
cannot be foreclosed by the finding of a court, or the verdict of a
jury, or both." [
Footnote 3]
The question for our decision, then, is whether the confession was
coerced. That question can be answered only by reviewing the
circumstances under which the confession was made. We therefore
proceed to examine those circumstances as shown by this record.
Near 6:30 p.m. on October 4, 1955, J. M. Robertson, an elderly
retail lumber dealer in the City of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, was found
in his office dead or dying from crushing blows inflicted upon his
head. More than $450 was missing from the cash drawer. Petitioner,
a 19-year-old Negro with a fifth-grade education, [
Footnote 4] who had been employed by
Robertson for several weeks, was suspected
Page 356 U. S. 563
of the crime. He was interrogated that night at his home by the
police, but they did not then arrest him. Near 11 a.m. the next
day, October 5, he was arrested without a warrant and placed in a
cell on the first floor of the city jail. Arkansas statutes provide
that an arrest may be made without a warrant when an officer "has
reasonable grounds for believing that the person arrested has
committed a felony," [
Footnote
5] and that, when an arrest is made without a warrant, the
person arrested "shall be forthwith carried before the most
convenient magistrate of the county in which the arrest is made,"
[
Footnote 6] and when the
person arrested is brought before such magistrate, it is the
latter's duty to "state the charge [against the accused and to]
inquire . . . whether he desires the aid of counsel [and to allow
him] a reasonable opportunity" to obtain counsel. [
Footnote 7] It is admitted that petitioner,
though arrested without a warrant, was never taken before a
magistrate, and that the statutes mentioned were not complied
with.
Petitioner was held incommunicado without any charge against him
from the time of his arrest at 11 a.m. on October 5 until after his
confession on the afternoon of October 7, without counsel, advisor
or friend being permitted to see him. Members of his family who
sought to see him were turned away, because the police did not
"make it a practice of letting anyone talk to [prisoners] while
they are being questioned." Two of petitioner's brothers and three
of his nephews were, to his knowledge, brought by the police to the
city jail and questioned during the evening of petitioner's arrest,
and one of his brothers was arrested and held in jail overnight.
Petitioner asked permission to make a telephone call, but his
request was denied.
Page 356 U. S. 564
Petitioner was not given lunch after being lodged in the city
jail on October 5, and missed the evening meal on that day because
he was then being questioned in the office of the chief of police.
Near 6:30 the next morning, October 6, he was taken by the police,
without breakfast, and also without shoes or socks, [
Footnote 8] on a trip to Little Rock, a
distance of about 45 miles, for further questioning and a lie
detector test, arriving there about 7:30 a.m. He was not given
breakfast in that city, but was turned over to the state police,
who gave him a lie detector test and questioned him for an extended
time not shown in the record. At about 1 p.m. that day, he was
given shoes and also two sandwiches -- the first food he had
received in more than 25 hours. He was returned to the city jail in
Pine Bluff at about 6:30 that evening -- too late for the evening
meal -- and placed in a cell on the second floor. The next morning,
October 7, he was given breakfast -- which, except for the two
sandwiches he had been given at Little Rock at 1 p.m. the day
before, was the only food he had received in more than 40
hours.
We come now to an even more vital matter. Petitioner testified,
[
Footnote 9] concerning the
conduct that immediately induced his confession, as follows:
"I was locked up upstairs and Chief Norman Young came up [about
1 p.m. on October 7] and told me that I had not told him all of the
story -- he said that there was 30 or 40 people outside that wanted
to get me, and he said if I would come in and tell him the truth
that he would probably keep them from coming in."
When again asked what the chief of police had said to him on
that occasion, petitioner testified:
"Chief Norman Young said thirty or forty people
Page 356 U. S. 565
were outside wanting to get in to me and he asked me if I wanted
to make a confession he would try to keep them out."
The chief of police, on cross-examination, admitted that he had
made the substance of that statement to petitioner, [
Footnote 10] and had told him that he would
be permitted to confess to the chief "in private." In this setting,
petitioner immediately agreed to make a statement to the chief. The
chief then took petitioner to his private office, and almost
immediately after arriving at that place there was a knock on the
door. The chief opened the door and stepped outside, leaving the
door ajar, and petitioner heard him say "
He is fixing to
confess now,' and he would like to have me alone." Petitioner did
not know what persons or how many were outside the door. The chief
reentered his office and began questioning petitioner, who orally
confessed that he had committed the crime. Thereupon, Sergeant
Halsell of the State Police and Sheriff Norton were admitted to the
room, and, under questioning by Sergeant Halsell, petitioner gave
more details concerning the crime. Soon afterward, a court reporter
was called in and several businessmen were also admitted to
the
Page 356 U. S.
566
room. Sergeant Halsell then requestioned petitioner, and the
questions and answers were taken by the reporter in shorthand.
After being transcribed by the reporter, the typed transcription
was returned to the room about 3 p.m., and was read and signed to
petitioner and witnessed by the officers and businessmen referred
to. Thus, the "confession" was obtained.
At the beginning of the trial, petitioner's counsel moved to
suppress the confession because obtained by coercion culminating in
a threat of mob violence. Following Arkansas procedure
(
McClellan v. State, 203 Ark. 386, 156 S.W.2d 800), a
hearing upon that motion was held before the trial judge in
chambers, at which the facts above recited were shown without
dispute. In addition, petitioner testified that the confession did
not contain the truth, and when asked why he made it, he
answered:
"Well, as a matter of fact, lawyer Branton, I was more than
afraid because Chief Norman Young had already told me that there
was 30 or 40 people outside and the way he stated it, if I hadn't,
if I didn't make the confession, that he would let them in, from
the conversation, from the way that he told me."
The trial judge overruled the motion to suppress the confession.
The same evidence was then repeated before the jury, and the
confession was admitted in evidence over petitioner's objection.
The court instructed the jury to disregard the confession if they
found it was not voluntarily made. The jury returned a general
verdict finding petitioner guilty of first degree murder as
charged, and assessed the penalty of death by electrocution.
Judgment accordingly was entered on the verdict.
That petitioner was not physically tortured affords no answer to
the question whether the confession was coerced, for
"[t]here is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much
affected by fear as by force. . . . A
Page 356 U. S. 567
confession by which life becomes forfeit must be the expression
of free choice."
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49,
338 U. S. 52-53.
[
Footnote 11] The undisputed
evidence in this case shows that petitioner, a mentally dull
19-year-old youth, (1) was arrested without a warrant, (2) was
denied a hearing before a magistrate at which he would have been
advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel,
as required by Arkansas statutes, (3) was not advised of his right
to remain silent or of his right to counsel, (4) was held
incommunicado for three days, without counsel, advisor or friend,
and though members of his family tried to see him they were turned
away, and he was refused permission to make even one telephone
call, (5) was denied food for long periods, and, finally, (6) was
told by the chief of police "that there would be 30 or 40 people
there in a few minutes that wanted to get him," which statement
created such fear in petitioner as immediately produced the
"confession." It seems obvious from the totality of this course of
conduct, [
Footnote 12] and
particularly the culminating threat of mob violence, that the
confession was coerced, and did not constitute an "expression of
free choice," [
Footnote 13]
and that its use before the jury, over petitioner's objection,
deprived him of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice," [
Footnote
14] and, hence, denied him due process of law, guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there was
adequate evidence before the jury to sustain the
Page 356 U. S. 568
verdict. But where, as here, a coerced confession constitutes a
part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is
returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to
the confession. And, in these circumstances, this Court has
uniformly held that, even though there may have been sufficient
evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment
of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the
coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 15]
The admitted facts, set out above, make applicable the
conclusion reached in
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.
S. 227,
309 U. S.
241:
"Due process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution,
commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record
shall send any accused to his death."
The judgment must be reversed because of the admission in
evidence of the coerced confession. It is therefore unnecessary at
this time for us to discuss or decide the other question presented
by petitioner -- whether the overruling of his motion to quash the
panel of petit jurors upon the ground that Negroes were
systematically excluded, or their number limited, in the selection
of the jury panel denied him the equal protection of the laws under
the
Page 356 U. S. 569
Fourteenth Amendment -- for we will not assume that the same
issue will be present upon a new trial.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.
S. 278;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.
S. 227;
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.
S. 219;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.
S. 143;
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.
S. 401;
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.
S. 596;
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S.
49;
Stroble v. California, 343 U.
S. 181;
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.
S. 556;
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.
S. 191. These cases illustrate the settled view of this
Court that the admission in evidence over objection of a coerced
confession vitiates a judgment of conviction.
[
Footnote 2]
Watts v. Indiana, supra, at
338 U. S. 50-53;
cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra, at
332 U. S. 153;
Malinski v. New York, supra, at
324 U. S. 404;
Haley v. Ohio, supra, at
332 U. S. 598;
and
Leyra v. Denno, supra, at
347 U. S.
558.
[
Footnote 3]
Lisenba v. California, supra, at
314 U. S.
237-238.
See also Brown v. Mississippi, supra,
297 U. S. 278;
Chambers v. Florida, supra, at
209 U. S.
228-229;
Haley v. Ohio, supra, at
332 U. S. 599;
Watts v. Indiana, supra, at
338 U. S.
50.
[
Footnote 4]
Petitioner was mentally dull and "slow to learn," and was in the
fifth grade when he became 15 years of age. Because of his age, he
was arbitrarily promoted to the seventh grade, and soon thereafter
quit school.
[
Footnote 5]
Ark.Stat.1947, § 43-403.
[
Footnote 6]
Ark.Stat.1947, § 43-601.
[
Footnote 7]
Ark.Stat.1947, § 43-605.
[
Footnote 8]
His shoes and socks had been taken from him for laboratory
examination of suspected bloodstains.
[
Footnote 9]
Petitioner took the stand both on the hearing of the motion to
suppress the confession, which was held in chambers outside the
presence of the jury, and upon the trial before the jury.
[
Footnote 10]
The chief of police testified:
"Q. When did the defendant first tell you he was going to
confess?"
"A. Approximately 1:00 P.M. on the afternoon of the 7th."
"Q. Now where were you at the time?"
"A. At the time that he told me he was ready to confess, he was
in the jail in an upstairs cell and I was standing outside of the
cell talking to him."
"Q. Were any other officers present?"
"A. There was not."
"Q. State whether or not anything was said to the defendant to
the effect that there would be 30 or 40 people there in a few
minutes that wanted to get him?"
"A. I told him that would be possible there would be that many
-- it was possible there could be that many."
"Q. Did you promise the defendant that he would have an
opportunity to confess in private?"
"A. I did."
"Q. Did you then go down to your office?"
"A. We did."
[
Footnote 11]
The cases of
Chambers v. Florida, supra, at
309 U. S. 240;
Lisenba v. California, supra, at
314 U. S. 237,
314 U. S. 240;
Haley v. Ohio, supra, at
332 U. S. 600;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra, at
322 U. S. 154;
and
Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547,
316 U. S. 555,
all announce the same principle.
[
Footnote 12]
See Fikes v. Alabama, supra, at
352 U. S.
197.
[
Footnote 13]
Watts v. Indiana, supra, at
338 U. S.
53.
[
Footnote 14]
Lisenba v. California, supra, at
314 U. S. 236;
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596,
322 U. S.
605.
[
Footnote 15]
Watts v. Indiana, supra, at
338 U. S. 50;
Malinski v. New York, supra, at
324 U. S. 404;
Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, at
322 U. S. 597.
Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, is
not to the contrary, for, in that case, this Court did not find
that the confession was coerced. Indeed, it was there recognized
that, when
"the ruling admitting the confession is found on review to be
erroneous, the conviction, at least normally, should fall with the
confession. . . . [R]eliance on a coerced confession vitiates a
conviction because such a confession combines the persuasiveness of
apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be
illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a false
foundation for any conviction. . . ."
Id. at
346 U. S.
191-192.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
I join in the reversal of the judgment in this case because the
Police Chief's testimony, quoted in
footnote 10 of the Court's opinion seems to me to require
acceptance of petitioner's claim that his confession was induced
through fear of mob violence.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON, on this record, would accept the conclusion
of the state court and jury that petitioner's confession was
voluntary. Therefore, he would affirm the judgment rendered.
See his dissent in
Moore v. Michigan,
355 U. S. 155,
355 U. S.
165.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.
I believe that, on this record, the state courts properly held
petitioner's confession voluntary. Moreover, even if the confession
be deemed coerced, there is sufficient other evidence of guilt to
sustain the conviction on the authority of
Stein v. New
York, 346 U. S. 156,
346 U. S.
188-194 (1953). Just five years ago, this Court
established in
Stein that there was no constitutional
error "if the jury admitted and relied on the confession," or
"rejected it and convicted on other evidence." 346 U.S. at
346 U. S.
193-194. For purpose of making the latter determination,
this Court assumed there that the confession was found coerced by
the jury. It makes no difference that the determination of coercion
here is by this Court, rather than by the jury, for, as is evident
from the majority
Page 356 U. S. 570
opinion, the inquiry is the same -- whether the confession was
coerced. I must apply the
Stein rule here because the
Arkansas procedure on admission of challenged confessions is
identical to that which we approved in that case.
See Nolan v.
State, 205 Ark. 103, 104, 167 S.W.2d 503, 504;
Dinwiddie
v. State, 202 Ark. 562, 570, 151 S.W.2d 93, 95, 96.