In respondent's suit against the Government in a Federal
District Court for the recovery of money only, which was tried
without a jury, the judge filed an opinion on April 14 granting
respondent's motion for summary judgment, without specifying the
amount, and the clerk noted that fact in the civil docket on the
same date. On May 24, the judge signed and filed a formal document
captioned "Judgment," which specified the exact amount of recovery,
and the clerk noted that fact in the civil docket on the same date.
The Government filed a notice of appeal within 60 days after the
latter entry but more than 60 days after the former entry.
Held: in the circumstances of this case, the appeal was
taken within 60 days from the "entry of the judgment," as required
by Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it
should not have been dismissed as untimely. Pp.
356 U. S.
228-236.
(a) Whatever may be the practical needs, no present statute or
rule requires that a final judgment be contained in a separate
document so labeled. P.
356 U. S.
232.
(b) When an opinion embodies the essential elements of a
judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge's intention that
it shall be his final act in the case and it has been filed and
entered in the docket, the time to appeal starts to run under Rule
73(a). Pp.
356 U. S.
232-233.
(c) When an opinion leaves doubtful whether the judge intended
it to be his final act in the case, the clerk's notation of it in
the docket cannot constitute "entry of the judgment" within the
meaning of Rule 58. P.
356 U. S.
233.
(d) A final judgment for money must, at least, determine, or
specify the means of determining, the amount, and an opinion which
does not either expressly or by reference determine the amount of
money awarded leaves doubtful whether it was intended by the judge
to be his final act in the case. Pp.
356 U. S.
233-234.
(e) The opinion in this case stated the amount of money
illegally collected from respondent, but, by its failure to state
the date
Page 356 U. S. 228
of payment, it failed to state facts necessary to compute the
amount of interest to be included in the judgment, and this
omission cannot be cured by a search of the record, because Rule
79(a) requires the clerk's entry to show the "substance of [the]
judgment." Pp.
356 U. S.
234-235.
(f) In the circumstances of this case, the formal "Judgment"
signed by the judge on May 24, rather than a statement in the
opinion filed on April 14, must be considered the court's judgment,
and the time for appeal ran from its entry in the docket. Pp.
356 U. S.
235-236.
236 F.2d 889 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions concerning the timeliness of an
appeal by the Government from a summary judgment of a District
Court to the Court of Appeals in an action for the recovery of
money only. The basic question presented is which of two series of
judicial and ministerial acts -- one on April 14 and the other on
May 24, 1955 -- constituted the "judgment" and "entry of the
judgment." If it was the former, the appeal was out of time, but if
the latter, it was not.
The overt facts are clear and undisputed. Respondent sued the
Government for $7,189.57, alleged to have been illegally assessed
and collected from it as federal stamp taxes, and for interest
thereon from the date of payment. After issue was joined,
respondent moved for summary judgment. The district judge, after
hearing the motion,
Page 356 U. S. 229
filed an opinion on April 14, 1955 (130 F. Supp. 322, 324), in
which, after finding that respondent had paid stamp taxes to the
Government in the amount of $7,012.50 and interest in the amount of
$177.07, but making no finding of the date or dates of payment, he
referred to an earlier decision of the same legal question by his
colleague, Judge Leibell, in
United States v. National Sugar
Refining Co., 113 F.
Supp. 157, and concluded, saying: "I am in agreement with Judge
Leibell's analysis and, accordingly, the plaintiff's motion is
granted." Thereupon, the clerk made the following notation in the
civil docket: "April 14, 1955. Rayfiel, J. Decision rendered on
motion for summary judgment. Motion granted.
See opinion
on file."
Thereafter, on May 24, 1955, counsel for respondent presented to
the judge, and the latter signed and filed, a formal document
captioned "Judgment," which referred to the motion and the hearing
of it and to the "opinion" of April 14, and then,
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff, The F. &
M. Schaefer Brewing Co., recover of the defendant, United States of
America, the sum of $7,189.57 and interest thereon from February
19, 1954 in the amount of $542.80, together with costs as taxed by
the Clerk of the Court in the sum of $37, aggregating the sum of
$7769.37, and that plaintiff have judgment against defendant
therefor."
On the same day the clerk stamped the document "Judgment
Rendered: Dated: May 24th, 1955," and made the following notation
in the civil docket:
"May 24, 1955. Rayfiel, J. Judgment filed and docketed against
defendant in the sum of $7,189.57 with interest of $542.80 together
with costs $37 amounting in all to $7,769.37. Bill of Costs
attached to judgment. "
Page 356 U. S. 230
On July 21, 1955, the Government filed its notice of appeal from
the order "entered in this action on May 25th, 1955. . . ."
Thereafter, respondent moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground
that the opinion of April 14 constituted the "judgment," that the
clerk's entry of that date constituted "entry of the judgment," and
that the appeal was not taken within 60 days from the "entry of the
judgment," as required by Rule 73(a). [
Footnote 1] The Court of Appeals, holding that the opinion
of April 14 was a "decisive and complete act of adjudication," and
that the notation made by the clerk in the civil docket on that
date constituted "entry of the judgment" within the meaning of Rule
58 and adequately disclosed the "substance" of the judgment as
required by Rule 79(a), sustained the motion and dismissed the
appeal as untimely. 236 F.2d 889, 891. Because of an asserted
conflict among the circuits [
Footnote 2] and the public importance of the proper
interpretation and uniform application of the provisions of the
Federal Rules governing the time within
Page 356 U. S. 231
which appeals may be taken from judgments of District Courts in
actions for money only tried without a jury, we granted certiorari.
353 U.S. 907.
Stated summarily, the Government contends (1) that practical
considerations require that a final judgment be contained in a
separate document so labeled; (2) that the district judge's opinion
did not contain any of the elements of a final judgment for money
nor manifest an intention that it was to be his final act in the
case; (3) that it was only the formal judgment of May 24 which
awarded any sum of money to respondent and which invoked the
provisions of Rule 58, saying
"When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs
or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment
forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction;"
(4) that where, as here, a formal judgment is signed and filed
by the judge it is prima facie his final decision, and, inasmuch as
nothing in his opinion indicated any contrary intention, the formal
"judgment" constituted his final decision; and (5) that the
notation made by the clerk in the civil docket on April 14 did not
indicate an award of any sum of money to respondent, and therefore
did not "show . . . the substance of [a money] judgment of the
court," as required by Rule 79(a) and, hence, did not constitute
"the entry of [a] judgment" for money within the meaning of Rule
58, nor start the running of the time to appeal under Rule
73(a).
Resolution of these contentions depends principally upon the
proper construction and application of the pertinent provisions of
Rules 58 and 79(a). Rule 58, in pertinent part, provides:
"When the
court directs that a party recover only money
or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter
judgment forthwith
upon receipt by him of the direction. .
. . The notation of a judgment in the civil docket as provided by
Rule 79(a)
constitutes
Page 356 U. S. 232
the entry of the judgment, and the judgment is not
effective before such entry."
(Emphasis supplied.) So much of Rule 79(a) as is pertinent here
provides:
"All . . . judgments shall be noted . . . in the civil docket. .
. . These notations shall be brief, but
shall show . . . the
substance of each . . . judgment of the court. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, the Government contends that practical
considerations -- namely, certainty as to what judicial
pronouncements are intended to be final judgments in order to avoid
both premature and untimely appeals, to render certain the date of
judgment liens, and to enable the procurement of writs of
execution, transcripts and certified copies of judgments -- require
that a judgment be contained in a separate document so labeled, and
urges us so to hold. Whatever may be the practical needs in these
respects, the answer is that no present statute or rule so
requires, as the Government concedes, and the decisional law seems
settled that "[n]o form of words . . . is necessary to evince [the]
rendition [of a judgment]."
United States v. Hark,
320 U. S. 531,
320 U. S. 534.
See also In re Forstner Chain Corporation, 177 F.2d 572,
576.
While an opinion may embody a final decision, the question
whether it does so depends upon whether the judge has or has not
clearly declared his intention in this respect in his opinion.
Therefore, when, as here, the action is for money only -- whether
for a liquidated or an unliquidated amount, as Rule 58 makes no
such distinction -- it is necessary to determine whether the
language of the opinion embodies the essential elements of a
judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge's intention that
it shall be his final act in the case. If it does so, it
constitutes his final judgment and, under Rule 58, it "directs that
a party recover [a sum of] money," and,
Page 356 U. S. 233
"upon receipt by [the clerk] of the [opinion]," requires him to
"enter judgment forthwith" against the party found liable for the
amount awarded, which is to be done by making a brief "notation of
[the] judgment in the civil docket [showing the substance of the
judgment of the court] as provided by Rule 79(a)." When all of
these elements clearly appear, final judgment has been both
pronounced and entered, and the time to appeal starts to run under
the provisions of Rule 73(a). And, as correctly held by the Court
of Appeals, the later filing and entry of a more formal judgment
could not constitute a second final judgment in the case, nor
extend the time to appeal. 236 F.2d at 892.
But, on the other hand, if the opinion leaves doubtful whether
the judge intended it to be his final act in the case -- and, in an
action for money, failure to determine either expressly or by
reference the amount to be awarded is strong evidence of such lack
of intention -- one cannot say that it "directs that a party
recover [a sum of] money," as required by Rule 58 before the clerk
"shall enter judgment forthwith"; nor can one say that the clerk's
"notation . . . in the civil docket" -- if it sets forth no more
substance than is contained or directed in the opinion, and, being
only a ministerial act (
In re Forstner Chain Corporation,
supra, 177 F.2d at 576), it may do no more -- " show[s] . . .
the substance of [a] judgment" of the court, as required by Rule
79(a), and "constitutes the entry of the judgment" against a party
for a sum of money under Rule 58.
While, as stated, there is no statute or rule that specifies the
essential elements of a final judgment, and this Court has held
that "[n]o form of words and no peculiar formal act is necessary to
evince [the] rendition [of a judgment]" (
United States v. Hark,
supra, at
320 U. S.
534), yet it is obvious that a final judgment for money
must at least, determine, or specify the means for determining, the
amount (
United
Page 356 U. S. 234
States v. Cooke, 215 F.2d 528, 530); and an opinion, in
such a case, which does not either expressly or by reference
determine the amount of money awarded reveals doubt at the very
least, whether the opinion was a "complete act of adjudication" --
to borrow a phrase from the Court of Appeals -- or was intended by
the judge to be his final act in the case.
But respondent argues, as the Court of Appeals held, that the
opinion stated the amount of money illegally collected from
respondent, and therefore adequately determined the amount awarded,
and that, inasmuch as the clerk's entry incorporated the opinion by
reference, it, too, adequately stated the amount of the judgment.
This contention might well be accepted were it not for the fact
that the action also sought recovery of interest on the amount paid
by respondent from the date of payment to the date of judgment, and
for the fact that the opinion does not state the date or dates of
payment, and hence did not state facts necessary to compute the
amount of interest to be included in the judgment.
Cf. United
States v. Cooke, supra, 215 F.2d at 530. In an effort to
counter the effect of these omissions, respondent states that a
search of the record, which it urges we should make, would show
that the Government's answer admitted the date of payment, and thus
would furnish the information necessary to compute the amount of
interest to be included in the judgment. It relies upon a statement
in the
Forstner case,
supra, saying "Whether such
a judgment has been rendered depends primarily upon the intention
of the court,
as gathered from the record as a whole. . .
." 177 F.2d at 576. (Emphasis supplied.) This argument cannot be
accepted under the facts here for the reason that Rule 79(a)
expressly requires that the clerk's entry "shall show . . . the
substance of [the] judgment of the court. . . ." Surely the amount
of a judgment for money is a vital part of its substance. To hold
that one must
Page 356 U. S. 235
search the whole record to determine the amount, or the facts
necessary to compute the amount, of a final judgment for money
would be to ignore the quoted provision of Rule 79(a).
In these circumstances, the rule declared by this Court in the
Hark case -- though a criminal case, and therefore not
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which, as we have
shown, afford no aid in determining judicial intent -- is exactly
apposite and controlling.
"Where, as here, a formal judgment is signed by the judge, this
is
prima facie the decision or judgment, rather than a
statement in an opinion or a docket entry. . . . The judge was
conscious, as we are, that he was without power to extend the time
for appeal. He entered a formal order of record. We are unwilling
to assume that he deemed this an empty form or that he acted from a
purpose indirectly to extend the appeal time, which he could not do
overtly. In the absence of anything of record to lead to a contrary
conclusion, we take the formal order of March 31 as, in fact and in
law, the pronouncement of the court's judgment, and as fixing the
date from which the time for appeal ran."
United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. at
320 U. S.
534-535.
See also United States v. Higginson,
238 F.2d 439, 443.
The actions of all concerned -- of the judge in not stating in
his opinion the amount, or means for determining the amount, of the
judgment; of the clerk in not stating the amount of the judgment in
his notation on the civil docket; of counsel for the Government in
not appealing from the "opinion"; of counsel for respondent in
preparing and presenting to the judge a formal "judgment" on May
24; and, finally, of the judge himself in signing and filing the
formal "judgment" on the latter date -- clearly show that none of
them understood the opinion
Page 356 U. S. 236
to be the judge's final act or to constitute his final judgment
in the case. Therefore, as in
Hark, we must take the
court's formal judgment of May 24 and the clerk's entry thereof on
that date as, in fact and in law, the pronouncement and entry of
the judgment, and as fixing the date from which the time for appeal
ran.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Unless otherwise stated, all references herein to Rules are to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[
Footnote 2]
The First Circuit, in
United States v. Higginson, 238
F.2d 439, declined to follow the Second Circuit's opinion in the
instant case, unless the latter may be said to rest upon local Rule
10(a) of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, providing,
in part, that a "memorandum of the determination of a motion,
signed by the judge, shall constitute the order," and
concluded:
"To the extent that the language of the
Schaefer
opinion might apply even where no such local rule exists, this
decision is not in accord with it."
Id., 234 F.2d at 443. In its later case of
Matteson
v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, the Second Circuit makes clear
that it regards the
Higginson opinion as in conflict with
its opinion in the instant case, saying:
"Since we viewed the local rule as merely corroborative of the
practice actually required by F.R. 58, Judge Hartigan's opinion
must be taken as disapproving our reasoning."
Id., 240 F.2d at 518.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Papanikolaou v. Atlantic
Freighters, 232 F.2d 663, also appears, in result at least, to
be in conflict with the Second Circuit's opinion in the instant
case.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins,
dissenting.
This case presents the question whether an appeal by the
Government to the Court of Appeals from a summary judgment rendered
against it was taken within the sixty-day period established by
Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ultimately,
decision turns on the need felt for nationwide uniformity in the
detailed application of rules of procedure within the federal
judicial system, as against regard for local conditions and
experience in the different circuits in construing rules phrased in
broad and functional terms. Though not so formulated by the Court,
this is the underlying question for decision, for I cannot believe
we brought here for review a discrete instance, a particular,
nonrecurring set of circumstances, or that we wish to encourage
petitions for certiorari to review, from time to time, other
individual sets of circumstances. The issues on the basis of which
the Government sought review in this case were said to be of
importance because they affected "all litigants in the federal
courts."
Respondent taxpayer sued to recover $7,189.57 in stamp taxes, an
amount specifically set forth in its complaint, alleged to have
been illegally assessed and collected from it, and moved for
summary judgment. On April 14, 1955, the District Court filed a
"Memorandum Decision" directed to the motion for summary
judgment.
Page 356 U. S. 237
In its opinion, the court, relying on Judge Leibell's decision
in
United States v. National Sugar Refining
Co., 113 F.
Supp. 157, found that the tax, in the amount of $7,189.57, had
been illegally collected, and concluded by stating that, "I am in
agreement with Judge Leibell's analysis, and, accordingly, the
plaintiff's motion is granted." 130 F. Supp. 322, 324. On the same
day, the clerk made the following entry in the civil docket:
"Rayfiel, J. Decision rendered on motion for summary judgment.
Motion granted. See opinion on file."
Over a month later, on May 24, 1955, the court signed a paper,
submitted to it by respondent, entitled "Judgment." This document
recited that, respondent having moved for summary judgment, and the
motion having been granted on April 14, 1955, and the court's
opinion having been filed,
"It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, The F.
& M. Schaefer Brewing Co., recover of the defendant, United
States of America, the sum of $7,189.57 and interest thereon from
February 19, 1954, in the amount of $542.80, together with costs as
taxed by the Clerk of the Court in the sum of $37, aggregating the
sum of $7,769.37, and that plaintiff have judgment against
defendant therefor."
On that day, the clerk made the following entry in the
docket:
"Rayfiel, J. Judgment filed and docketed against defendant in
the sum of $7189.57 with interest of $542.80 together with costs
$37 amounting in all to $7769.37. Bill of Costs attached to
judgment."
The Government filed its notice of appeal on July 21, 1955,
ninety-eight days after the decision granting the motion for
summary judgment, and fifty-eight days after the entry of the
formal judgment of May 24. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, six judges sitting en banc, unanimously dismissed the
appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal had not been filed
within sixty days from the entry of judgment as required by
Page 356 U. S. 238
Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
found that judgment had been entered on April 14, 1955, when the
motion for summary judgment was granted, and not on May 24, 1955
when the formal "Judgment" was docketed.
Rule 73(a) provides:
"When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a
court of appeals the time within which an appeal may be taken shall
be 30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from unless a
shorter time is provided by law, except that in any action in which
the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party the
time as to all parties shall be 60 days from such entry. . . ."
Rule 54(a) defines a "judgment" as: "a decree and any order from
which an appeal lies."
Rule 58, entitled "Entry of Judgment," provides that:
"Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the
provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall
be entered forthwith by the clerk; but the court shall direct the
appropriate judgment to be entered upon a special verdict or upon a
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned
by a jury pursuant to Rule 49.
When the court directs that a
party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the
clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the
direction; but when the court directs entry of judgment for
other relief, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the form
of the judgment and direct that it be entered by the clerk. The
notation of a judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule
79(a) constitutes the entry of the judgment; and the judgment is
not
Page 356 U. S. 239
effective before such entry. The entry of the judgment shall not
be delayed for the taxing of costs."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Rule 79(a) describes the civil docket mentioned in Rule 58, and
goes on to declare that:
"All papers filed with the clerk, all process issued and returns
made thereon, all appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments
shall be noted chronologically in the civil docket. . . . These
notations shall be brief, but shall show the nature of each paper
filed or writ issued and the substance of each order or judgment of
the court. . . ."
Thus, before the time for appeal begins to run under Rule 73(a),
a judgment as contemplated in Rule 58 must have been rendered by
the court and, in compliance with Rule 79(a), entered by the clerk
in the civil docket. The judgment must have been both properly
rendered and properly entered, and the entry of judgment is the
decisive procedural moment. In the present case, the question is
whether the memorandum decision of April 14, 1955, was a "judgment"
within the meaning of the Rules, and, if it was, whether the
clerk's docket notation of that date showed the "substance" of the
judgment.
The Rules nowhere define with mechanical exactitude the meaning
of the term "judgment." Rule 54(a), however, in stating that a
judgment includes "a decree and any order from which an appeal
lies," emphasizes that a judgment is not confined to judicial
actions so described, but includes any act of the court that
performs the function of a judgment in bringing litigation to its
final determination. Rule 58 is pertinent to what that function is
and in describing when a judgment shall be entered indirectly
illumines what a judgment is within the contemplation of the Rules.
Thus, when a jury returns a general verdict and there have been no
interrogatories,
Page 356 U. S. 240
judgment on the verdict shall be entered forthwith by the clerk,
without further direction from the court. When the case is tried to
the court and the relief awarded is complex, the court must approve
the form of the judgment and direct that it be entered by the
clerk. However, when the court directs that a party recover money
only, and that is the situation in the present case, or that all
relief be denied, the clerk is to enter judgment forthwith upon
receipt of the direction.
One thing is clear from a close reading of these Rules in the
light of the general purpose "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 1.
Simplicity and speed, when consonant with effective protection of
the interests of the parties, are touchstones for the
interpretation of all the Rules, especially those strategically
placed to advance the litigation to its final conclusion. Thus, as
regards the judgment contemplated by Rule 73(a), no formal document
stamped "judgment" is required, and the direction that a party
recover money or that all relief be denied may be included in an
informal memorandum, given at the end of a written opinion, or even
delivered orally from the bench. Of the many decisions in the
Courts of Appeals on this question, none has suggested that a
judgment must be expressed in a formal, autonomous document, as is
required by the cumbersome, wasteful practice in some States. Such
a requirement would contradict the liberal policy of the Federal
Rules. We have recognized, even in a criminal case not governed by
these Rules, that "No form of words and no peculiar formal act is
necessary to evince [the rendition of a judgment] or to mature the
right of appeal."
United States v. Hark, 320 U.
S. 531,
320 U. S. 534.
The fact that by Rule 58 the court is expressly required to approve
the form of the judgment when the relief granted is more complex
than money or costs is surely convincing that,
Page 356 U. S. 241
when only money or costs are awarded, there is no such
requirement.
The 1946 amendment to Rule 58 underscored the purpose not to
require from the court a particular formal act or an explicit
direction that judgment be entered. The Rule had provided that:
"When the court directs the entry of a judgment that a party
recover only money or costs or that there be no recovery, the clerk
shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the
direction. . . ."
308 U.S. 737. It was amended to read:
"When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs
or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment
forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction. . . ."
329 U.S. 863. According to the Notes of the Advisory
Committee,
"The substitution of the more inclusive phrase 'all relief be
denied' for the words 'there be no recovery' makes it clear that
the clerk shall enter the judgment forthwith in the situations
specified
without awaiting the filing of a formal judgment
approved by the court."
28 U.S.C., p. 4343. (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, the
elimination of the words "the entry of a judgment" made it clear
that it is the direction to recover that is the essential act, and
not a direction explicitly to enter judgment or a direction framed
in any particular manner.
Of course, the court may, in the exercise of its control over
the shape of the judgment and the time of its rendition, indicate
that no judgment will be rendered until a formal document is drawn
up, approved, and signed. The Rules themselves recognized that, in
many cases, according to the relief awarded, the careful
formulation of a separate judgment may be indispensable to the
proper disposition of the litigation. Moreover, a formal document
evidencing the judgment may in some circumstances be necessary for
execution, for registration
Page 356 U. S. 242
under state law, or for divers purposes unrelated to the taking
of an appeal. In the present case, for example, the Government
states that, under Treasury Department procedures, respondent could
not have secured payment of the judgment without submitting a
certified copy stating the precise amount of the judgment plus
interest and costs. But these requirements, admitting their
relevance to the particular purposes for which they are designed,
do not justify eroding an important federal procedural policy in
favor of speed and simplicity in taking appeals by demanding that
because the definitive adjudication of a claim must be in a
particular form for a particular purpose it must be so for all.
What is required under Rule 73(a) is action by the court that
clearly indicates that the issues presented by the litigation have
been adjudicated, and that the decision is wholly completed and not
dependent on further action by the court. Furthermore, since the
parties must be in a position to make an intelligent choice whether
or not to appeal, the court must inform them not only that it has
decided the case, but what it has decided. In assessing the court's
action to determine whether these requirements have been met and a
judgment has been rendered within the meaning of Rule 73(a), an
appellate court naturally looks to the import of the trial court's
action as it must reasonably have appeared to the parties.
Certainty that the court has in fact rendered an appealable
judgment is, of course, a vital consideration, so that meritorious
appeals may not be lost through inadvertence. Surely such certainty
can be attained by directing trial judges to explicitness in
decision and expression without insisting on archaic formalities
that pointlessly delay the course of the litigation. As Chief Judge
Clark has indicated in an opinion following the decision in the
present case, appellate rules should not be "adjusted to
accommodate
Page 356 U. S. 243
carelessness at cost of . . . serious losses in effective court
procedure. . . ."
Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517,
519.
It is readily apparent that these criteria set only very broad
limits on the interpretation of judicial action, and that
considerable scope is left for variation according to local custom
and practice, properly so in a country as diversified and vast as
ours. In this regard, the judgment in
United States v.
Hark, 320 U. S. 531,
supra, a criminal case involving an appeal direct to this
Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, now 18 U.S.C. ยง 3731, is not
significantly different from a judgment under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. There, the District Court rendered an opinion
granting the defendants' motion to quash the indictment, and, some
weeks later, signed a formal order to the same effect. This Court
concluded that the formal order, rather than the earlier opinion,
was the judgment of the court within the meaning of the statute,
and that the appeal from it was timely. This conclusion was
reached, however, only after finding that the customary practice in
the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, from which
the appeal had come, was to issue a formal order quashing an
indictment and to regard it as the judgment. The Court expressly
refused, because of the diversity of practice in the lower courts,
to lay down a "hard and fast rule" that, when a formal judgment is
filed, it must necessarily be regarded as the judgment for purposes
of appeal. In saying that a formal judgment is
prima facie
the judgment of the court, we made it clear that this presumption
could be overcome by a showing of local practice to the
contrary.
In
Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.
S. 283, a case involving the timeliness of a petition
for certiorari for review in this Court of a judgment of a Court of
Appeals, we found that, by common
Page 356 U. S. 244
understanding and long continued practice in the Court of
Appeals, the formal order of mandate, rather than the opinion, was
regarded as the judgment of the court. The Court respected this
practice because, as we said,
"Whether the announcement of an opinion and its entry in the
docket amounts to a judgment for purposes of appeal, or whether
that must await some later formal act, ought not to be decided on
nice-spun argumentation in disregard of the judicial habits of the
court whose judgment is called into question, of the bar practicing
before it, of the clerk who embodies its procedural traditions, as
well as in conflict with the assumption of the reviewing
court."
325 U.S. at
325 U. S.
287-288. Procedural requirements within the federal
judicial system are not to be fitted to a Procrustean bed. To the
extent that the Federal Rules clearly contemplate a certain manner
of doing things, of course such explicitness must be respected. But
when the Rules do not so require, and the subject is one intimately
associated with local practice and custom and adequately dealt with
on that basis, loyalty to the Rules precludes imposition of
uniformity merely for its own sake.
In the Second Circuit, a decision of a District Court, when it
is a complete, clear, and final adjudication, is deemed the
judgment of the court, even though a later, formal judgment is
signed and filed at the instance of one of the parties. We have the
word of a unanimous Court of Appeals for this. Moreover, we have
the decisions of that court over a number of years consistently
enforcing, without dissent, the practice to which it adheres in the
present case. So active a litigant as the Government could hardly
have been unaware that such was in fact the governing practice in
the application of Rule 73(a). The rule when first squarely stated
in
United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, Inc., 200 F.2d
936,
Page 356 U. S. 245
938, reflected a position taken in a line of earlier
authorities, [
Footnote 2/1] and it
has since been repeated with increasing emphasis and clarity.
[
Footnote 2/2] That Court has
continually admonished the District Courts to be clear and explicit
in their adjudications, so that certainty will not be sacrificed
and litigants confused, but no less has it been concerned, because
of the volume of litigation in the courts of that harried circuit
and the widespread criticism of the law's delays, to formulate and
enforce procedures that by their speed and simplicity will best
expedite cases to a final determination.
If the decision of a District Court is, standing alone, a clear
and final adjudication of the case, and, at the time rendered,
sufficient to give notice of the running of the time for appeal,
the Court of Appeals has refused to reassess its significance in
the light of a later formal judgment. To give weight to the filing
of the formal judgment in this situation, that court has found,
would increase, rather than diminish, uncertainty and confusion,
since the legal effect of the first decision would vary depending
on the chance, often within the control of the parties as much as
the court, that more formal action is taken later. The temptation
would be too great to present a formal judgment for the court's
approval simply to cast doubt on the finality of the earlier
action, and thus improperly to extend the time for appeal.
Although, in other circuits, a contrary position appears to have
been taken and
Page 356 U. S. 246
weight is given to the later filing of a formal judgment,
e.g., United States v. Higginson, 238 F.2d 439, 441-443,
it cannot be said that the view adopted by the Second Circuit is
without reason or inappropriate to the needs and practicalities of
litigation in that circuit. [
Footnote
2/3] In view of the varying problems in different circuits, we
should, in this matter, leave to a Court of Appeals a considerable
measure of freedom to interpret and form the practice in the
District Courts in the light of its experience with the procedural
relations between itself and those courts.
If the general rule of practice and interpretation in the Second
Circuit is not in conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is also not unreasonable as applied in the present
case. The opinion of the District Court clearly informed the
parties that respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted,
and nothing in the language of the court remotely suggested that
any formal judgment or further action by the court was contemplated
or necessary for finality of adjudication. The amount of the
judgment was the amount, plus interest and costs, of the tax
illegally assessed and collected, and this amount was recited in
the opinion as an agreed fact. Rule 58
Page 356 U. S. 247
specifically provides that the entry of judgment shall not be
delayed for the taxing of costs, and, since the date of the payment
of the tax was not in dispute, the interest due was a simple,
mathematically ascertainable item, and the failure to state it
explicitly in the opinion neither qualified nor delayed the
definitive aspect of the judgment.
The Court itself recognizes that a "judgment" for the purposes
of appeal is no more than an action by the court that finally and
completely adjudicates the issues presented by the litigation, and
that ultimately the question is one of ascertaining the intention
of the District Court in a given case. Nevertheless, the Court
reverses the unanimous determination of the Court of Appeals on
this question, and it appears to rest this unusual action on the
slender reed that the opinion of the District Court failed to show
on its face the amount of the interest. In judging whether the
District Court intended to make a final disposition of the case,
the Court of Appeals surely was correct in concluding that this
trivial circumstance was more than outweighed by the other
circumstances of the case.
There may be cases in which the trial court's decision is
inconclusive and ambiguous as to whether further action is
contemplated, or it may be impossible to determine the practical
effect of the judgment without complicated computations or
information not available at the time the court renders its
decision. But the present case is not one of these. The different
considerations such cases present do not justify us in striking
down a reasonable procedural rule relevantly applied. Nor is it
material that, in this case, it was respondent itself that
submitted for the court's approval the formal judgment of May 24th.
When the motion for summary judgment was granted on April 14th and
a final judgment rendered according to the
Page 356 U. S. 248
established practice in the Second Circuit, the time for appeal
commenced to run automatically by force of Rule 73(a). The fact
that the court or either of the parties later proceeded on the
assumption that further action was necessary or desirable to obtain
a judgment, or for whatever reason, could in no way enlarge the
time within which to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate
court. Such action could not prevent either respondent or the Court
of Appeals from insisting on the finality of the District Court's
first decision.
What has been said in regard to the rendering of judgment
applies equally to the entry of judgment on the civil docket. Rule
79(a) requires that the notation on the docket be brief but show
the "substance" of the judgment rendered. "Substance" in this
context is not a term of Aristotelian metaphysics; it has no
meaning apart from the realities of custom and practice and
adequacy of notice to those whose conduct is governed by the docket
entries and the information they reasonably convey. Such a
practical reading of the Rule does not, contrary to the
Government's contention, render nugatory the requirement that the
substance of the judgment be shown, but properly interprets that
requirement in terms of the purpose for which it was designed.
The docket entry in the present case recited that the motion for
summary judgment had been granted, and referred to the court's
opinion on file. The opinion, in turn told, of the amount of the
judgment. Surely we cannot say, on a question so related to local
custom and understanding, that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding this sufficient notice to the parties that the case had
been decided and how it had been decided. The docket entry,
standing alone, would doubtless convey little to a stranger to the
litigation. To those familiar with the case, however, and attentive
to the question of appeal, it comprehensively
Page 356 U. S. 249
conveyed the vital information necessary to protect their
interests. The use of the word "judgment," or the recital of the
amount of the judgment in the docket as well as in the opinion
would have done no more, and a flat rule that such recitals must be
included would convert Rule 79(a) from a common sense direction to
maintain a docket useful to the court, the clerk, and interested
parties into a demand for pointless technicalities that ultimately
might well seriously inconvenience them. If the amount of the
judgment must necessarily appear in the docket, so also, it can be
argued, must the terms of an injunction, the substance of that
judgment; but by such inclusions the usefulness of the docket as an
index and brief history of the proceedings would be substantially
impaired, if not defeated.
It must be remembered that the problem before us concerns not
the niceties of abstract logic or legal symmetry, but the
practicalities of litigation and judicial administration in the
federal courts of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, comprising
the Second Circuit. Doubtless the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
insofar as they govern the time for taking appeals, must be
observed throughout the country by all eleven Courts of Appeals.
But since the Rules do not lay down self-defining specifications or
mechanically enforceable details on many matters, including the
rendition and entry of judgments, does due regard for the Rules
require more than obedience to the functional purposes they
express? Does their observance necessarily imply a nationwide
uniformity in their formal application? We have for review the
practical construction given to Rule 73(a) by a Court of Appeals
with as large a volume of business as any. By this practice, the
appellate jurisdiction of that court has been guided for some
years, and it has been approved by every appellate judge in the
circuit who has had occasion to consider the question. The
membership of the Court of Appeals reflects the experience of
judges among those of longest experience in our judiciary, both on
the District Courts and the Courts of Appeals, judges who have had
extensive experience at the bar both in private and public
litigation, and judges of special competence in the domain of
procedure. [
Footnote 2/4] A rule of
procedure authenticated by such a weighty certificate of legitimacy
should not be nullified out of regard for considerations of
elegantia juris. Certainly we should not upset it unless
compelled to do so by the clear requirements of unambiguous
legislation or the enforcement of unassailable even if implicit
standards for the fair administration of justice.
I would affirm the judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See Leonard v. Prince Line, Ltd., 157 F.2d 987, 989;
Murphy v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 158 F.2d 481, 484-485;
Binder v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Assn., 165 F.2d
896, 901;
Markert v. Swift & Co., 173 F.2d 517, 519,
note 2.
[
Footnote 2/2]
United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467;
Napier v.
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 223 F.2d 28;
Matteson v.
United States, 240 F.2d 517;
Edwards v. Doctors Hospital,
Inc., 242 F.2d 888;
Repan v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 243 F.2d 876.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In its opinion in the present case, the Court of Appeals invokes
not only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its own carefully
formulated views on the rendition of judgment as understood in
those Rules, but also Rule 10(a) of the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York. This Rule provides that,
"A memorandum of the determination of a motion, signed by the
judge, shall constitute the order; but nothing herein contained
shall prevent the court from making an order, either originally or
on an application for resettlement, in more extended form."
However, in
Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517,
following the decision in the present case, the Court of Appeals
explained that it "viewed the local rule as merely corroborative of
the practice actually required by F.R. 58. . . ." 240 F.2d at
518.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The court sitting on the present case included:
Chief Judge Clark -- 6 years' private practice, 19 years on the
Court of Appeals, 21 years member of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judge Frank -- 22 years' private practice, 6 years' federal
administrative service, 16 years on the Court of Appeals.
Judge Medina -- 35 years' private practice, 4 years on the
District Court, 7 years on the Court of Appeals.
Judge Hincks -- 14 years' private practice, 22 years on the
District Court, 5 years on the Court of Appeals.
Judge Lumbard -- 21 years' private practice, 6 years in the
United States Attorney's Office, 3 years on the Court of
Appeals.
Judge Waterman -- 29 years' private practice, 3 years on the
Court of Appeals.
Other judges who sat in
United States v. Wissahickon Tool
Works, Inc., 200 F.2d 936,
supra, or the cases cited
in
356
U.S. 227fn2/2|>note 2 were:
Judge Learned Hand -- 12 years private practice, 15 years on the
District Court, 27 years on the Court of Appeals at retirement.
Judge Augustus N. Hand -- 19 years' private practice, 13 years
on the District Court, 26 years on the Court of Appeals at
retirement.
Judge Swan -- 13 years' private practice, 26 years on the Court
of Appeals at retirement.
Judge Chase -- 7 years' private practice, 10 years on state
courts, 25 years on the Court of Appeals at retirement.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
The effort which has gone into this case has at least ended
happily from the point of view of preserving the integrity of those
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bearing on the
timeliness of appeals. The Court's opinion, and the dissent of MR.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER which I have joined, are at one on the basic
issue, namely, that entry of a formal judgment is not necessary to
start the time for appeal running, and also agree that the
determinative question in any given case is whether the District
Court intended its decision on the merits to be a final disposition
of the matter. After an en banc Court of Appeals had decided that
the District Court in this instance did intend to make a final
disposition of the case, I should have thought this Court would
have considered it the better course to affirm the judgment below,
with an appropriate suggestion to district judges, to leave no room
for argument about their intentions respecting finality, rather
than to reverse the Court of Appeals on what was essentially an
issue of fact.
Even so, the Court's action perhaps has a silver lining, for I
daresay it will stimulate district judges to be more at pains in
the future,
cf. Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517,
518, to give in their opinions in these "money" cases an
affirmative indication of intention regarding the finality or
nonfinality of their decisions. If such is the effect of this
decision, it will be a healthy thing, for surely such a commonplace
affair as the time for appeal should not be permitted to breed
litigation.