Under the Natural Gas Act, a regulated natural gas company
furnishing gas to a distributing company under a long-term contract
filed with the Federal Power Commission may not, without the
consent of the distributing company, change the rate specified in
the contract simply by filing a new rate schedule with the
Commission under § 4(d) of the Act. Pp.
350 U. S.
333-347.
(a) Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act, which requires uniform
rates, the Natural Gas Act expressly recognizes that rates to
particular customers may be set initially by individual contracts
filed with the Commission. Pp.
350 U. S.
338-339.
(b) Authority for natural gas companies to change their contract
rates unilaterally is not conferred by § 4(d) of the Act, which
provides that
"no change shall be made by any natural gas company in any such
[filed] rate . . . or contract . . . except after thirty days'
notice to the Commission,"
given by filing new schedules showing the changes and the time
they are to go into effect. Pp.
350 U. S.
339-340.
(c) The Act neither grants nor defines the initial rate-setting
powers of natural gas companies; it merely defines the review
powers of the Commission and imposes such duties on natural gas
companies as are necessary to effectuate those powers. Pp.
350 U. S.
340-343.
(d) There is nothing in the structure or purpose of the Act from
which can be inferred any right, not otherwise possessed and
nowhere expressly given by the Act, of natural gas companies
unilaterally to change their contracts. Pp.
350 U. S.
343-344.
(e) The conclusion here reached fully promotes the purposes of
the Act. Pp.
350 U. S.
344-345.
(f)
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S.
56, and
Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power
& Light Co., 300 U. S. 109,
distinguished. Pp. 345-
350 U. S.
346.
Page 350 U. S. 333
(g) The new schedule filed by the natural gas company in this
case was a nullity insofar as it purported to change the rate set
by its contract, and the contract rate remained the only lawful
rate. P.
350 U. S.
347.
(h) Under its general power to issue order "necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act," the
Commission had authority to reject the unauthorized filing of a new
schedule of rates by the natural gas company, and the Commission's
failure to do so and its order "permitting" the new rates to become
effective were in error. P.
350 U. S.
347.
(i) Any amounts paid by the distributing company in excess of
the contract rates were unlawfully collected, and the natural gas
company is obligated to make restitution of the excess payments. P.
350 U. S.
347.
215 F.2d 883 affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether under the Natural
Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717
et seq., a
regulated natural gas company furnishing gas
Page 350 U. S. 334
to a distributing company under a long-term contract, may,
without the consent of the distributing company, change the rate
specified in the contract simply by filing a new rate schedule with
the Federal Power Commission. The pertinent provisions of the Act
are set forth in the margin. [
Footnote 1]
Page 350 U. S. 335
Respondent Mobile Gas Service Corporation (Mobile), a
distributor of natural gas to domestic and industrial users in
Mobile, Alabama, acquires its gas from petitioner United Gas Pipe
Line Company (United), a "natural gas
Page 350 U. S. 336
company" subject to regulation under the Act. In 1946 the Ideal
Cement Company (Ideal), planning to construct a cement plant in the
city provided it could be assured a supply of gas at a sufficiently
low rate, obtained from Mobile an agreement to furnish gas for a
10-year term at 12 cents per MCF (thousand cubic feet). Mobile, in
turn, before entering into a contract with Ideal, obtained from
United a 10-year contract to supply gas for resale to Ideal at the
equivalent of 10.7 cents per MCF, a rate substantially lower than
that for other gas furnished by United. This contract was filed
with the Federal Power Commission as an amendment to the general
supply contracts between Mobile and United, and, with the approval
of the Commission, became a part of United's filed schedules of
rates and contracts.
In June, 1953, United, without the consent of Mobile, filed new
schedules with the Commission which purported to increase the rate
on gas for resale to Ideal to 14.5 cents per MCF, a rate more
closely approximating that for other gas furnished to Mobile by
United. Claiming that United could not thus unilaterally change the
contract rate, Mobile petitioned the Commission to reject United's
filing. The Commission denied the petition, holding that, under §
4(d) of the Act, the new rate, being a non-suspendible industrial
rate, automatically became effective 30 days after filing, and
would remain in effect unless and until the Commission should,
after investigation
Page 350 U. S. 337
under § 4(e), determine the new rate to be unlawful. Mobile paid
the new rate until April 15, 1955, when United, with Commission
approval, accepted an assignment to it of Mobile's contract with
Ideal. [
Footnote 2] This
assignment made the pending investigation into the lawfulness of
the new rate moot, since, in the Commission's view, its
determination on that matter would have no retroactive effect.
Thus, the only question before us is whether United property
collected from Mobile the difference between the old 10.7-cent rate
and the new 14.5-cent rate during the period from July 25, 1953
(when the new rate purportedly went into effect), to April 15, 1955
(when United took over the Ideal contract) -- a sum aggregating
approximately $240,000. On Mobile's petition for review, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Hastie, J., dissenting) reversed
the Commission's order, directed it to reject United's filing of
the new schedule insofar as it purported to increase the rate in
question, and held Mobile entitled to a return of the amounts paid
in excess of the contract rate. 215 F.2d 883. Both the Commission
and United, which had intervened in the Court of Appeals,
petitioned for certiorari, which we granted because of the
importance of this question in the administration of the Natural
Gas Act. 348 U.S. 950. For the reasons discussed below, we hold
that the Natural Gas Act does not give natural gas companies the
right to change their rate contracts by their own unilateral
action.
The question presented is solely one of the proper
interpretation of the Natural Gas Act, there being no claim that
the statute, if interpreted to permit a natural gas company
unilaterally to change its contracts, would be
Page 350 U. S. 338
unconstitutional.
Cf. Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City P.
& L. Co., 300 U. S. 109. The
Act [
Footnote 3] requires
natural gas companies to file all rates and contracts with the
Commission, § 4(c), and authorizes the Commission to modify any
rate or contract which it determines to be "unjust, unreasonable,
unduly discriminatory, or preferential," § 5(a). Changes in
previously filed rates or contracts must be filed with the
Commission at least 30 days before they are to go into effect, §
4(d), and, except in the case of industrial rates, the Commission
may suspend the operation of the new rate pending a determination
of its reasonableness, § 4(e). If a decision has not been reached
before the period of suspension expires, a maximum of five months,
the filed rate must be allowed to go into effect, but the
Commission's order may be made retroactive to that date.
In construing the Act, we should bear in mind that it evinces no
purpose to abrogate private rate contracts as such. To the
contrary, by requiring contracts to be filed with the Commission,
the Act expressly recognizes that rates to particular customers may
be set by individual contracts. In this respect, the Act is in
marked contrast to the Interstate Commerce Act, which in effect
precludes private rate agreements by its requirement that the rates
to all shippers be uniform, a requirement which made unnecessary
any provision for filing contracts.
See Armour Packing Co. v.
United States, 209 U. S. 56. The
Commission, in its brief, recognizes this basic difference between
the two Acts, and notes the differing natures of the industries
which gave rise to it. The vast number of retail transactions of
railroads made policing of individual transactions administratively
impossible; effective regulation could be accomplished only by
requiring compliance with a single schedule of rates applicable to
all
Page 350 U. S. 339
shippers. On the other hand, only a relatively few wholesale
transactions are regulated by the Natural Gas Act, and these
typically require substantial investment in capacity and facilities
for the service of a particular distributor. Recognizing the need
these circumstances create for individualized arrangements between
natural gas companies and distributors, the Natural Gas Act permits
the relations between the parties to be established initially by
contract, the protection of the public interest being afforded by
supervision of the individual contracts, which, to that end, must
be filed with the Commission and made public.
The provision of the Natural Gas Act directly in issue here is §
4(d), which provides that
"no change shall be made by any natural gas company in any such
[filed] rate . . . or contract . . . except after thirty days'
notice to the Commission,"
which notice is to be given by filing new schedules showing the
changes and the time they are to go into effect. It is argued that
this provision authorizes a natural gas company to change its rate
contracts simply by filing a new schedule of rates, to go into
effect in no less than thirty days. On its face, however, § 4(d) is
simply a prohibition, not a grant of power. It does not purport to
say what is effective to change a contract, any more than § 4(c)
purports to define what constitutes a "contract" that may be filed
with the Commission. The section says only that a change
cannot be made without the proper notice to the
Commission; it does not say under what circumstances a change
can be made. Absent the Act, a unilateral announcement of
a change to a contract would, of course, be a nullity, and we find
no basis in the language of § 4(d) for inferring that the mere
imposition of a "filing and notice" requirement was intended to
make effective action which would otherwise be of no effect at all.
In short, § 4(d), on its face, indicates no more than that
otherwise valid changes cannot be put into effect
Page 350 U. S. 340
without giving the required notice to the Commission. To find in
the section a further purpose to empower natural gas companies to
change their contracts unilaterally requires reading into it
language that is neither there nor reasonably to be implied.
It is argued, however, that a different conclusion is compelled
when § 4(d) is read with the other provisions of the Act.
Petitioners attempt to characterize the Act as setting up two
separate and distinct "procedures" for changing rates: (1) the
"hearing and order" procedure of § 5(a), under which the Commission
may determine existing rates to be unreasonable and order changes
to be made; and (2) the "filed-rate" procedure of § 4(d) and (e),
under which the natural gas company may initiate changes, in which
event, the Commission's only concern is with the reasonableness of
the new rate. These are said to be complementary and mutually
exclusive procedures, the choice between which -- since both
expressly relate to changes in "contracts" as well as other rates
-- depends solely on who is seeking the change, and not on whether
the rate sought to be changed is embodied in a contract. From this
characterization of the procedures, petitioners conclude that, when
a natural gas company initiates a rate change under § 4(d), the
proceedings are governed exclusively by § 4(d) and (e), and hence
the Commission's only power is that which it has under § 4(e) to
set aside the new rate if that is found to be unlawful.
The major defect of this argument is that it assumes the answer
to the very question in issue -- whether natural gas companies are
empowered to "initiate" unilateral contract changes under § 4(d).
That the so-called "filed-rate" procedure is applicable to changes
in contracts as well as other rates proves only that contracts may
be changed, not that they may be changed unilaterally. Moreover,
the very premise that §§ 4(d) and (e) and 5(a) are alternative
rate-changing "procedures" is itself
Page 350 U. S. 341
based on a misconception of the structure of the Act. These
sections are simply parts of a single statutory scheme under which
all rates are established initially by the natural gas companies,
by contract or otherwise, and all rates are subject to being
modified by the Commission upon a finding that they are unlawful.
The Act merely defines the review powers of the Commission and
imposes such duties on natural gas companies as are necessary to
effectuate those powers; it purports neither to grant nor to define
the initial rate-setting powers of natural gas companies.
The powers of the Commission are defined by §§ 4(e) and 5(a).
The basic power of the Commission is that given it by § 5(a) to set
aside and modify any rate or contract which it determines, after
hearing, to be "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or
preferential." This is neither a "rate-making" nor a
"rate-changing" procedure. It is simply the power to review rates
and contracts made in the first instance by natural gas companies
and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them. Section
5(a) would, of its own force, apply to all the rates of a natural
gas company, whether long established or newly changed, but, in the
latter case, the power is further implemented by § 4(e). All that §
4(e) does, however, is to add to this basic power, in the case of a
newly changed rate or contract (except "industrial" rates), the
further powers (1) to preserve the
status quo pending
review of the new rate by suspending its operation for a limited
period, and (2) thereafter to make its order retroactive, by means
of the refund procedure, to the date the change became effective.
The scope and purpose of the Commission's review remain the same --
to determine whether the rate fixed by the natural gas company is
lawful.
The limitations imposed on natural gas companies are set out in
§§ 4(c) and 4(d). The basic duties are
Page 350 U. S. 342
the filing requirements: § 4(c) requires schedules showing all
rates and contracts in force to be filed with the Commission, and §
4(d) requires all changes in such schedules likewise to be filed.
In addition, § 4(d) imposes the further requirement that the
changes be filed at least thirty days before they are to go into
effect. It may readily be seen that these requirements are no more
than are necessary to implement §§ 4(e) and 5(a): the filing
requirements are obviously necessary to permit the Commission to
exercise its review functions, and the requirement of 30-days'
advance notice of changes is essential to afford the Commission a
reasonable period in which to determine whether to exercise its
suspension powers under § 4(e).
The relationship of these sections thus affords no support to
petitioners' characterization of § 4(d) and (e) as establishing a
rate-changing "procedure" -- a "proceeding" before the Commission
"initiated" by a natural gas company filing a "proposed" change.
Section 4(d) provides not for the filing of "proposals," but for
notice to the Commission of any "change . . . made by" a natural
gas company, and the change is effected, if at all, not by an order
of the Commission but solely by virtue of the natural gas company's
own action. If the purported change is one the natural gas company
has the power to make, the "change" is completed upon compliance
with the notice requirement, and the new rate has the same force as
any other rate -- it can be set aside only upon being found
unlawful by the Commission. It is thus no more a "proposed" rate
than any other rate, all of which are equally subject to Commission
review. Likewise, no "proceeding" is "initiated" by a § 4(d)
filing. A proceeding to review the new rate may be initiated under
§ 4(e), but, if so, it is initiated by the Commission in the same
manner as a proceeding under § 5(a) to review any other rate, that
is, upon complaint or its own motion.
Page 350 U. S. 343
The only difference is the interim suspension power given by §
4(e), but that in no way affects the character of the proceeding,
which remains, like a § 5(a) proceeding, simply a review by the
Commission of a rate established by the natural gas company. In
short, the Act provides no "procedure" either for making or
changing rates; it provides only for
notice to the
Commission of the rates established by natural gas companies and
for review by the Commission of those rates. The initial
rate-making and rate-changing powers of natural gas companies
remain undefined, and unaffected by the Act.
All of the relevant provisions of the Act can thus be fully
explained as simply defining and implementing the powers of the
Commission to review rates set initially by natural gas companies,
and there is nothing to indicate that they were intended to do
more. Admittedly, the Act presumes a capacity in natural gas
companies to make rates and contracts and to change them from time
to time, but nowhere in the Act is either power defined. The
obvious implication is that, except as specifically limited by the
Act, the rate-making powers of natural gas companies were to be no
different from those they would possess in the absence of the Act:
to establish
ex parte, and change at will, the rates
offered to prospective customers, or to fix by contract, and change
only by mutual agreement, the rate agreed upon with a particular
customer. No more is necessary to give full meaning to all the
provisions of the Act: consistent with this, § 4(d) means simply
that no change -- neither a unilateral change to an
ex
parte rate nor an agreed-upon change to a contract -- can be
made by a natural gas company without the proper notice to the
Commission. Hence, there is nothing in the structure or purpose of
the Act from which we can infer the right, not otherwise possessed
and nowhere expressly given by the Act,
Page 350 U. S. 344
of natural gas companies unilaterally to change their
contracts.
Our conclusion that the Natural Gas Act does not empower natural
gas companies unilaterally to change their contracts fully promotes
the purposes of the Act. By preserving the integrity of contracts,
it permits the stability of supply arrangements which all agree is
essential to the health of the natural gas industry. Conversion by
consumers, particularly industrial users, to the use of natural gas
may frequently require substantial investments which the consumer
would be unwilling to make without long-term commitments from the
distributor, and the distributor can hardly make such commitments
if its supply contracts are subject to unilateral change by the
natural gas company whenever its interests so dictate. The history
of the Ideal contract furnishes a case in point. On the other hand,
denying to natural gas companies the power unilaterally to change
their contracts in no way impairs the regulatory powers of the
Commission, for the contracts remain fully subject to the paramount
power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public
interest. The Act thus affords a reasonable accommodation between
the conflicting interests of contract stability, on the one hand,
and public regulation, on the other.
It may be noted also that this interpretation, while precluding
natural gas companies from unilaterally changing their contracts
simply because it is in their private interests to do so, does not
deprive them of an avenue of relief when their interests coincide
with the public interest. Section 5(a) authorizes the Commission to
investigate rates not only "upon complaint of any State,
municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company," but
also "upon its own motion." Thus, while natural gas companies are
understandably not given the same explicit standing to complain of
their own contracts
Page 350 U. S. 345
as are those who represent the public interest or those who
might be discriminated against, there is nothing to prevent them
from furnishing to the Commission any relevant information and
requesting it to initiate an investigation on its own motion.
[
Footnote 4] And if the
Commission, after hearing, determines the contract rate to be so
low as to conflict with the public interest, it may under § 5(a)
authorize the natural gas company to file a schedule increasing the
rate.
The prior decisions of this Court cited by petitioners as
requiring an opposite result are readily distinguishable. In
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S.
56, a rate contract between a railroad and a shipper at
the filed rates in effect at the time the contract was made was
held not to justify payment at the contract rate for shipments made
after the filed rates for shipments of that character had been
increased by the railroad. The very basis for that decision,
however, was the requirement of the Interstate Commerce Act that
rates to all shippers be uniform and comply with the single tariff
filed with the Commission, there being no provision under that Act
for the filing of individual contracts. That is, the Interstate
Commerce Act, by its own force, precluded contracts for rates
different from those applicable to other shippers. The Natural Gas
Act, on the other hand, recognizes the need for private contracts
of varying terms, and expressly provides for the filing of such
contracts as a part of the rate schedules. No contention is made
here that the fact that the Mobile contract was at a rate different
from that to other customers in itself made the contract illegal,
or that -- as held in
Armour -- United could not lawfully
have complied with the contract had it wanted to. In
Midland
Page 350 U. S. 346
Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
300 U. S. 109, the
Court held only that a statute interpreted by the state court as
authorizing unilateral contract changes by a public utility was not
unconstitutional. On the other hand, in
Wichita Railroad &
Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas,
260 U. S. 48, this
Court interpreted a Kansas statute, not yet fully construed by the
state court, as not giving such a power to a public utility, and,
to the extent that that decision rested upon an original
interpretation of similar statutory language, it affords strong
support for our interpretation of the Natural Gas Act.
The only two Courts of Appeals that have squarely ruled on this
question, those for the District of Columbia and Third Circuits,
have concluded that neither the Natural Gas Act [
Footnote 5] nor the virtually identical
provisions of the Federal Power Act [
Footnote 6] authorize unilateral contract changes.
[
Footnote 7] The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, although distinguishing its
decision on a procedural ground, has indicated a contrary
conclusion. [
Footnote 8] The
parties have also referred us to numerous state court decisions
construing state statutes of varying degrees of similarity to the
Natural Gas Act, some holding that unilateral contract changes were
authorized [
Footnote 9] and
others
Page 350 U. S. 347
holding that they were not. [
Footnote 10] Taken as a whole, the state decisions prove
little more than that the question is an open one, and afford
little guidance to the proper interpretation of the Federal
Act.
From our conclusion that the Natural Gas Act gives a natural gas
company no power to change its contracts unilaterally, it follows
that the new schedule filed by United was a nullity insofar as it
purported to change the rate set by its contract with Mobile, and
that the contract rate remained the only lawful rate. There can be
no doubt of the unauthorized filing under its the unauthorized
filing under its general powers to issue orders "necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act," § 16, and its
failure to do so and its order "permitting" the new rates to become
effective were in error. Any amounts paid by Mobile in excess of
the contract rates on the basis of the erroneous order of the
Commission were therefore unlawfully collected, and United is
obligated to make restitution of the excess payments.
Cf.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.
S. 781.
Affirmed.
* Together with No. 31,
Federal Power Commission v. Mobile
Gas Service Corp., also on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 4. . . . (c) Under such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe, every natural gas company shall file with
the Commission, within such time (not less than sixty days from the
date this Act takes effect (June 21, 1938)), and in such form as
the Commission may designate, and shall keep open in convenient
form and place for public inspection, schedules showing all rates
and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices,
and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all
contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates,
charges, classifications, and services."
"(d) Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be
made by any natural gas company in any such rate, charge,
classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract
relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the
Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing
with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new
schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the
schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or
changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown,
may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days'
notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to
be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in
which they shall be filed and published."
"(e) Whenever any such new schedule is filed, the Commission
shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State,
municipality, or State commission, or upon its own initiative
without complaint at once, and if it so orders, without answer or
formal pleading by the natural gas company, but upon reasonable
notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such
rate, charge, classification, or service, and, pending such hearing
and the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such
schedules and delivering to the natural gas company affected
thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension,
may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of
such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer
period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go
into effect:
Provided, That the Commission shall not have
authority to suspend the rate, charge, classification, or service
for the sale of natural gas for resale for industrial use only; and
after full hearings, either completed before or after the rate,
charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission
may make such orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a
proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the
proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the
expiration of the suspension period, on motion of the natural gas
company making the filing, the proposed change of rate, charge,
classification, or service shall go into effect. Where increased
rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may, by
order, require the natural gas company to furnish a bond, to be
approved by the Commission, to refund any amounts ordered by the
Commission, to keep accurate accounts in detail of all amounts
received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in
whose behalf such amounts were paid, and, upon completion of the
hearing and decision, to order such natural gas company to refund,
with interest, the portion of such increased rates or charges by
its decision found not justified. At any hearing involving a rate
or charge sought to be increased, the burden of proof to show that
the increased rate or charge is just and reasonable shall be upon
the natural gas company, and the Commission shall give to the
hearing and decision of such questions preference over other
questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as
possible."
52 Stat. 822-823, 15 U.S.C. § 717c.
"SEC. 5. (a) Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon
its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State
commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate,
charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected
by any natural gas company in connection with any transportation or
sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such
rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the
just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation,
practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and
shall fix the same by order:
Provided, however, That the
Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate
contained in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas
company on file with the Commission unless such increase is in
accordance with a new schedule filed by such natural gas company;
but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are
unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or
are not the lowest reasonable rates."
52 Stat. 823-824, 15 U.S.C. § 717d.
[
Footnote 2]
United agreed to pay Mobile 2 cents per MCF for transporting the
gas to Ideal. Since, under the assigned contract, United received
only 12 cents per MCF from Ideal, its net return after the
assignment was only 10 cents per MCF, less than the 10.7 cents it
had received under its earlier contract with Mobile.
[
Footnote 3]
See note 1 pp.
334-336,
supra.
[
Footnote 4]
See § 14(a) of the Act, providing in part:
"The Commission may permit any person to file with it a
statement in writing . . . as to any or all facts and circumstances
concerning a matter which may be the subject of investigation."
52 Stat. 828, 15 U.S.C. § 717m.
[
Footnote 5]
Mobile Gas Service Corp. v. FPC, 215 F.2d 883, the
decision below.
[
Footnote 6]
Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. FPC, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 140,
223 F.2d 605,
aff'd, 350 U. S. 350 U.S.
348.
[
Footnote 7]
See also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 142 F.2d
943, 954,
aff'd, 324 U. S. 324 U.S.
581.
[
Footnote 8]
Tyler Gas Service Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 217
F.2d 73.
[
Footnote 9]
E.g., City of Lamar v. Town of Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 248
P. 1009;
Kansas City Light & Power Co. v. Midland Realty
Co., 338 Mo. 1141, 93 S.W.2d 954,
aff'd, 300 U. S. 300 U.S.
109;
Suburban Water Co. v. Oakmont Borough, 268 Pa. 243,
110 A. 778;
North Coast Power Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 114 Wash. 102, 194 P. 587.
[
Footnote 10]
E.g., Rutland Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Burditt
Bros., 94 Vt. 421, 111 A. 582;
Commonwealth ex rel. Page
Milling Co. v. Shenandoah River L. & P. Corp., 135 Va. 47,
68-73, 115 S.E. 695, 701-703;
In re Searsport Water Co.,
118 Me. 382, 392-393, 108 A. 452, 457-458;
see also Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co. v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting Co., 295
F. 895.