Within the meaning of § 302(b) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, which makes it unlawful for "any representative of any
employees" to receive money or other thing of value from the
employer, an individual who was the president and principal
negotiator of a labor union is a "representative" of employees. Pp.
350 U. S.
300-307.
(a) The term "representative" in § 302(b) is not limited to "the
exclusive bargaining representative" of the employees, but includes
any person authorized by the employees to act for them in dealings
with their employers. Pp.
350 U. S.
301-307
(b) A narrow reading of the term "representative" would
substantially defeat the purpose of the Act. Pp.
350 U. S.
304-305.
(c) In this legislation, Congress was not aiming solely at the
welfare fund problem. P.
350 U. S.
305.
(d) The legislative history supports the construction here given
§ 302(b). Pp.
350 U. S.
305-306.
(e) The provision in the Labor Management Relations Act that the
term "representative" shall have the meaning that it has in the
National Labor Relations Act does not require that the term, as
used in § 302, be construed to include only the exclusive
bargaining representative. Pp.
350 U. S.
306-307.
225 F.2d 417 reversed and remanded.
Page 350 U. S. 300
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision in this case is whether the president
and principal negotiator of a labor union is a "representative" of
employees within the meaning of § 302(b) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141. That section
makes it unlawful for "any representative of any employees" to
receive money or other thing of value from the employer. The
District Court,
128 F.
Supp. 128, held that respondent Joseph P. Ryan was a
"representative" within the meaning of § 302(b), but the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, Judge Hand dissenting. 225
F.2d 417. Because of the importance of this question in the
administration of the Act, we granted certiorari, 350 U.S. 860.
Ryan was president of The International Longshoremen's
Association (ILA) during the years 1950 and 1951. The ILA and its
affiliated groups were the recognized collective bargaining agents
for longshore labor in the Port of New York, and bargained through
a wage scale committee of which Ryan was a member. He signed the
agreements negotiated during that period. J. Arthur Kennedy &
Son, Inc., and Daniels & Kennedy, Inc., were concerns engaged
in stevedoring operations; their employees were members of the ILA,
and they were bound by the agreements negotiated with that union by
the New York Shipping Association. The District Court found that
James C. Kennedy, president of both Kennedy companies, had given
Ryan $1,000 in December of each year from 1946 through 1951, and
$500 in April, 1951. These findings are not disputed. Ryan was
indicted under § 302(b) for accepting the one 1950 and two 1951
payments. [
Footnote 1] He was
found guilty and sentenced to
Page 350 U. S. 301
six months' imprisonment on each of the three counts, the
sentences to run concurrently, and fined $2,500.
The Court of Appeals reversed solely on its interpretation of
the term "representative" in § 302(b) of the LMRA. It concluded
that the term had a technical meaning in labor legislation and was
limited to "the exclusive bargaining representative" of the
employees, which, in this case, was the ILA itself. Since the
section applied only to the "representative," payments to Ryan
individually were not covered, even though, as president of the
representative union, he was a member of its wage scale committee
and signed all negotiated agreements. We do not decide whether any
official of a union is
ex officio a representative of
employees under § 302. We believe, however, that respondent's
relationship brings him within that term.
The LMRA provides that the term "representative" shall have "the
same meaning as when used in the National Labor Relations Act as
amended by this Act." § 501(3). The pertinent definition appears in
§ 2(4) of the NLRA: "The term
representatives' includes any
individual or labor organization." 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. §§
151, 152(4).
The Board has held that employees may choose to elect an
individual as exclusive or sole bargaining representative.
[
Footnote 2] The Court of
Appeals, laying much stress on these holdings, assumes that the
possibility of such a one-man exclusive bargaining representative,
though extremely rare, [
Footnote
3] is the only reason for the inclusion of the word
"individual"
Page 350 U. S. 302
in this definition. We cannot accept such an anomalous view. It
is obvious that any labor organization, even when serving as an
exclusive bargaining representative, can negotiate, speak, and act
only through individuals. All collective bargaining is conducted by
individuals who represent labor and management. Many limitations or
prohibitions upon labor organization action can be effective only
if there are corresponding limitations or prohibitions on the
individuals who act for the labor organization. Congress, we
believe, placed the identical limitations on both individuals and
organizations by terming both "representatives" of employees in §
2(4). We agree with Judge Hand that, in using the term
"representative," Congress intended that it include any person
authorized by the employees to act for them in dealings with their
employers.
Considering the precise words of the statute -- "any
representative of any employees" -- it is plain that their literal
meaning strongly suggests that they were meant to include someone
in the position of respondent Ryan who represented employees both
as a union president and principal negotiator. And this
interpretation is strengthened by a consideration of the full text
of § 302. [
Footnote 4]
Paragraphs
Page 350 U. S. 303
(a) and (b) of § 302 make it unlawful for any employer to offer,
or any representative to accept, money or other thing of value.
Paragraph (c) lists five exceptions to these broad prohibitions.
The first exempts payments as compensation for services "to any
representative who is an employee" of the employer. Thus, it is
clear that § 302 anticipates that a "representative" may be an
individual. Of the remaining four exceptions, one could
Page 350 U. S. 304
apply only to unions but each of the other three could apply as
readily to individuals. [
Footnote
5]
Further, a narrow reading of the term "representative" would
substantially defeat the congressional purpose. In 1946, Congress
was disturbed by the demands of certain unions that the employers
contribute to "welfare funds" which were in the sole control of the
union or its officers and could be used as the individual officers
saw fit. The United Mine Workers' demand that mine
Page 350 U. S. 305
operators create a welfare fund for the union by contributing 10
cents for each ton of coal mined, caused the Congress to act. The
Case Bill, N.R.4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., which regulated welfare
funds in a manner similar to § 302, was enacted in 1949, but was
vetoed by the President. The following year, the Taft-Hartley Act
containing § 302 was passed over another veto. But, if
"representative" means only the "exclusive bargaining
representative," the explicit limitations on welfare funds in §
302(c)(5) may be easily evaded. Payments made directly to union
officials, or to other individuals as trustees, would apparently be
excluded from § 302. Thus, a narrow construction would frustrate
the primary intent of Congress.
Nor can it be contended that, in this legislation, Congress was
aiming solely at the welfare fund problem. Such a suggestion is
supported neither by the legislative history nor the structure of
the section. The arrangement of § 302 is such that the only
reference to welfare funds is contained in § 302(c)(5). If Congress
intended to deal with that problem alone, it could have done so
directly, without writing a broad prohibition in subsections (a)
and (b) and five specific exceptions thereto in subsection (c),
only the last of which covers welfare funds. As the statute reads,
it appears to be a criminal provision,
malum prohibitum,
which outlaws all payments, with stated exceptions, between
employer and representative.
The legislative history supports these conclusions. As passed by
the House of Representatives, the Hartley Bill forbade employer
contributions to union welfare funds, and made it an unfair labor
practice to give favors to "any person in a position of trust in a
labor organization. . . ." H.R.3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §
8(a)(2). The scope of this bill was enlarged when it reached the
Senate to include, in the words of Senator Taft, a "case
Page 350 U. S. 306
where the union representative is shaking down the employer. . .
." 93 Cong.Rec. 4746. The resulting Senate amendment made it
criminal both for the employer and the "representative" of
employees to engage in such practices.
It is not disputed that the plain language of the Senate version
of the bill brought within its coverage any individual who dealt
with an employer on behalf of two or more of the latter's employees
concerning employment matters. As passed by the Senate, § 302
contained a special definition of the term "representative."
[
Footnote 6] The Joint
Conference Committee substituted for it the definition of that term
in the NLRA, as amended. § 501(3). This substitution was among
those described by the Joint Conference Committee Report as "minor
clarifying changes." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 67.
We cannot read this history as supporting the conclusion that
the scope of § 302 was limited by the Joint Conference to include
only the "exclusive bargaining representative" of employees. Such a
change would have drastically reduced the scope of the section, and
could hardly be described as a "minor clarifying" change.
Certainly, in the face of this legislative history, we should not
reduce the legislation to a practical nullity.
It is insisted that this interpretation clashes with the use of
the term "representative" in various sections of the NLRA. In the
majority of the examples given, the scope of the term is made clear
by other words in the provisions
Page 350 U. S. 307
themselves. [
Footnote 7] But
further, the provision in the LMRA that "representative" shall have
its NLRA meaning is no more applicable to § 302 than to any other
section of the LMRA, and, in several other sections of that Act, it
is patent that "representative" cannot be construed to include only
the exclusive bargaining representative. For example, § 204(a)
refers to "employers and employees and their representatives," and
§ 211(a) refers to "interested representatives of employers,
employees, and the general public." There are other examples, but
these are sufficient. If the severely restricted construction
contended for the word "representative" is inapplicable to one
section of the LMRA, there is no compulsion to apply it to any
other section.
We conclude, therefore, that § 302 prohibits payments by
employers to individuals who represent employees in their relations
with the employers. The judgment is reversed
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
The previous section, 302(a), makes it unlawful for any
employer
"to pay or deliver, or to agree to pay or deliver, any money or
other thing of value to any representative of any of his employees
who are employed in an industry affecting commerce."
The record does not disclose whether the Government has taken
any action under this section against the employers involved.
[
Footnote 2]
See The Robinson-Ransbottom Pottery Co., 27 N.L.R.B.
1093;
Louisville Sanitary Wiper Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 88.
[
Footnote 3]
Statistics supplied by the NLRB for the last two years show that
one-man exclusive bargaining representatives constitute less than
0.1% of all representatives certified by the Board. In fiscal year
1955, the Board certified 1 individual in 2,904 elections in which
representatives were chosen. There were 10 petitions for
certification filed by individuals in 4,372 elections. In fiscal
1954, 5 individuals were certified in 3,108 elections in which
representatives were chosen. There were 11 such petitions, and a
total of 4,813 elections.
[
Footnote 4]
"SEC. 302 (a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay or
deliver, or to agree to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of
value to any representative of any of his employees who are
employed in an industry affecting commerce."
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any representative of any
employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce to
receive or accept, or to agree to receive or accept, from the
employer of such employees any money or other thing of value."
"(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1)
with respect to any money or other thing of value payable by an
employer to any representative who is an employee or former
employee of such employer, as compensation for, or by reason of,
his services as an employee of such employer; (2) with respect to
the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value in
satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a decision or award of
an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment,
settlement or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or
dispute in the absence of fraud or duress; (3) with respect to the
sale or purchase of an article or commodity at the prevailing
market price in the regular course of business; (4) with respect to
money deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership
dues in a labor organization:
Provided, That the employer
has received from each employee, on whose account such deductions
are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a
period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the
applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner; or (5)
with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund
established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive
benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and
dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly
with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and
their families and dependents):
Provided, That (A) such
payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from
principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their
families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on
retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or
illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to
provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life
insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident
insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be
made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and
employees and employers are equally represented in the
administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as
the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the
employees may agree upon and, in the event the employer and
employer groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and
there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such
agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial
umpire to decide such dispute, or, in event of their failure to
agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to
decide such dispute, shall, on petition of either group, be
appointed by the district court of the United States for the
district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall
also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a
statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection
by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and
at such other places as may be designated in such written
agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the
purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made
to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein
cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or
annuities."
"(d) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of
this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or
to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. . . ."
61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C. § 186.
[
Footnote 5]
Subsection (4), relating to check-off payments for union dues,
presupposes that the "representative" is the labor union itself.
Subsections (2), relating to payments of judgments or arbitration
awards, (3), relating to purchase or sale of goods in the ordinary
course of business, and (5), relating to payments to trust or
welfare funds, however, are consistent with either interpretation
of the term "representative."
[
Footnote 6]
Section 302(g) of the Senate version stated,
"For the purposes of this section, the term 'representative'
means any labor organization which, or any individual who, is
authorized or purports to be authorized to deal with an employer,
on behalf of two or more of his employees, concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work. . . ."
[
Footnote 7]
Examples are, § 1, "designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment," § 7, "to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing," § 8(b)(4)(B) and (C), "a
labor organization as the representative of his employees," §
8(b)(4)(D), "bargaining representative for employees."